Rosenberg: A Bad General or Just A Maligned One?
Introduction
by Patrick E. Wilson
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At the end of the 1809 campaign many of the high ranking Austrian officers who had taken part were either decorated or promoted for their contribution to it, though many had neither showed much distinction or demonstrated any special talent.
One who was not promoted or decorated was Feld-Marshall Leutnant Print Franz von Rosenberg-Orisini, a German officer of Italian descent, who had fought with Archduke Charles in 1796 and 1805, and had just fought in most of the important battles of 1809 but was now ignored by Archduke Charles as he rewarded his most immediate officers for their services. It seems that Rosenberg was being blamed for losing the battle of Wagram and therefore the war against Napoleon, the Emperor of France.
Though to this author it seems that he was more sinned against then sinned, and therefore this essay is an attempt to show that Rosenberg did everything that could be expected of him at Wagram and Eckmühl.
In early 1809 the Austrian army organised itself into a number of Corps d'Armée along the French model and Feld-Marshall Leutnant Rosenberg found himself appointed commander-in-chief of the IV Corps. Like many other high-ranking officers of the Austrian army Rosenberg had had little experience of handling a formation of such size, the average Austrian corps consisting of about 30,000 men, 2,000 cavalry and 8 or more batteries of artillery.
Rosenberg's corps for the campaign initially consisting of 27 battalions, 16 squadrons of cavalry and 10 batteries of artillery or 27,800 men and 60 guns organised into 3 divisions, a large formation for any General inexperienced in the command of such numbers. Rosenberg, like his colleagues, had previously been used to an army of columns of "division" sized formations, with which they could and did perform well with, notably at Marengo and the 2nd battle of Caldiero. A whole corps would be a different matter, though Archduke Charles had tried to tackle this problem with his manual, "The Fundamentals of the Higher Art of War for the Generals of the Austrian Army." which covered everything from Strategy to the basic principles of war, such as protection of convoys or field fortifications. Nevertheless there still remained that fundamental flaw in the Austrian higher command as the day of renewed war with France approached, and that was the lack of experience that Archduke Charles' Generals possessed, though some were to perform well enough and amongst these we must place Rosenberg.
On 10th April 1809 the Austrian army invaded Bavaria and thus began the Franco-Austrian war of 1809. At first, all went well as the Austrian army drove back the Bavarian army before it and seized a central position between two major elements of the French army, Marshal Davoust in the Regensburg area and the rest of the French army at Donauworth. This ultimately led Archduke Charles (the Austrian Commander-in-chief), to direct his main forces to encircle and destroy Davoust at the earliest moment. One of the officers involved in this manoeuvre was General Rosenberg, who with his IV corns soon found himself immersed in a life and death struggle with Davoust's veteran 3rd corps in the wooded and hilly terrain of the Regensburg area.
First Clash
Their first clash occurred during the battle of Teugen-Hausen on the 19th April, when Davoust's left-hand divisions fought their way past both Rosenberg's IV corps and General Hohenzollern-Hechingen's III corps. But the battle, which really demonstrates Rosenberg's military talent and the Archduke Charles' unhelpful attitude towards some of his Generals, occurred a couple of days later at Eckmühl. Here Rosenberg found himself under attack from a number of directions and was left to get out of it the best way he could.
The morning of the 22nd April 1809 found Rosenberg in the Laichling area, to the north east of Eckmühl, a few kilometres above the Gross Laber River. It was a strong position consisting of the Unter and Ober Laichling villages with a range of hills behind, the right of the position was anchored on extensive woodland and the left by the Gross Laber River, which in turn was covered by the Bettel Berg, where Rosenberg had placed his reserve artillery under an energetic officer. Indeed, the position had demonstrated it's strength the day before when Rosenberg's men had successfully held out against a determined attack by Marshal Davoust's formidable divisions. The combat had raised the mural of Rosenberg's men and proved that they could, given the right environment, fight as well as the French.
However, the coming battle promised a somewhat; different; type of affair from that of the 27th simply because, and perhaps unknown to Rosenberg, the Austrians were to be heavily outnumbered from the very beginning. Rosenberg's orders for the day were to hold his current position whilst Archduke Charles attacked Davoust's right; with the main body of his army, though luckily for Davoust but unfortunately for the Archduke. The French Marshal had moved the majority of his forces to his left and had left only his cavalry under the redoubtable General Montbrun to entertain the Austrians on his right. The net result being that the Archduke's attack caused very little damage to Davoust's corps and even less to the overall strategic picture. The main development and fighting of the day occurred on Rosenberg's front a front the Archduke ignored and left in the hands of Rosenberg. Indeed, it can be argued that Rosenberg found himself placed in an unenviable position and left to get out of it the best way he could.
To understand the true nature of Rosenberg's position on that April day, one has to be aware of the bigger strategic picture, for not only did Rosenberg fact: Davoust's corps but, also Lefebvre's Bavarians and these were to be joined by other formations which Napoleon had hurried up from Landshut, and which guaranteed the French numerical superiority in the battle of Eckmühl. Nevertheless, Rosenberg and his men fought a courageous and valiant battle that afternoon and did the reputation of the Austrian army great honour,
The battle itself did not begin until noon that day, when Davoust's regiment the 10th Legere attacked and captured the village of Unter Laichling, though not without casualties, The combat then escalated, as more and more troops from both sides were drawn into the affair, furious skirmishes took place in the adjacent woods, the Austrians delivered a few memorable cavalry charges and their infantry fought with their usual professionalism but the French slowly gained the upper hand and Rosenberg lost his position to Davoust's well planned attack. Although the really decisive moment came when a French Cuirassier attack overwhelmed the artillery position on the Bettel Berg, a position that the Bavarian cavalry and infantry had been unable to secure earlier in the day. Despite his evident defeat, Rosenberg managed to pull hack his corps and retreat down the road toward Regensburg because the French attacking forces had managed to get themselves entangled in the developing twilight of the day.
French cavalry did catch up but by then the Austrian reserve cavalry had also came up and a very large cavalry battle developed near the village of Alt Eglofsheim. A combat that allowed Rosenberg's battered corps to escape the field of Eckmühl and eventually reach the safety of Bohemia. From where it would then take part in the great battles of Aspern-Essling and Wagram, and it is to the latter we must turn in our discussion.
Wagram
Rosenberg's role in the battle of Wagram was very important, for not only did he hold a key position but he also held the Austrian left flank and therefore was the General who would be the first to receive the support of Archduke John and his Army of Italy. Rosenberg's position on the edge of the Wagram escarpment was essentially a strong one the village of Markgrafneusiedl, which was protected in front by the Russbach stream, acted as a major redoubt and formed the centre of his defensive line and was undoubtedly the pivot of position. In addition there were a number of infantry trenches on the escarpment behind, which added extra support to the troops, which would defend Markgrafneusiedl. Rosenberg's command consisted of his own IV corps, General Nordmann's Advance guard and General Nostitz's light cavalry division. Many of the regiments were under strength, especially Nordmann's Advance guard which had sustained heavy casualties in fighting against the French advance the previous day. Nevertheless, Rosenberg had positioned his forces carefully, his infantry divisions defended Markgrafneusiedl and the Russbach stream, Nordmann positioned his Advance guard in close support, forming his infantry and cavalry in a double line ready to intervene at a moment's notice. Nostitz formed his 26 squadrons of light cavalry to the left of Rosenberg's main position. Together these military formations faced the divisions of Marshal Davoust; in some cases for a second or third time in the campaign.
Rosenberg's orders for the 6th July 1809 were delivered at very short notice, about 2.00am in the morning and he was due to attack at 4.00am! Again it may be worthwhile if we take a brief look at the overall strategic picture. Napoleon had crossed the River Danube on the night of the 4th 3uly in a brilliant manoeuvre that combined perfect timing with audacity and drove the Austrian army back onto the Marchfeld on the 5th 3uly. The Marchfeld was a ground that was familiar to most Austrian soldiers for it was the place where peacetime manoeuvres were held, it was also the place Archduke Charles had chosen to fight on. There are a number of reasons for this firstly it offered some good defensive positions with the numerous villages that lay dotted about the area, secondly the flatness of the ground offered the Austrian artillery a perfect killing ground and perhaps more importantly, the ground offered the Austrian army the type of terrain it preferred to fight upon.
In the early hours of 6th 3uly the Austrian army was deployed in a semicircle facing the French army, on its left flank stood Rosenberg's corps in position behind the Russbach stream and the village of Markgrafneusiedl, next came Hohenzollern's and Bellegarde's corps behind the villages of Bauemdorfs and Wagram respectively. At right angles to them stood the reserve corps under Prince Johann Liechtenstein opposite the village of Aderklaa, where there had been some particularly fierce fighting against the Saxons on the night of the 5th. Finally on the Austrian right stood Klenau's and Kollowrat's corps, which were actually out of sight of the French.
On the French side, Davoust opposed Rosenberg whilst his colleagues Oudinot and Eugene de Beauharnais faced the villages of Bauemdorfs and Wagram. Bernadotte with the Saxons, supported by Massena's excellent corps stood opposite Liechtenstein's reserve corps.
Archduke Charles had conceived a Cannae like plan where his flanks would descend upon the French in a manner similar to that employed by Hannibal against C. Terentius Varro and his legions in 216 BC. Indeed at times in the forthcoming battle it looked as if something along these lines may very well happen to the French. As the French army fought off one crisis after another, the battle of Wagram was to be a very close fought thing and Rosenberg was to play a very full part.
His orders for the 6th July 1809 were to attack Davoust around the villages of Glinzendorf and Grosshofen, whilst Klenau and Kollowrat simultaneously attacked the French left and rear. Bellegarde and Liechtenstein would hold themselves in readiness to administer the Coup de Grace. The attack would go in at 4.00am. Unfortunately the late arrival of orders everywhere meant that only Rosenberg found himself in a position to attack on time and he did so dutifully and caught Davoust off guard, and was even making some progress against Davoust's fearsome troops when he received an order to break off his attack and return to his original position. This was because Rosenberg had been the only one who had attacked on time and thus if he pressed too hard he could find himself out on a limb if the enemy counter attacked. Archduke Charles was wise to order Rosenberg to pull back as he did and anyway Rosenberg had had an impact upon the battle already, for his attack had totally wrung footed the French and they would take several hours to recover from it, and as a direct result the rest of the Austrian army would find itself with several opportunities to not only defeat but possibly smash the French army as Archduke Charles had intended.
Markgrafneusiedl
Meanwhile the battle on Rosenberg's front had sprung into action around the village of Markgrafneusiedl, for it was here that Davoust concentrated his initial efforts with two of his divisions (Pacthod and Gudin). Rosenberg's Austrians (the Stain infantry regiment, the Erzherzog Karl Legion and several hundred Landwher), defended the village of Markgrafneusiedl with a stubbornness that had hardly been known in earlier battles. Repeatedly Rosenberg's men stopped the advance of the French but Pacthod and Gudin persevered with their assault and gradually gained a foothold in Markgrafneusiedl. Elsewhere Davoust's other divisions assaulted Rosenberg's left wing but here too his men hold out and even counterattack with some success. However the fight was taking it's toll, especially amongst Rosenberg's commanders, for General Nordmann fell in counterattack and General Vecsey was killed in the fight for Markgrafneusiedl. Eventually exhaustion and fire drove Rosenberg's men out of the village and by 11.00am the French had captured the devastated ruins that had once been Markgrafneusiedl, and yet the fighting continued in the rear of the village for a tower that dominated the area.
But that too was soon in French hands as Friant (one of Davoust's other divisional Generals), stormed the tower at the second attempt and joined up with Pacthod and Gudin. At this point Rosenberg pulled hack his line and stood to face all that Davoust's four divisions could throw against him. Davoust's renewed assault was not long in coming hut Rosenberg very nearly overwhelmed him in a spectacular and well timed cavalry attack that scattered some of Davoust's first line. Fortunately for Davoust, the attack was made piecemeal and Davoust's cavalry came to the rescue and began to turn the tables on Rosenberg's exhausted men, for Davoust's cavalry had found Rosenberg's flank and driven off General Nostitz who had been positioned there. Rosenberg's position was now compromised and he could only retreat, which meant his neighbour, had to retreat too, namely Hohenzollern and Bellegarde, it was a decisive moment in the battle. Luckily the French were exhausted too and the Austrian commander-in-chief, Archduke Charles himself had realised the exposed nature of his position once Rosenberg had been compelled to retreat. As a result Rosenberg, like the rest of the Austrian army, was able to retreat to fight another day. Rosenberg himself had throughout the battle fought well with what he had, often in dangerous situations and against a numerical superior enemy, and yet he carried out his duty and remarkably well under the circumstances.
After the battle of Wagram, Rosenberg successfully withdrew his corps into Bohemia exchanging shots with Massena as he did so. Indeed, his rearguard under General Radetsky convinced Massena he faced a lot more troops then he did and as a result Rosenberg got away to Brunn via Nikolsburg, and thus missed the last battle of the campaign at Zniam.
Performance?
What can be said of Rosenberg's performance in the campaign as a whole? On the whole it appears no worse then could be expected of an Austrian General of the period but on deeper investigation it can be seen that Rosenberg did better then could be expected of an Austrian General. Again and again he found himself placed in unenviable positions and to the surprise of many, and the honour of the Austrian army, skilfully extracted himself at both Eckmühl and Wagram. In both cases he was outnumbered, up against the formidable Davoust, attacked from different directions and held a key position in the Austrian line but nevertheless performed creditably, even well under the circumstances.
Under any criteria, especially those of a military operation, his performance has to be applauded. For not only did he attempt and partially carry out his orders to the letter but when they proved impossible, given the local circumstances, he was able to withdraw his forces and break contact with the enemy and retreat to fight another day. Though it can he argued that he was aided in this by the disorganised and disordered state of the enemy at the time.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Archduke Charles was wrong to blame Rosenberg for defeat at Wagram and use him as a scapegoat for the failure of the campaign, when there were others who deserved the accolade more then him. For I do not believe he did a wrong thing in the entire campaign. Indeed, he demonstrated a thoroughly professional approach to his position and was a credit to the Austrian army whilst others, it has to he said, demonstrated a capacity that was hardly equal to the name of General.
Arnold, James R., Crisis on the Danube; Napoleon's Austrian Campaign of 1809 (Arms and Armour: London, 1990).
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