Reproducing the
Napoleonic Command Experience

Part Two: The Machin Model

by David Commerford

Part 1

In the first part of this article (FE53) I looked at the requirements and the history of Command in Wargaming. I closed with a comparison of the work of George Jeffrey and James Machin. Jeffery, a pioneer in the simulation school of writers and Machin who now moves the war games design, into the area of the model.

So What's a Model?

A Model is primarily, a direct representation of a process, or real life entity. It is concerned with depicting its namesake by copying its fit, form and function, in a one for one fashion and relying on this direct replication to produce an acceptable result.

The main advantage of a model is ability to provide 'insights' into 'cause and effect' relationships because of this replication of the inner workings of the processes involved. Thus you are able to see into the process and use this information to help determine why things work the way they do.

The major disadvantage to a model is that its ability to replicate an entity is based on the quality and level of detail of the information it is founded on. In many cases, such as the Napoleonic wars, that kind of detailed information does not always exist in its entirety.

A simulation is an imitation or interpretation of the effect that this entity has on its surroundings. Its focus is on the overall appearance and outcome, not the duplication of the inner workings or their relationship. Its main strength lies in the fact that you do not need to have all the details correct in order to produce an acceptable answer to a given problem. This is because the simulation's emphasis is on outcome. For example you don't really need to know allot about what the muzzle velocity, or the round to round dispersion pattern, or even the rate of fire of the weapon system, so long as you can produce an acceptable result in terms of reproducing the battlefield effect.

This can be a very powerful tool, especially when used to support the operation of a higher working level simulation, because you are less concerned about of the effect of this minor detail as you are about the simulation itself. Thus, in effect you are simply creating a 'Black Box' to produce a result.

The main disadvantage is the lack of an audit trail. All you have is a result that mirrors reality. Looking beneath the surface only reveals the process by which you created this answer. It can't tell you much about how or why this answer relates to reality. In this sense it is hard to trace the failure in a command decision as some of the process may be approximated. This is often the case in commercial wargames.

Both Modelling & Simulations are acceptable methods that can be used either exclusively or in conjunction with one another to obtain a specific design goal or objective. For example Flight Simulations use several different models (Physics, Aerodynamics, Weather etc.) to produce an overall result.

Modelling in V & D

At this point I would like to make clear, that while V & D uses models, Machin does not attempt to Model everything within the game. Indeed, some things, fear, morale and combat, for example, cannot be truly dealt with in this manner. I think that it's interesting to note, that a lot of gamers and indeed some rules writers, put a lot of stock by Fire tables, in relation to the outcome of combat. On the assumption that they are producing some form, or part of, a Combat Model. When in fact what they are doing is Modelling weapon performance, often on too pure a basis, where insufficient account of the effects of visibility and terrain are allowed for. Combat in real terms has many more abstractions. Think of the first KGL horse falling into the French square a Garcia Hernandez and you may see the difference.

However, the hub of the rules, the command and decision process, is modelled using examination of historical events and the quantifiable aspects of human sight, reaction time etc. to reproduce within levels of accuracy not previously found in commercial wargaming. There are other benefits that can be accrued from this design philosophy, to quote the nineteenth-century Scottish scientist, Lord Kelvin, "When you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but, when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind". It is this area that makes V&D different as by using access to published military data it crosses from the world of Livermore into hobby gaming. Sees — Understands — Decides — Implements — Executes

"No matter what the form or subject of the wargame model, good ones share the following key characteristics and features:

    a) They accurately reflect factors most prominent for player decision levels.
    b) They are flexible enough to deal with unusual decisions.
    c) They are stochastic in nature (use probability to formulate solutions).
    d) They are documented to allow others to understand the assumptions and procedures used in their construction.

Notice that chief among these characteristics is the need to accurately reflect the most prominent features of the decision process." (Dr. Peter P. Perla, "The Art of Wargaming", U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD 1990, p.215-6.)

Those of you not already asleep by now may remember my references to the Boyd Cycle or OODA Loop in Part One of this little enterprise. It has an essential place in the command sequence, if fact it is, THE COMMAND SEQUENCE! It does not matter if your game is simultaneous or turn based, if does not revolve around the above (which, if it sounds like it's been ripped from a Field Manual, is because it probably has) you may as well be playing Snakes and Ladders.

It simply must be there. It is describes way all combats are addressed and in fact should be the bedrock of rules for any period. When real people, with real guns, play for real. It is the rotation that allows smaller, better-trained forces to defeat larger, less competent ones, by the seizure and maintenance of the initiative.

OODA in Practice

During the Second World War the Germans became renowned practitioners of what was know as Auftragstaktik (mission tactics). This being the concept of flexible command, where well trained troops lead by competent NCOs and Junior Officers operated under a Mission Order, which outlined the objectives, allocated resources and then in the main, left matters to those on the ground to carry them out. Thus the fast moving units of the Blitzkrieg could bound forward, confident that someone was backing them up, while they were using their training and initiative to press forward and deal with local problems.

This doctrine relies on the complimentary concept of Schwerpunkt for effect. Schwerpunkt, the focus of energy, or decision point, is what keeps the whole thing moving by concentration of force, or effort, at key points. By having relative strength at enemy weak points, as you break them, Auftragstaktik comes into play and people not bound by tight orders, can refocus Schwerpunkt on the next point, based on local observation, break that and so on. The objective is to keep the enemy constantly off balance and your force driving forward in order to give no chance of recovery.

The classic manifestation would be the Wehrmacht's operations in France during 1940, or Russia in 1941. If I were asked to nominate a Napoleonic example my first thoughts would be III Corps at Auerstadt. Where the operations of a smaller, well trained and more flexible force, who's leadership reacted with a series of aggressive, animated command decisions, at all levels, not only prevented them being annihilated by a superior force but lead to a significant victory.

The essential driver of Auftragstaktik is the previously mentioned OODA loop. Once you are at the Schewrpunkt, he who loops fastest wins. What's this got to do with wargames? Well, quite a lot actually. As along with Befehlstakitik (order or command tactics) the more constrained, traditional written order, formal planning approach, it's also a way of describing and analysing C2 and associated activity. As I commented in my first article, while the likes of Guderian and Rommel might spring to mind in association with these concepts, commanders through out history have striven to produce these results, with varying degrees of success.

To recap, Observation (of the enemy, your dispositions, the ground your fighting over etc). Orientation (to enemy actions, actual, as well as possible and tactical circumstances). Decision (what you do in the light of what you see). Action (translation of what you have determined into action) is what it's all about. A command structure that lets you go through this process faster than your enemy means you always have the jump on him, you win, he loses.

So in any game, not only should the French in their prime, get through this little lot PDQ, compared to the Austrians for example but you as the commander need to be doing better than the player opposite you. Any rules that can't deliver on differences in the national levels of competency and reward you for being able to run the loop on behalf of your units, do not meet the test of Command Reproduction. End of Story!

Now, in our period unfortunately it is not quite that simple. Our alter egos lived in a Befehlstakitik world. No choice really, Auftragstaktik is fine when everyone is trained and reasonably well educated but it also helps if you don't have to wait half an hour while a horseman gallops across the field. Although of course the latter consideration more or less effects everyone equally. Hence, a historical reliance on written orders and constrained command methods.

There is also a problem in that we have to have the formality of Befehlstakitik mixed in with a little local Auftragstaktik where it would be historical to allow it. French Imperial ADC's on a mission from God, Archduke Charles grabbing Grenadiers (yes I've heard the rumours) that sought of thing. Also differences in training and national doctrine come into play, as does the year in question. Auerstadt, could not be reproduced by the French army of 1814, for example, although Napoleon himself did manage it in the Champaubert, Montmirail, Vauchamps phase of that campaign by exploiting the terrain and poor enemy dispositions.

However, many rules fail the test of accuracy at the first hurdle, visibility. Almost all allow commanders far too much information and total understanding of what the figures on the table represent.

To illustrate this let me remind you of Waterloo and a point in the in the famous film. You may recall that both Commanders are notified of movement to their flank. At first they are not sure if it is a body of troops at all. There follows the agonies of uncertainty. What are their uniforms? Are they French or are they Prussian? All is agitation and indecision. It may have been Rod Stiger and Christopher Plummer up there on the screen but the portrayal of their reactions was real enough.

Can you see? If you can see, do you understand what you see? If so, then you can make a decision. Having decided, give an order and only then will something start to happen.

Not only does V& D address the basic needs of this process it goes several steps further in that it replicates through the Sees — Understands — Decides — Implements — Executes mantra, the OODA process itself and uses it as a the games core. The game turn if you like, although the game has no fixed turn as such, rather a rolling sequence of a events.

The Command Figure – This Time it's Personal

Attempts at controlling player's ability to acquire visible information are not new. However, in most rules when matched against the command and communication possibilities of the period, the S.U.D.I.E. sequence is too easily influenced by events that are Beyond Visual Range of the Commander depicted on the tabletop.

What tends to happen is that the infamous "helicopter view" takes over and we allow players to composite information, that they would only have access to in a piece meal fashion, if they were actually present, in the field. The common practice, even where movement blocks are used to conceal troops, of revealing what can be seen on contact, so that a player commander can access what is happening a mile or two away instantly. Gives both a time and a knowledge advantage that is foreign to an accurate model of the process.

In V&D Machin has gone for a simple premise, based on the fact that action can only be brought about by information, of tying the command process to the whereabouts and activity of the command figure(s). Put simply, this means that if your representative figure can see what's happening (it's in range and angle) and passes the required dice rolls, to both confirm this observation and the information gained (this is the "understands" element) things can be made to happen. However, if you/your figure is engaged in rallying a unit, for example, or issuing detailed orders to you chief of staff perhaps, the opportunity for this possibly key moment of observation, may pass unnoticed.

The actual observation data and terrain factors used in V & D are real. Taken from field trials under various conditions, including smoke effects, using real people to assess the visual possibilities. They are not a mere question of what the author feels is right, in terms the ground scale of the game, or the size of the local clubs table or any other criteria.

In addition, players like people in real life cannot do everything at once. Choices must be made. Is it better to remain in a prominent position and spend the maximum time observing the field, in the hope you will be able to issue more telling instructions later? Or, dash Wellington like, over to a known point of crisis and make a personal intervention to steady the situation while relying on your staff (oh yes, they have "eyes" too) to keep track of things, if they can.

Speaking of staff. They have a part to play. Machin has included within the command structure mechanisms that allow for the collection and transmission of information by staff and units. These are not as far reaching, or efficient, as personal action by a command figure but rather designed to help fill in grey areas so that the game does not degenerate purely into an exercise in placing commanders. It is the combined use this peripheral information and personal observation/direction that will, with a good plan, win the battle.

Gentlemen, Place Your Bets

Two further aspects that I if feel sets V&D apart, in the command area, are the army moral function and command authority. With most rules there is an element of orders in one form or another although some of the most popular have no provision for this what so ever. The very enjoyable and much played Fire and Fury being a classic example of the latter (although my group has grafted on, with minor amendments, the order system from General de Brigade, which works quite well).

However, isn't it wonderful how your opponent so often happens to have another unit on call, in the right place at the right time? Or, to be honest, how many times have you, just slid that battalion, brigade, or what ever to cover a collapse or unexpected manoeuvre. When in truth you just plonked them there at the start of the game without thinking of what you were going to do with them at all.

Well this needs to be addressed if you want a command model. The old adage about a place for everything and everything in its place must apply.

Resource Management is a part of being a commander, using a force to it's optimum effect involves having the right amount of force for the allocated tasks in the right area. To this you have to decide on what your units will be doing during the game. In V&D every force must have an order. Not in itself a revolutionary concept but the manner of using the order system is interesting.

There have been in the past rules which used the idea of Army Moral. Often these have been tied to unit loses either in strength or accumulative moral loss. Here again Machin has attempted something different by introducing an element of direct risk. Each type of "Mission" is given a fixed value in accordance with the risk to the overall enterprise. So a main attack, or a key defence, has a high value and a diversion or a support role a lower one. The success or failure of these individual tasks is what adds up to the success or failure of the army. In effect you are wagering the success or failure of the outcome on where you chose to make the key actions happen. This need not be in terms of a high risk manoeuvre, although of course it could be, rather in terms of if you commit 60% of your units to a particular activity, you had better make sure that they are successful or the results will be pretty dire.

This then adds a risk to the decisions that are made, if you chose to attack in the wrong place, or handle it badly the impact on the overall army position will be high, even if minor actions elsewhere go well. In this manner the game not only forces you to consider your decisions, you must support your judgement and if you are wrong a clear outcome will present itself. Games will not drag on while you haggle over the finer points of a loosing position, as your overall force will not sustain such argument.

This should give a more realistic game than those were speed of players thought and rapid reaction to orders allows a lost battle to be sustained far beyond the point where a defeated general would be trying to break off the action.

The Command Authority aspect is a reinforcement to the order process which stops the sloughing off of units to undertake unauthorised activity. In that there is a standard test which prevents players just picking up any old unit and throwing it in to the fight. Units must function within the chain of command and the operational order. They may defend themselves, but don't expect to be able to get your lancers to charge if no one is on hand with the authority to order it.

Final Thoughts

I hope I have been able to give some insight to the alternative possibilities of James Machin's work and what is involved in meeting the criteria for a Command Model. There is more to tell. The built in control that will keep non player directed units acting within the boundaries of national doctrine, for example. However, for me the key stone is the manner in which he uses military data on human performance in regard to reaction times, visibility and decision making, in a manner consistent with widely accepted command principals that are linked to the Naploeonic period and use of time by commanders.

As Napoleon himself said, "The loss of time is irretrievable in war, the excuses that are advanced are always bad ones, for operations go wrong only through delays

"It may be that in the future I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute"

The rules themselves have already been demonstrated in pre production form at US conventions and are currently under going the traditional "good hammering" that seems the norm for all sets these days, prior to them becoming commercially available. Hopefully, they will come out the other side of this arduous process ready to give the Napoleonic enthusiast a taste of what was really involved in the Command Experience.

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