Count Villim Vilimovich Fermor (1702-1771) was of German-Scots ancestry, being the son of an emigrant from Britain. In the 1730s he was an aide-de-camp of the field marshal B. Munnich. He gained an early reputation as an advocate of aggressive tactics upon the publication of his Disposition for Military Arrangements and Movements for a General Battle against the Turks in 1736. This document was composed at the request of marshal Munnich and expounded on the advantages of offensive strategy in war. He participated in Russia's wars with Turkey (1735-39) and Sweden (1741-43), gaining technical experience and expertise thereby.

Unpopular with the Russian officer corps, and preferring the company of Germans, he was nevertheless given promotion through the ranks as one of the few officers possessing any technical proficiency. He was a lover of luxury. The following description of his entourage is quoted in Christopher Duffy's Russia's Military Way to the West (page 81):

"The baggage and its escorting columns always went ahead, with Count Fermor's tent and other effects, which were borne on camels. Then came the train of the commander-in-chief. And how did he travel? - well, first of all we encounter the commander's escort, namely two thousand Cossacks and Kalmyks, riding in splendid order. Then follow a company of cuirassiers with kettledrums, keeping up an incessant din like the rest of the music. Behind the music, ride two adjutants, and finally come Fermor in person and his party of generals, followed by a numberless host of retainers under the escort of several thousand Cossacks."

Despite Fermor's love of luxury, he was a reformer of some of the excesses of the commissariat and improved the quality of the army as well as the level of comfort of his soldiers. He allowed the soldiers to carry lighter loads and provided them with warmer clothing.

During the Seven-Year War he rose to command the Russian Army, replacing General Apraxin in late 1757. He had already fought under Apraxin at Gross-Jagersdorf, where he commanded the First Division - although not with great distinction. He nevertheless was a favorite of Count Vorontsov and the "French" party which had great influence at court at this time, a factor which no doubt counted heavily in his favor.

He showed a certain zeal for his command by initiating a new campaign in the spring of 1758, advancing back into East Prussia, which had been evacuated by Apraxin for mysterious reasons the previous year. In contrast to Apraxin's cumbersome, disorderly advance accompanied with much looting and conflagration, Fermor's was a model of speed, discipline, and restraint, with his army moving over 125 miles to Konigsberg in about a week in an offensive devoid of arson and pillage. The inhabitants of East Prussia were treated with great deference, and this gentility was reciprocated, much to Frederick the Great's displeasure. The soldier king made it a point after the war never to visit that "disloyal" province.

Having reoccupied East Prussia, Fermor now set his sights on Berlin. Whereas East Prussia had proved to be an easy province to occupy, the advance to Berlin promised to be a bit more problematic. The rivers tended to run from the southeast to the northwest, a circumstance that was not conducive to the strengthening of Russian lines of communications that were to be stretched thinner with each advance. Then, too, there was the river Oder, which must be crossed; it was festooned with a number of strong points and fortified cities such as Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Breslau.

Fermor's initial advance, which had been started prematurely and had been sparked by Austrian concern for Frederick's sudden advance into Moravia, was rather poorly managed and haphazard. The march across Poland was disconnected, and Fermor did not bother to do much reconnaissance. In August, the Russians halted in front of the small fortress of Custrin where Fermor attempted in vain to besiege it, lacking proper ordnance for a proper bombardment. There the Russian advance slowed to a halt.

News that Frederick had left his main army behind in Silesia and was heading to attack the Russians with a detached force caused Fermor to break off the siege on August 24th and march to the village of Zorndorf where he intended to confront the Prussians. Fermor adopted a rather poor position in a marshy hollow dominated on all sides by higher ground. Frederick, arriving with his army, sized up Fermor's position and decided to march entirely around the latter's position so as to attack it from the rear. This maneuver forced the Russians to change their front by 180 degrees. Despite this, and despite the disadvantages of ground, Fermor's army was able to fight his Prussian opponent to a standstill in what could only be described as a soldiers' battle with the situation entirely out of control of the high-ranking officers; Fermor himself seems to have been rendered hors de combat, either by a light wound (the official account), or possibly a sense of self-preservation (according to Prince Charles of Saxony).

In the aftermath of the battle, Fermor claimed a victory of sorts, although he blamed his failure to make it more complete on the lack of discipline of his men. This was patently unfair, as the 18,000 Russian casualties and over 12,000 Prussian would indicate the stolidity of the Russian troops. As if by mutual consent, both exhausted armies broke off contact. On August 27, the Russians withdrew themselves to Klein-Cammen where they dug themselves in. By September 1, they were in retreat toward Landsberg. Frederick was in no position to follow up his alleged "victory," having to march off on September 2, to unite with Prince Henry and face the Austrians once more.

Fermor was investigated thoroughly for his conduct of the campaign and battle by Lieutenant-General Kostyurin, Aleksandr Shuvalov's brother-in-law, and criticized for his abortive siege of Custrin, his failure to prevent Frederick from crossing the Oder, his poor deployment prior to the battle of Zorndorf, and, finally, his failure to give instructions to his subordinates during the battle. Fermor tarried ineffectually at Landsberg on the Warthe River until the approach of winter drove him into winter quarters across the Vistula. A final chapter to Fermor's abortive campaign was an unsuccessful siege of the city of Colberg on the Pomeranian coast, a siege which ended on November 1st owing to lack of siege artillery, ammunition, or maps of the fort as well as inadequate naval support.

Over the intervening winter, discontent with Fermor's leadership and competency grew. It was said that Fermor was " . . . disagreeable to, and despised by, the troops. And it is added, that the uneasiness of his situation has drawn him into a state of habitual drinking, which, if true, must lessen him still more in their eye."

He was ultimately dismissed for hesitance and irresolution and replaced by the Russian General Petr Semenovich Saltykov. Fermor, however, was still regarded as capable enough to retain a command, thus he served as a subordinate to Saltykov in the following campaign where he commanded the first division at Paltzig and held a command on the Russian right flank at Kunersdorf.

During the campaign of 1760, Saltykov's age seemed to have caught up with him. A series of promising ideas involving combined operations with the Austrians came to naught, and the Russian army sank into a malaise punctuated by a seemingly endless series of pointless marching and counter-marching. Clearly suffering from fatigue and ill health, Saltykov was relieved of command. His replacement, but only temporarily, was Fermor.

It was during his second stint in command that Fermor performed what was probably his most brilliant feat of the war; this being the 1760 joint Austro- Russian raid on Berlin. Acting upon a plan first mooted by Montalembert, the French representative at Russian headquarters, the plan involved 18,000 Austrians and Saxons under the Austrian Lieutenant-General Lacy, a Russian advance guard of 5,600 men under Major-General Totleben, and an additional complement of 12,000 men under Lieutenant-General Chernyshev. Such was the strength of the combined force that the 14,000-man Prussian garrison gave up the city without a fight.

Here the intent of the raid, that being to destroy war material and factories and lay the city under severe contribution foundered due to the possible malfeasance of Totleben. Minimal damage was done to Prussian stores and factories, and the initial demand of four million thalers was quickly reduced to one-and-a-half, payable in installments! Totleben was later found out to have treasonous tendencies and was imprisoned for a time.

Once again Colberg was besieged. This time, the siege was broken by the Prussians in September. Thus ended the 1760 campaign. In late 1760, Fermor was replaced by Aleksandr B. Buturlin.

From 1763, Fermor was a general-governor of Smolensk, and, from 1764, senator.

Bibliography

Duffy, Christopher, Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700-1800, London, 1981.
Konstam, Angus, Russian Army of the Seven Years War I, London, 1996.

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