Dispatches
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re: Cousins v. If one really insisted one might debate with Peter some potentially weak points of arguments, such as if he includes his own works in his belief that nothing worthwhile has been written since 1918, or perhaps whether the Hapsburg led Holy Roman Empire really has that much of a connection with the later Prussian led creation of a Germany. But this would be mere sidetrack argument of no worthwhile merit. One could try to seriously take on Peter over his facts about the 1815 Waterloo Campaign, but first you would need to spend many years of research and endless weeks in reference libraries across Britain and Germany to provide greater primary proofs than Peter; surely an arduous and, almost certainly, pointless task. The arduousness of that task and comments on the availability of primary material bring up what are perhaps more important points on the costs of authorship. If you look in Peter's book you will find a book of his published through RAFM in 1984, nearly 20 years ago, followed by many others; so he has some twenty hard years under his belt as a published author and a proven track record of sales. This makes it possible for a publisher to gauge how many sales might be expected of a book by him on similar topics and so therefore whether to accept it, perhaps offer an advance, include an allowance for original artwork, or plan any marketing of their own. Unless you can provide some similar proofs it's very difficult to get a publisher to look at your book. Catch 22 perhaps, but there is a serious cost in time and money to printing or stocking a book so you need a good reason for someone else to fund even that, never mind the costs of your research. The latter of which, as far as I know, were not offered even in Peters hard won position. On the dust jacket of John H. Gills book ‘With Eagles to Glory’ is mentioned 3 years of work and visits to libraries across Germany and Austria. Now the cost of a day away in lodging, travel, and food can easily run over £100, so we are looking at around say £3,000 a month when researching away from home. Even when at home there is a cost as you could be doing something else which pays money, a full time job, the additional week end job, perhaps renovating a property, or at least behind the counter at McDonalds. You really should be counting the cost of research at a minimum £10 per hour. Full time, hard core 250 hours a month, that's £2,500. So if John H Gill spent an entire 3 years on the book with 6 months on the road, plus a minimum print run, then that cost at least £110,000; give or double give the odd 10s of thousands. That's serious money which not too many people have for a hobby ? Normally only an academic institution, civilian or military, that you already worked many years for, is willing to put up that kind of effort for a book on the Napoleonic period (unless it is about visitors to Josephine's underwear). The time costs in looking up references, indexing, fetching books from archives, making copies of pages in a way that does not harm the book (so no photocopying), producing print out, and posting it out are considerable. And for that to be offered by libraries to anybody who just happens to ask, well I don't think we pay enough taxes for everyone to get a free band of research assistants. Yes turning up at a library to do that yourself is expensive and time consuming. And even then, with key documents in your research you need to do more than just skim them for quotes, going back to re-read prime sections several times over, so it's really better to have a copy next to your elbow. Original documents and reports tend to cost hundreds, occasionally thousands, of pounds each, again not cheap, but arguably cheaper than repeated visits to libraries in foreign countries. Without these originals you are in serious danger of unknowingly copying enough nonsense to obscure the valid parts. Now I do know there is at least one large book that's put together almost entirely from old Ospreys, very useful if you are just starting and want to know which army is green and which one red, but I am not convinced it added to our knowledge base of the period. So if you want to do a worthy contribution, book wise, there is no easy nor cheap road known. Perhaps the most sensible way would be to decide your budget in time and money first; and should the answer be less than many years and tens of thousands, then as said, restrict the target to short magazine articles, and on less well know topics rather than a book. Oh, yes. Lastly I do wish I could say I had taken my own advice before attempting to write a book. But you get all carried away in a rush of enthusiasm wanting to tell the world what they don't seem to know, don't you ? Well best of luck to you all and see you in print.
(5 years in the writing, several publisher rejections, a well justified editorial rejection, a huge credit card bill, a half renovated house, a lonely family, and a dented tin hat.) Girard was a Duke! With regard to the enquiry concerning General Jean-Baptiste GIRARD in FE 69 - I can tell you that according to Reverends Armorial du Premier Empire and Les Princes et Duc's du Premier Empire by Joseph Valynseele; the General was indeed duc de Ligny. Having been wounded on the 16th June, he was taken to Paris. Napoleon conferred the title on the 21st and the General died on 27th June. I do not know when, if ever, the documents confirming the patents were issued - perhaps a search of his career records at Vincennes would clear that up
Cornwall Prisoners of War Dear Dave, I noted with interest the query posted by Peter Gibbs regarding the numbers of prisoners of war held in Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. As this is a particular interest of mine, I thought I would reply with some facts and figures on the subject. During the period 1792-1815, upwards of 200,000 prisoners of war arrived in Britain, to reside in the Land Prison, Prison Ship and Parole Depots. Of this total, 122,440 were taken during the Napoleonic Wars 1803-15, with the highest prisoner population in any one year being 72,000 in 1814. These figures do not include approximately 20,000 prisoners held in prisons abroad (e.g. Malta, Canada, Jamaica), or the many thousands of soldiers and seamen taken prisoner but exchanged after a few days or weeks, often in theatres such as Canada and the West Indies. The prisoner totals include all the nationalities with which Britain was at war. French captives provided the largest number, but in the prisons were also found Americans, Danes, Germans (from most of the German states), Dutch, Spanish, Italians, Poles, Swedes; Caucasian and Negro, men, women and children, military and civilian. The continuous war at sea provided a steady flow of captives, not just from the major actions but also from the war on trade. Many enemy merchant ships and privateers fell victim to the Royal Navy and to British privateers. The major theatres of the war that provided large hauls of prisoners were the West Indies throughout the period (4,000 were sent from there to Portchester Castle in 1796 as but one example); and the Iberian Peninsula from the end of 1809 onwards, which provided many thousands of captives (e.g. 20,000 in 1811-12). Interestingly, in 1803, when Napoleon was planning his invasion of the south coast, it was decided not to reopen Portchester Castle as a War Prison, as there were many who queried the wisdom of housing up to 7,000 enemy nationals next to the major naval base of Portsmouth. However, so many French soldiers and seamen from this invasion force were taken when ships of the Royal Navy attacked the coastal traffic along the shores of northern France and Holland, that by 1805 it was obvious that increased prison accommodation was required. Thus, plans were drawn up to construct a new Land Prison at Princetown, Dartmoor, which was completed in 1809. During the 1790s, when Britain was at war with France, Holland and Spain, the various nationalities were kept separate within the system (administered by the Transport Board of the Admiralty). By 1809, Dutch, German, Italian and Polish soldiers were all included in the 'French' category, as many were taken in the French Armies in Spain. Spanish (1803-08), Danish (1807-14) and American (1812-15) prisoners, while being kept alongside the other nationalities, were recorded separately. During the Revolutionary War, a prisoner could expect to remain captive for no more that 18 months to 2 years, as regular exchange cartels were organised between the belligerent powers. After 1803, this still applied to Spanish, Danish and Americans, but the exchange system between Britain and France all but broke down. This resulted in Frenchmen languishing in the prisons for many years. The crew of the French frigate La Créole was captured in the summer of 1803, and they remained confined on board the ortsmouth hulks until June 1814. I hope this provides an answer for Mr Gibbs. There is much information on prisoners of war to be found in the Admiralty (Transport Board) records at the Public Record Office, Kew.
Memorandum Upon The “Belle Alliance” Campaign Of 1815 It appears by the statement of the Historian (Mr Hofschröer – letter FE 69, following letter in FE68, about my article “A Belle Alliance“ in FE67…), that his theme of “missed material” has been extended to the whole of “German” history, 19th century Britain, etc... With reference to Lobau’s Corps, I am glad to accept Mr H’s rare praise for correctly stating the time when Bülow’s troops became directly involved in the fighting – although it was not central to my point – but I am interested to see the contribution of the Prussians at Waterloo stretched to taking part in the defeat of D’Erlon’s Corps, (hitherto regarded as a feat of Wellington’s troops, and specifically the British cavalry), by their appearance several km away: an expanded claim for the Prussian impact which is not made explicit in Mr H’s “1815” works, and appears to be an afterthought. Mr H’s comment that I do not know the difference be-tween troops being tied down and being directly involved in combat is not worthy of further comment, and as for the rest he misses the point. Before, and even after the Prussians were sighted (up until shortly before they actually arrived), Lobau’s Corps was available in principle and practice to be used against Wellington’s army. But instead, the decisive attack to achieve a quick and efficient victory was apparently formulated at around 11 a.m. – long before any Prussian presence was expected or suspected - and specified an attack by D’Erlon’s Corps on Wellington’s line, with Lobau’s Corps not mentioned. According to plan, D’Erlon’s Corps attacked alone, and was repulsed, and (Mr H at least agrees in his “1815” books) it was, like the British heavy cavalry, rendered hors de combat. I wish I could be so sure, as I am about Bülow, about the other timings which I questioned in my article. Book after book over the years have repeated, without questioning, that it was around 1.30 p.m. on the 18th June that Lobau’s Corps, following the cavalry of Domon and Subervie, was turned to face the Prussians seen approaching Waterloo, and that this manoeuvre tied down over 9,000 French troops before the Prussians had even arrived. But the accepted timing of the movement of Lobau’s Corps may be wrong (a possibility supported by Prussian, French and British accounts), and it may actually have happened much later: that supports the view that Lobau’s Corps was in practice available for use against Wellington’s army. The effects of a combined attack by D’Erlon’s and Lobau’s Corps, or by the former supported by the latter, are pure speculation. That Lobau’s Corps was not used somehow against Wellington’s army in that attack was, arguably, a major tactical error by Napoleon – but it seems to have had nothing to do with the arrival or even the sighting of the Prussians. Mr H is entitled to his opinion: but I think it ignores the decision-making logic and perhaps the “facts”, and I simply suggested that this required further research, perhaps particularly among French records, to determine what actually happened Regarding Vivian’s Brigade, Mr. H. queries two references to Siborne Sr.’s “History”, and he is correct about one. The first reference to p. 354 was an editing mistake (repeating a previous reference) and should have said p. 329. I apologise for any confusion, although it may inadvertently have achieved one desired effect of the article, to get people to look at “History” again. If the reader looks at p. 329 of “History” – the full passage, not the edited excerpt quoted by Mr H – he will read that Siborne Sr. states that, when Vivian removed his brigade from the left to the centre of Wellington’s line, the Prussians had been sighted by patrols but had not actually arrived and taken up position in the line – and the second reference queried, to p. 152, was however correct – Vivian called their arrival “tardy”. Further, according to “History” Vivian moved without orders: Delancey - who, I do not need to be told, was Wellington’s chief-of-staff - had indicated to Vivian that fresh cavalry was needed in the centre, but no order is mentioned; Vandeleur refused to move without orders; and on his way to the centre Vivian met Uxbridge, who congratulated him on anticipating Wellington’s wishes. Mr H is not merely stretching the “facts” in “History” but ignoring them. His comments about orders which Vivian received to halt when it reached the centre, and about alleged contradictions in the “Waterloo Despatch” regarding when Wellington became aware of the Prussian intervention, are irrele-vant to the point. On the “Waterloo Despatch”, Mr H is only concerned to simplistically and “logically” measure the “Despatch” against his standard of truth in order to find Wellington lacking and condemn him for deliberately writing a false “Despatch”. There are a host of reasons – operational, personal, morale-preservation, political etc. – why the “Despatch” could not and should not be expected to be a 100% accurate and objective record or assessment of the events of the campaign, and such factors, which are part and parcel of human life, must be taken into account. Questions of intent and meaning are matters of interpretation, and are professional bread and butter to many - lawyers and historians, for example – but they are not as simple and “logical” as Mr H suggests. The early reports of both sides were inaccurate and biased, lacking an overall perspective. From one viewpoint the “Despatch” may not have been the distorted record some of those who scrutinise it might think. It is consistent with the views frequently expressed in the Siborne Correspondence by many British officers that the British troops were the major contributors – even the victors - in the victory on the 18th June, and that the Prussians were not only late, but did not contribute much to the result: a view which, quite naturally, may have been biased by their having expended considerably more man-hours on the main battlefield on the 18th June than had the Prussians, despite the large numbers brought up by the latter. I suggested that Siborne Sr.’s Model - intended to show the historically accurate truth of the real proportions of Wellington’s and Blücher’s troops at one moment towards the end of the battle – would not accurately reflect the perceptions from Wellington’s side - and I tried to quantify the difference (without of course suggesting that this calculation was actually done by anyone at the time). But then, FitzRoy Somerset doubted the wisdom of Siborne Sr.’s proposed circular to surviving British officers, fearing that the mass of conflicting accounts which would result from asking such questions twenty years after the battle would only generate work and controversy – whereas the “Despatch” had “high authority”, because at least it was written at the time and by Wellington as commanding general: and when Siborne Sr. went ahead anyway, FitzRoy Somerset said: “The Lord give him safe deliverance!”. It was equally in Prussia’s interests to glorify its achievements, and to gloss over failings (and highlight the failings of others, notably Wellington). I wish that Mr H would subject Prussian reports to the same level of scrutiny, rather than concentrating solely on the shortcomings of the “Despatch”. Blücher’s letter to the King of Prussia of the 17th June 1815 stated that, although a battle had been fought by Wellington at Quatre Bras on the 16th June, it “…could, however, contribute only little to the outcome of the whole…”; yet did not this “sideshow” tie down, directly or indirectly, up to 45,000 French troops, which had they been available at Ligny would have made that Prussian defeat and retreat far worse? The “Blücher / Gneisenau Report“ of 19th June 1815 is largely concerned with the Prussian side of events: might one not object that it was deliberately playing down the role of Wellington’s “English” army? It also grossly exaggerates the size of the French army facing Wellington to 130,000 (and a similar exaggeration of French strength at Ligny reverses the truth that the Prussians comfortably outnumbered the French that day): perhaps to suggest that Wellington was doomed without Prussian help? It also implies that the most decisive Prussian impact came at the moment “…the first columns of the corps of General Ziethen arrived on the points of attack, near the village of Smonhen [sic], on the enemy's right flank, and instantly charged. This moment decided the defeat of the enemy...“; were the actions of no-one else – Prussian or otherwise - important then? And we also find the following: “…The repeated charges of the Old Guard were baffled by the intrepidity of the Scottish regiments; and at every charge the French cavalry were over-thrown by the English cavalry…” Now I did not try to change the wording of the “Despatch”, as Mr H accuses, but suggested two specific examples from the “Despatch” which I suggested were capable of alternative interpretation by anyone with an open and reasonable mind. One of those was a section of the “Despatch” which Mr H interprets “logically” as a sequence, which I proposed was not necessarily what was being implied. Presumably we can apply Mr H’s logic to this last quotation: and the “logical deduction” here is then that the Old Guard (actually the Middle Guard) was not only defeated by Scottish troops (!) but also that this happened before the great French cavalry attacks, and therefore before the Prussians arrived! Finally in connection with the “Despatch”, Mr H again raises its relevance to the issue of the alleged “Ziethen message”. It is true that I did not mention this - because it happened on the 15th June, and my article expressly ruled out discussion of matters pre-18th June. But for the record, the Prussian evidence on this issue is equally questionable; and although Mr H has indeed written extensively about this issue, and may have a lot invested in proving his interpretation, that does not mean that the issue is decided: for others have written about it too, and have reached conclusions completely the opposite to those reached by Mr H. I suspect that the lack of teaching of German history in British schools has not changed – which is why attitudes such as those of the Daily Star reporter encountered by Mr H persist. (While I am grateful for Mr H’s fag-packet guide to “German” history, it is something about which I am aware and do not need lessons). With some people, resistance to the argument, that the German role in the campaign has been undervalued, perhaps reflect prejudices against Germany arising from more recent history, (often before they were born) and may be hardened by the case (regardless of its merits) simultaneously being made against Wellington. Mind you, the poor chap’s confusion and lack of understanding is hardly helped if he is reviewing a book called (if only its sub-title) “The German Victory”; which, as the second of two volumes on the campaign, a reader might expect to be concerned largely with the battle of Waterloo (its inside cover states that it will cover “The decisive German contribution to victory at Waterloo; German eyewitness accounts and regimental reports; The battles of Waterloo, Wavre and the taking of Paris” – and who in the general public knows about Wavre and Paris?); and yet it transpires that actually the author did not mean that the Battle of Waterloo was a German victory anyway. I reject the claim – which is that of “received” British history and is still repeated today - that this battle or campaign was a British victory. The 1815 – or “Belle Alliance” – campaign was won by an (imperfect) alliance, and (if campaign were substituted for battle) I would agree that “…At a distance of 150 years it is easier to view and honour achievements…This was a battle where extraordinary success was achieved as a result of co-operation, of a classical mutual endeavour and effort. If there is anywhere, in history, an instance of a battle led and won on the foundations of a 'Belle Alliance', this is that battle.” (Colonel E. Kaulbach in “Waterloo: Battle of Three Armies”, 1979, p. 177). But claims have been made that the campaign was “The German Victory” (per one of Mr H’s “1815” books); or even “more of a German victory than a British one” (Mr H’s qualification); or even that one reason for calling the campaign a German victory is that “Germany could have won this campaign without Britain. Britain could not have won it without Germany…“ (in an interview Mr H gave which is published on the web-site “Napoleon in Battle”). The last two, of course, would not have grabbed the attention of anyone browsing the bookshelves like the first, nor in all probability would they have fitted onto the cover of a book. I simply do not think that these claims are justified, on several grounds (but not on the grounds, which Mr H seems to imply, that I believe that Germany did not exist until 1871: this was not actually a claim of my article, in which I only alluded to the literature on the idea of “German-ness” (and part of that was deliberately flippant) at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, and about “myth-making” in the Second German Empire, or Reich, generally acknowledged to have been founded in 1871). My article in so far as it mentioned the “German Victory” claim, was dealing with the campaign, and not just the battle, as was made clear. When I referred to “a British Waterloo myth” I was referring to the popular conception of a single battle won by the British. I then made a distinction into individual parts - pre-campaign, and on the 15th-17th June 1815 (and I ought to have said for completeness post-18th June) to make it clear that I was not going to deal in detail with the pre-18th June period. Having gone on to the 18th June, I said that Siborne Sr. leaves the reader in no doubt that the victors of the main battle were the British and German troops – particularly the British – under Wellington; and that the Prussians played a supportive and co-operative role. I defy anyone to read Siborne Sr.’s “History” and come to any other conclusion. Mr H says that I have based my view of Siborne Sr.’s relationship with Wellington on my own interpretation of certain “odd words“ taken out of context from “History” – but it is quite a big context to choose from: indeed, in picking quotations from “History” to illustrate Siborne Sr.’s tone, I was so spoilt for choice that I could hardly be accused of being selective. I should also say here, that in my letter to FE 69 I mentioned having made three requests of Greenhill Books for permission to quote from their books in my article, but getting no response. I am assured by Greenhill that all such requests are taken very seriously and given appropriate responses. The reason why my request received no response was that the contact address on the Greenhill web-site was an old address that had not been updated when the site was recently reorganised. I am happy to clear this matter up – no serious offence or harm was meant to Greenhill by the comment, which was made in exasperation while slaving to the Editor’s deadline – their books are of course invaluable to the Napoleonic enthusiast. Mr H queries the logic of my comment about his support for Siborne Sr., seems to think it also applied to Mr H’s support for Chesney, and thinks I questioned the value of both men as historians because they did not have access to research which was only done after their deaths. I knew that key elements of Mr H’s case were undiscovered at the time “History” and “Lectures“ were written – but that was not my point. I made no criticism of Chesney, who I feel was very balanced, but who levelled the accusation of bias against Siborne Sr. It seems illogical to me for a historian whose mission includes the debunking of the myth of a British victory, to give uncritical approval to all things connected with Siborne Sr. – at least that is what I see in what Mr H has published about him so far. Mr H says that Siborne Sr.’s “History” is a classic, well-researched, balanced, etc. Now “History” is a classic work, but Siborne Sr. was a serving British officer when his “History” was produced, and as Chesney said, this showed in his work which is suffused with a pro-British and pro-Wellington tone, which reduces the value of “History” as a historical work unless used with care. There was sufficient “evidence” with which to criticise Wellington at the time: that which may have been used against Wellington – thinking of Siborne Sr.’s change of mind on the “Ziethen message” issue in the third edition of “History” – and the possibility that “History” may have become a battleground in the “Wellington dispute”, raises questions about Siborne Sr. as historian. Its research was not without flaws (for example the problematic circular to surviving British Officers, and short-comings highlighted by its reviews in the Prussian “Militär-Wochenblatt”). Furthermore, Siborne Sr.’s “History” gives credence to the perhaps unjustified criticisms of the Nether-landers which riddle the work (although there are many references to the dubious conduct of the Netherlanders in the Siborne Correspondence, which require investigation). I suggest that the reader of his “1815” books and other articles, contrasting them with Siborne Sr.’s “History”, will not fail to see why I see an anomaly in Mr H’s position. Perhaps Mr H appears to be so uncritically supportive of Siborne Sr. because “History” at least gave the Germans in Wellington’s army, and the Prussians, a good deal of praise. It could not possibly be because Siborne Sr. came around to supporting the Prussians over the “Ziethen message” issue, and according to Mr H, Siborne Sr. was the subject of a Wellingtonian conspiracy. Mr H’s attack upon the Marxist interpretation of history puzzles me. I do not subscribe to the Marxist school (since it was privatised, I could not afford the tuition fees…) or indeed any other school of history, and I do not know much or particularly care how they might have viewed the Prussian General Staff – which seems to be the entire point of the attack. If the reader saw such an agenda in what I wrote, I would be very surprised, and it may say more about the critic than it does about me. In any case, Mr H is attributing a precision and meaning to my comments which was not intended. The selection and interpretation, to suit one’s cause, of any material which is written by past or serving members of the organisations about which they write is dangerous. The writers of much of this material understandably have a rather one-sided perspective - for who can write truly objectively about the present or past (recent or long gone) of an organisation, military or other, when the writer is currently a member of and / or dependent upon that organisation for financial and other rewards? By material I meant all history books, biographies, journals, documents, etc. It includes, but is not only, that in the Prussian (and German) General Staff and archives. If I had one issue in mind at this point, it is his use of material – including that produced by the Prussian General Staff from its archives to make its case to Siborne Sr., and other British material which it is claimed supports his case – in the “Ziethen message” issue, which is raised again in his letter. The 1815 historian must try to penetrate below the (perhaps natural) bias of this British, French, Netherlands and Prussian / German material and to come to a balanced view if possible. Mr H has accused certain writers or “historians” of bias, who at the time were members of the British army – although Siborne Sr. and Chesney, both serving British officers when their works were written and published seem to be honourable exceptions, the latter perhaps justifiably. A standard Netherlands text of the campaign, written by De Bas and De Wommersom when they were serving army officers, has been similarly accused by others. On the Prussian / German side, the “instructional material” – often given the title “Geschichte” – written under the auspices of the Prussian or German General Staff), and used by non-army historians, was particularly criticised by Pflugk-Harttung. Perhaps we should look to genuinely pan-national third party historians only. Pflugk-Harttung would seem to come into this category. Indeed he is praised by Mr H and said to be in no small way the inspiration for his own work. Since he wrote in the early 1900s, he had available the archives and published works of all of the nations or contingents in the 1815 campaign up until that time. Yet interestingly, few of his interpretations and conclusions - many unsupportive of Mr H, but often critical of partisan Prussian / German writers and historians - make it into the pages of Mr H’s “1815” books. For someone who does not want to quibble about odd words, Mr H goes into a very detailed “irony attack” upon my use of the expression “the establishment”. Again, I fear that he has attributed an exactness which was never intended, but I hope that the fairer reader understood the meaning. The Siborne conspiracy – call it what you will – clearly originated in some part of the establishment, and if it damaged Siborne Sr. to such an extent, one presumes it spread wider than a small cell of Wellington and his croneys but took in other willing or perhaps innocent henchmen. There is no precise definition of establishment, although it is usually taken to mean people “at the top” with some power and influence (otherwise its workings would not be of much interest); nor is there a list of who was in or out at any particular moment in time – which must to some extent depend upon inter- pretation by the onlooker. Mr H quotes a selection of people and institutions that he construes as members of the establishment at the time under discussion. It is rather meaningless to quote a handful of “names” out of context – though plausible comments are possible on these few – but I presume Mr H has a full list of the establishment, and will tell us soon the precise extent to which it was pro- and anti- Siborne Sr., Wellington, the model, the Waterloo myth, etc., with reasons why, and in context. I would just say about one of those quoted, Sir Hussey Vivian, that one gets the distinct impression from his voluminous contribution – nearly 50 letters – to the Siborne Correspondence, that he was as much concerned to impress upon Siborne Sr. his brigade’s contribution to “our victory” of the 18th June and thus to secure his place in history, as he was to give his support to Siborne Sr. and the Prussian cause, which in any case was by no means unambiguous; and Mr H could not call him as a witness on the “Ziethen message” issue, or for the “received” view about the movements of Lobau’s Corps. I understand the difficulties of summarising long and complex arguments into short articles. However, the result should surely be persuasive. Based upon “Peer Pressure!” - and other articles by Mr H on this issue over recent years - I proposed a short and alternative take, to demonstrate that if I (and I count myself as an intelligent reader) am not only unconvinced, but can quite reasonably and easily propose an alternative interpretation on the basis of the evidence so far provided, then either those articles have failed to persuade, or they are simply “tasters” for the book, and one questions why they are published, if they are not also intended to invite comment and debate. Of course Mr H is right that there is a vast amount of material which needs to be examined in order to get to the bottom of this issue, and I will not be doing the necessary further research, for reasons which I outlined in my letter to FE 68 – time, cost, etc. I am happy to let Mr H do it for me by proxy, and I look forward to his book, which will no doubt be persuasively argued, and backed by evidence, and which I will read with critical interest, like any open-minded and intelligent reader. I might even buy it! I think I have covered all of the comments made by Mr H – but another deadline looms…I will just close by saying that there is ambiguous evidence, and therefore room for alternative interpretation and conclusions, in history: but rest assured, anything which I put into letters and articles, and responses to readers’ comments – which I at least welcome - will be expressed politely…
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