The subject of cavalry successes on the battlefield is one that interests many amateur and professional historians. Most of us to be sure have reed of the success of Prussian General Seydlitz at Rossbach and perhaps of the achievement of British General Granby at Warburg during the SYW. These actions very likely stand out as the most notable of that war, among others, and inspire us with a sort of enthusiasm as we imagine whet it must have been like, perhaps with a desire to recreate such "supreme" moments upon the miniature wargame tabletop.

Some of us dabble in wargame rules writing and therefore must concern ourselves with regulations for mounted combat. Others, in greater numbers, play along with the concepts we design for same. The purpose of this series will be to examine the use of cavalry in the mid-Eighteenth Century in order to hopefully create a better understanding of how it was employed and to identify the Ingredients which contributed to success and failure in cavalry warfare. It is also our hope to examine the components of the charge ttself. Reader response is sought in order to amplify what will be presented and from it all, we hope to learn what happened when the cavalry officer bellowed, "Bugler, Sound the Charge!"

Employment of French Cavalry Mid-18th Century

If looks and courage could win battles, then the cavalry of the French Army had no equal. There was perhaps no more splendid array of colorful and glittering uniforms to be found in Europe than in the mounted branch of King Louis XV. It was numerous as well and In preparation for this essay I was continually impressed by the bravery of French cavalrymen. However, there were no singular successes we unanimously applaud in contrast to their opponents. The reasons perhaps may be garnished from the following presentation.

The Horse

I. The horse itself seemed to be a problem in terms of quality and quantity. General Mortaigne, when writing to the Minister of War Belle-Isle in 1758, complained that light units were badly mounted. (1) This posed a significant problem in the "petite guerre" which raged between the light troops of each side, the purpose of which was to gain and hide information.

Also, in August of that year, the Army of the Lower Rhine had 8,235 serviceable mounts and 2,202 unfit; 2,545 were lacking altogether."(2)

Further, "The quality of French horseflesh was only mediocre at best," according to Guibert. In any event the quantity was not sufficient. There were frequent complaints over the poor quality of horses. Though regulations required that cavalry mounts be at least four feet, nine inches at the withers, this was not observed."(3)

A further problem arose out of the fact that French cavalry captains owned the horses of their respective companies. The government helped pay for losses but the amount in practice was found to be half what was needed. As a consequence there were financial catastrophies which proved ruinous for many. However, of worse consequence was the tendency of the cavalry officers to pamper their horses. One method of doing so was to charge at the trot as oppossed to the more successful gallop employed by the Prussians.(4)

These problems were recognized by French military theoreticians of the time but must not have been acted upon. Even the great Marshall Saxe believed that there was on obsession amoung cavalry commanders for keeping their horses fat and sleek and generally mollycoddling them ..."" It would have been better to train hard with continuous exercise so as to be more fit for service.(5)

The Horsemen

II. What about the horsemen themselves? Kennett has some enlightening views about the dragoons and hussars in saying "the French were constantly at a disadvantage in the petite guerre or reconnaissance and patrol missions. The cavalry and dragoons, originally charged with this function, no. considered it beneath their dignity: their former clan h ad b een replaced by a 'slowness and formalism.' The hussars still fulfilled their role as a reconnaissance and patrol force, but their quality had much deteriorated. .. the ranks were filled with a motley group of deserters and foreigners. The service was hold in low repute, and justifiably so. In 1758 an entire regiment of hussars was dissolved because of pillage and brigandage."(6) (Note: The unit in question was probably Regiment Polleresky.)

In terms of new recruits, there was a need for greater emphasis to send better trained men and mounts into the theatre o( war. The theoretician Guibert as mentioned by Qulmby, ...condemned the continual feeding of untrained men and horses into regiments which kept them at low effectiveness. It was all wrong to make riding-school equitation the basis of cavalry training. One needed the simplest utilitarian training which would give the men the necessary knowledge and put them into the squadrons in the shortest possible time."(7)

Apparently at the time it was considered better to look good while riding rather than to perform military tasks with an epitome of precision. Guibert, ' . declared that half of the cavalry did not ride as it should. He wanted cavalrymen, not fancy riders."(8)

This era was also a period wherein officers received their commissions not necessarily by expertise but rather by purchase of same. This meant that wealth and birth determined who would command the cavalry rather then expertise and service. "Every commissioned rank was available for cash: a man would buy a regiment as he might buy an estate. In 1760 the King's minister Choiseul had attempted to put a stop to this custom: yet a young Colonel of noble birth might still say to his Lieutenant Colonel, 'You must recognize the difference between a man like you and a man like myself,' and receive the cutting answer; "Yes, it takes forty thousand ecus to make a man like you: men like me are made with forty years service."(9)

The recruit, too, became a problem during var. During peacetime it vas apparently easier to recruit men of the right characteristics to ride In the ranks, but during war, this quality deteriorated and was further hampered by large desertions.

The Weapon

III. The weapon of the French cavalryman, the saber, come under criticism an well. Kennett states, "There were occasional complaints that the sabers were badly tempered and that they were not as long as those of the enemy."(10)

The Charge

IV. After digesting the above, we come to the charge itself. What was a French cavalry charge like? To begin with, critics of the time felt that, its two-squadron regiments were too weak for fighting purposes."(11)

In forming up, a brigade of cavalry would form into two lines and each squadron would Itself be in two ranks. The first line of the brigade would be deployed without intervals while the second (behind the first) would have gaps between squadrons. "The cavalry dressed so badly that in the War of the Austrian Succssion ... it could not march in line."(12)

Again Quimby says of Guibert that the latter, "declared that it had long been falsely believed In France that speed and order were Incompatible. The result had been that French cavalry charged in headlong dashes which had no order and had to succeed at the first attempt, since there was no way of rallying them, nor could they exploit a succcess if they obtained it."(13)

In general, Guilbert per Quimby felt that most charges succeeded by "... frightening and dispersing the enemy than by spilling blood. All charges normally should be made in line. bait he admitted one or two situations where they might be made in column. These were:

(1) attacking surrounded infantry, especially a Honk or some angle unprotected by fire;

(2) charging inferior cavalry so posted that its wings could not be enveloped.

Aside from these situations, all charges should be made in line, because the great advantage of superior cavalry lay in its ability to extend Its forces and embrace the flanks of the enemy's dispositlon."(l4)

So we come to the end of this essay on the French cavalry of the Seven Years War. The author wishes to remind readers that surely the bravery and desire of the French cavalry to come to grips with the enemy was not absent. Surely the massive charges at Minden are enough evidence of this. Though these failed, many were quite surprised that they did; times had changed, charging the impetuously advancing and the unsupported British Brigade at Minden ended in disaster for the French cavalry end resulted in the loss of the bottle for the French. Yet the regiments rode when ordered again and again over the Minden heath which was becoming increasingly and probably alarmingly littered with the shattered debris and remains of earlier charges.

The author also wishes to remind his readers that the professional historians of the works cited in this essay researched works in the French language which this author cannot do. I say this in the interest of balance. It is my hope that one of our readers can add to this article by describing successes and failures of the French cavalry of the SYW from French or other sources.

FOOTNOTES

1 Kennett p. 49
2, 3 and 4 Kennett p. 125
5 Lawford p. 116
6 Kennett p. 49
7 Quimby pp. 136
8 Qulmby p. 137
9 Funcken p. 12
10 Kennett p. 117
11 and 12 Qulmby p. 88
13 Quimby p. 134
14 Qulmby p. 138

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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