Interplay of Opposing Tactics

The example of British and French infantry attempting to resolve the issue with the arme blanche (by cold steel) reveals another important dynamic that a "realistic" set of miniatures rules must address. Theoretical doctrine usually did not always unfold as originally intended. What did transpire was influenced by the other side's actions. In this sense, the interplay of one side's method of attack in relation to the other side's method of defense was like the traditional children's game, "rock, paper, and scissors."

An offensive tactic that could be very effective against one defensive tactic could prove much less effective against another. The a press attack worked best when the defenders either started to fire at medium to longer range. They were less effective when the defenders withheld their fire until the attackers had approached to extremely close range.

On the other hand, this defensive tactic of abstaining from fire was not a good option when the attackers were content to deliver a series of volleys and gradually close.

How the mounted arm tended to behave during the final moment a cavalry versus cavalry action provides even more illustrative example. There were four possible outcomes when opposing bodies of cavalry charge one another. One side or the other could, waiver, then break and flee. Alternatively, both sides could pull up, and inevitably a few brave souls would sally out to engage in individual combat. Their comrades followed them and the melee became general. Sometimes, however, the opposing sides would veer and would ride parallel to each other for a few hundred yards before circling back to their respective rears to reform. Sometimes, the two cavalry forces would "thread," that is, pass through each other. [26]

Now, which of these did occur was actually a function of speed of the opposing cavalry bodies, as well as their cohesiveness. So, for example, a knee-to-knee charge delivered at speed (the brainchild of the Prussians during the War of Austrian Succession [27]) could not pull up; but if the other side was not intimidated into fleeing (the most probable result) the two sides would veer. Opposing cavalry that charged in the loose err fourrageur would often thread, while cavalry that utilized Lasalle's determined, but controlled charge at the fast trot during the Napoleonic era was more likely to pull up than those employing many other cavalry charge tactics. [28]

NOTE: In the following case the player first rolls to see which set of charge tactics his cavalry will employ (see first table below.) He then cross-references the enemy's charge doctrine with a second die roll. This indicates how the opposing cavalry forces will interact (one side flees, they thread through each other, etc.)

EXAMPLE: Let's say a player with French WSS cavalry throws a "4" when determining how his cavalry will act during the charge. This means his cavalry will advance until close range, deliver carbine fire, let the carbine drop and rush in with outstretched swords en terce. Let's further say that the opposing player with WSS German cavalry discovered that his cavalry would deliberately countercharge by advancing with the sword (i.e., deliver a charge at a controlled gait without firing). If the French player threw a "8" when consulting the second chart the opposing cavalry would be advanced to contact and a melee would occur. 

Phased Tactics

Some tactical practices during the horse and musket era were quite sophisticated and consisted of a series of discrete steps. Probably one cannot find a better illustration of these highly articulated, "phased tactics" than light cavalry tactics during the Seven Years' War. Prussians cavalry officers were the first to systematically transform hussars from a light, irregular body used to harass the enemy during the petit guerre, as the day-to-day campaigning was called, into a highly organized, professional fighting force that, when forced to, could stand up to heavier classes of cavalry on the open battlefield. Under the guidance of General Winterfeld, Prussian hussars utilized formal assault tactics when attacking an enemy. One of these was the charge by divisions technique used to first harass and then attack enemy infantry.

The Prussian hussar squadron was divided into three divisions; all formed along three ranks. The troopers in the first division of the squadron advanced out of the line at the gallop and reformed along two ranks. Their sabers hung from their wrists as they pulled out their carbines. After the first rank fired, the second rank advanced in front and fired in turn. Now, it was the first rank's turn to advance in front of the second rank and discharge its pistols. Then, the second rank did the same. The same process was repeated one last time to allow both ranks to fire their second pistol. Having fired all three firearms, the first division then galloped back to reform directly behind the second division in their squadron. They continue to remain on two ranks however.

Next, the second division's reformed on two ranks. The six files on the right of the third line formed on two ranks on the right of the first two ranks, while the left half of the third rank formed two ranks on the left. This was done in place without the division galloping out of the line. The third division, meanwhile, galloped out of line, formed on two ranks, and performed the same leapfrog technique that the first division had done a few moments before, first firing carbines, and then both pistols. After the third division retired, presumably behind the first division which itself had rallied behind the center (second) division, the second division, now on two ranks galloped about thirty paces. At this point, the troopers stood up on their stirrups and attempted to strike the enemy directly to their front. [29] 

Stands and Frontages

Generally a tactical-level miniatures rules set represents each infantry battalion with several stands of figures, which, with the exception of stands removed to represent casualties, remains fixed throughout the contest. Although it seems intuitively obvious that a battalion's organization and frontage remained constant, this is actually one of the most pervasive sources of unrealism! During the early eighteenth century, an infantry battalion and a cavalry squadron's frontage was not a constant, but expanded and contracted as required by circumstances as the battle unfolded (and again we are not talking about casualties.) There were three important factors that caused these fluctuations.

Tactical versus Administrative Organization

During the early eighteenth century, the tactical organization differed from the administrative organization in all Western European armies. This was as true for cavalry as it was infantry. When a battalion was called to form, the companies and their officers formed in the officially prescribed sequence. The men were told off, and the battalion was then divided into the tactical organizations. For example, the administrative organization of a native French infantry battalion (i.e., from the infanterie francoise) was variously a grenadier and 12 fusilier companies or a grenadier and 16 fusilier companies.

For tactical purposes on the field of Mars, it was organized into manches (one-thirds), demimanches (one-fifths) or quart de manches (one-ninths.) Of course, none of these tactical units worked if the battalion found itself suddenly attacked by enemy horse and the commander wanted to form square. Then, the battalion to be divided into divisions (one-quarters)!

British infantry were hardly better oft! When the battalion was to maneauvre, the battalion commander was to divide the unit into "divisions." Unfortunately, this was a very flexible term and it could be half, third, quarter, fifth or sixth of the battalion, depending upon the commander's wishes. [30]

A second tactical subdivision had emerged by 1700. When the battalion was to fire, the commander who wished to employ the newly introduced platoon fire would divide the battalion into sixteenths, not counting the grenadiers. If forced to form square the same battalion would be organized into 12 platoons or four divisions.

There was a similar differentiation between the administrative and tactical organization of British cavalry. The typical British cavalry regiment consisted of 2 or 3 squadrons, where each squadron was organized into 3 companies. However, tactically, the squadron could be organized into ranks by fours (groups of 4 files), quarter ranks (one-fourth of the squadron), ranks of three divisions (thirds of the squadron), ranks of two divisions (into 2 equal parts). [31] 

Opening and closing of ranks and files

Probably the single most difficult concept for the modern to understand is that, unlike the Napoleonic era, prior to the widespread introduction of Prussian reforms during the 1750s, the distance between the ranks and files changed repeatedly depending upon circumstances and the task to be performed.

At the heart of the problem was the nature of the shoulder arm when the manual of arms (the steps used to load, fire and reload the musket) was first codified. The musket had a lit match which had to be kept away from the infantrymen's body at all cost. Should the match rub against any loose powder in his pockets he and his neighbors could be blown apart. The solution was to use very expansive movements when loading the musket and, of course, to separate the files.

There were three notable characteristics of the manual of arms at this stage. The infantryman was required to keep his head upright, he was forbidden to look along the barrel, his chest was kept nearly parallel to the firing a line and his elbows were kept at shoulder level outstretched. This not only guaranteed that fire was highly inaccurate - this explains the low rate of casualties that were suffered during the early eighteenth century compared to during the Seven Years' War - it also meant that each file took up more space when the battalion had to deliver fire.

Figure 6: This illustration is from a French manual of arms that appeared in the late 1730s. This practice only disappeared in the Austrian army in 1748, the French in 1750, while it lingered on in the British infantry until 1756. (Courtesy of the Ann S.K. Brown Collection at the Hay Library, Brown University.)

In the French army, the problem was compounded by the method used to deliver fire. The men in the first rank would deliver their fire and then turning to the rear would walk down the space between the files until they reached the rear where they would reload. This meant that when the battalion was to fire, the files had to be kept open (each file occupied about 4 feet.) In other situations, the file was "half open" or took up 2 feet. Marshall Puysegur estimated that when a battalion was charged by cavalry, the files were closed even further, each man now only taking up 15 inches of space. [32] 

Figure 7: This rare period illustration shows two opposing German infantry battalions in line during the early 18"' century (the battalion in the foreground has utilized the older fire by ranks, while that at the top employs platoon fire.) Notice the relatively large space between files and ranks. In a French battalion, the distance between ranks and files would have been even greater. During the 1730s in a Prussian battalion that had adopted Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau's new manual of arms the files would have been much closer than that shown -- Taken from Hanns Flemming's Der Volkonunene Teursche Soldar, Liepzig, 1726 (Courtesy of the Anna S.K. Brown Collection at the Hay Literary, Brown University.)

This was no trivial problem, but had the most profound effect even on grand tactics. As late as 1751, the official French instructions required that the battalions maintain a "full interval" between each other, in other words, the distance between battalions was equal to their individual frontages. It was impractical for French infantry to maintain an en muraille formation, i.e., a continuous "curtain," as they approached the enemy. Had each battalion been positioned immediately beside its neighbor, it would have been impossible to order the men to deliver fire, should it become necessary. The files would have to have been closed because of the proximity of the enemy and their would have been no room for the first and later succeeding ranks to go to the rear after firing where they were to reload.

The solution was for the French battalions to be kept with wide intervals between each other as they advanced. Then, if required to fire, the battalion would be ordered to open files, the width of the battalion would double and the battalions would find themselves monetarily en muraille.

Although much less severe, British and Imperialist infantry experiences similar problems during this period. At exercises and reviews, the ranks were at full distance (4 paces apart) while they were closed to two paces when the men were to fire. While wheeling. the ranks were closed to a pace distance. During reviews, the files were kept one pace distance, while they were at "half open" distance when firing. But more were brought closely together to close files while marching or wheeling. [33]

Doubling the Ranks and Doubling the Files

Now, one could argue, and probably legitimately, that these change of distances between ranks and files as the battalion manoeuvred and fired were relatively small compared to other critical distances, such as the distance between combatants, the frontage of the battalion, etc, and they do not necessarily have to be re-created to achieved a new heightened sense of tactical level reality in the tabletop wargame.

There was one other phenomena that much more significantly altered the aspect ration between a battalion's ranks and files and absolutely cannot be ignored. This was one of the most basic manoeuvres of the time: doubling the files and doubling the ranks.

Doubling the files was used to double the depth of the files, e.g., have a four rank formation assume eight ranks. Doubling the ranks meant to double the length of the ranks by proportionally reducing the depth of the files. A commander might double the ranks when suddenly faced by a much stronger enemy formation which otherwise would envelop his battalion or when it was necessary to occupy naturally defensible terrain that was slightly longer than the width of battalion. The ranks were also often doubled when the battalion was placed behind a hedge or in covered way. Doubling the files was used to make the formation more narrow, such as when artillery or another battalion had to make its way to the front through the battalion's position. [34]

Doubling the files also strengthened the battalion defensively, so it was often employed when threatened by enemy horse, or it became necessary to attack a strong position. Although the concept of "column" was rarely used during this early period, a commander could achieve the same results by doubling the files of battalion and then doubling them a second time. Thus, a French 4-rank line could be increased by two successive doublings to 16 ranks. There were many cases where such massive deep formations were used on the early eighteenth century battlefield, but these instances have largely been ignored by historians simply because they were not known as "columns." 

Conclusion

Although the infantry and cavalry in each army employed many formations and maneauvres that were common to most other western European armies, there were also a number of tactical practices unique to each country or nationality. During the War of Spanish Succession, for example, French infantry continued to rely on the old fire by ranks method of delivering fire, while their British counterparts had generally switched to platoon firing. Prussian cavalry had developed a quicker, but more coherent cavalry charge by the 1740s, while from that point onward Prussian infantry gradually developed more effective methods of manoeuvring. Thus, any game/rules system that seeks to realistically portray period warfare on a tactical level must show these differences.

The "ideal" tactical level system must also address three other issues. In order to guarantee that the battlefield is populated with the same variety of tactics that actually occurred, and not just the obviously most effective practices, tactical control must often be taken away from the player. Individual battalions must be made to perform the most commonly occurring practices, even when better options were theoretically available.

It is also important to create a system that illustrates the "phased" nature of many tactics. To allow for irregular and light cavalry tactics or the use of "small parties" and "commanded men" the player must perform the individual steps of these tactics, rather than simply applying some top level modifier or rule that abstractly represents these phased techniques. Also, any system that attempts to accurately portray warfare in the early eighteenth century, and this applies to even those who focus is on a more grand tactical level, must address the constant frontage changes that was such a distinctive characteristic of warfare during this period.

Finally, those of us who are intensely interested in how armies fought during the musket era must make one fundamental alteration to our general mindset. It is critically important not to limit our investigations exclusively to our favorite period of study. All to frequently those enamored to the Wars of the Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century, for example, limit their studies to Napoleon's armies and those of his adversaries. The same can be said about those interested in the Seven Years' War, the American Civil War and the War of Spanish Succession.

The methods used during any single time period didn't suddenly, as if by magic, spring out of the ground, the progeny of tacticians' imagination, but almost always developed over a lengthy period of time. To truly understand the methods, practices and techniques used in any period it is always necessary to also study the preceding period, and even those in the era that followed!

Footnotes