Rumours
Rumours of increased Austrian military activity and political problems in Paris had caused Napoleon to return from Spain to his capital in January 1809. Having studied the situation he calculated that if Austria was to renew hostilities it could not open the campaign until 15 April.
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But he was wrong, Charles crossed the Inn river, the border between Austria and Bavaria five days earlier. This early move threw French plans into confusion. Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff, who held command of the army while Napoleon remained in Paris, exacerbated this dangerous position. His misunderstanding of the confused sequence of orders he received from Napoleon resulted in the army marching, counter-marching and becoming thoroughly disjointed.
Meanwhile Charles, although advancing slowly due to the appalling weather which turned the roads to rivers of mud, had brushed aside any opposition he had met and successfully crossed the Iser river at the First Battle of Landshut on 16 April. However, the following day Napoleon arrived at the front, established himself at Donauwörth on the Danube and quickly analysed all the reports he could gather on the state of the army.
While Napoleon was reorganising the army Charles reformed his own north of Landshut and sent out numerous patrols and reconnaissance parties to establish a clearer picture of his enemy's position. The information that came back suggested to him that the main strength of the French and their allies was being concentrated north of the Danube between Ingolstadt and Regensburg. To break this concentration Charles issued orders for the army to push north-west from Landshut and force the Danube at Kelheim.
Once across he felt sure the French would have to fall back and evacuate large areas of German land. On 18 April the Austrian army recommenced the advance. At the same time Napoleon had issued orders for his army to concentrate in three masses, at Geisenfeld, Ingolstadt and Pfaffenhofen, although circumstances were to dictate that Davout's III Corps, who were designated to form at Geisenfeld, would not arrive intact.
Shortly after Charles had set the army in motion on 18 April he received fresh intelligence stating that Davout's corps had begun to cross to the south bank of the Danube at Regensburg. Charles' impression that the French were concentrating north of the river was dispelled. What Davout's intentions were he did not know but it now seemed to Charles that he could attack this isolated corps with the river at its back and with overwhelming numbers. Davout, for his part, was following Napoleon's orders to join the concentration of the army, at Geisenfeld, but as his corps had been widely distributed he had not been able to begin the march on the 18 April as Napoleon had intended. Davout therefore was a day behind schedule and in a very dangerous position.
In light of this new information, at about 10.00am on 18 April, Charles began to issue new orders to the army. Three korps (III, IV and I Reserve Korps) were to concentrate at the town of Rohr from where the attack on Davout would commence the following day. V and II Reserve Korps, both of which had been weakened by detachments to I Reserve Korps, were to protect the left of the force marching on Rohr while VI Korps were to secure the left of this protecting force.
On the morning of 19 April Charles issued his orders to the three korps now at Rohr, which were based on the fact that he believed Davout had began marching along the Danube and was already in the vicinity of Abbach. These orders specified that these three korps were to move to the north-west towards the Schambach hills, overlooking the Abensberg – Regensburg road. Generalmajor Thierry was to be detached from III Korps and received an order to begin his march at 6.00am. He was instructed to move with his infantry brigade, supported by a dragoon regiment and some artillery, and take up a position on the hills above Kirchdorf between Abensberg and Biburg. From this position Thierry was to observe the Bavarians reported to be around Biburg. However, after Thierry had left Rohr Charles received further intelligence that caused him to revise his orders to the army.
Surprise
Much to his surprise the reports stated that Davout was still outside Regensburg and had not yet began his march. Charles realigned the direction of the march from Rohr, sending the three korps northwards to locate and destroy Davout's III Corps. To ensure Davout could not evade interception the three korps were to open out into a wide converging cordon, aiming to pin him with his back to the Danube. I Reserve Korps were to take the right, IV Korps with the Grenadiers of I Reserve Korps the centre and III Korps, commanded by FML Hohenzollern, the left. Charles reasoned that if he could intercept Davout further north it would mean that the Bavarians around Abensberg/Biburg under Marshall Lefebvre would be less likely to be in a position to offer him support.
Orders were issued to V, II Reserve and VI Korps to close up to each other and watch for any movement by the Bavarians from beyond the Abens river. Thierry, who was already on the march when these new orders were issued had been instructed to make contact with V Korps who were positioned to his left. Thierry's command was made up of: IR1 Kaiser (2 2/3 battalions – 2,670 men), IR29 Lindenau (2 2/3 battalions – 2,470 men), 4. Levenehr-Dragoner (6 squadrons – 725 men), a 1/2 Cavalry battery and a 1/2 Brigade battery. His total strength was 5,140 infantry, 725 cavalry and 8 guns, although 458 of the IR1 were new recruits with little training.
Von Thierry
Ludwig Ritter von Thierry, who had been born in Neufchateau in Luxembourg in 1753, was 56 in 1809. It is possible that he would have used the French version of his name, Louis Chevalier de Thierry. In 1773 he joined the Austrian army as an ensign (fähnrich) in IR28, becoming a first lieutenant (oberlieutenant) in 1781 before being promoted to captain (hauptmann) in 1789 during the Turkish War of 1788-90. In 1793 he was fighting against the French with his regiment in the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) where he was awarded the Maria Theresa Order for outstanding bravery at the Siege of Valenciennes. The following year he remained in the Austrian Netherlands before moving to the Upper Rhine where he was posted between 1795 – 97. At the end of this time Thierry was promoted to major.
In 1799 IR28 transferred to Italy and Thierry took part in the actions of Legnago, Magnano, Cassano and Trebbia, where he was wounded. He continued to serve in Italy and in 1800, the year he became lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, he was at the Siege of Genoa and fought at Marengo. In 1804 Thierry was made colonel (obrist) and given command of IR28, but a year later, in Germany, the regiment was one of those forced to surrender at Ulm. Four years on, in 1809, after 36 years distinguished service with his regiment he was promoted to the rank of Generalmajor and given command of a brigade in III Korps.
Thierry had a difficult march from Rohr along a very bad track before he eventually took up a position on the hills above Kirchdorf from where he had an excellent view of the Bavarian camp at Biburg. Shortly after his arrival a colonel from the staff galloped up with new orders for him. Thierry was informed that the army was now striking north towards Regensburg and it was to be his responsibility to cover the Abens river between Abensberg and Biburg and prevent any threat developing against the army's rear. For this purpose Thierry was to place a large reserve at Bruckhof, with a detachment in the woods north of Gadenhof and another on the Kirchdorf hills. The staff officer brought with him four guns from a Position battery but these were held up by the poor condition of the track which had suffered greatly from the effects of the rain and the passage of Thierry's brigade.
From their position on the hills the staff colonel, observing the Bavarians, became convinced that they were preparing to march from Abensberg towards Regensburg. He urged Thierry to follow his new orders immediately, to intercept and prevent this move which could threaten the army. Having detailed the staff colonel, Richter, to take command of the detachment which was to be remain on the Kirchdorf hills close to Hörlbach, Thierry led the rest of his command off the high ground towards the village of Bruckhof. Richter's command consisted of the third battalion IR1 Kaiser (four companies only as the other two had not yet reached the army) and half a squadron of the dragoons. At Bruckhof Thierry detached IR29 Lindenau, 31/2 squadrons of dragoons and the 1/2 Brigade battery. Having made these dispositions Thierry marched on as rapidly as possible, directing his men towards the Regensburg road at Arnhofen. After making these detachments, as ordered, Thierry now marched with only two battalions of IR1 Kaiser, 2 squadrons of 4.Levenehr-Dragoner and a 1/2 Cavalry battery.
Thierry followed a track through thick woodland and emerged about a kilometre south of Arnhofen between 10.00 and 11.00am. This village was on higher ground and had flat-topped hills on either side which commanded Thierry's position. Initially he could only observe a handful of vedettes on the hill south-west of the village. However, unseen by Thierry, due to the hills screening the road from Abensberg to Arnhofen, the leading elements of Kronprinz Ludwig's Bavarian 1st Division were approaching. These men, 1. Chevaulegers-Regiment-Kronprinz and Regnier's 6pdr light battery, had been ordered to advance through Abensberg with all speed by Lefebvre when he received news that Austrian troops were present in the woods near Bruckhof.
With no obvious signs of a strong enemy presence Thierry ordered his men forward from the edge of the Seeholz, the wood through which they had just marched, towards Arnhofen. At the same time he ordered mounted patrols forward to climb the high ground shielding the Abensberg road. But before the patrols could reach their target a strong body of Bavarian cavalry, 1.Chevaulegers-Regiment-Kronprinz, crested the ridge directly in their path. As a number of mounted skirmishers advanced the Austrian 1/2 battery opened fire against the cavalry from the edge of the Seeholz.
However, Thierry's position was soon weakened when he found himself under Bavarian artillery fire from Regnier's battery that had suddenly appeared on a knoll on the rising ground towards his left front. Within fifteen minutes two of his four guns had been dismounted. Concerned by his exposed position and unaware of the true strength of the Bavarians Thierry pulled his two battalions back to the edge of the Seeholz from where he could threaten any advance from Abensberg that approached on the near side of the high ground. The dragoons remained in the open. Alerted by the sound of firing 2 battalions of IR29 Lindenau, 31/4 squadrons of dragoons and two guns, the majority of the detachment left at Bruckhof, advanced into the Seeholz. Bruckhof was now only held by four companies of IR29, a 1/4 squadron of dragoons and two guns. Back in Abensberg Lefebvre had located an infantry regiment from the 2nd Division, 6. Linien-Infanterie-Regiment Herzog Wilhelm, and ordered them to advance immediately towards the Seeholz. Then Kronprinz Ludwig was ordered to follow on with the rest of his 1st Division.remained in the open. Alerted by the sound of firing 2 battalions of IR29 Lindenau, 31/4 squadrons of dragoons and two guns, the majority of the detachment left at Bruckhof, advanced into the Seeholz. Bruckhof was now only held by four companies of IR29, a 1/4 squadron of dragoons and two guns. Back in Abensberg Lefebvre had located an infantry regiment from the 2nd Division, 6. Linien-Infanterie-Regiment Herzog Wilhelm, and ordered them to advance immediately towards the Seeholz. Then Kronprinz Ludwig was ordered to follow on with the rest of his 1st Division.
Back on the open ground between the Seeholz and Arnhofen the two Austrian dragoon squadrons had mounted a charge against the Bavarian battery and the chevaulegers. Attacking up rising ground the attack on the battery was repelled by a blast of canister but the chevaulegers, who had chosen to accept the charge at the stand, fired their carbines at fifty paces. Undeterred the Austrians rode on and crashed into the chevaulegers, sending
them in disorder to the rear. Regnier had just given the order for his battery to limber up in a desperate bid to escape the victorious Austrian dragoons when two squadrons of 1. Dragoner-Regiment from the 1st Division entered the fray, hit the Austrians in the flank and drove them away. The cavalry of both sides now reformed, the Austrian dragoons being reinforced by their comrades from Bruckhof. Each side kept a wary eye on the other, but neither attempted to renew the combat.
By now though the Bavarian infantry had began their assault on the Seeholz. The detached schützen of the Herzog Wilhelm regiment led the attack while the two battalions drew up in line behind, waiting for the breakthrough. In response, the redeployment of one the Austrian cavalry guns and the fierce fire from IR1 thwarted this attack. The 2nd battalion of Herzog Wilhelm then led forward another attack, with the 1st battalion in reserve, but were twice repelled. A fourth attack was mounted, led by a schützen screen reinforced with volunteers, and this time broke into the Seeholz. However, before they were able to secure their position the two battalions of IR29 that had marched forward from Bruckhof immediately counter-attacked and threw the Bavarians out of the wood. The Austrian cavalry battery meanwhile had been reinforced by the two guns brought forward from Bruckhof but had found it necessary to withdraw into the woods to gain some protection. Shortly afterwards the dragoons followed.
Worsening Situation
Despite this success in defending the wood the situation was worsening for Thierry. While IR29 had been ejecting the Bavarians from the Seeholz the two infantry brigades of the 1st Division had now arrived on the scene and positioned themselves just to the north-east of Abensberg, facing the wood. To support the Herzog Wilhelm regiment, the 2. Linien-Infanterie-Regiment Kronprinz was ordered forward. Preceded by their schützen, the two battalions of this regiment advanced in line side by side to the right of Herzog Wilhelm. The length of the line meant that the Bavarians could now outflank the left of the Austrian line positioned in a salient of the wood. As this attack came forward Thierry was made aware that two other battalions and a battery were advancing to the extreme right of the Bavarian line, along a road known as the Ochsenstrasse which ran eastwards towards Bachl. Thierry accepted that his position was now hopeless and gave the order for his brigade to withdraw to Offenstetten.
His retreat was initially carried out stubbornly, the Bavarians in the woods could only follow slowly and those on the Ochsenstrasse only advanced as far as Gadenhof. Eventually though the pressure mounted on the Austrians and the withdrawal broke down into disorder. The Bavarians captured one of the guns that had been dismounted by Regnier's counter battery fire. As Thierry emerged from the woods close to Offenstetten he received welcome support from the dragoons that had been left at Hörlbach. Their arrival seemed to persuade the Bavarians that they had done enough for the day. Although fighting between individual groups was continuing in the woods a terrific downpour of rain brought the days proceedings to a close. Thierry gathered his command together, which had become greatly disorganised in the retreat, and found he had lost half his infantry and a third of his cavalry.
During the day those of his detachments that had not come to his support had been absorbed by V Korps and many of his brigade, who had been driven south during the retreat, had also found their way to V Korps. Thierry had received a number of communications from Archduke Louis, the commander of that korps, during the day but had been unable to make contact with the main army. At 4.45pm he reported to Louis that he was now at Offenstetten and after a few hours rest he intended retiring to Rohr as he felt his position to be exposed and dangerous in the face of so numerous a foe. Louis immediately wrote back urging him to hold his position and assured him that support was close at hand. GM Bianchi with a brigade from V Korps was nearby at Biburg and VI Korps was due to arrive on the Abens the following day.
In addition Thierry was informed that III Korps had detached GM Pfanzelter at Bachl during their advance north and that Louis had ordered FML Schustekh, one of his divisional commanders, to Rohr with four squadrons to support them both. With these assurances Thierry prepared to hold on to his position at Offenstetten. Thierry contacted Pfanzelter, who held Bachl with two squadrons of 3.Erzherzog Ferdinand-Husaren, the first battalion of 9.Peterwardein Grenzer and a 3pdr 1/2 Brigade battery (four guns), and requested support if he was forced to retreat again in the morning.come to his support had been absorbed by V Korps and many of his brigade, who had been driven south during the retreat, had also found their way to V Korps. Thierry had received a number of communications from Archduke Louis, the commander of that korps, during the day but had been unable to make contact with the main army. At 4.45pm he reported to Louis that he was now at Offenstetten and after a few hours rest he intended retiring to Rohr as he felt his position to be exposed and dangerous in the face of so numerous a foe. Louis immediately wrote back urging him to hold his position and assured him that support was close at hand. GM Bianchi with a brigade from V Korps was nearby at Biburg and VI Korps was due to arrive on the Abens the following day.
In addition Thierry was informed that III Korps had detached GM Pfanzelter at Bachl during their advance north and that Louis had ordered FML Schustekh, one of his divisional commanders, to Rohr with four squadrons to support them both. With these assurances Thierry prepared to hold on to his position at Offenstetten. Thierry contacted Pfanzelter, who held Bachl with two squadrons of 3.Erzherzog Ferdinand-Husaren, the first battalion of 9.Peterwardein Grenzer and a 3pdr 1/2 Brigade battery (four guns), and requested support if he was forced to retreat again in the morning.
While Thierry, detached from III Korps, had spent the day fighting the Bavarians between Abensberg and Arnhofen, the main body of his korps had run into part of Davout's III Corps, as had been hoped, near the village of Teugn. It had been a hard fought battle but Davout's men had won the day and forced the Austrians back to Hausen. Archduke Charles' plan had received a major setback. Archduke Louis with V Korps had only received scanty reports from the main army during the day but knew III Korps had fought an action.
Acknowledging the weakness of Thierry's position and his lack of significant direct support, Louis recognised the importance of Rohr and determined to move his korps there as soon as VI Korps, under FML Hiller, had closed up, bringing him closer to the main army. If the French/Allied army mounted a new attack, pushed Thierry aside and occupied Rohr then the Austrian army would have a wedge driven through it. Hiller, riding ahead of his korps, reached Louis at about 9.00am on the morning of 20 April, when he discussed the situation in detail with Louis. While discussions continued a despatch arrived from Charles. In it he informed them of his plans and recommended that both Louis and Hiller were to draw back towards the Grosse Laaber river at Rottenburg and Pfeffenhausen respectively, as Charles felt their right flank was under threat following the result of the previous days action at Teugn – Hausen.
Different Understanding
Hiller however had come to a different understanding of the current situation. He believed the activity around Abensberg had been to screen the withdrawal of the French and their allies back across the Danube at Kelheim. Hiller therefore determined to take the initiative and planned to move his VI Korps through Pfeffenhausen towards Rohr and drive back any enemy forces he encountered towards Kelheim. Louis registered his concern about the time it would take Hiller to move his korps up to Rohr, but he had been subordinated to Hiller in orders and so agreed to hold his position facing the Abens while Hiller manoeuvred into position.
Napoleon had not been idle during this time. While awaiting news from Davout on 19 April he swiftly reorganised the army and made plans to open his counter-offensive the next morning. Directly in the path of this attack sat a greatly concerned Generalmajor Thierry.
Napoleon had been joined by Marshall Lannes on 19 April. To ensure he made full use of the new arrival's talents Napoleon quickly formed a Provisional Corps for him to command. To the infantry divisions of Morand and Gudin, who were currently separated from III Corps, he added Nansouty's heavy cavalry division, Clement's brigade from St.Sulpice's cuirassier division and two cavalry regiments from Jacquinot's light cavalry brigade. Napoleon's plan was for a great drive on the strategically important town of Rohr. Lannes new command was to form the extreme left of the attack and was to swing to the north of the Abensberg-Bachl road, through Schambach, before turning south and moving on Rohr. The centre of the attack was to be led by the 1st Bavarian division who, having moved through Abensberg, were to clear the hills and move along the road to Bachl and Rohr. This division was to be followed by Bavarian 3rd division and Demont's French reserve division. The right line of attack was to be spearheaded by the 2nd Bavarian division through Biburg. They were tasked with cutting the Landshut road to prevent any retreat from Rohr. This line was to be supported by Vandamme's Württemburg Corps.
In the early hours of 20 April Generalmajor Thierry considered his position once more. He had formed the remains of his brigade, ten companies of IR1 Kaiser, six companies of IR29 Lindenau and four squadrons of 4.Levenehr-Dragoner on the hills to the east of Offenstetten. From these he garrisoned the village with a small detachment and a company was placed in a strong defensive position in a farmstead east of the village, known as Sommerkeller. A few zuge (1/4 companies) of infantry were placed in the woods behind another farmstead, Schärferei, north of the Bachl road. The bulk of his command, the equivalent of just over two battalions, were positioned on rising ground on either side of the road on a frontage of 1300 paces, with woods to their rear. Two squadrons of dragoons were placed on each of the flanks .The elements of his brigade that had become separated during the previous days retreat were now concentrated at Hörlbach under the command of the Colonel Hammer of IR29.
Thierry sent a request to GM Bianchi, whose brigade formed the right of V Korps opposite Biburg, asking him to occupy Hörlbach and allow his men to rejoin the brigade. There was no immediate response. Back in Rohr FML Schustekh, who had been ordered to that town with four squadrons of 8. Kienmayer-Husaren, had pointed out that the nature of the wooded terrain around the town made the hussars of limited value and therefore received a reinforcement of eight companies of 7.Brod Grenzer. Schustekh was now responsible for Thierry at Offenstetten and Pfanzelter at Bachl. There could be no doubt that until Hiller arrived with VI Korps the road to Rohr was not securely defended, and by not following Charles' order to pull back, the left wing of the army was in a perilous position.
Thierry sent mounted patrols forward in the morning to observe the Bavarians. Oberst Richter, the staff officer who had arrived the previous day, had accompanied one of these patrols and on his return informed Thierry that there was no apparent retrograde movement by the Bavarians and he felt it would be advisable to begin withdrawing his brigade. Thierry had also received a communication from GM Pfanzelter that an enemy force was now visible north of Bachl, to Thierry's rear. Then, moving along the Ochsenstrasse towards Offenstetten an enemy column appeared and fighting broke out. It was about 10.00am. Thierry immediately informed Pfanzelter that he would be retiring through Bachl towards Rohr. He asked Pfanzelter to cover this withdrawal and to form the rearguard once he had passed through Bachl.
The troops that Thierry observed advancing towards him were from the 1st Brigade of the 1st Bavarian division, to their left the 2nd Brigade was pushing through the Seeholz. The whole of the force was preceded by the division's schützen. The weak Austrian detachment holding Offenstetten was no match for the vastly superior numbers of Bavarians descending upon them and following a brief resistance the first battalion of 1.Linien-Infanterie-Leibregiment, moving to the right of the road, succeeded in capturing the village. The second battalion advanced to their right. The rest of the 1st Brigade deployed in two lines across the road. Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade, which had been advancing through the Seeholz had driven back the Austrian picquets and emerged onto the open fields at the eastern end of the woodland. Having reformed they pushed forward, passing through the hamlet of See on their right, towards the Schäferei farmstead. Thierry could see his weakened brigade was hopelessly outnumbered, and he was not even aware of the further two divisions that were preparing to follow the lead Bavarian division.
Determined to extricate his command he gave orders for the infantry, artillery, which now included two 3pdr guns sent forward from Bachl by Pfanzelter, and two squadrons of the 4.Levenehr-Dragoner to begin their march towards Bachl. To delay any attack infantry detachments were left at the Schäferei farmstead, north of the road and Sommerkeller farmstead, to the south. Meanwhile, the battalion of the Leibregiment that had already captured Offenstetten carried on their advance, towards the Sommerkeller, but were thrown back to the village. Further attempts to take it also failed and it was only after the Austrian artillery had been withdrawn that a joint attack by both battalions of the Leibregiment eventually broke the defender's resistance sometime between 11.00am and midday. To enable these brave men to make good their escape the two squadrons of Levenehr dragoons, left to protect Thierry's retreat, charged the first battalion of the Leibregiment.
The Bavarians responded quickly, forming squares and firing a volley at about fifteen paces. The dragoons had seen enough and turned to the south where they entered a wood only to encounter a body of Bavarian schützen and suffered further casualties. North of the road the Austrian defenders of Schäferei were putting up a stiff resistance to the schützen of the 2nd Brigade, but they too were eventually forced out and retired eastwards towards Bachl. The Bavarians followed up only tentatively as the Austrians continued to take advantage of any opportunity to delay their pursuers.
Well Done
Thierry had done well to extricate his command in the face of overwhelming numbers. He must have felt a sense of relief as the road emerged from the woods at Scheuern from where he knew he would be in sight of the village of Bachl, and Pfanzelter's men drawn up to offer him support. Poor Thierry, who had been battling alone for two days, must have been horrified now to observe not Pfanzelter's men but a regiment of French Chasseurs à cheval, drawn up facing him just to the west of the village.
GM Pfanzelter, in command at Bachl, had had an interesting morning. As early as 7.30am his outlying picquets had been driven in by French cavalry that had appeared to the north of Bachl. These men were an advanced detachment of Lannes Provisional Corps that had moved north from Abensberg earlier than the Bavarians and were swinging towards Bachl via Schambach. However, Pfanzelter's initial fears of attack abated as the French made no attempt to move on his position. In fact the French were busy sweeping the surrounding hills to ensure no hidden Austrian detachments were lurking. Reassured by the lack of visible activity, Pfanzelter had answered Thierry's request for support by sending him two of his four 3pdr guns and faced the French with his force of a battalion of grenzer and two squadrons of hussars. As the morning progressed there was still no movement before him although a build up of French troops to the north was obvious.
Then, as the morning drew to a close Pfanzelter received an order from Army Headquarters informing him that both he and Thierry were to rejoin III Korps immediately. Wasting no time Pfanzelter, who had presumably been growing more nervous, set his command in motion eastwards towards Langquaid, informing Schustekh in Rohr of his departure, but Thierry was not made aware of this move. At about the time Pfanzelter was about to move off the French cavalry finally attacked, captured his two 3pdrs and also intercepted the other two which had earlier been despatched to Thierry but were now returning unescorted. Jacquinot's light cavalry attack had been brief but dramatic. Besides capturing the guns the light horsemen surrounded two companies of grenzer and forced their surrender too as the rest of Lannes Corps moved forward. Gudin's infantry division arrived just in time to fire a few parting volleys at the disappearing Austrians. However, what was left of Pfanzelter's force, four companies of the first battalion 9.Peterwardein Grenzer and two squadrons of 3.Erzherzog Ferdinand-Husaren, escaped further injury and unmolested rejoined III Korps.
Deperate Situation
The situation for Thierry and his exhausted men was now desperate. With no sign of Pfanzelter his only chance was to reach Schustekh at Rohr. But with the menacing presence of French cavalry at Bachl he realised he could not risk his men in the open. Having lost direct contact with his own cavalry during the withdrawal Thierry ordered his men into the woods to the west of the Rohr road, and to make their way to the town. Now, for the first time discipline broke down as the men made their way through the trackless woodland, aware that enemy infantry were in pursuit and cavalry were moving along the road just beyond the tree line.
By the time they approached Rohr, probably between 1.30 and 2.00pm, only about three companies of infantry and half a squadron of dragoons retained any sort of order. Schustekh, with his detachment of eight companies of 7.Brod Grenzer and four squadrons of 8.Kienmayer-Husaren, had drawn up on the hills just behind the town watching the approach of Lannes.
Lannes Corps was led in their advance by a regiment of Chasseurs à cheval, which, on approaching Rohr, moved to threaten Schustekh's right flank. They were followed by St.Sulpice's heavy cavalry division, which drew up in front of the town and deployed their artillery. Behind came Morand's infantry division. This force was joined by the cavalry brigade from the 1st Bavarian division that had advanced to Rohr via Sallingberg.
In the face of such daunting odds Schustekh took the brave decision to attack the leading French cavalry with his hussars and those dragoons that had arrived at his position. By gaining some time in this way he hoped that Thierry's command would be able to reform to some extent. The Austrian cavalry charged into Jacquinot's leading Chasseurs à cheval regiment, and so surprised were they that they were driven back. However, a cuirassier regiment crashed into the right flank of the momentarily victorious Austrians and drove them into an area of marshy ground where they found it impossible to rally. Although the cavalry continued to resist in isolated pockets any co-ordinated defence was over. One group of fleeing hussars swept up Schustekh himself in their retreat. With their cavalry broken and in disarray the grenzer and Thierry's infantry had no hope of holding onto their position. Attacked by French cavalry and the infantry of Morand's division these men had no choice other than to retreat. In a very short time any attempt at an organised withdrawal collapsed.
Those that could made for the woods, others were cut down in the open or captured by the marauding French horsemen. Thierry desperately continued trying to hold his men together. On more than one occasion he dismounted from his horse and encouraged his men to make a stand. But it was to no avail, and during one of these attempts at Eulenbach, about two kilometres south of Rohr, the brave but unfortunate General Thierry was captured, his brigade all but destroyed. The French continued their advance, in many cases mingling with the fleeing Austrians. It was only in front of Rottenburg that they were finally halted, as leading elements of Hiller's VI Korps finally arrived.
Over
So for Thierry the Battle of Abensberg was over. It is impossible not to have sympathy for him. Thrust forward by his army commander, he was from that time on almost deserted by those around him. He recognised the danger his exposed position placed him in on the night of 19 April but was reassured that support was close at hand should he need it. However, when the need arose he found himself alone and unsupported until he struggled in to Rohr some four hours after his personal battle had begun. But by then the support he found was far too small to prevent the disintegration of his battered brigade. He had made every effort possible to maintain control over his command in very trying circumstances. He continued to demonstrate this right to the very end when he was captured while attempting to rally his men shortly after the collapse of the position at Rohr. Generalmajor Thierry was a very brave and resourceful general, but at Abensberg he had been dealt a very bad hand.
That evening the forces of Archduke Louis and Hiller were positioned at Pfeffenhausen and Turkenfeld, about four kilometres south-east of Rottenburg. Louis' command had found itself in the path of Napoleon's right flank attack during the day, but it had not been pressed forward with the conviction shown by the left and centre. Louis had defended well until circumstances elsewhere prevailed on him to order a withdrawal to Pfeffenhausen. During the night Louis and Hiller determined to withdraw to Landshut on the Iser river. Napoleon had now driven a great wedge between the two wings of the Austrian army. The French victories at Landshut and Eggmühl that followed ended the opening phase of the 1809 campaign. The bloody climax was to be reached later that year on the battlefields of Aspern-Essling and Deutsch-Wagram. The unfortunate Generalmajor Thierry would not be there to take part.
Unfortunate Gen. Thierry: Worsening Situation
When preparing any book for publication it is very easy to get side-tracked by tantalising snippets of information, and before you know it you have disappeared off in a totally different direction from that which you intended. Sadly the constraints of publishing do not always allow you to follow these paths to the degree you would like. I found myself on one of these paths recently when preparing material for a book on Battle of Eggmühl for the Osprey Campaign Series.