I The following excerpt comes from Jim Mitchell's translation of the above referenced work, published by Old Battlefields Press. The booklet depicts copies of maps drawn by French engineers showing the layout of various camps during Marshal d'Estrees' campaign against the Duke of Cumberland's Army of Observation. The booklet also includes a journal of the military operations written by the Sr. Du Bois. I have included the section that deals with the events leading up to the battle of Hastenbeck. I heartily recommend that anyone with an interest in this campaign purchase a copy of the booklet from Jim Mitchell.

Events From July 20th to July 26th

The Army left its Camp of Holtzmunden, marched on Olendorff and protected its march by a detachment of 88 companies o grenadiers and all the dragoons under the command of M. le Duc d'Orleans.

The enemy, some troops of whose leaders had been visible in the gorges of Wunkensen, Escherhausen and Halle, retired, and the Army camped at Olendorff on the 20th. They stayed there the 2 1 st and left on the 22nd to go to Halle.

M. de Maillebois, with the Volontaires de Flandres and Volontaires de Hainault, and the grenadiers of Solms, opened his march as of the 21st, and, on the morning of the 22nd, reconnoitered the position of the enemy, who occupied the villages of Bergen and Frucken. There was a light skirmish which ceased as soon as M. de Maillebois had finished his recormaisance.

M. le Marshal, who arrived early on the 22nd, went in person with the Princes onto an advanced plateau in the plain which is between these two villages and the one of Heven, where he went to establish his general quarters. M. le Marshal, after having sent some volunteers [Editor: I assume this refers to the light troops in either the Volunteers of Flandres or of Hainault, as referenced earlier] to probe the villages of Bergen and Frucken, didn't judge it appropriate to attack them and retired. The enemy benefitted from this movement by advancing onto the plateau, which we had just left, a body of cavalry, which caused M. le Marshal to beat "General Quarters". All the Army which had arrived there at this moment advanced with the greatest energy onto the field of battle, which was discerned in an instant. The enemy retired and the Army went into camp. It is estimated that their detachments may be 5 to 6,000 men.

July 23rd

It was decided that M. de Contades, at the head of 50 companies of grenadiers and 3 regiments of dragoons, would go, at dusk, to the village of Broeckhusen, on this side of Bergen, which the enemy held in force. This detachment was supported by the Reserve of M. d'Armenfieres, who was to operate on Frucken, and M. de Vogue, at the head of 14 companies of grenadiers and some Voluntaires de Flandres and de Hainault, taken onto the heights of Afferten in the woods on the enemy left to reconnoiter and harrass them on that part. M. le Marshal set in motion on the 24th at 2:00 a.m., to see the effect of the detachment of M. de Contades. He followed his Army and arrived at daybreak upon the plateau on which he had been earlier.

The enemy abandoned the villages of Bergen and Frucken. They retired to Ladforde and held the heights and the woods which line this part of the river Weser.

There appeared to be some enemy cavalry deployed in front of the village. The infantry that remained in the village retreated; and some cannon shots that were fired, the size of our Advance Guard, and the way that the reserve force of M. de Broglie - which by the left bank of the Weser, cooperated with our maneuver - these all soon persuaded the enemy to quit the heights. M. de Vogue, on his part, seized a very good position on the heights to the left of the enemy, from where he fired a cannonade for a long time, he reported, to M. le Marshal, that the enemy were reinforcing before him, and he was ordered to withdraw.

The Army camped in the terrain that had been taken; the left on the Weser and the right at the village of Bergen, the plateau not being near enough to the center of the line. It was debated in a council of war that was held at 5:00 p.m. whether to attack the enemy; the avenues of approach to them being very difficult, it was decided that a reconnaisance be made and to maneuver in order to try to remove then by turning them.

During the night, M. le Marshal received a report that the enemy himself had retired. Consequently he made new arrangements, and sent back M. de Vogue with a larger force to resume his position on the heights at daybreak on the 25th, and he was reinforced by a brigade of infantry under the command of M. de Chevert. M. de Maillebois arrived there at 6:00 a.m., in the middle of a very lively cannonade, and, judging that the worsening affair was seriously engaged, counted on M. le Marshal, who, on what he himself had understood of the attack of M. de Vogue, had already left, with the reserve of M. de Armentieres, and gone by the accepted debouches onto the heights of Ohsen. He had ordered his army to follow him. It indeed arrived on the heights successively. A general survey of the enemy army in his camp of battle would show the right on Hameln and the left pushing through the woods and to the heights of Afferten.

This part was sustained by batteries and a kind of redoubt. Our army was gathered, at 4:00 in the afternoon, on the heights of Ohsen, touching by its left the Weser. If found before its left a nearly impassible marsh, protected , on the enemy's side, by a plateau where cannon had been established; and the village of Hastenbeck was in the front of the center. The position of the enemy not permitting a frontal attack, it was contemplated to turn them via the left.

Initially destined for this operation was the reserve of M. de Randan which had come, via Einbeck, to Halle; but M. le Marshal charged M. de Chevert, with the brigades of Picardie, Navarre and La Marine. They were also joined by the brigade d'Eu, which was one of the two that M. de Randan had, which had rejoined the army. The remainder of the day was employed at these different positions, and with each side cannonading the other until night.

It was agreed that the attack of the following day would commence with M. de Chevert, and that the army itself would move off on his signal. There arose at daybreak a fog so considerable that the armies couldn't see themselves until 6:00 a.m. Then the enemy began to fire some volleys from their cannon, to which we did not reply but faintly, all the time awaiting the signal of M. de Chevert. He was not able to arrive at the point of his attack until 8:30 a.m. It was at that moment that the army moved forward.

M. d'Armentieres debouched onto the right with the brigades of Belzunce, La Couronne and Alsace, sustained by the brigade Imperiale (Royal?) and the Dragoons a pied. Their object was to attack the batteries and redoubt of the enemy.

The remainder of the line started slowly and the commencement of the attack of M. de Chevert was heard. M. d'Armentieres had changed his direction a little and was thrown entirely into the woods. This was remedied by marching the brigades of Champagne and Reding toward the enemy redoubt. This movement was necessary because the remoteness of M. d'Armentieres had reversed the general order of the battle.

The woods on the right became the real field of battle. The remainder of the terrain was that of our artillery, which was placed and served superiorly. The attacks of the right made their progress. Picardie, Navarre and La Marine always gained the flank of the enemy, the brigades of Champagne and Alsace dominated the redoubt, and Reding guarded the edge of the woods.

At this moment it was decided to initiate the attack on the left, and M. de Guerchy was made to march upon the village of Hastenbeck with the Regiment du Roi, the Grenadiers de France and the Grenadiers de Solar; and the other columns advanced slowly; it was seen then that the enemy had depleted their left and turned some troops about in order to support the woods; there was heard a very lively fire, and there were seen to appear at the same time some squadrons in the gap at the right. As soon as M. le Marshal was aware, he sent orders to march a brigade of cavalry and one of infantry there.

This movement and the troops which had been withdrawn in this part that were seen to be in apparent disorder, deferred for some time the success of the other attacks; the cavalry which had gone there re- established order. The fire from the woods having ceased, and the dust that was seen, indicated the retrograde motion of the enemy. Then M. le Marshal decided to support the cavalry, the Grenadiers de France, which M. de Guerchy exited from the village of Hastenbeck, and he sent the Carabiniers and the brigade of Royal Pologne there.

The enemy continued their retirement on the heights of Hameln. M. le Marshal followed them as far as the village of Afferten; but seeing that they retired in good order, and being master of the battlefield, he had his army camp there, and was content to push forth a detachment to mask Hameln. There were taken from the enemy 9 pieces of cannon and 2 howitzers; some prisoners were taken, among whom is a major general and two officers; ignoring the losses of the enemy, ours amounts to 1500 men killed or wounded; we lost no officers of mark, except for M. le Marquis de Laval, Assistant Marshal General of the Lodgings, who was killed, and messers de Chatelet and Belzurice were wounded. One cannot, moreover, give too much praise to our infantry and artillery.

The terrain did not permit the cavalry to attack; the Princes were served by all.

The 28th, the enemy continue their retirement on Minden. The town of Hameln capitulated. 700 men of the regular troops which are there in garrison have permission to withdraw; 300 peasants or militiamen remain prisoners, these being all the sick and wounded that were left there.

There were 60 pieces of cannon found in this position.

Editor's Comment

One of the most interesting aspects of this little excerpt is the narrative describing the use of grenadiers in combination with light infantry and dragoons. There are numerous examples in the text where the grenadiers and light troops are sent ahead of the rest of the army to clear out a village or other piece of tactically important ground. This is something to consider when we are re-enacting battles on the wargame table.

One can imagine a number of interesting scenarios involving a moderate-sized French force of grenadiers, light troops, dragoons and other light cavalry trying to attack a village astride a key cross road junction, or an advance to contact scenario similar to the first day at the battle of Gettysburg (in the American Civil War). Perhaps Luckner's Hussars and various other Hanoverian light troops are holding a key ridgeline, waiting for a brigade of British regulars to advance and relieve them. Meanwhile, a French task force similar to the one noted above tries to pry them out of the position.

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