Dispatches
Letters to the Editor
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Westphalian Confirmation Dear Dave, Just a quick answer to the question posed in Issue 59 by Mr. John Walsh: Mr. Walsh is correct. Neither of the two Westphalian cuirassier regiments served in Spain. As indicated in Napoleon’s German Allies No. 1, the only Westphalian cavalry regiment to go to Spain was the 1st Chevauxlegers Regiment. For a detailed review of the Westphalian and other Rheinbund troops in Spain, see Chapter IV, ‘Vermin, Scorpions and Mosquitoes’ in The Peninsular War, edited by Ian Fletcher, Spellmount 1998. The 1st Westphalian Cuirassier Regiment participated on the fringes of the 1809 war against Austria and took part in the Russian campaign along with its sister cuirassier regiment (the 2nd) and the two hussar regiments (1st and 2nd). Hope all is well. Westphalian Cuirassiers Reading the “Dispatches” in FE59, I noticed the inclusion of a question raised by John Walsh and answered by myself in regard to the presence of Westphalian Cuirassiers in the Peninsula conflict. Following this brief exchange, John and I looked deeper into the matter, answering the original question to a certain degree of certainty, but raising numerous other queries for which we could discover no conclusive solution. Hence, it was decided to “publish” our findings so far, both for those readers who might be interested and those who may be able to fill in some of the gaps in our research. Firstly, the question of whether the Westphalian Cuirassiers were present in the Peninsula: to this the answer appears to be a definite no. After an exhaustive study of various works on the Iberian campaign, John and I managed to draw up a list of those Westphalian units that did partake in those proceedings and the Cuirassiers were remarkable by their absence. We then took another approach and attempted to discover in what arenas the Westphalian Cuirassiers were active - our findings are listed below and, as before, there is no reference to their presence in the Peninsula. i) There were two regiments of Cuirassiers in Jerome Bonaparte’s Westphalian army, the first formed in 1807, and the second in 1812. ii) While numerous Westphalian units were despatched to Spain, the Cuirassiers were retained in North Germany as part of a multi-national force whose role was to defend the Baltic coast against British naval raids instigated by Admiral Saumarez. iii) In 1809, while Napoleon was at war with Austria, it was the task of this multi-national force, composed of Danes and Germans, to keep the peace amongst their fractious neighbours. With the risings of von Schill and the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, this force was brought into action, the 1st Westphalian Cuirassiers forming part of a small Westphalian force that was defeated by the renegade Duke of Brunswick at Oelpe on 1st August 1809. iv) Little else has been found concerning the military exploits of the 1st Cuirassiers until the Russian campaign of 1812 when, with its newly formed sister regiment, they were attached to the IV Cavalry Corps under Latour-Maubourg. They fought at Borodino and throughout the retreat from Moscow, suffering horrendous casualties, both in combat and through attrition. Philip Haythornthwaite claims that, from all the Westphalian Cavalry Regiments that embarked on this great adventure into the Russian Motherland, only 60 troopers returned to the Vistula in December 1812 fit for service. It is possible that these were amalgamated into numerous composite cavalry regiments that appear to have been attached to the garrisons of the Vistula and Oder but, without more detailed army lists, this remain purely speculative. v) The Westphalian Cuirassiers do not seem to appear in the Army of 1813 and, with the dissolution of the Kingdom of Westphalia, their establishments were disbanded in 1814. The Cuirassiers, from what we were able to deduce, had very little experience in the field before 1812 and for this there are two possible reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, their presence in Northern Germany was required to contain both British naval incursions and their own fractious German neighbours - with no major conflicts in this area of Germany before 1813, they thus had little opportunity to “win their spurs”. However, it is also possible that their restricted employment on the battlefields of Europe could have been because Napoleon thought of them as sub-standard and too expensive to fund. Haythornthwaite quotes the Emperor as saying: “I have told the King [Jerome], over and over again, that he ought not to have cuirassier regiments, because that branch of the service costs too much money, and the native horses are not adapted for it.” So, if the Cuirassiers were not present in the Peninsula, which Westphalian units were? According to our research, the answer is as follows: i) The 1st Chevaux-Legers Regiments (and possibly the 2nd formed in 1812) - attached for the majority of the conflict to Marshal Victor’s I Corps which itself operated for a greater part of the Peninsula War in Andalusia. This unit is known to have taken part in the Battles of Ucles (13th Jan 1809), Talavera (27/28th Jul 1809) and Villafranca (13th Sep 1813). In 1811-12, lances were adopted by this regiment and the 1st Westphalian Chevau-Legers-Lanciers may have taken part in the action at Las Rozas (11th Aug. 1812). The lance was withdrawn from service shortly afterwards. ii) The 2nd, 3rd & 4th Line Infantry (2 bns each) and 4th Light Infantry (1 bn) who served under St Cyr in Catalonia in 1808, as part of Morio’s division at the siege of Gerona in 1809 and then under Suchet in Eastern Spain. These regiments appear to have been mainly employed for garrison duties and do not appear to have taken much part in any actual campaigning. The 2nd and 3rd Line Infantry Regiments may have been withdrawn from Spain in 1812 as they appear in the army lists of the VIII Corps at Borodino. iii) The Legion Hanoverienne, composed of 3 line infantry battalions and a regiment of Chasseurs. These troops were present under the command of Marshal Soult in the Corunna campaign of 1808/9 and the Chasseurs at least were present at the Battle of Corunna itself. Of the infantry, we were only able to confirm that the 1st Battalion was present in Soult’s army, although in Haythornthwaite’s brief account of the Hanoverian Legion, it would appear that the other two battalions were, if not in Soult’s command, then certainly somewhere else in Spain. The Legion was disbanded on 9th Aug. 1811, the three infantry battalions forming the 127th, 128th and 129th French Line Infantry Regiments, while the Chasseurs formed the basis for the new French 9th Chevau-Legers. These troops left Spain and fought in the Russian Campaign in 1812, in Germany in 1813 and were officially disbanded upon the fall of Napoleon on 12th May 1814. iv) The “Regiment Westphalien”, which was formed in 1806 at Posen from Prussian PoWs. It was a light infantry regiment of six companies and saw action under Moncey at the abortive assault on Valencia. On 30th Sep 1808, it was disbanded and the men were attached the Hanoverian Legion. v) A force of 522 “Westphalian Light Horse”, along with their 559 mounts, appears in French returns included in Napier’s “History of the Peninsula War”, Volume I, Appendix XXVIII, but it is uncertain whether these troops were the Chasseurs of the Hanoverian Legion, the 1st Chevau-Legers or a totally different cavalry regiment altogether. vi) Another mysterious unit of cavalry (or maybe the same as the one mentioned above) was a light regiment attached to Suchet’s command in Eastern Spain. This unit remained in Spain throughout the course of the conflict and was apparently disarmed in 1813 because of fears that it might desert to the enemy after the Allied conquest of their home state. Unfortunately, no trace of this unit can be found in any army lists and its identity remains a mystery. vii) There seem to be certain references to the presence of the Chevau-legers of the Westphalian Guard being present in the Peninsula, Martin Windrow stating that it was this regiment, and not the 1st Chevau-Legers, who were present at Talavera and at Majalahonda/Las Rozas. We thus referred to Digby Smith’s army lists and at Talavera discovered the mention of “Westphalian Chevau-Legers”, while at Las Rozas of “Westphalian Chevau-Leger-Lanciers”; however, there was no explicit designation of Guard or Line. Thus, the only clue as to these units’ true identity derives from the information given above concerning the temporary adoption of the lance by the 1st Chevau-Legers in 1811-12 - the front rank of the Guard Chevau-Legers appears to have been armed with lances from 1807 until they were disbanded in 1814. From this it COULD be deduced that the change of unit designation given by Digby Smith coincides with this change of armament and strongly hints that it was in fact the Line regiment present in these two actions BUT we had no way of knowing for sure if the units mentioned were actually the same regiment or two separate formations. Another element that may have caused confusion amongst historians and eye-witnesses is the similarity in uniform of these formations, the main noticeable difference being the colour of the facings - the 1st Regt sporting orange and the Guard red. After months, or even years, on campaign, would these two colours have been easily distinguishable? In total, 8,200 Westphalian troops (not including the Hanoverian Legion and the “Regiment Westphalien”) were despatched to Spain from 1808-13 of which 7,000 are listed as casualties - they had the highest casualty rate of all Napoleon’s allies in Spain, despite the majority of their number being allocated to Garrison duties. This is partially explained by an unusually high rate of desertion among some of the battalions - why? - because when Westphalia was formed, it included large tracts of territory original governed by Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel and Hanover and recruits from these regions were, on the whole, not too keen to serve Napoleon. Their nation states had been dissolved, their monarchs deposed and a man, Jerome Bonaparte, whom, it is alleged, men found hard to admire, now ruled them. Many Hanoverians and Brunswickers left their homes and took service with the British and it would appear that some of the Westphalian deserters also found their way into the British army, while others joined ranks with the Spanish guerrillas. One last point that requires a mention is the rather haphazard usage of the terms “Westphalian”, “Westfalian” and “Westphalien” which cropped up during our research - from what we were able to deduce, the first in the English rendering of the name, the second the German and the latter French. Could anyone confirm this? This is roughly about as far as we have got. All that is left is to list the points upon which we have become stuck.. i) Were the Westphalian Cuirassiers active in any other arenas besides Northern Germany in 1809 and Russia in 1812? ii) What were the designations of the two unidentified Westphalian Light Cavalry regiments, the first mentioned in Napier and the latter attached to Suchet’s command? iii) Were the Chevau-Legers of the Westphalian Guard present in the Peninsula conflict or is this an inaccurate rendering of events by certain historians? iv) Besides those mentioned above, were there any other Westphalian units present in Spain from 1808-14? v) Is there anything written above that is incorrect or disputed by a different source? Finally, any other info on the Westphalian participation in the Peninsula conflict would be warmly welcomed. Main Sources: The Napoleonic Wars Data Book by Digby Smith
Some Other Sources Used
Quatre Bras Dear Editor, May I express my pleasure in having read Leon Parté’s fine article on “Quatre Bras” in FE 59? I would like to take this opportunity of raising a couple of points that may be of interest to your readers. The question of exactly what was said at the meeting at Brye in the early afternoon of 16 June 1815 has attracted a good deal of attention from historians. As the various eyewitness accounts do not correspond with each other in the exactitude of their detail, it is unlikely that agreement will ever be reached on this issue. In such cases, I prefer to use the documented record and interpret that using logic to determine the likely sequence of events. What most accounts agree on is that Wellington promised to support Blücher with 20,000 men at Ligny. It would seem that two possible lines of advance by Wellington’s forces were discussed. First, as Gneisenau may well have suggested, from Quatre Bras; second, as Wellington appears to have said, down the Charleroi road and into Napoleon’s left flank. Logic tells me that Gneisenau most probably did suggest option one. This would leave the Prussians to do most of the fighting and give them credit for the victory. In this scenario, Wellington’s troops would have been subordinated to Blücher’s, in effect forming the reserve to the Prussians. Obviously, that would not be acceptable to Wellington, who most probably favoured option two as this allowed him independence of action. Furthermore, by taking the French in the flank,Wellington would have made the move that decided the battle and he could then have claimed the credit for the victory. As to later claims made that Wellington agreed to support the Prussians on the proviso he was not himself attacked, I consider it unlikely he ever made such a statement. My reasoning is that when Wellington left Quatre Bras about midday to ride to Brye, the skirmishing of that morning had stopped and there was no sign of French movement. Furthermore, the troops moving to Quatre Bras showed no signs of urgency until the Prince of Orange instructed them to advance rapidly, this happening only once it became clear the French were about to attack. The threat of a French attack occurred in Wellington’s absence, so the Duke could not have known about it. That being the case, why would he have made such a proviso? Wellington only found out about the assault on Quatre Bras when he returned there after the meeting with Blücher. That indicates that the proviso Wellington is claimed to have made was clouded by hindsight and thus put into his mouth at a later date. Incidentally, it was the Prince of Orange who saved the day for Wellington by calling up reinforcements in the Duke’s absence, a point that most Anglophone histories miss. I hope my comments have been of interest. The Coin Dear Dave, The coin illustrated in the last FE (May/June 2001) is in fact Spanish. Close examination shows VII after Ferdinand and HISP (Hispana for Spain), which shows it to be a coin of the Bourbon Ferdinand VII, dethorned by Napoleon in favour of Joseph. In relation to Austria, I should add that it is easy to mix up two more Ferdinands: 1) Archduke Ferdinand, eldest brother of Emperor Francis II/I, was originally Grand Duke of Tuscany, then from 1803, Elector of Salzburg, and from 1806, Grand Duke of Wurzburg.2) Archduke Ferdinand d’Este, cousin of Emperor Francis and from the d’Estes who ruled Lombardy as a Habsburg possession until 1800. He was the CinC of the Amry in Germany in 1805 with Mack as his Chief of Staff. Ferdinad saw the trap closing at Ulm and escaped with part of the army - we know what happened to Mack! Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #60 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |