An Unfortunate Trio:
Napoleon's Command Team of 1815
Part 2
by Patrick E. Wilson, UK
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On the 12th June 1815, Marechal Michel Ney received a letter from Marechal Louis Davoust ordering him to join the Armée du Nord, the message from Napoleon read: 'Send for Marechal Ney and tell him that if he wishes to be present for the first battles, he ought to be at Avenes on the fourteenth.' [9]
It was a surprise appointment, for Ney and Napoleon had not been on the best of terms since April 1814 when Ney had led the famous 'Mutiny of the Marechals' Indeed, it seems that Ney was a last minute replacement for Marechal Edouard Mortier, who had fallen ill with an attack of Sciatica. As Mortier wrote in his diary: 'I have violent pains accompanied by chills. M. Percy examined me and warned me that this would continue for forty days. Since I cannot possibly mount a horse, I sent my regrets to the Chief-of-Staff for my inability, in this condition, to share the glory and dangers of the Army... ' [10]
This was a severe blow to Napoleon who, on the opening of a new campaign, lust a tough fighting general who excelled at being a perfect subordinate and, what is perhaps more important, was admired and liked by every general officer in the Army. Ney was no where near this officer in the popularity stakes and one wonders why he responded to Napoleon's summons at all considering the fact that he'd largely been ignored since Napoleon's return to France.
Nevertheless, Ney and his principal aide-de-camp Colonel Heymes, arrived at Avesnes on 13th June.
There Ney met Napoleon, who was on this occasion very amiable but told Ney nothing of what his command would be or the overall strategy for the campaign. Perhaps Napoleon still hoped Mortier would recover and he would not have to make use of Ney, and this is demonstrated by the fact that when Napoleon left Avenes, he left Ney with no positive idea of what he was to do or any means of following him. Indeed, Ney and his aide Heymes arrived at Beaumont in a requisitioned peasant's cart, (Beaumont was where Napoleon had moved his Headquarters to). Here Ney sought out the ill Mortier and whilst consoling him on his illness, bought two fine battle chargers from him and it was on these that Ney finally caught up with Napoleon at Charleroi on 15th June.
To Ney's surprise Napoleon give him command of the entire French left wing and told him to: 'Go and drive the Enemy back along the Brussels road.' [11]
This placed Ney at a great disadvantage, not only had he no opportunity to get to know his principal commanders and the organisation of his command but he had to quickly improvise his own staff there and then. Undeterred, Ney left his aide Colonel Heymes to organise a staff of some sort and set off to join General Reille, who was then in the process of taking Gosselies from the Prussians. Ney ordered a division to follow the retreating Prussians and sent a cavalry division to reconnoitre towards Frasnes and Quatre-Bras. A subsequent report confirmed that Quatre-Bras was held in some strength, Ney sent some infantry to support the cavalry at Frasnes and then ordered a halt for the night. This was a wise decision as his men were fatigued by their marching and fighting on what was a very humid day. Returning to Gosselies form his outposts Ney found no word from Napoleon, writing to Soult at 11.00pm that Quatre-Bras appeared to be held in strength, Ney then instructed Heymes to get the names and strengths of the units under his command.
But still concerned at the lack of orders from Napoleon, he returned to Charleroi for new instructions. Arriving at midnight, Napoleon ordered a late supper and apart from criticising him for not pushing on to Quatre-Bras, left Ney with the distinct impression that the main thrust of the French Army was to be on his sector in the morning. But still Napoleon did not give him any written orders, these were only dictated at 9.00am and consequently did not reach Ney until 11.00am. The order again emphasised that the main action of the day was to be on his flank: 'My intention is that, immediately after I have made up my mind, you will be ready to march on Brussels. I shall support you with my Guard, who will be at Fleurus, or at Sombreffe, and I shall wish to reach Brussels tomorrow morning.' [12]
By 11.45am Ney, together with General Rielle, had concentrated their dispersed troops and were ready to attack and d'Erlon's corps had been told to hurry its march.
By 2.00pm only the Bossu wood at Quatre-Bras was still held by Wellington's troops, who were fighting ferociously. Unluckily for Ney and Reille, Wellington was now aided by a steady stream of reinforcements, which allowed him to hold on to the vital cross-roads despite the desperate nature of the French attacks. At 4.15pm Ney received a new order from Napoleon: '...you shall attack whatever force is before you, and after vigorously driving it back, you will turn in our direction, so as to bring about the envelopment of those enemy troops which I have already mentioned to you. If the latter is overthrown first, then His Majesty will manoeuvre in your direction so as to assist your operation in the same way.' [13]
This was the first real indication Ney had received about a battle being fought on the French right wing, besides which he had been attacking the enemy to his front with vigour since noon and by now Rielle's men were tiring whilst the enemy had been heavily reinforced, it was time to call up d'Erlon's men to complete the victory: 'Let him not lose a moment in bringing up 1st Corps'. [14]
Unfortunately, an Imperial aide, Colonel Forbin-Janson, had already delivered an order from Napoleon instructing d'Erlon to proceed to the French left at Ligny. d'Erlon sent his Chief-of-Staff Delcambre to inform the Ney of this manoeuvre, Ney was furious at this for it deprived him of 20,000 men he badly needed to win his battle.
He was still fuming when Colonel Laurent rode up with written confirmation of the order. That unfortunate officer received a good dressing down but the order he carried, a copy of Colonel Forbin-Janson's order, which the latter had failed to deliver, showed Ney that he was supposed to be supporting Napoleon now and not vice versa as originally intended. Unfortunately it was now too late to make amends because Ney in his fury had despatched Delcambre after d'Erlon with a order to return. This whole episode could have been avoided if Colonel Forbin-Janson had remembered to deliver the original order, for Ney would have learned earlier then he did that the main effort of the day was to be at Ligny and the outcome would have been very different. As it was Ney had to hold on at Quatre-Bras with Reille's now tired troops as d'Erlon would not return in time for him to win the battle as he had hoped.
At the end of the day Ney found himself pushed back to his start positions by Wellington's reinforced army, though he was far from defeated. The whole responsibility for this breakdown in communications on the afternoon of 16th June must ultimately rest with Napoleon, for had he kept Ney more fully up to date with developments then he would not have reacted as he did.
That night Ney sent in his report of the day's events and blamed d'Erlon for depriving him of a fine victory but he heard nothing from Napoleon about what had happened at Ligny. Indeed, it was not until the following morning that he received confirmation that the Prussian army had been 'routed" and he was to: '. . . take up a position at Quatre-Bras, as you were ordered to do; but if it is impossible to act in this manner send a detailed report immediately and the emperor will move thither along the road already mentioned (the Namur and Quatre-Bras high road); if, on the other hand, you are only confronted with a rearguard, drive it off, and occupy the position. Today is required for completing this operation, replenishing ammunition, gathering strugglers and detachments . . .' [15]
This order distinctly gives the impression that the 17th was to be a day of rest apart from the occupation of Quatre-Bras. However, Ney had been up since daylight and had reconnoitred Quatre-Bras, Wellington was there in force and well positioned. At 6.30am Ney sent Soult a detailed report to this effect, this report reached Imperial Headquarters at 8.30am but Soult had left for Ligny and it was sent after him, from here it spent the rest of the morning chasing after the Marechal and finally it only reached him six hours later at Quatre-Bras.
During this period Ney had formed up his two corps as ordered in Napoleon's 8.00am order and had awaited the sound of Napoleon's guns along the Namur road before launching his own attack in support. He must have wondered why he got no answer to his 6.30am report. On receipt of Napoleon's 11.00am order: 'The Emperor has just placed in position before Marbais a Corps of Infantry and the Imperial Guard. His Majesty desires me to tell you that his intention is that you shall attack the enemy at Quatre-Bras, and drive them from their position; the corps at Marbais will support your operations.' [16]
Ney responded immediately, unfortunately his leading unit the Red Lancers of the Imperial Guard clashed with Napoleon's leading unit the 7th Hussars. This occurred because Napoleon also began his advance when he realised the full significance of a second message that Ney had sent, which read as follows: 'The enemy is presenting several infantry and cavalry columns that seem to want to take the offensive. I will hold out with Count d'Erlon's infantry and General Roussel's cavalry until the last, and I hope that I may even be able to repel the enemy until His Majesty lets me know his resolve. I will take up a position intermediate to Count Rielle.' [17]
It must have been then that the awful truth had dawned, a magnificent opportunity to catch and destroy Wellington was being lost. Napoleon, so lethargic that day (17th June), now sprung into life, immediately advancing on Quatre-Bras with the Reserve. Ney himself had received Napoleon's 11.00am order about a hour later and consequently the two advances converged.
On meeting each other, Napoleon expressed his surprise that Ney had been so tardy in following orders, Ney no doubt referred to his 6.30am report and maintained that he had compiled with orders and had been waiting for the emperor's assistance in accordance with Napoleon's 8.00am order. Still Napoleon was enraged and remarked that: 'Someone has lost us France!' Ney, never-the-less, pointed out that all was not lost and that the English rearguard could still be caught and destroyed. This seemed to have the desired effect and Napoleon turned to d'Erlon and said: 'Go, my dear general, place yourself at the head of the cavalry and pursue the rearguard.' [18]
If fate had decreed Napoleon's troops would have caught Wellington's and forced them to fight there and then but fate had decreed otherwise, as a violent thunderstorm burst overhead and reduced men and horses to a walking pace, and compelled Napoleon's cavalry to keep to the roads.
That night Ney was as miserable as his men but at least he was to find a dry bed for the night unlike many of his soaked troops. Ney's performance the next on the field of Waterloo has attracted a lot of censure over the years. This is particularly true of the great massed cavalry charges that Ney led and which Napoleon, with good cause, likened to the Battle of Crecy. This simile I find highly appropriate, for what had been intended as a brigade to divisional action, snowballed into a major effort that is probably the most memorable action of this great battle.
Some time after the failure of the second attack on La Haye Sainte Ney noticed what he believed to be retrograde movement in Wellington's line, actually it was Wellington's decision to move his troops back a hundred yards or so from the crest of the ridge which he defended to shield them better from the effects of Napoleon's artillery.
The attack was well under way before it was noticed by Napoleon and his staff, and yet he could still have stopped it, he did not. Indeed, after it's failure he ordered forward General Kellermann's cavalry corps to support and renew the attack, Kellermann himself would have questioned the wisdom of this but his divisions were already on the move and he could only follow. Was it mass hysteria amongst the cavalry? That fatal flaw that had produced those magnificent though futile charges at Crecy.
Kellermann's cavalry was followed by General Guyot's heavy cavalry of the Imperial Guard, who ordered these forward is unknown but is thought that they may have supported Kellermann on their own initiative. Again no one attempted to stop them. The result of this second series of charges was the same as the first. Historians and other commentators have criticised Ney for not supporting these attacks with horse artillery but how could he when much of the artillery had been attached elsewhere by Napoleon himself. Indeed, it was Napoleon in his supervisory role who should have ordered forward the necessary artillery and infantry, both of which were readily available, especially as it was he who had ordered Kellermann forward in support. Instead all that Ney received was the blame for the failure of the cavalry attacks, perhaps Napoleon's attention was diverted by the growing Prussian menace, we do not know. Ney, himself fought as he usually did, from the front, leading attack after attack and demonstrating why he was called 'the bravest of the brave'. He had at least four horses shot from under him that day, received a hasty sabre cut to the head and almost brought victory for Napoleon.
I do not think anyone could have asked more of Ney that day and let us not forget that he paid the ultimate price for the defeat at Waterloo. Nor do I think anyone could have asked more of him in this short campaign, for he started at a disadvantage (the lateness of his appointment) and anyway, Napoleon it seems, probably did not want him there anyway. So consequently their relationship, on Napoleon's side at least, was strained to say the least. Moreover I would argue that it was Napoleon who let Ney down and not the other way round, as Ney himself once said of Napoleon: 'Since he no longer makes war himself, and isn't the general anymore, but wants to play the Emperor everywhere, why doesn't he go back to the Tuileries and let us be the generals for him.' [19]
Napoleon played the Emperor on the morning of 17th June and kept both Grouchy and Ney waiting for orders, consequently golden opportunities were lost that day and the responsibility for this must be laid at the foot of Napoleon.
Marechal Edouard Mortier
Finally let us take a brief look at the man who did not quite make it. Marechal Edouard Mortier. As we have already seen this Marechal fell ill just before the campaign opened and if he had been well then the whole course of the campaign would have been different. I believe that Napoleon would have preferred Mortier to Ney in command of the left wing and perhaps have kept that Marechal better informed then he did Ney. He was certainly on better terms as Mortier was loyal to the bitter end in 1814.
Some consider Mortier to be of little consequence, a general of minor talents, I however would argue that he had potential and had demonstrated an ability for independent command on a number of occasions, notably Hanover in 1803, Swedish Pomerania 1806-07, Spain in 1810, Russia in 1812 and France 1814. He also had the respect of both officers and the rank and file, was widely liked even amongst the Marechalate, spoke English and had even campaigned in Belgium the previous year. I believe there is little doubt that he could have performed the role of wing commander well, whether Napoleon was ultimately victorious or not. Sadly for Napoleon, France and the coming campaign he fell ill just when he was needed the most.
To conclude this essay then, none of the senior officers appointed by Napoleon let him down. Soult was experienced enough to take on the rule of Chief of Staff, indeed, if he had as been as bad as some make out the brilliant concentration of the Armée du Nord could hardly have taken place. Grouchy was experienced enough to take on the role of wing commander, it was Napoleon who kept him waiting for orders, who sent orders late and thus allowed the Prussians time to rally. Grouchy's performance after Waterloo bears witness to his capabilities, when Left to think for himself he extracted himself from a tricky situation with great skill. Ney was certainly experienced enough to command his wing but was kept in the dark until the Last moment, then when the situation changed he was not informed and has even taken the blame for the lost opportunity of 17th June. I have already said where I believe the true blame for this missed opportunity lies. Ney's performance at Waterloo was exactly the same as it had been in other battles, if victory had been achieved he would have been highly praised, instead he is accused of ruining the French cavalry in fruitless charges.
Finally there is poor Mortier, if he had been well Ney would not have got a command but he was not and Napoleon had to work with Ney, a man he no longer trusted.
[1] Cited by Sir Peter Hayman, Soult: Napoleon's Maligned Marshal (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990), p.224
Becke, A.F., Napoleon and Waterloo (London: Greenhill Rooks, 1995 Reprint of 1936 Edition).
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Ney convinced that quick charge might settle matters, ordered forward General Farine's Cuirassier brigade. Farine's divisional commander, General Delort, objected saying that it was neither the time or ground was right for a charge. Ney, furious that time was being wasted by unnecessary debate, then ordered forward not only Delort's division but the rest of General Milhaud's Cuirassier corps too. Milhaud reluctantly obeyed and asked General Lefebvre-Desnoettes to support him with the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard.