Battle of Jena
An Opinion
by Patrick E. Wilson, UK
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To Tauentzien’s right lay the greater part
of the Prusso-Saxon Army; namely the
Saxon’s of Zeschwitz’s 2nd division,
Grawert’s excellent 1st division and some
Grenadiers under von Prittwitz. Later that day
a detachment under Major-General von
Holtzendorff would move to the village of
Dornburg to cover the far-left flank of the Army.
The stage was thus set for the historic
battle of Jena and the future of Europe hung in
balance once again as two armies of formidable
reputation confronted each other for the first
time since 1795, when Prussia had withdrawn
from the first coalition deployed against a revolutionary
France.
The two armies which confronted
each other were very different and
represented their own epochs, one the heir of
Rossbach and Leuthen and seen as a rigid one
of fierce discipline but little recent experience.
The other, the victor of Ulm and Austerlitz and
known for its revolutionary methods of raging
war. Thus, the field of Jena as it would become
known, would see the clash of the old and the
new, as the heirs of Frederick the Great fought
it out with the forces of the new master of war,
Napoleon. Indeed Napoleon had been anxious
to avoid war with Prussia and had warned his
Marshals of its renown, telling Marshal Soult to
be wary of its Cavalry in particular.
War cam in a dispute over Hanover, when
Napoleon tried to return it back to Britain in
return for peace after he had given it to Prussia
only a year before for keeping out of the 1805
war. Prussia was not impressed to say the least
and abruptly declared war in the autumn of 1806.
Prussia possessed a large well trained
army, nearly a quarter of a million men and its
leaders, the Duke of Brunswick, Prince von
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, von Mollendorf von
Ruchel etc., all had fine reputations and a
wealth of experience. The only problem
seemed to be a general lack of decision when
it came to deciding upon a plan of campaign,
of which they had several.
This indecision led to the wasting of days and weeks, when a quick and decisive strike at
Napoleon’s forces in southern Germany may have caught them dispersed, a victory could
perhaps have bought armed support from Austria and undone Napoleon's successful 1805 campaign.
And yet, by the 13th October, despite a couple of unfortunate mishaps at Schliez and
Saalfield, the Prussian army would find itself in a very favourable position. Indeed, it has
been argued that the very indecision of the Prussian senior command had worked to their
advantage and they or rather Prince von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, would find himself with
an opportunity to inflict a severe defeat on one of Napoleon’s Marshals.
This was precisely what Hohenlohe was about to do when his chief of staff
Massenbach returned from Burnwick’s Headquarters on the 13th October 1806.
Massenbach brought with him instructions to remain on the defensive
whilst Brunswick with the main Prussian Army retreated for the Eble.
Thus, Hohenlohe’s orders were to cover the Saale River line and prevent
the enemy from interfering during Brunswick’s march to the Eble. He was there-fore
perfectly justified in his plan to attack and throw back into the Saale the French forces
currently occupying the Landgrafenburg and for this he argued vehemently, asserting
that it would be the right course to pursue.
But Massenbach, emphasised what he understood to be the purely defensive nature of
the orders they had received from Brunswick, the Prussian Commander-in-Chief,
which, argued Massenbach, precluded any form of tactical offensive. This of course,
was plainly not the case, for one cannot imagine a commander of Brunswick’s experience
issuing such rigid orders, strategic defence by no means excludes a tactical
offensive.
Hohenlohe though, sadly as it turned out for Prussia, gave in to
Massenbach’s arguments and thus missed out on a great opportunity, probably the best Prussia would have.
Across the valley however,
Lannes, the French commander on the
spot, did all he could to get his troops ready
to defend his position should the Prussians
attack and Napoleon, on receipt of Lannes’
report rushed all the troops he could to his
assistance. By 4pm Napoleon was there
himself and during this he had all of Lannes
5th Corps and his footguards under Marshal
Lefebure, placed upon Landgrafenburg. He
was also instrumental in getting Lannes
artillery in position.
What a contrast with Prussian activity
across the valley, Hohenlohe merely having
his men return to camp after his dispute with
Massenbach and the abandonment of his tactical
offensive. And yet, Hohenlohe still held
the advantage, for if he attacked first thing in
the morning he could still have had the pleasure
of tumbling both Lannes Corps and the
much vaulted “Grognards” into the Saale before
the arrival of their supports.
All Hohenlohe did was to lead Holtzendorff with his
detachment, as mentioned above, to Dornberg
to counter a perceived threat to his position
from that direction, a threat that at the time
had little foundation and only served to
weaken his main forces before Jena.
The 14th October 1806 dawned with a
heavy fog, which benefited General Tauentzien
as he positioned his limited forces of about
8,000 men in a dozen battalions, two cavalry
regiments and a couple of batteries in a defensive
line between the villages of Lutzeroda
and Closwitz. The heavy fog however disadvantaged
Lannes. Unable to see anything from
his front, he had to grope his way forward and
consequently collided with Tauentzien’s Prus-so-
Saxon division early on.
The subsequent fight rapidly developed into a soldiers battle,
with both sides taking heavy casualties and
their supporting artillery firing blindly into the
fog, killing both friend and foe. Gradually
though, Lannes divisions, under Suchet and
Gazan pushed Tauentzien’s division back towards
the Dornburg heights. Suchet successfully stormed Closwitz whilst Gazan took
Lutzeroda but upon reaching the heights of
Dornburg, they were vigorously counter-attacked
by Tauentzien’s hard fighting division
and Lannes was forced to commit his supports
to steady his front line.
But strangely enough Tauentzien did not press his advantage, instead
he halted, turned about and marched off
toward Klien-Romstradt.
What Happened?
For some time now Hohenlohe had been
listening to the roar of cannon from
Tauentzien’s battle with Lannes, as well as
receiving message after message describing
the severity of Lannes attack. He was also a
little annoyed to notice that General Grawert,
commander of his 1st division, was slowly
moving elements of his command towards the
sound of Tauentzien’s fight.
Finally comprehending the situation Ho-henlohe
reacted, ordering Tauentzien to retire
and reform near Klien-Romstradt. He then
sent Grawert’s cavalry
to cover this manoeuvre
and his infantry to occupy
and hold the Dornburg,
whilst directing Zeschwitz’s Saxon’s to
Isserstadt and the Schnecke pass to cover Grawert’s right.
Finally, Hohenlohe despatched an aide riding
flat out for Weimer with a request that General von Ruchel, who was
assembling his Corps there prior to following Brunswick on his way
to the Eble, to come to his immediate assistance with his 15,000 men.
Meanwhile the French had not been idle, Lannes troops recovered
from Tauentzien’s counter-attack and
made an assault on the key village of Vierzehnheilgen
which controlled the Dornburg
heights. The 40th Ligne under General of
Brigade Rielle actually entered the village
before the appearance of Grawert’s division
forced them to retire.
Further to the right Marshal
Soult made an appearance with his first
division (St.Hilaire). But his advance coincided
with another by General Holtzendorff,
who hearing the roar of Tauentzien’s battle
had decided to rejoin Hohenlohe’s main body.
Collinson with Soult’s advance was inevitable
and it occurred near the village of Rodigen,
northeast of Jena.
Holtzendorff attacking St. Hilaire’s division as it reached the ridge above
the village with his infantry but then realising
he was out-numbered he resolved to retire on
the nearby village of Nerkwitz. Utilising his
cavalry, Holtzendorff conducted a fine withdrawal
until Soult’s cavalry appeared on the
scene and attacked with such fury that not only
was Holtzendorff’s cavalry driven off but his
infantry was severely damaged too.
The French taking 400 prisoners, 2 colours and an
artillery battery that got stuck in a ravine in the
confusion and forcing Holtzendorff to retire
on Apolda and Stroba. Neither St. Hilaire nor
Soult’s cavalry followed this success up, for
Soult drew them off to the aid of Lannes, then
heavily engaged against Grawert’s division on the Dornberg.
To Lannes’ left another force was making
its appearance, this was Marshal Augereau’s
7th Corps and they attacked through the Isserstadt
wood, only to find themselves for the rest
of the battle involved in a grim struggle for the
village of Isserstadt with Zeschwitz’s Saxons.
However, a gap had developed between
Augereau’s right and Lannes left, Napoleon
quickly covered this with a 25 gun battery but
it did not stop an impatient Marshal Ney, who
had been waiting for an opportunity to get into
action, from plunging into the gap at about the
same time that General Reille retired from
Vierzehnheilgen.
With his Corps cavalry and several elite battalions, about 4,000 men, Ney
charged with his natural impetuosity and
quickly over running a Prussian battery
pushed Grawert’s cavalry back and may have
entered Vierzehnheilgen too. But before him
stood over 20,000 Prussian and Saxon troops
with many guns that soon began inflicting loss
on his own meagre forces and the Prusso-Saxon
cavalry about 45 squadrons strong prepared
to punish him severely for his recklessness.
Luckily, Napoleon came to his aid;
sending his aide Bertrand to his assistance
with two of Lannes cavalry regiments as well
as having Augereau and Lannes move troops
to fill the gap between their Corps. Under the
cover of these measures Ney’s battered troops
were able to retire and regroup.
The state of the battle was now as follows:
On the French left Augereau held the Isserstadt
wood and Colonel Habert at the head of the
105th Ligne had just stormed the village of
Isserstadt. Between the Isserstadt wood and
Lannes left stood General Marchand’s division
of Ney’s Corps, which had replaced Ney’s
advance guard that had now retired. Lannes
Corps held the centre of the French position
with Lefebure’s guardsmen to the rear in support.
Lannes Corps was also battered and tired
from almost five hours of continuous combat
and was now taking casualties from the Prussian
artillery and Jager fire from in and around
the village of Vierzehnheilgen. On the French
right, Soult was arriving fresh from his victory
over Holtzendorff. In reserve, apart from
Lefebure’s guardsmen, the other divisions of
Ney’s and Soult’s Corps were approaching and
Marshal Murat, the Grand Duke of Berg, was
assembling his reserve cavalry.
Grawert’s division was also drawn up in a
classic Prussian formation; two battalion echelons,
fused on the right with the left leading and
looking as if they were on parade. It was a
splendid and awesome sight. To Grawert’s rear
left stood the rallied cavalry of Holtzendorff’s
command all that general had been able to send
to Hohenlohe’s assistance.
Finally in reserve there was Tauentzien’s division, currently reforming at Klien-Romstradt
and von Ruchel’s divisions marching up to Hohenlohe’s assistance and
expected soon.
From a Prussian view point everything was progressing well, the
initial French assault had been held, Grawert was poised and ready to
attack and everyone was now confident of a Prusso-Saxon victory.
It was about 11am and the climax of the battle had been reached,
Vierzehnheilgen was now in flames and Napoleon called on Lannes for
one more effort. The intrepid Lannes then led his divisions into a hail
of artillery shells and Jager bullets and surged into Vierzehnheilgen,
fighting raged in the streets as the French ejected its Jager defenders.
Hohenlohe sent Grawert’s men forward and Lannes victorious, though
exhausted divisions ran straight into them.
Contact was mutually unpleasant; Grawert’s massed volleys driving the French back to shelter
of Vierzehnheilgen’s ruined streets and environs, where they made the most of the cover it afforded.
Whilst the Prussians of Grawert’s division continued to fire regulation volleys
that had relatively little effect upon the French behind
Vierzehnheilgen’s walls and hedges.
The French inflicted severe casualties on Grawert’s men as they
stood before them on the Dornberg. Grawert would have been better advised
to storm Vierzehnheilgen, indeed several officers urged Hohenlohe to do so but he had decided
to call a halt and wait for Ruchel’s arrival.
This was a fatal mistake for he missed his best opportunity
of the day. He had stormed Vierzehnheilgen, and there is little doubt that Grawert’s division
could have done so, Lannes hard used and decimated divisions
may well have given way with dire consequences for the French centre,
considering the proximity of the Prusso-Saxon cavalry.
Instead, Grawert’s fine formations stood for two hours under heavy fore from
the French in and around the Smouldering ruins of Vierzehnheilgen, taking horrendous casualties
for no useful purpose and becoming increasingly dispirited. Though it
was not all one sided, for the French too took heavy casualties, especially from the numerous Prussian batteries,
having a number of guns dismounted and artillery caissons blown up.
At least once Lannes tried to break the Prussian line by attacking with his right but found himself thrown by a Saxon cavalry
charge that sent him tumbling back and almost broke his own line.
Hohenlohe was again urged to exploit this opportunity, this time by
Colonel Massenbach, who argued for a supreme effort with all the
available cavalry to buy time for Ruchel’s arrival and that to wait
passively may prove fatal. For once Massenbach was right. However,
Hohenlohe had just received some unpleasant news, Augereau’s cavalry
had driven off Zeschwitz’s Saxon cavalry and inflicted severe casualties upon his infantry.
At the same time Augereau’s infantry,
supported by Marchand’s division, had advanced and broken
Hohenlohe’s line and effectively cut off Zeschwitz’s Saxon’s from the
main body of Hohenlohe’s Army. This item of bad news had undoubtedly
convinced of the need to retreat rather than attack; a movement that
began well enough and would have succeeded had Napoleon not decided
to attack again at that precise moment.
It was now about 1pm and Napoleon was confident that he had
now enough reserves and that the Prussians and Saxons were worn
down enough to guarantee a successful general attack. Ordering Soult
to turn Hohenlohe’s left, Augereau to take care of Zeschwitz’s Saxons
and Lannes supported by Ney’s 1st division, to once more storm the
Prusso-Saxon centre. Murat’s reserve cavalry was to exploit any breakthrough.
And yet, elements of Hohenlohe’s forces still showed some fight, Tauentzien’s rallied division
intervening to save part of Grawert’s division from the sabre’s
of Murat’s cavalrymen. Whilst Zeschwitz’s Saxons turned upon
Augereau’s divisions and pushed them back into the Isserstadt woods.
Nevertheless Murat’s cavalry gathered in 2,500 prisoners, 16 guns and
8 colours and Hohenlohe’s once proud Prusso-Saxon Army was well and truly beaten.
It was at this unfortunate moment that Ruchel’s divisions made
their appearance upon the field of battle. Near Kapellendorf Ruchel
encountered Massenbach and was told of Hohenlohe’s lost battle.
Asking what he could do, Ruchel is told to advance through Kapellendorf to
Hohenlohe’s assistance. It was fatal advice. It would have better if he had taken up a defensive position to
cover the retreat of Hohenlohe’s forces, with perhaps Kapellendorf as his centre. Instead, Ruchel followed
Massenbach’s advice and advanced to Hohenlohe’s assistance. Meeting Hohenlohe, Ruchel gave him command
of his troops and together they formed the men into battle formation and marched off to meet the enemy.
It was unquestionably Hohenlohe’s final error of the day,
perhaps the worst. For he should have used these troops in a defensive
manner to gain time in which to rally his own troops, instead he sent
them off to attack the victorious French. Ruchel, undoubtedly a very
brave soldier, did not flinch and gathering in all available cavalry from
Hohenlohe’s forces he advanced. Encountering the French near Gross-Romstradt,
Ruchel’s cavalry made short work of Lannes and Soult’s
light cavalry and brought the French advance to an abrupt halt.
However, encountering the infantry of St. Hilaire’s division and Vedel’s
brigade, Ruchel halted his own infantry and began the regulation volley
fire that Grawert had used earlier in the day. The result very much the
same, the French artillery and skirmish fire decimated his formations,
though not without some loss themselves, and thoroughly disrupted
Ruchel’s alignments.
Like Grawert before him, Ruchel would have been better pressing home his attack with the bayonet rather than relying on massed volley
fire. St. Hilaire and Vedel seeing that Ruchel’s infantry were wavering, attacked themselves with the bayonet and despite all
Ruchel’s efforts, he received a serious wound near the heart but refused to leave his post, his gallant and somewhat fool-hardy
attack collapsed before the bayonets of St. Hilaire and Vedel, and the sabre’s of Murat’s cavalrymen.
Ruchel’s men contributed another 4,000 men to Murat’s haul of prisoners as they too fell from the field of Jena.
Meanwhile the Saxon’s fighting Augereau’s men still held
their ground and were still in the Kotschau
area at the time of Ruchel’s defeat. When
French Dragoons and Cuirassiers attacked
from the rear and compelled them to lay down
their arms, and thus three complete brigades
of perhaps 6,000 men surrendered to Murat,
who had led the French Dragoons in person. It
was a sad end to a fine military display by the
Saxon Army. Only their Cavalry escaped to
fight another day.
This final act also brought the battle of
Jena to an end. French losses were about 6,500
men, the greater part being in Lannes Corps,
and Prusso-Saxon losses were about 10,00
men killed and wounded, with another 15,000
men taken prisoner. It had been a monumental
disaster; another Kolin but it had promised
great success too.
Opportunities
The 13th and 14th October 1806 saw the Prusso-Saxon Army of Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen
presented with two distinct opportunities
of inflicting a severe check to the French
Grande Armée.
The first of these occurring on the 13th when Marshal Lannes crossed the
Saale relatively unsupported with his Corps.
Hohenlohe should have annihilated him but
Massenbach, his chief of staff, dissuaded him,
emphasising the defensive orders he had just
received from the Commander-in-Chief, the
Duke of Brunswick.
This was folly of the highest order. For had Hohenlohe acted as his
instinct told him, he would have been obeying
his orders in the widest sense, which was to
protect the march of Brunswick’s main army,
and by defeating Lannes and driving him into
the Saale, then Hohenlohe would have been
doing just that, as well as giving the French
something to think about at the same time.
The second opportunity occurred on the
14th, between 10 and 11am, when Marshal
Lannes Corps collided with Grawert’s division
in and around Vierzehnheilgen. By this
time Lannes divisions were tired and had
taken many casualties during their fight with
Tauentzien’s division that morning, whist
Grawert’s men were relatively fresh, keen and
thirsting to avenge Prince Louis’ death at
Saalfeld, four days earlier.
And yet, Hohenlohe held Grawert’s men back and instead of
storming Vierzehnheilgen at bayonet point
relied on massed volleys to dislodge Lannes,
had he forgotten how Prussian infantry had
stormed Leuthen despite the fierce resistance
of its defenders. Surely victory beckoned, especially
as Grawert’s infantry had more than
45 squadrons of cavalry to support them.
Lannes must have given way to the impact of
such a force. Yet, Hohenlohe halted and despite
the entreaties of his staff, would not give
the order to attack and consequently lost the
initiative to the French. His excuse afterwards
was that he was awaiting Ruchel’s arrival. But
that officer only received his request at 9am
and could hardly be expected to arrive before
mid-afternoon considering the fact that he had
to assemble his men and march up from Weimer.
It was therefore essential to attack the
French with what was available before they
too brought up supports and Hohenlohe knew
these were on the way but chose to remain in
the open, exposed to enemy fire and wait
Ruchel’s arrival. A fatal, as it turned out, mistake.
Finally there is Hohenlohe’s use of
Ruchel’s force at the battle’s end. This is
almost incomprehensible. Committing your
last reserve to the offensive when everything
depended upon finding a bastion behind
which you could rally your defeated troops
was surely folly. Ruchel could have formed
this bastion around Kappellendorf and the
subsequent events of the campaign may
have been different.
The battle of Jena reminds me of
Napoleon’s remark on luck: “What is luck?
The ability to exploit accidents.”
And that: “A man has his day in
war as in other things.”
It is manifestly clear to me that Hohenlohe did
not possess the ability to exploit accidents
and certainly seemed to have had his day
and perhaps rivals Junot at Valuntino for
letting opportunities slip. Though the real
reason may be that Hohenlohe, like other
Prussian leaders, had been at peace since 1795
and consequently lacked recent experience of
warfare.
Chandler, David G., The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: Macmillan, 1966. Reprint London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987).
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on the 13th October 1806 Marshal
Jean Lannes began to occupy the
Heights of Landgrafenburg above
the Thuringian town of Jena, opposite him
between the villages of Luterode and Closwitz,
stood the Prussian General von Tauentzien
with the 3rd division of Prince von
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen’s Prusso-Saxon Army.
From a well conceived withdrawal, river line by river line to
link up with their Russian allies by Colonel
von Scharnhorst to a “military promenade” as
proposed by Colonel Massenbach.
On the Prusso-Saxon side of the field, opposite Augereau
stood Zeschwitz with three Saxon brigades,
supported by the Saxon cavalry to his left.
Opposite Marchand stood the Grenadiers of
Dyherrn’s brigade and the cavalry who had
opposed Ney’s attack. Next came Grawert’s
fine infantry division, who stood on the Dornberg
heights behind the village of Vierzehnheilgen
where they had just arrived. Indeed, it was
Grawert’s artillery and Jagers who were now
inflicting casualties on Lannes divisions.
A furious barrage announced the French attack and the Prussians
and Saxons fought back hard and for the first hour at least, though
steadily going back, they kept up a steady front in the face of repeated
French attack. But eventually men began to give way, throw down their
arms, abandon guns and surrender. It was then that Murat’s cavalrymen
struck, thundering forward they did what Hohenlohe had failed to do
earlier in the day and turned disorder into rout.