A Bitter Feud?
An Examination of the Relationship
Between Ney and Soult
in Galicia in 1809
by Patrick E. Wilson UK
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At right: Soult
No where is this more evident then in the Peninsula, though there are later examples of none co-operation in Russia in 1812 and Germany in 1813. But a very early example occurred in Galicia in Northwest Spain in 1809 during the early stages of the Peninsula War and contained portents of things to come, although it should have been predictable given the nature of the officers involved.
Michel Ney and Jean de Dieu Soult had known each other some time, they had both served in the
revolutionary armies on the Rhine, and Ney's cavalry even rescuing Soult's infantry at the Battle of Alten-kirchen in 1796. (Ney's influences seem to have been Jean-Baptiste Kleber and Jean Bapiste Jules Bernadotte, both independent minded souls and able soldiers with a gift for looking after themselves. Soult's influences seem to have been Francois Lefebvre and Andre Massena, both hard fighting generals who evidently inspired Soult with their professionalism, determination and respect for discipline).
When Sir John Moore decided to advance into Spain in support of the Spanish armies in 1808, both Ney and Soult had arrived in Spain and had played a part in the defeat of the Spanish armies that autumn. Sir John Moore's intervention in Spain now drew them both into Galicia and laid the seeds of conflict between Ney and Soult which would eventually end in the abandonment of Galicia altogether by the French Army.
Catalyst
The catalyst, which bought about this unfortunate series of incidents, was Moore's decision to advance to engage Soult's Corps at Sahagun in December 1808.
Napoleon had by this time also heard that Moore was in Spain and was determined to annihilate him. But to do this he needed Soult to fix his attention whilst he descended on the Englishman's rear with the Imperial Guard and Marshal Ney's Corps, all the troops he had immediately available to hand. If Moore retreated Soult was to follow him closely and try and delay him.
However, Moore got wind of the trap and retreated just in time, teaching the Chasseurs a Cheval of the Imperial Guard some lessons in rearguard fighting. After this decided cheek Napoleon turned over the pursuit to Marshal Soult as his presence was needed urgently elsewhere. Soult undoubtedly was the best man for the job and certainly the most able French soldier in the area. Unfortunately Ney was also in the area and did not like the idea of taking orders from Soult, especially as he believed he should have been given the job. Ney's orders were to co-operate with Soult and provide him with all the necessary support in the pursuit of Moore's army.
In addition it should be pointed out that Ney's troops were tired, having forced marched from Madrid over the Guadarramas in the middle of winter, whilst Soult's Corps was relatively fresh, though not entirely fully concentrated. Still it was Soult's troops that conducted the pursuit for the most part, although Ney did lend him his cavalry brigade under Colbert. This unit was to be ignominiously repulsed at Calcabellos and Colbert, a close friend of Ney, took a sniper's bullet in the forehead. This cannot have helped relations between the two Marshals, as Ney sent his own aides to take care of Colbert's personnel effects, though Soult can hardly be blamed for the impetuosity and foolhardiness of others.
However, a few days later Soult's Corps encountered Moore's Army at Lugo fully drawn up for battle and prepared to fight. The position Moore had chosen was excellent defensively and would cost Soult dearly if he attacked it head on, Soult instead called on Ney for support and decided to wait until he had the numbers to feel confident of victory. Probing attacks confirmed Soult's initial suspicions about the strength of Moore's position. Soult waited the whole of the following day for Ney's support but that Marshal's help was not forthcoming, he was later to argue that Soult's request for support was not worded strongly enough and moreover the roads were difficult. But this sounds nothing like the man who attacked without orders at Jena or who is said to have precipitated the Eylau campaign by his actions.
As a result of Ney's non-appearance and Soult's inactivity Moore retreated again and thus the opportunity of inflicting, if not destroying a British army at Lugo, was missed. Soult again suggested that Ney lend him one of his divisions for the pursuit of Moore to ensure he had the resources next time to inflict a decisive defeat upon the British. But Ney was having none of it and drifted off into Galicia in pursuit of the Marquis de la Romana and the remnants of his Galician army and their supporting guerrillas, a task that he failed to accomplish and one that totally frustrated him.
Corunna
Soult, meanwhile was left to pursue Moore with his own troops and finally cornered Moore at Corunna but received a sharp repulse when he tried to drive Moore and his redcoats into the sea. Next day the British Army left of their own accord, though without Sir John Moore, who had been killed in the previous days fighting. Soult, after erecting a memorial to his opponent, was left in a position to claim that his campaign had ended successfully, in that he had driven Moore's Army out of northern Spain.
In the aftermath of Corunna, whilst Ney received the unenviable task of subduing the province of Galicia, Soult received orders from Marshal Berthier to more against the British troops that still remained in Portugal, his ultimate object being Lisbon and the Expulsion of the British from the Peninsula. At first things went well despite some hard fighting by the Portuguese, which delayed Soult's advance, but by March 1809 Soult had captured Oporto. Now however things went awry and Soult was beset by a series of problems, the worst of these being the in fighting and intrigue of a few of his own generals who undermined his authority and ultimately the military effectiveness of his command. An added problem had also arisen when the British government had decided to reinforce its forces in the Peninsula, General Craddock, then in control of 10,000 British troops at Lisbon, was reinforced by a certain Sir Arthur Wellesley to 25,000.
Wellesley's first target was to be Soult's dispersed and discontent command. It was a task that the new man on the block carried out with great skill, tumbling a surprised Soult out of Oporto and sending him in headlong retreat back into Galicia. It could have been worse but Soult abandoned much of his Artillery and wounded to the British, and despite the incompetence of some of his generals. Soult called it treachery, managed to reach the relative safety of Galicia at the end of May in 1809 with 19,000 exhausted men, many without muskets and with their uniforms in tatters.
This ignominious rout did nothing for Soult's reputation and when his men encountered Ney's troops, they received nothing but derision and contempt from their erstwhile comrades. Ney ignored Soult's request for artillery, equipment and supply, despite the presence of large amounts that had been captured from Moore's Army at the beginning of the year. Though possibly the real reason for Ney's intransigence in meeting Soult's requests lay in the brusque manner in which Soult asked for them. Ney was a touchy individual at the best of times and Soult would have been better advised to use a tact on this occasion, for he seems to have assumed that as senior Marshal he could treat Ney as just another subordinate general.
The net result of these bad management skills was a brisk feud between the two Marshals
that cumulated in Ney actually drawing his sword on Soult during one of their meetings. Only the quick intervention of their aides prevented Soult from learning of Ney's skill as a swordsman, he was incidentally one of the best in the French Army. Nor was this the first time Soult that had had a sword drawn on him, in 1805, the night before Austerlitz, Marshal Lannes had demanded satisfaction for an earlier incident. It proved another close thing, only Soult's quick and decisive response; "We have more important things to occupy our attention just now," cooled the situation.
This example clearly supports the idea that Soult had difficulty in dealing with the demands of co-operating successfully with his equals, or at least with the more cantankerous and volatile ones. He had no problems with Mortier or Lefebvre but then they were both amiable and likeable fellows.
Rumours
However, the problem of co-operation between Soult and Ney still remained, it was not aided by the calumny and taunting remarks of Ney's officers and men who went about with cries of "Roi Nicolas" in response to rumours that Soult had tried to get himself made king of Portugal whilst in Oporto. These rumours emanated from Generals Loison and Quesnel, two of the officers who had clashed with Soult in Portugal. Their accounts of Soult's activities had found their way to the ears of Ney and Thiebault (another enemy of Soult), who had lost little time in disseminating the story, despite it being questionable. The only way that the rift between Soult and Ney could be solved was by the so called Convention of Lugo, which laid down the respective responsibilities of each officer.
In return for all the guns, ammunition and supplies of British origin, Soult would support Ney in the pursuit of his objectives, namely the pursuit and capture of the Marquis de la Romana and the remnants of his army and their supporting guerrilla bands. To do this Soult would have to base himself on Montforte and advance on Orense but Soult also had the watch the Portuguese frontier, since the whereabouts of Wellesley was uncertain. Ney meanwhile had in addition to the above mentioned objectives the task of capturing Vigo. The treaty seemed to satisfy everyone. Ney happily marching off in pursuit of his objectives but on encountering stiff resistance at Oitaben he requested assistance from Soult, now supposedly advancing on Orense.
Imagine Ney's surprise when he learned that Soult was on his way to Zamora. Ney, quite understandably, was beside himself with rage, whatever Soult's motives were he felt let down. Abandoning his own advance he retreated out of Galicia altogether, picking up Soult's wounded, which he accused Soult of having abandoned, and burning no less then twenty seven
Galician towns and villages in his rage. On reaching Astorga Ney told all who would listen how Soult had; "left me with all his wounded and, having exhausted the supplies in all my depots he abandoned me at the moment I counted on his support".
Ney even sent his chief-of-staff, Henri Jomini, to Napoleon in Vienna to complain of Soult's conduct. Soult, for his part pointed out that he had followed the clauses of the convention, one of which pointed to his responsibility to keep an eye on the Portuguese frontier and in
advancing on Zamora he was doing just that. Still the recriminations between Ney and Soult blew up again, each accusing the other of abandoning Galicia and leaving a fellow marshal to their fate. The argument was rather academic, when there arrived, direct from Vienna,
an instruction from Napoleon ordering Soult to take command of three corps, his own, Mortier's and Ney's. But it was one thing to be nominated "commander-in-chief" by long distance order, quite another to put it into action.
Ney of course went ballistic and in a defiant mood handed over his troops to his senior general, Count Marchand, informing Soult that he had no confidence in him and writing to King Joseph, Napoleon's brother then on the throne of Spain, that he couldn't serve under such a man. When Soult tried to bring together his command and advance against Wellesley, sending his orders direct to Marchand. Ney stepped in to forbid Marchand to move, arguing that Soult's plan was doomed to failure and he would rather be shot then be associated with it, whilst King Joseph intervened to temporarily deprive Soult of Mortier's services too! The net result of all of this was that Wellesley had the opportunity to march from the Tagus towards Madrid and engage Marshal Victor in the drawn Battle of Talavera before Soult could intervene effectively. Still, Soult almost caught up with Wellesley, having now gotten his troops together and Ney to play ball. Mortier scattered a enemy force near the Banos Pass, Soult's Corps seized the bridge at Arzobispo, where General Caulaincourt's Dragoons routed a Spanish force and took 600 prisoners. But Ney failed to find the ford at Almarez and cut off Wellesley from Portugal and therefore let the British Army escape to fight another day. Soult's disappointment can be imagined but there was yet another blow to come when he was refused permission to pursue and complete the destruction of Wellesley's battered forces.
Soult saw his command broken up soon afterwards, leaving only his own corps under his direct orders, whilst Ney, to his joy, found himself posted to the Salamanca area with the task of holding down the province of Leon. Though Ney's joy was to be short lived, for in October of that year he suddenly told to go on leave by Napoleon and his period in Galicia was over. It had been a disaster from beginning to end and he was probably glad to leave, plus he was rid of
Marshal Soult and was not to see that officer until the fateful campaign of 1815. But he was not to know that at the time. Soult meanwhile had been promoted to King Joseph's "Major-General" in place of Marshal Jourdan, who had went home because of ill health (and perhaps, the feeling that he was ignored by almost everyone). Soult was probably glad to see the back of Ney but had others to contend with now, such as Victor and General Sebastiani. Though these proved a little easier to handle than the volatile Ney.
Soult would remain in the Peninsular for almost the rest of the Napoleonic wars and can be seen as more successful then most in coping with the demands and difficulties of command in that theatre. Ney and Soult were to meet again in the Waterloo campaign, they held key positions and one can wonder whether their performances suffered because of bad memories from their time in Galicia. Did Ney when he suddenly found d'Erlon's Corps marching off without his authorisation think of Galicia? Did his subsequent actions have something to do with distant memories of Galicia? It is certainly worth consideration when we analyse the Marshal's performance at Quatre Bras on the 16th and 17th June 1815.
Finally, were Ney and Soult conducting a personnel feud in Galicia in 1809, I have my doubts, primarily because of the different characteristics of the two men involved. Ney was temperamental and easily provoked at the best of times, he needed to be treated with tact and that was something Soult, a brusque and aloof individual was unable to do. It is important to remember that Soult experienced problems with Marshals from time to time, Ney was not an exception, only the most famous of Napoleon's Marshalate. Therefore we can argue that the dispute between Ney and Soult was due to a lack of Communication and interpersonal skills. What was needed was one of them to sit down and talk calmly about what was required of the other, the characters of both prevented this, their own up bringing prevented this and consequently, they were unable to settle their differences of opinion once and for all.
This is one of the major flaws within the Napoleonic Marshalate, many of its officers were promoted from below and this may have been an excellent way to reward good combat officers. But many lacked the social skills necessary for their high rank, especially the essential interpersonal skills required for effective communication and command. Soult himself realised this and had his highly intelligent staff officers teach him much of what they knew. Ney and Soult are therefore just two examples of a serious flaw, one of many that existed within
Napoleon's Empire as a whole. It had a magnificent edifice but the foundations were unsound.
Chandler, David G., (ed) Napoleon's Marshals (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987).
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One of the most interesting subjects of the Napoleonic
Wars is undoubtedly the French Marshalate of the period. The officers Napoleon promoted to this rank were a very mixed bunch and came from every level of society in Napoleonic France, having risen to their high rank through sheer merit and of course, being in the right place at the right time. But the Marshalate also had a very serious flaw and this was to show itself whenever Napoleon himself was not present, the men who made up the Marshalate, with very few exceptions, could not or would not co-operate with each other.
Ney (right) and Soult had quite different characters, Ney was a hot-tempered hussar who came under the early influence of independent minded souls and would later display this characteristic in abundance! Soult however was a cold and reserved soldier, very successful as chief of staff
to Lefebvre and as a second-in-command to Massena during the Revolutionary wars. He displayed a professional spirit and a determination that marked him out early for high command, he understood the need for discipline and was noted for his abilities as an administrator, and this is shown in his soldiers nickname for him: 'Iron hand'. Unfortunately these very same qualities were an enigma to a hussar like Ney and consequently a clash of personalities was almost inevitable, given Ney's well known quarrelsome nature and Soult's brusque manner in dealing with others.