The Battle of Kay: July 23, 1759 Battle Description and Order of Battle

The Battle of Kay

Battle Description
and Order of Battle

a translation by Denise Meuser

Editor's Note: the following account of the battle of Kay, or Paltzig, is a translation from the onginal German text found in the book Die Schlachten Friedrichs des Grossen by Joachim Engelmann, Podzun-Pallas, 1991. This account provides a hefty tactical narrative of the battle than the overview that I wrote on the previous pages.

Introduction

In 1759, the King lost confidence in Dohna's leadership of the corps and replaced him with Lieutenant-General Carl Heinrich von Wedell on July 20th. "All officers, no matter who they are, must obey him and execute his orders with loyalty, hard work and bravery, as if I myself were present."

This was extraordinary power for the youngest of the Generals of the army that was deployed on July 27th between Zullichau and Kalzig at the road to Schwiebus, to face the Russians who were positioned heavily entrenched at Goltzen on the road to Bomst!

The Prussians troops had suffered heavy losses at Zorndorf, and with their 30 battalions, 63 squadrons, 56 pieces of heavy artillery, all together 27,400 men, faced an enemy almost double their strength. At 2 p.m. on July 22nd, the Russians under Saltykov marched west through the woods until they reached Buckow and moved into battle order at 1 p.m. the following day, between Buckow and Harthe, with the front line facing south. They had over 54 battalions with 46 grenadier companies, 58 squadrons and 3,900 Cossacks, 188 pieces of heavy artillery for a total of 52,300 men.

Wedell was supposed to prevent the Russians from crossing the Oder at Crossen by "attacking from a favorable position." At 4 p.m. the Russians advanced in battle order for the high ridge bordered by the Kalkmuehlen and Eichmuhlen Fliess (canal) for Paltzig, in order to cut off the Prussians from the west, thereby forcing them to abandon their advantageous camp northwest of Zullichau.

On July 23rd, Wedel probed the opponent's left wing at the Langmeil camp sometime after 3 o'clock with three grenadier battalions and 15 squadrons of both Dragoons and Hussars under the commands of Wobersnow, Schorlemer and Puttkamer, respectively. Without making further reconnaissance, Wedel was convinced that the Russians would remain in their camp positions. Even the dust clouds near Harthe did not make him suspicious. Nobody thought it would be possible to circumvent the enemy in an outflanking march to the north, due to the difficulty of the terrain.

The message from HR 7 (Malachowsky Hussars, or Yellow Hussars) around 11 o'clock that the enemy column was approaching and marching on to Schoenborn, and that the enemy was taking the entrenchments on the Eich-Berg mountain under fire was interpreted as a sign of the enemy marching off to Schwiebus. Nevertheless, Wedel rushed back into the camp where the army was ready to march. He decided to prevent the Russians from marching on to Crossen and to attack them on the march if he couldn't put his army in front of them.

At 1 o'clock he commenced efforts to occupy the Palzig heights before the Russians. Especially for the reconnaissance of Palzig, Wedel gave no orders, despite the fact that HR 7 had already come under artillery fire from the heights northwest of the village of Nickern as it attempted to cross the canal at Nickern.

The Battlefield Terrain

The battlefield of July 23rd, between Palzig and the Eichmuehlen Fliess is surrounded by woods to the north, west and south. Palzig is situated on the west side of the slightly rolling ridge that eases to the East towards the Eichmuhlen Fliess, the latter of which has 100-meter wide swampy meadows on either side, and these fall straight 10 to 15 meters to the south to the Zauche ground [Editor: this appears to be a dry stream bed], which at that time of the year was dry and filled with brush.

The Eichmuhlen Fliess was only crossable at Nickern, between two ponds at the Eich-Muehle mill, on foot between Glogsen and Vorwerk Glogsen, as well as at the bridge at the Gross-Muehle on the Zuellichau-Crossen road. West of the town of Kay a tongue of land 800 to 900 meters wide extends from the Schrniede-Berg hill to the Gross-Muehle mill. Its slopes were densely covered and obstructed any view from the Palzig ridge to the crossing at Gross-Muehle. The ridges north of Glogsen exceeded the Palzig ridge in height, but were too distant for the range of artillery fire of that era.

Map depicting the Prussian attack at Palzig. The Russians turned back the attacks of individual brigades: first Manteuffel, then Huelsen, Kanitz, Schorlemer and Wobersnow. Map courtesy of Christopher Duffy, Russia's Military Way to the West.

Large Tactical Map (slow: 142K)

Because only an intricate access over the Schmiede-Berg mountain existed, apart from the Zauche ground, the ridge position offered excellent defense. The access could be covered with devastating fire from the southern height. If the Russians pursued closely, the bottleneck at Gross-Muehle could be fatal. The contrary would have occurred if the Russians would have to retreat from the ridge and cross the Kalkmuehlen canal in their rear. A Prussian attack from the direction of Nickern would have had better prospects.

The Russians reached the Palzig heights around one o'clock and realized that the Prussians were also on the move. Saltykov formed the front line of battle from the Zauche ground to the road leading to Nickern with Fermor's 1st Division and extended it further left with the Observation Corps of Galyzin and Totleben's light cavalry.

The second line of battle contained the 2nd Division of Villebois, positioned in front of the village of Palzig, and then, to the left were Jeropkin's cuirassiers. As a reserve on the right, Demiku's regiments marched into position. The heavy artillery was divided into eight batteries, with six of them positioned on the obviously threatened right wing. Around 2:30 p.m. the deployment was completed without incident.

Prussian Cavalry Attack

In the meantime, the Prussian cavalry had reached the Gross Muehle and cleared the Schmiede-Berg of any Cossacks. Under this protection, the infantry crossed the Eichmuehlen Fliess. This action prompted Saltykov to reinforce the cavalry on the right wing. When the Manteuffel brigade reached the Schmiede-Berg, Wedel gave the order to attack, assuming that he was engaging the Russian vanguard, in order to conquer the heights with a forceful advance.

Huelsen's brigade was supposed to take position to the right of Manteuffel, Stutterheim had to circumvent the right wing of the enemy by crossing the Zauche, and Kanitz was supposed to march in a wide circumvention [following behind Stutterheim] via Roll-Muehle and Feder-Muehle to reach the back of the heights.

There were no artillery positions on the west bank of the stream. So as not to slow the attack, the artillery had to take positions between Eich-Muehle and Glogsen, too far away to have any favorable effect. The infantry on the Schmiede-Berg was left without protection.

In the attack, Manteuffel's five battalions came under immediate heavy artillery fire from which there was no proper cover. Everyone pushed fonvard to get at the enemy. They emerged from a woods at 3:30 p.m., but the firece Russian canister fire could not deter the Prussians from capturing both batteries that faced them. With an iron calm, the Russians absorbed the attack, although some battalions swerved.

Overwhelmed by the superior number of Russians, the Prussians were forced to retreat back to their initial position. Also, the second decisive attack collapsed half-way under a barrage of artillery fire. At this moment, the brigade of Huelsen (to the right of Manteuffel's brigade) joined in the attack, extended the line into the enemy center and pulled the regiments IR3 (Bernburg) and IR7 (Bevern) to the front for the third attempt. [Editor -these two regiments comprised Manteuffel's brigade ] In furious close combat, in heat, powder smoke and dust, they broke through the first Russian line. Manteuffel was seriously wounded and his adjutant was struck down. When low ammunition caused lR3 and lR7 to retreat, Huelsen's battalions were overwhelmed and had to retreat as well.

At the same time, Stutterheim had curved to the south from the Gross-Muehle and had advanced into the right flank of the enemy from the Heide-Berg hill, hidden by the wooded hill chain south of the Zauche. As soon as his brigade [two regiments of Kanitz and Goltz] reached open ground, they came under such heavy fire from the batteries and the 2nd Moskow and Vyborg regiments, that the attack collapsed. The Cossack regiment (in this area) attacked the left flank of the Prussians and inflicted more casualties as they retreated back to the Schmiede-Berg.

At that moment, in the Zauche, Schorlemer's cuirassier brigade charged, supported by Norman's cavalry brigade (DR6 and DR8 and HR2) north of the Schmiede-Berg. Their blow hit the Russian right wing in the front and in the flank, up to the second line, that defended itself with musket butts and bayonets. At this point, Demiku, Gaugreben and Leropkin led a forceful counter-attack against the Prussian cavalry, forcing the latter to retreat. The Russian infantry, however, was not able to pursue.

Meanwhile, Wobersnow and his brigade appeared in front of the Eich-Muehlen Fliess and attempted to cross the stream twice, although the enemy's left wing reached far to the north. He turned south and was in Kay at 5:30 p.m. HR7's flanking attempt was nipped in the bud by Totleben, who set the whole village [Nicker'] on fire. Sipce there was no longer any threat to the Russian left, Saltykov now moved his troops to support the right wing, where Kanitz, after a futile attempt to cross the stream south of the Gross-Muehle, renewed the attack up the Schmiede-Berg at 5:30. In vain! At 6:00 p.m. Wobersnow's six battalions once more fought their way to the front, but they did not get very far. When Wobersnow fell, they retreated, covered by a local counter-attack by HR7. The firing finally ceased at seven o'clock that evening.

Wedel succeeded in leading his beaten troops back to the heights south of Kay, without interference. The Russians only pursued as far as the Eichmuehlen Fliess, then held a prayer service on the Schmiede-Berg before moving back into camps at Palzig.

Wedel crossed the Oder River at Tschicherzig on July 24th, in order to prevent a unification of the Russians and Austrians from the south shore. Saltykov could have destroyed Wedel's army in the river crossing. When news of the defeat reached Frederick, he decided to take over the command against the Russians.

With loses of 6,776 officers and troops, Wedel lost nearly a quarter of his strength, among them 65 officers. There were 1,400 dead including 8 officers and 2,257 were captured or missing, with quite a few among those supposedly deserting. Thirteen artillery pieces and four standards were lost. Six commanders fell and many more were wounded. The most casualties were suffered by IR32, IR3, IR24, IR49, IR7 and IR9; along with grenadier battalions 13/26 and Garl/Gar IX. Among the Prussian cavalry, DR6 and cuirassier tegiments CR12, CRI and CR5 suffered severely. The Russians lost 4,833 officers and men, with 813 men dead.

A Final Analysis

In principal, Prussian reconnaissance was not up to par with the extensive one of the Russians. There were very few Russian deserters, something that was mainly prevented by mentality and language differences. Saltykov did not maneuver much, but instead sought the confrontation. The terrain conditions in the tight space between Zuellichau, Fauler Obra and the Oder River were difficult and required thorough exploration.

Wedel's task was difficult. Because the road to Crossen was the obvious route for the Russians to join forces with the Austrians, he should have taken the outflanking march of the Russians into consideration, or at least have investigated that possibility, instead of looking for them on the opposite side. His expectations of either taking the Palzig heights or attacking the Russians during their march were equally questionable. The cavalry stuck too close to the infantry, while the infantry was put into action in a piecemeal and unfocused way, and the artillery, which had been heavily reinforced by the King during the winter of 1758-59 had almost no effect on the battle. Kanitz's flank march was too wide and would have arrived too late even in the case of success. The attack could have also been staged against the Russian left wing north of the Eichmuehlen Fliess via Nickern. The repetition of failed attacks at the same location was also a mistake. The General Staff passed judgement:

"the battle of Kay was that which set everything in motion, that led to the culmination of the whole war; which was the decision at Kunersdorf."

Prussian Order of Battle

(Lt.-General Carl Heinrich von Wedel, Commanding)

FIRST LINE OF BATTLE (Wedel)

Normann's Cavalry Brigade

Manteuffel's Brigade

Hulsen's Brigade

Stutterheim's Brigade

Schorlemer's Cuirassier Brigade

SECOND LINE OF BATTLE (Kanitz)

PRUSSIAN RESERVES (Wobersnow)

Wobersnow's Brigade

Stationed at Nickern

HR7 Malachowsky "Yellow" Hussars 7 sqds

Stationed at Zullichau

Prussian Artillery

Russian OB

(General Saltikov, commanding)

RUSSIAN FRONT BATTLE LINE 1

1st Division (Fermor)

Observation Corps

RUSSIAN SECOND LINE OF BATTLE

Cavalry Brigade Demitu

Cavalry Brigade Teraptin

2nd Division (Villebois)

Detachments at Baggage Lager (Mordvinov)

Musketeer regiments Apcheron, Kazan, Neva, Chernigov and two Observation Corps regiments. Also, Dragoon regiments Arkhangel, Tobolsk, and some squadrons of the Serbian Hussar Regiment. One artillery brigade of 13 field guns.

Artillery Attached to Main Russian Army

186 field guns and 124 regimental guns.

Total Russian forces engaged: 52 battalions and 50 squadrons.

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