Is your Command
under Control?

Napoleonic Generalship and Leadership

by David Commerford, UK

It's late in the morning of 6th July 1809. In the vicinity of the small Austrian town of Rassdorf. His Imperial Majesty is in a characteristic state of impatience. As he paces back and forth his left hand is clenched behind him. In his right hand is his Mobile. He speaks. "Lou! Lou! is that you?" "What's the hold up?" "I've got Mac and Geno sitting on their hands, Andy's up to his ears in Kaiserlicks and I've half our artillery up my arse." "Where the hell are you" "What's that?" "The church tower? Yeah, I see the dammed tower, what I don't see is you!" "Yeah, Yeah, got it, you pass the tower and we go" "Sure about that?" "OK then but get the lead out, or we'll be here all summer!" Now believe it or not, this is not how it happened. Although I know a good number of wargamers who think it, or something similar, happened all the time. Or at least that's how they treat command and control in their games. Yes folks, good old C&C is the single most misunderstood, or wilfully ignored, aspect of, would be, historical wargames of any era. Ours is no exception. Given the potential all seeing, all knowing position we hold as gamers thousands of scale feet above the battle it is all to easy to forget the reality of ground level perception. In our period, even with Imperial Headquarters at your disposal, you may have been in Command but you were seldom in Control. Try This The next time you are out in the countryside (if you already live there go out and try this now) particularly if there are some even modest hills around you, or a few decent stands of timber. Stop for a moment, ignore the dog, the kids and any obvious 20th Century additions and just try to imagine how you would co-ordinate a Brigade level attack on some nearby vantage point or habitation. Try to expand this idea up to a Division or Corps action and then try to conceive the sheer amount of space these men would take up on the land you are asking them to operate over. This is very difficult, most people have no conception of the size of formations and it is outside most people's spatial awareness or immediate experience, either to visualise them, or place them in a real landscape. The nearest most of us will get to seeing 30,000 people in the same place is at football game, when they are all around us and in a very confined area. Imagine as you walk, such a crowd divided up into thirty groups and spread other the terrain in front of you. Some will be in view all the time, some hidden, others disappearing in a fold only to reappear as you move along. Wait! This imaginary host is standing still (if they're not, get someone to order it at once!) what happens when not only are you moving but they are as well? Can you see them? Can they see you? Where are they going now? How far have they got? What happens when they hit that stream over on the left and find out that it's ten feet wider and four feet deeper than you thought? What do you mean, what stream? You knew it was there, didn't you? The problem (amongst others) is that unless you as the commanding General had chance to cover the ground personally you probably did not know, nor as a result will you be prepared for, or be able to deal with, the resultant disruption to your plans. However, if you were lucky or well versed enough in the ways of war, to understand that every action and reaction is governed by communications that travel at the speed of the fastest available horse, you might just get away with it. Coping So, how did people cope? I hear you ask. The limitations of command effectiveness in the period, or indeed any period prior to full blown radio communications, are summed up for me in the famous analogy between the commander of a force and the archer with his arrow. In both cases they can, with reasonable certainty, set the direction and time of release although, in the latter respect units in the field were considerably less reliable. Once on the way the force/arrow is very much prey to outside influence and changing their direction or stopping their progress can be regarded as impossible. In view of this, Generals both good and bad, were forced to adopt the same approach. All actions were broken down to the lowest and simplest level. Orders, though sometimes written it what today seems complicated language, were essentially move from A to B. When you get there either do X, wait for Y to happen or help Z do something else. Above all else they were to convey as limited discretion possible, commensurate with the completion of the required task and if the Commander in question, or his Chief of Staff, had any desire to see the formation concerned again that day, would include a route and a destination. Unfortunately this schematic approach had its drawbacks, largely due to its inflexibility; making changing ones mind very difficult and in the right (or should that be wrong?) circumstances, virtually impossible. Some, examples from Austria. Firstly, Archduke Charles, before Wagram, had been put in two minds about his dispositions by Wimpffen, one of his staff. Then at 5pm on the day of the battle he decided that he was unhappy with the result and wanted to change his mind in response to events. He then had orders drafted for a realignment of the entire army. By the time this was ready events had made the dispositions impossible to carry out. So the orders were torn up and it now being too late to implement his own idea, Charles was forced to keep to the plan originally put forward by Wimpffen. Secondly, on the night of the 5th July orders, were sent to the III and VI Korps to be in position for attack at 4.00pm. Unfortunately, for these to be of use, the Korps had to be on the move by 1.00am at the latest. It was a bit of a problem therefore, that they did not actually receive them till two hours later! The intention however, was that commanders were told to go some where and do something. When they arrived, they, if at all possible, did what was asked. Once they had done it they stayed put. Reordered their command and waited like a good little computer for the next part of the instruction to come down the line. What they did not, repeat did not, do (George Armstrong Custer are you paying attention at the back!) was decide to pop over the next ridge, or conduct a nifty flank attack on their own initiative, in the certain knowledge that they could get to the enemy before their supports could get involved. Largely because they didn't have a tape measure long enough to check the distance and the enemy might not be using the same rules as them anyway! The essential chain of command had to be as short and as tight as possible for it to function, innovation was only to be applauded if it worked! What was required was the preservation the integrity of your command. The Brigade, or whatever, you were in charge of was only of any use as long as it survived. Of course at some point the out come of the entire battle might require it to be blown to tiny pieces but that, dear reader, was not your decision. The longer it remained intact the longer it was a threat and the longer its potential usefulness. Easier Said than Done All this did tend to be a lot easier to write about than to do. Of course, as in most things in life some, people were better at the C & C business than others, some armies employing the veritable "guilded phalanx" of staff officers with the entire range of ability in their ranks. In French army there was a definite policy of employing intelligent and enterprising staff officers who could assess a situation quickly and, where required, take command for a special operations. Thereby giving a much higher degree of flexibility in the command structure than in some of the Allied armies, where staff appointments were often a matter of patronage and social status. For example the Russian staff work was so poor that Austrian officers controlled the higher level operations of the two armies whenever they worked together. This disadvantage did reduce over time. The Prussians during the 1813-15 period laying the ground for what was to become the basis of modern army operations following the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau reforms. The Blucher and Gneisenau double act in particular setting the style for high level staff planning being put into action by a determined field commander. The British, just to be different, had there own approach which reached the high point of its success in the Peninsular. Here, Wellington, with a relatively small number of capable individuals, who he could trust to make good judgements in difficult situations, was able to fashion a structure to fit his own style of command. Using their eyes and ears he was able to appear at crucial points of the battlefield to make the key decisions with a knowledge that he would not be called upon just to admire the view, while all hell broke lose elsewhere. Average Wargame So how does this compare with the average wargame? Not to well I fancy. For a start not having total control makes it harder to win and we all want to win don't we? So we allow rapid changes of plan, instant (or nearly) attack/counter attack and initiative exercised on a level you wouldn't believe. How is this rampant unreality kept in check, if at all? Well, in the dim, if not to distant, past when all the world was simultaneous, there was the written order. These did not work for the Divisional level games they were associated with let alone the anything larger. They took to much time, were open to such interpretation that they might as well not have existed and were nothing more than a legalised excuse for a fight and not always with modal soldiers either. These still hang around on the periphery of a number of rule sets but these days they can be found in conjunction with National requirements as to formations and minor tactics (not entirely relevant to the issue) and that wonderful instrument the command radius. Just what are these supposed to be? The distance a general can see? The distance he can shout? The distance he can throw an ADC? Everyone fiddles the measurement. It's always the same in spite of the terrain and visibility considerations and if you can manage to keep all or most of your force inside it reaction is still far to fast. Does any body offer a better alternative? Well, yes, but at a price. That price (excluding the cash) is eleven pages long and requires careful reading, detailed application and a fair bit of practice. Yes gang, you regulars will be there already, I'm sorry but it's Empire. With concise descriptions of five alternative courses of action for Corps and seven for Divisions/Brigades if it's not there, not only can you not do it but in reality you would not have tried it anyway. In fairness General de Brigade has a stab at this as well but in keeping with its much simpler format it only takes four pages and has an entirely lower intensity of approach. What Empire (and GdB to a lesser extent) provide is a framework for players to act as they should. That is to say, that if you as a player agree to abide by the spirit as well as the letter of these laws they will limit your options to a pretty high level of accurate performance. They will cut out arguments and coupled with the time delays and activation dice rolls built into the rules, stop you from the reactions you could not make. So, Empire should be pretty much perfect then? Err, well, no not really. Firstly, they are for Corps/Army level games and don't work very well below this. Secondly, and most importantly, they do not, as written, solve the time and distance equation. Somewhere, in the effort to speed up the game by allowing fast grand tactical movement, they lose the plot. Allowing such large moves, that on the tables most people have access to, even with all the constraints of the rules, it is perfectly possible (particularly for the French) to zoom across the table and recover seemingly hopeless positions. Thereby undermining the foundation of realism the order structure creates. However, this is not unresolveable. If you can find a place for a huge table or are willing to halve all move and firing distances you really will think you are the Archduke Charles. Get your orders or dispositions wrong then; buddy boy and you are stuffed! This simple "resetting the clock" along with the standard rules has in my experience produced; orders not acted upon, orders received late, orders that were irrelevant when they arrived due to events overtaking them, units marching off to carry out orders that were no longer applicable with out being recalled, units getting hammered by marching into situations they could see coming while the C in C could not and much, much more. It's All You However, there is one additional ingredient in all this. It's you. Regardless of the rules if you want to play toy soldiers you can. If you don't it's ultimately up to you. You can be more inventive in you own games, I hardly ever play a game that does not have some form of hidden movement involved, even if its only the employment of dummy units (balsa wood blocks or card shapes, that sort of thing) just to add uncertainty and confusion. A more "professional" attitude amongst the players will also help. It's not hard to determine what can or cannot be seen and the chances of a reaction to it by individual honesty and mutual agreement. Simple devices, such as, insisting that unless avoiding obstacles, units will always move, fire and fight directly to their front (allowing facing change for threats but not immediate attacks) will start to trammel the units and commanders into patterns of thought and action less akin to the era of the air strike! As players if you want total command and control you can have it and you will have yourself a game. If you want more than that you will have to accept chaos theory and learn to succeed in an environment where your own side is as much of a problem as the opposition! Successful commanders had to learn to get results in adverse circumstances. In the group I play with, owners of Russian and Austrian armies consider it a point of honour to fight them in the style of their real life counter parts, with all the drawbacks it entails. They have learned that within the limitations of their armies command and control they can put up a good show and as in history, if properly handled they can give French armies, particularly poorly led ones (not mine, of course) all the problems they can handle. I hate them. Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #45 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com