A Successful Night Attack
Poland: December 1806
by A. Ricciardiello, Poland
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With the necessity of continuing the war with Prussia's ally Russia after the Jena campaign. Napoleon decided to march through Greater Poland straight to Warsaw. In so doing he would control the territory and could then establish bridgeheads on the right bank of the Vistula for offensive operations.
As events transpired Napoleon concluded that there would be a general engagement north of Warsaw, and for his part, Benningsen would defend the Narew, Wkra area.
In the general advance to the North on the 23rd December, Napoleon would eventually have Davout cross the river Bug to the right bank, with other corps eventually coming up behind him and from the west in the hope of catching the Russians.
It is the amphibious nature of Davout's operation at night that makes this such an interesting and remarkable event. Furthermore it reveals the excellent organisation, flexibility and professionalism of III Corps.
The initial advance on Warsaw was spearheaded by Davout who began his march on the 8/9th November, after having organised the entire army's supplies in Poznan.
He eventually encamped his corps in and around Warsaw on 3/4th December With some of Gauthier's Division at Okunin.
The Russians retired in the face of the French advance, evacuating Warsaw on the 26th November, and falling back over the Bug on the 3rd December.
In the vicinity of Okunin, Davout conducted a reconnaissance on 9th December. He ordered Gauthier to move his whole Division there, into an area that was flat marshy and wooded, with the right bank of the Bug being generally higher than the left. (See Map)
Gauthier did try a surprise crossing earlier with his advance guard but was thwarted by unfavourable river conditions. However, with the whole Division in place, he arranged a feint at Gora with a detachment of the 13th Chasseurs a Cheval, 3 companies of 1/85th regiment, and a howitzer under Milhaud. These only fired and made a lot of noise at about 7am., embarking 100 lights only when the main body had already crossed at Okunin.
At that place, Gauthier's men (3 light companies of the 25th and 85th, 1 battalion each of 25th, 2/85th, and an 8pdr.) started to cross at 5.30 a.m. 10th December, beginning with a light co. of the 85th in 12 skiffs. These went on 100 yards and waited for the rest.
Before dawn the remainder crossed, with no resistance met. The 25th subsequently went to reconnoitre toward Pomichowo, under the command of Colonel. Duplin of the 85th.
With the main body established General Touzard of the engineers came to organise the bridgehead. Within 24 hours, using locals to help construct defences, they had built an entrenchment, with a breastwork 150 yards. behind, big enough to protect a third of the men in attack column. Behind this was a redoubt for another third.
Whilst all this was being made the corps artillery commander, General Hanicque, was busy building a pontoon bridge, to the island.
Seeing all this activity, the Russians decided to act. After moving into position at night, they made several attacks, but were successfully beaten off. The French later went on to take the lower part of the island. After holding this part of the island for some time, General Petit cleared and held the rest on 20th December.
Petit's Division itself crossed over on the 22nd and moved toward Pomichowo, where it bivouacked. The 1st Division followed at dusk and occupied the bridgehead on the 23rd when Napoleon arrived, who conducted a reconnaissance in the morning.
East of Charnowo, the Bug's right bank is bordered by a steep hill which continues as a low escarpment . In this area was the main Russian position of approximately 15,000 men and 20 guns, mostly behind breastworks. Their left fell on the Bug, their right the Wkra, protected by entrenchments. Their front was further covered by guarded abatis. All the original bridges had been destroyed.
Napoleon gave Davout orders for a night attack. The 1st Division formed up on the island, the 3rd formed a reserve at the bridgehead. An advance guard was made up from 8 light infantry companies and part of the 13th light regiment forming 3 columns to cross the canal with 3 guns and a single company escort per column. The escorts were to advance, fire, then the guns would open up. Under this fire, boats and bridges would be launched. 3 piquets, each of 60 Chasseurs a Cheval were then to charge at the opposition.
On from the charge, the 17th would cross and form into battle order leaving 150 yards. between each battalion, and enough space for 3 squadrons of light cavalry behind, plus the rest of the Division.
The Division had orders to advance to Czarnowo and attack the left of the main Russian position, thereby cutting off any enemy retreat.
Once all this was in motion, Petit's 3rd Division was to cross then go up along the left bank of the Wkra to take the trenches facing Pomichowo. Following him was the cavalry of Marulaz, ready to cut off any retreating guns.
Supporting this, 6 x 12pdrs. were put on the heights above Pomichowo to hit the enemy flank as Petit attacked. In addition, as a diversion, along about 2000 yards. of the Wkra's right bank, light infantry lit bundles of damp straw to create a dense smoke screen when the bombardment started. A small detachment of 80 men with 2 guns, under Captain Perrin advanced northwards on the right bank too.
Back on the French right, Morand's 1st Division initial advance guard attack comprised of;
They waited behind the canal for the guns, advanced at dusk then fired across the river. These men crossed in various kinds of boats, provided by engineers and the Sailors of the Guard. As soon as they landed engineers set to work on a bridge for cavalry and artillery.
A very important, and integral part of the operation was to have Colonel. Guyardet of the 13th with some sappers cut a swathe through the woods to the road, making an obstacle free way to be followed.
It would seem as if all went as planned, because at about 7 pm., the battalions of the 1st Division followed the way to the main Russian positions. The 17th reconnoitred the line to Czarnowo.
The Russians were taken by surprise and had their batteries captured. They counter attacked vigorously and forced the French right, Sack. Simultaneously the light advance guard columns also found themselves under attack.
The 17th having fallen back rallied in the protection of some woods, who the enemy wouldn't pursue in the dark. They had however run out of ammunition, and were therefore relieved by the 30th.
By now the whole of the 1st Division was across with the cavalry of Marulaz, plus Latour-Maubourg's dragoon brigade. Davout ordered Morand to take the village with the whole Division.
On the French left, Petit was probably behind schedule as his attack comprised of only 400 men of the 12th! As soon as the Russians saw them they opened fire. The French 12 pdrs returned fire with Perrin's two pieces going into action too. The hay had been lit: the French attacked. The Russians fired a single salvo at the rush then turned and fell back onto the road to Czarnowo.
The works were taken. A group of men were kept in the entrenchments, another group was put into square. Within the space of a few minutes the Russians attacked these small groups twice, and were twice beaten off.
For about half an hour there was a respite for the French, probably as the Russians were Colonellecting themselves, as once more they found themselves under attack. Again the Russians were beaten off.
Back on the French right, the Russians were pouring a hail of fire into the French advance. The 1/30th found themselves in a ravine in front of the village and turned it on the river side flank whilst the 2/30th attacked frontally and the 1/17th the left of it. On a plateau in front of the wood were the reserves; 1/13th and 2/17th standing behind several squadrons of cavalry.
The advance guard continued to push forward on the left of the main advance, and cleared Russian outposts still in the woods. To the rear of these was the Divisional reserve of the 51st and 61st regiments.
Meanwhile Morand's 400 received a few reinforcements; a light co. of the 85th and 2 Grenadier companies of the 21st. A little later 5 companies of the 2/12th were added; the rest of the battalion was used as a bridge guard.
At 2.00. a.m. The Russians threw themselves at their foe, this time with cavalry on the road to try and turn the French left. It didn't do them much good. In spite of a gritty fight lasting half an hour, the cavalry were routed by a single volley from the Grenadiers on the road.
With this action Russian resistance largely evaporated, the village had already been taken, and they were retreating in considerable disorder. Colonel. Exelmans sent out some skirmishers and the 1/1st Chasseurs a Cheval along the road to Czarnowo. These made contact with the 1st Division and pressed a few retreating, disordered Russians.
Some of the Russians managed to rally in woods for a final attempt, but didn't gain anything from it; the immediate pursuit continued with the cavalry, the 51st and 17th regiments.
Later on, Friant's 2nd Division took up the task of following, which they did to Nisielsk. There, all the light companies were sent to cut off the retreat. This they didn't manage, but succeeded in surprising the Russians once more, and captured 3 guns.
Further equipment was lost to the French in a firm action with the 1st Brigade in some woods, which again forced the Russians to retreat in disorder. Eventually the 2nd Division camped beyond Nisielsk, and having caught up, the rest of the corps soon did likewise. On 25th December, the march continued.
Davout reported that the operation was carried out as if it were done in daylight, with as equal order and precision. Obviously the French had enough time to become very familiar with the lay of the land. But, the daring and the execution of a river crossing at night demonstrates the ability and experience of men who really knew what they were doing: bear in mind that night fighting was generally considered too risky an option to take.
On the other hand, the rivers did lend themselves to being easily followed to the French objectives, and it could very well have been a very clear moonlit night; a common phenomenon in this part of the world in winter. However, these things do not detract from the ease with which men can be made more nervous and difficult to control at night by obstacles, the enemy and insecurity in general, inherent to darkness. The important work of Guyardet comes to mind when thinking of difficulties with terrain, to eliminate delays and confusion. Also, the Russian reaction to Morand's 400 man assault, though here the flank firing by 12 pdrs. would be very significant. Not to forget the smoke too. One can only imagine what was going through the minds of the defenders at the time.
The switching of commanders to take up specific tasks at various times also demonstrates the great flexibility and efficiency of the French corps system. This reiterates the point made above relating to experience etc., though Davout's corps was well known for its excellent organisation and composition of crack troops.
Not withstanding that amphibious operations are complicated and difficult under any circumstances, it must be stressed that this landing was made at night, with the element of surprise maintained through out. And this one may have given some people relevant experience for a much larger crossing, two and a half years later.
Esposito V.J, A Military history and atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. 1962.
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