Wavre
Grouchy's Lost Opportunity?
by Richard Dyson, UK
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Much has been written about the events of the Hundred Days Campaign, but surprisingly little is known about the Battle of Wavre, a conflict that took place on the same day as Waterloo. It was by no means a minor affair; 30000 French were engaged against 15000 Prussians. Many published accounts of the campaign tend to treat Wavre as not much more than a side-show and give little detail of what actually occurred.
This article, by looking at the relevant French and Prussian literature, will attempt to redress this situation and explain exactly what happened over the three days of the Wavre campaign; the 17th, 18th and 19th of June, 1815. It will also attempt to dispel some of the myths surrounding Wavre and in particular the controversy surrounding Marshal Grouchy, the commander of the French forces. Grouchy has received an unfair press over the years. A traditional view is that he was too cautious, his troops marched too slowly and that he failed to take the opportunity on the 18th to move to support Napoleon's right flank. It has been argued that if Grouchy had made such a movement he could have changed the outcome of Waterloo in Napoleon's favour. As the reader will see however, scrutiny of the documents produces a different story; one that is more sympathetic towards Grouchy and more critical towards Napoleon.
Beginning
The Wavre campaign proper began on the 17th of June. The previous day Napoleon had defeated the Prussians, though not decisively, at Ligny while Marshal Ney had fought an inconclusive battle with Wellington's troops at Quatre-Bras. On the morning of the 17th Napoleon returned to the scene of the previous day's fighting at Ligny and after a tour of the battlefield issued his orders. Ney was instructed to attack the English army at Quatre-Bras while Napoleon would march up to support him. [1]
The intention was to finish the business of the preceding day and destroy Wellington's forces. Grouchy's orders were given slightly later. The exact time is a little vague, Grouchy himself stated that it was at about between 12 and 1 pm, [2] before midday is probably more accurate. Grouchy was initially given a verbal order by Napoleon. He was told to pursue the Prussians, never letting them out of their sight and to complete their defeat. [3] The exact wording of this order has been disputed over the years and it is fortunate that Napleon chose to follow up this verbal order shortly afterwards with a written instruction.
The text of this read as follows:
"Meet at Gembloux with the cavalry corps of generals Pajol and Excelmans, the light cavalry of the 4th Corps, the Teste division and the 3rd and 4th Corps of infantry. You will direct yourself towards Namur and Maastricht and you will pursue the enemy. Understand his moves and instruct me of his positions so that I can understand what he wants to do. I set my headquarters at Quatre Chemins [Quatre Bras] . . . It is important to understand what Blucher and Wellington want to do and if they intend to unite their armies to cover Brussels and Liege to attempt to start a battle. In all cases, keep both your infantry corps within one league of each other, with several avenues of retreat; position your cavalry detachments to allow communication with headquarters". [4]
Napoleon's thinking was that the Prussians were initially retreating eastward, hence the reference to Namur and Maastricht. Grouchy was ordered to pursue them closely and Napoleon was also concerned lest Blucher and Wellington unite their forces. Caution was stressed by Napoleon; Grouchy had to keep his troops close together with several lines of retreat. This emphasis on pursuing the Prussians, and the accent on caution, dictated the whole outcome of the next three days. No alternative orders were given until a full twenty-four hours later, when Grouchy had almost reached Wavre.
Grouchy's Command
32,000 men were allocated to Grouchy's command. [5] The 3rd Corps had three infantry divisions and was commanded by General Vandamme. The 4th Corps, under General Gerard, had three infantry divisions and one cavalry division. Grouchy also had two corps of cavalry. General Excelmans commanded two divisions of dragoons while General Pajol had a weak division of hussars. Pajol also had the Teste infantry division from the 6th Corps under his leadership. The French troops had 102 guns between them. Grouchy had a significant force under his command but one must remember that no fewer than three Prussian corps were retreating away from Ligny. Awareness of this may have influenced his strategy in the days ahead.
After leaving Napoleon Grouchy made his preperations for an advance on Gembloux. Excelman's and Pajol's forces had already been sent out by Napoleon in the morning. Pajol had been told to reconnaitre in the direction of Namur while Excelmans had advanced as far as Gembloux with his dragoons. No further orders were given to these commanders at the moment. Vandamme's and Gerard's corps were ordered to move towards Gembloux. [6] Vandamme received his orders at approximately midday [7] while Gerard received his at twelve-thirty. [8] There was considerable delay in getting the French troops started. Grouchy had ordered the 3rd Corps of Vandamme to move off first, even though it was south of the Ligny battlefield and behind the 4th Corps. The leading division of the 4th Corps, under General Hulot, consequently had to wait until all of Vandamme's troops had departed. It was not able to leave until 3 pm. [9] The French troops had also been cleaning their muskets and had unsaddled their horses when the order to march was announced. Consequently there was some delay before they could get ready to move off.
Progress towards Gembloux was slow. Both the 3rd and 4th Corps had to keep close together, on one single road, which resulted in frequent stops and starts. The weather on that day was very bad and undoubtedly slowed down the soldiers. General Gerard wrote that ".... all that day they had to bear a rain which fell in torrents and made the roads very difficult." The last French troops, from Gerard's 4th Corps, did not finally arrive in Gembloux until 10 o'clock that night. [10]
Throughout the day Grouchy had received various reports of the Prussian forces, none however that definite as to point him in any particular direction. As already noted, General Excelmans had been sent out by Napoleon towards Gembloux. There he had found a substantial body of Prussian troops encamped on the left bank of the River Orneau. [11]
Excelmans did nothing but observe these troops, though in his defence he had only just over two thousand cavalry against what appeared to be an entire enemy corps. He did inform Grouchy of these Prussians, probably around early afternoon, but they moved off soon afterwards and were nowhere in sight when the French infantry arrived at Gembloux. Pajol meanwhile had sent back a report that stated that the Prussians were moving in an easterly direction. Early in the morning he had seized eight cannon and some carts near Mazy and according to his dispatch the ". . . enemy continued his retreat on Saint-Denis and Leuze, to win the Namur to Louvain road." Pajol added that he had decided to send his troops in that direction. [12]
Thus by the time that Grouchy arrived at Gembloux he was not really that much clearer as to the Prussians' whereabouts than when he had met Napoleon at midday. From Pajol's and Excelman's dispatches and from other pieces of intelligence that he had acquired, Grouchy was unable to say if the Prussians were falling back to the east via Namur and Liege or moving towards Wellington. Indeed he seems to have believed that they were doing both.
Grouchy to Napoleon
At 10 pm he wrote a letter to Napoleon which showed his uncertain state of mind:
"Your Majesty, I have the honour to inform you that I occupy Gembloux and that my cavalry is at Sauvinieres. The enemy, thirty thousand strong, is still retreating. . . According to all the reports, it seems that when the Prussians arrived at Sauvinieres they divided into two columns: one took the road to Wavre, going via Sart a Walhain, the other column seems to have gone towards Perwes. One can perhaps infer that one part is going to join Wellington and that the centre, which is the army of Blucher, is retiring on Liege, another column with the artillery having retreated on Namur. General Excelmans has orders tonight to send six squadrons to Sart a Walhain and three to Perwes.
According to their reports, if the mass of Prussians retire on Wavre, I will follow them in that direction in order to prevent them reaching Brussels and to seperate them from Wellington. If, on the contrary, my information proves that the main Prussian force has marched on Perwes, I will go to this town in pursuit of the enemy. . ." [13]
Grouchy began issuing his orders for the next day shortly after writing this letter. By now the majority of the French forces were concentrated around Gembloux. Excelman's cavalry were situated just north of the town at Sauviniere. The two infantry corps were encamped around the town, Vandamme's to the north, Gerard's to the south. Pajol's troops however lay some four miles to the south at Le Mazy. He had arrived there in the evening still in pursuit of any Prussians retreating towards Namur. Grouchy planned a march north-north-east from Gembloux towards Sart a Walhain. Vandamme was ordered to set off at 5am and march on Sart a Walhain preceded by Excelman's cavalry. [14] Gerard was to leave at 8am and follow Vandamme's corps. [15] Pajol was instructed to move at daybreak from Le Mazy to Grand-Lez, a village to the north-east of Gembloux, at which point he would receive further orders. Grouchy would not decide the final destination of his forces until later in the night. In his letter to Pajol he stated that : "I will aim towards Sart a Walhain, but after the intelligence that I will receive during the night perhaps I will bear off towards Perwes le Marche." [16] Grouchy also ordered Pajol to send a strong reconnaisance to Namur to see if any Prussians had passed that way and if they had evacuated the town.
As the night wore on it became apparent that the Prussians were concentrating on Wavre. Pajol's reconnaisance to Namur found that the town was empty, indicating that no Prussians had passed through it. [17] A report timed at 3am stated that three Prussian corps had marched through Sart a Walhain the day before heading towardsWavre. [18] Just before daybreak Grouchy finally made up his mind and resolved to head towards Wavre. He ordered Pajol to move north to Tourinnes after he had arrived at Grand-Lez.
Then at about 3am he wrote the following letter to Napoleon:
"All my reports and information confirm that the enemy is retiring on Brussels, in order to concentrate there, or to give battle after joining Wellington. Namur is evacuated, according to General Pajol. The 1st and 2nd Corps of Blucher's army appear to be heading, the first to Corbais, the second to Chaumont. They must have left yesterday evening at half past eight from Tourinnes . . .. I leave straight away from Sart a Walhain from where I will march to Corbais and Wavre. . ." [19]
Prussian March
The Prussians had actually arrived at Wavre during the evening of the 17th of June. Following their defeat at Ligny, they had spent the day retreating northwards via Tilly and Mont St Guibert. Gneisenau, chief of staff to the Prussian commander Blucher, had temporarily taken over command following Blucher's injury and disappearance at Ligny. His main aim was to regroup his forces and then move north parallel to Wellington's troops so that they would be close enough to support the Allied army if necessary. By nightfall on the 17th the Prussian forces were deployed as follows. The 1st and 3rd Corps were bivouacked on the left bank of the Dyle, just beyond Wavre. The 2nd and 4th Corps were on the right bank, Pirch 1's troops were near Aisemont, Bulow's at Dion Le Mont. A rearguard consisting of one cavalry regiment and two infantry battalions from Bulow's Corps under the command of Colonel Ledebur was left at Mont St Guibert. [20]
With the Prussian troops regrouped and the return of Blucher to command they now felt able to go to the assistance of Wellington. Blucher received a message on the evening of the 17th from Wellington stating that the Allied army was now positioned opposite the French at Waterloo, expecting an attack in the morning and that he desired Prussian support. [21] At approximately midnight Blucher dictated a reply to the Prussian liaison officer with Wellington, von Mufffling:
"I report to your Excellency that, as a consequence of the word that I have received that Lord Wellington wants to start an attack tomorrow in the position from Braine L'Alleud to La Hay, I will set my troops moving in the following way: Von Bulow's Corps shall set out from Dion-Le-Mont at dawn tomorrow and proceed through Wavre via St Lambert, in order to attack the enemy's flank. The 2nd Corps shall follow the 4th Corps directly, and the 1st and 3rd Corps will be prepared to advance there too. The exhaustion of the troops, part of whom have not yet arrived (namely the tail end of the 4th Corps) makes it impossible to proceed earlier . . ." [22]
Blucher thus planned on the 18th to move the whole of his army from Wavre to support Wellington just as Grouchy was preparing to march towards that town. The Prussians were obviously aware of Grouchy's soldiers coming up from the south. They did not however know exactly how many French there were or if they would reach Wavre in time to impede the Prussian move westward. A corps would be left behind as a rearguard only if the French arrived in force at Wavre.
As General Grolman, Blucher's quartermaster-general, stated: "The question will be decided by midday. If the enemy has not appeared in too great a force before Wavre by then, the 1st Corps will follow the 2nd and 4th, maybe the 3rd Corps too. In any case, the enemy's crossing of the Dyle must be resisted until the main strength of the army has crossed the Lasne, one mile west of Wavre." [23]
French March
Turning once more to the French, as the sun rose on the morning of the 18th they stirred from a damp and cold night and began to prepare to march. It took a while to get the troops ready. The 3rd Corps did not set off until 7 or 8 am. [24] The last division of the 4th Corps, which was to follow, did not leave until 9am. At least one hour's delay was caused by congestion of troops in Gembloux. Progress on the march was slow, the road to Sart a Walhain was in poor condtion and the 4th Corps, being at the rear, had to occasionally halt to avoid being bunched up with the 3rd Corps. [25] Excelman's cavalry, leading the French advance, soon encountered pickets of Prussian light infantry (or tirailleurs) as they moved along the road from Sart a Walhain to Wavre. [26] Grouchy arrived at Sart a Walhain at about 10 o'clock. After presumably receiving more intelligence from his cavalry he wrote another letter to Napoleon at 11am:
"The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of Blucher are marching in the direction of Brussels. A corps from Liege has effected its junction with that which fought at Fleurus [Ligny]. Some of the Prussians that I have in front of me are heading towards the plain of La Chyse. It would seem that they plan to assemble there or fight the toops which are pursuing them or lastly join Wellington, a plan announced by the offficers. This evening I shall be massed at Wavre and thus will find myself between Wellington, whom I presume is retreating before your Majesty, and the Prussian army. I need further instructions on what Your Majesty wants me to do . . ." [27]
Grouchy did not have an accurate idea of where the Prussian forces were heading to. He thought that they were moving towards Brussels via the north-east, the plain of La Chyse, when as we know the Prussians were at this moment in the process of marching westward to Waterloo. Grouchy also seemed to be in no hurry; at the end of the letter he asked Napoleon to transmit new orders ". . .so that I can receive them before commencing my movement tomorrow."
One must remember however that Grouchy had had no contact with Napoleon for almost 24 hours. He was unaware that Napoleon's forces were just about to start attacking the Allied army only a few miles away. Napoleon had not informed Grouchy of his whereabouts despite having received three dispatches from the Marshal.
Cannon Fire
News of Napoleon soon reached Grouchy from another source. At about 11.30am, while Grouchy was allegedly eating strawberries, he started to hear the sound of canon-fire to his left. [28] This was the opening salvo of the Battle of Waterloo, though Grouchy did not know this at the time. General Gerard of the 4th Corps had by now arrived and urged Grouchy to march to the sound of the cannon. A heated argument ensued, accounts of which vary, but it is fair to surmise that Grouchy insisted on marching towards Wavre, citing that Napoleon had expressly ordered him to pursue the Prussians.
He also stated that as it was nearly midday his troops would not be able to reach Napoleon in time. Gerard offered to march his 4th Corps towards the fighting, leaving the rest of Grouchy's forces to continue heading northwards.This was also turned down by Grouchy. [29] Many historians have criticised Grouchy for this decision, arguing that if he had changed direction at this point he could have saved the Battle of Waterloo for the French. He could have marched to support the French right wing or fallen upon the Prussian advance. In the author's opinion however much of this criticism has the advantage of hindsight, of prior knowledge of the outcome of Waterloo. Grouchy at this time did not know what Napoleon's plans were or what the canon-fire concerned. Being the sort of commander that he was he felt it best to stick to his original orders and pursue the Prussians. Some commentators, Jomini for example, have questioned whether an attack by Grouchy on the Prussians' flank could have altered the final outcome of the Battle of Waterloo. The Prussians would have been able to hold off Grouchy with two corps whilst keeping the other two to march against Wellington. [30]
And so the French troops continued their slow march towards Wavre. Some time after midday, exactly when has never been determined, Grouchy received a letter from Napoleon written at ten o'clock. The Emperor told Grouchy that he was just about to attack the English at Waterloo, ". . . therefore His Majesty desires you to direct your movements upon Wavre, in order to join up with us, and connect yourself with our operations, pushing before you the Prussian corps which has taken this direction and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you must arrive as soon as possible." [31] This letter served if anything to convince Grouchy that he had earlier taken the right decision, to continue marching towards Wavre.
The Prussian advance towards Waterloo was now well under way. The soldiers had set off at sunrise, Bulow's 4th Corps leading. Progress was slow, the 4th Corps was actually to the east of Wavre, and was delayed by the mass of troops in the town. A fire had also broken out in Wavre itself, causing more delays. Pickets had been posted south of Wavre to watch out for any advancing French. By 12.30 pm however the detachment at Mont St. Guibert had still not seen anything, as this letter to General Bulow from its commander, Colonel von Ledebur, describes:
"I report obediently to your Excellency that the enemy has not worried us yet; just now and then patrols from Charstre have been seen in the distance; I have sent out three patrols . . . so far none of them has returned. In compliance with your orders, we will stay here until the enemy reaches us." [32]
Contact
Between one and two o'clock the lead elements of Excelman's cavalry corps came into contact with Ledebur's troops. Von Renher, commanding officer of the 10th Hussar regiment attached to Ledebur's command, wrote a rare first-hand Prussian account of what then occurred:
"When the news arrived in Mont St Guibert that the enemy had already got round us on the left flank, this seemed to me, considering the safety measures which had been taken . . . unlikely. I set out immediately, but in fact could already see two French squadrons, the head of the enemy vanguard, on the road from Corbais to La Baraque, where we were meant to be retreating to . . . The enemy had already outflanked the outposts of our left wing from Walhain . . ." [33]
Ledebur, to extricate himself from this potentially dangerous situation, ordered the Hussars and his horse artillery to charge the French troops. The French were forced to move off the La Baraque road. Their line of retreat open once again, the two Prussian infantry battalions withdrew northwards to the cover of the nearby La Huzelle wood. The 10th Hussars screened the retreat. [34]
The 2nd Prussian Corps under General Pirch 1 was still moving across the Dyle bridges when news of this skirmish reached him. Pirch 1 decided to keep the 7th and 8th brigades south of the Dyle and ordered General von Brause of the7th brigade to command this rearguard. Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr of the 2nd Corps was also south of the Dyle with his cavalry brigade. In the village of Aisemont, just south of Wavre, von Borcke's 9th brigade from the 3rd Corps was still encamped. Von Brause positioned the majority of the 8th brigade in the La Huzelle wood alongside Ledebur's detachment, with a few battalions behind. The 7th brigade, formed into line, was kept in reserve. [35]
At the same time Grouchy, upon hearing of the skirmish between Excelman's and Ledebur's forces, ordered General Vandamme's leading troops, who had now arrived at the scene, to attack. Excelmans and his cavalry were ordered to move and outflank the Prussian rearguard via Dion Le Mont. [36] Intermittent fighting continued for about an hour until at 3.30pm General von Brause ordered his troops to retreat. The 7th brigade withdrew first, crossing the river Dyle at Bierge, then came the 8th, while Sohr's cavalry and Ledebur's detachment made up the rearguard. The last Prussian troops to cross the river destroyed the bridge at Bierge. [372]
The only other sizeable Prusssian force still around Wavre was General Thielemann's 3rd Corps. Initially Thielemann thought that this initial French attack was just a probing one and was still planning to march off with his corps to join the other Prussian troops. Thielemann himself left an account of what happened:
"Colonel von Clausewitz [The 3rd Corps chief of staff] was told by General Grolman . . . at 1pm that I was either to defend the line at Wavre or to leave some battalions there while I marched off to the right to serve as a reserve. Towards 3pm, when the 2nd Army Corps had not yet completely passed the Wavre defile, the enemy appeared before them and engaged with the rearguards of both the 2nd Army Corps and mine, the 9th brigade . . . Being of the opinion that the enemy merely wanted to occupy the rearguard in order to halt the Corps, but that they would not get involved in seizing a line like that at Wavre, I let the majority assemble to march away, and sent an order to General von Borcke to also go through the defile with the 9th brigade . . . to leave 2 battalions in Wavre." [38]
Thielemann may have also thought that the French were feigning a diversion at Wavre while the bulk of their army planned to move left and march to the battlefield at Waterloo. At about 4 pm the leading elements of the French 3rd Corps reached the outskirts of Wavre, just south of the river Dyle, and began to attack the Prussian troops there. General Vandamme probably launched this assault on his own initiative, without waiting for Grouchy's specific orders. [39] Most of the Prussian 3rd Corps was either on the march or just about to depart and Thielemann now realised that only two battalions in Wavre would be insufficient to hold off the French. He thus ordered the 3rd Corps to halt and deploy to defend its positions. [40]
Third Corps Deployment
The Prussian 3rd Corps consisted of four infantry brigades and two cavalry brigades, with a total of 42 guns. Thielemann positioned the 12th brigade on the heights behind Bierge, supported by six guns of the horse battery number 20. The 10th brigade was stationed to the left of the 12th on the hill behind Wavre. It was formed up into three lines, two battalions in the first line, three in the second and one in the third. To the left of the 10th brigade, on the other side of the Brussels road, Thielemann placed the 11th brigade. General von Hobe's two brigades of reserve cavalry were stationed in the rear around La Bavette and the reserve artillery was placed on the heights behind Wavre.
The town of Wavre itself was garrisoned by three infantry battalions and two squadrons of cavalry from the 9th brigade under the command of Colonel von Zepelin. As described earlier, General von Borcke, commander of the 9th brigade, had been ordered by General Thielemann to leave two battalions in Wavre. He added another battalion and two squadrons of cavalry on his own initiative and then marched off towards Couture with the other six battalions and all his artillery. Borcke played no further part in the battle and his missing troops could have been very useful to Thielemann.
No satisfactory explanation has been found for Borcke's decision to move off. One theory is that he thought that the whole of the Prussian 3rd Corps was still marching towards Couture and thus felt that he could continue on his way. The extreme left flank of the Prussian position at Bas-Wavre was held by two infantry companies under the command of Major von Bornstadt. Finally a detachment of three infantry battalions and three cavalry squadrons under the command of Colonel von Stengel of the 1st Corps garrisoned the village of Limal on the Prussian right. [41]
In all General Thielemann only had some 15000 troops with which to oppose Grouchy's 32000 men. He did though have geography on his side. The valley of the River Dyle, on which Wavre was sited, was often steeply sided and dotted with woods, terrain that favoured the defender. Although the River Dyle was not very deep, the heavy rains of the preceding day made it very difficult to cross. This fact directed the fighting towards the five bridges in the immediate vicinity of the opposing forces. From left to right there were bridges at Bas-Wavre, Wavre (two), Bierge and Limal. Only three of these were barricaded. There was not enough time to barricade one of the bridges at Wavre and for an unknown reason Colonel von Stengel's detachment at Limal did not barricade the bridge there. This was later to have very severe consequences for the Prussians. Thielemann also stationed sharpshooters along many parts of the left bank of the Dyle and his troops loopholed houses adjacent to the river to provide a more secure firing position. [42]
Tactics
Thielemann's tactics and the deployment of his troops must be praised. Two brigades of infantry and all of his cavalry were stationed in the rear so that they could reinforce any part of the front that was threatened. Clausewitz, the famous military theorist who was at the time the 3rd Corps chief of staff, eloquently summarised the Prussian tactics in his book "The Campaign of 1815 in France.":
"General Thielemann's arrangements were designed to let as few troops as possible out of his possession, to engage in a fire-fight with the smallest number of infantry possible, to make the main effort through the use of artillery, and thus to be in a position, if the enemy wanted to break through the valley with an assault somewhere, to lead the bulk of troops still fresh against them . . . " [43]
More French troops had by now arrived at the scene of the fighting. Grouchy came up himself and ordered Vandamme's corps to continue to attack Wavre. General Excelman's cavalry were directed to Bas-Wavre with the instruction to try and cross the River Dyle there. [44] News came from General Pajol that he had found no traces of the Prussians at Tourinnes, where he had been ordered to earlier by Grouchy. The Marshal sent him the following order to attack the Prussian right flank: "General, march with all haste, with the division Teste and your corps, to Limal; cross the Dyle there and attack the enemy who is opposite." [45] This instruction would take some time to realise as Pajol's troops were some seven miles from Limal.
Grouchy's Plan
Grouchy planned to attack the Prussians at several different places along the Dyle. He then possibly hoped to exploit any bridgehead that he could seize. Due to the terrain and the fierce resistance of the Prussians his plans were unsuccessful. Vandamme's 3rd Corps easily penetrated the small suburb of Wavre on the right bank of the Dyle but then met fierce resistance from the Prussian troops on the other side of the river. In the course of a savage firefight the lead division, under General Habert, suffered 600 casualties and Habert himself was injured. The French attack was repulsed.
The French did not help themselves by any tactical finesse, they simply advanced in column according to one witness. [46] In the end though it was the withering fire of the Prussians that stopped them. As Grouchy himself wrote after the battle: ". . . not a man could put a foot outside his refuge without being exposed to a hail of balls and bullets." [47] A second attack by the 3rd Corps, by General Lefol's division on the bridge at Bierge, was also repulsed at this time.
Napoleon to Groucy
It was now between four and five o'clock in the afternoon. A messenger rode up with another letter from Napoleon, one written at 1.30 pm. Grouchy was informed that the main French army was now engaged in battle with Wellington's forces. He was instructed to move towards Napoleon and fall on the enemy troops who were menacing the French right. A postcript to the dispatch contained more worrying news however:
"PS. A letter which has been intercepted says that General Bulow will attack our flank; we believe his corps is appearing on the heights of St. Lambert; therefore do not lose an instant in drawing nearer to us and joining us and to crush Bulow, whom you will surprise in the very act." [48]
This letter was far more decisive in tone than the one Napoleon had sent three and a half hours earlier. Grouchy was instructed to immediately march and attack Bulow's corps. He was however on the wrong side of the River Dyle, facing a tenacious Prussian defence, and it was almost five o'clock.
Hulot's division from General Gerard's 4th Corps had now arrived at Wavre; the other two divisions were still some distance behind. Grouchy ordered Hulot to replace Lefol's attack on Bierge with his division. Then, realizing that he had to quickly move some troops across the Dyle to have any chance, however slender, of aiding Napoleon, Grouchy rode back to the small hamlet of La Baraque to meet up with the rest of the 4th Corps. He ordered the two divisions there to march towards Limal and join up with Pajol's forces in their attempt to cross the river. Grouchy then went back to the battlefield where Hulot's division had by now made two unsuccessful assaults on the mill of Bierge.
The French attacks had been hindered by the difficult terrain. The ground was open, marshy and there were many deep ditches which hindered movement. The Prussians had the advantage of much cover from the buildings in Bierge and the many trees that lined their side of the river. Grouchy and Gerard led in person a third assault, but this was just as unsuccessful as the first two. Gerard was hit in the chest by a musket ball and carried from the field severely wounded. Grouchy then abandoned the attack and leaving only the 3rd Corps in place at Wavre, ordered the units from the 4th Corps who were there to march to Limal. These troops took the road parallel to the river but their progress was slowed by the difficult terrain. [49]
General Pajol had meanwhile made his way to La Baraque, where he met up with the 7th cavalry division commanded by General Valin who had replaced the original commander, General Maurin, who had been injured. Pajol placed Valin's division at the head of his column, the Teste division behind it and Soult's cavalry as the rear guard. Scouts reported that Limal was occupied by Prussian troops (The 19th infantry regiment under Colonel von Stengel), but for some reason they had not barricaded the bridge there. When Pajol reached Limal, at about 8 pm, he immediately ordered the 1st brigade of Valin's cavalry to charge the bridge. The charge was successful and the French cavalry, now reinforced by Valin's 2nd brigade, forced the Prussians out of Limal. Colonel von Stengel withdrew his troops to the plateau overlooking Limal and Limalette. Pajol had by now though brought the Teste division across the Dyle and with this gradually pushed the Prussians back from the plateau. At long last the French had finally succeeded in penetrating the Prussian defence. [50]
Grouchy arrived at Limal with the lead elements of his forces at around 11 pm to hear this welcome news. [51] It was now dark however, and little time was left to exploit this opportunity.
Prussian Counterattack
First though Grouchy had to face a Prussian counter-attack. General Thielemann received news of the French success at Limal at about 10 pm. [52] He ordered Colonel von Stulpnagel's 12th brigade, stationed at Bierge, to march towards Limal with six of its battalions, leaving the other three behind. Three battalions from the 10th brigade moved into Bierge to replace those departing from the 12th brigade.
General von Hobe's reserve cavalry was also ordered to support the 12th brigade and the other Prussian units made a general move to the right. Stulpnagel took position on a hill overlooking Limal, his left flank secured by cavalry, his right by a number of houses. Leaving one battalion behind as a reserve and with Stengel's troops and the reserve cavalry to his right, Stulpnagel ordered the remaining five battalions forward in two lines of attack. In the dark though the Prussian advance lost cohesion. The first line was halted by volley-fire from two French battalions, the second line lost its way and was attacked by French tirailleurs. On the right Stengel's assault was halted by French cavalry and he was forced to retreat. Stulpnagel called off the attack and withdrew his infantry to the Rixensart wood, leaving one battalion in front of it as a picket-line. Hobe's cavalry stationed themselves behind the wood. The French and Prussian troops were so close to each other that there was continual shooting and skirmishing throughout the rest of the night. [53]
In the town of Wavre General Vandamme continued in his attempt to try and seize a bridgehead over the Dyle. Thirteen attacks were made during the evening but all were unsuccessful. Prussian counterattacks actually succeeded in crossing over to the French side of the river on several occassions. In the course of the fighting Zepelin's garrison of three battalions was reinforced by two battalions from the 11th brigade. [54] The Prussians held on to Wavre primarily because of their strong defensive position. The French could only attack across two bridges and the houses on the Prussian side of the Dyle were heavily fortified. Colonel von Zepelin also utilised some skilful tactics.
The Prussian writer von Damitz described how the Prusssian reserves were held under cover in side-roads adjacent to the river. When the French troops crossed the bridge these reserves surged out and attacked the French in the flank, pushing them back. [55] General Excelman's cavalry also made an attack on the village of Bas-Wavre on the Prussian left wing. This too failed, despite being defended by only a small force of two infantry companies under Major von Bornstadt. [56]
By now the fighting had ceased across the whole of the battlefield. The remaining two divisions of the 4th Corps finally arrived on the Limal plateau and Grouchy positioned them in preperation for an attack at sunrise the next day. He was in a difficult situation though. The onset of darkness had prevented him from carrying out Napoleon's last order and breaking through the Prussian 3rd Corps to come to support the main French army. Even though Grouchy had no clear idea about the outcome of Waterloo, he was by now acutely conscious that he had possibly failed in his duty. A letter to General Vandamme written at 11.30 pm on the night of the 18th of June clearly shows Grouchy's worried state of mind:
"My dear general, we have made our way through Limal, but the night has not allowed us to go on, so that we are face to face with the enemy. Since you have not been able to cross the Dyle, proceed immediately to Limal with your corps, only leaving in front of Wavre enough troops to keep that part of Wavre which we occupy. At daybreak we will attack the troops that I have opposite me and we will succeed, I hope, in joining the Emperor, just as he orders me to do. It is said that he has beaten the English; but I have no more news of him and am very embarrassed to give him ours . . . I beg you, my dear comrade, to carry out this order immediately. It is only by this way that we will get out of this difficult situation in which we find ourselves, and the safety of the army depends on it." [57]
Napoleon's Defeat at Waterloo
News reached the Prussians in the night about Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. A patrol from Marwitz's cavalry brigade brought back a report that the French had been beaten. His spirits raised and thinking that Grouchy would now retreat in the morning, General Thielemann planned an attack at dawn. His strength was weakened however when Colonel von Stengel and his detachment of three battalions and three squadrons marched away to rejoin the Prussian 1st Corps. Stengel's decision has never been properly explained. Perhaps he felt that with the good news from Waterloo, the battle at Wavre was now virtually won and that he could return to his unit.
To cover the gap left by Stengel's departure Thielemann was forced to extend the 12th brigade to the right. Only three weak battalions from the 12th now occupied the Rixensart wood. Colonel von Luck of the 11th brigade was ordered to support the 12th brigade with three battalions from the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr regiment. Two battalions from the 11th brigade's 4th Kurmark Landwehr regiment were ordered to move behind Wavre to act as support for the troops there. The Prussian left was held by five battalions from the10th brigade, resting upon Bierge. The mill of Bierge was still occupied by two battalions from the 12th brigade and all the other Prussian troops stayed in their previous positions. [58]
At sunrise on the 19th, at approximately three o'clock in the morning, Thielemann attacked with his cavalry. The 8th Uhlans from the Marwitz's brigade advanced first, with the 5th and 7th Uhlans in support on the left. Two horse artillery batteries formed part of the attack and opened up on the French columns on the plateau. Soult's cavalry division bore the brunt of the Prussian fire and General Pajol rushed up guns to support it. In the ensuing firefight, conducted at very close range, The Prussians came off worst, suffering many casualties and losing five guns. The Prussian cavalry were forced to retreat. [59]
Grouchy then ordered the French troops forward. By now there were four infantry divisions on the plateau overlooking Limal. Teste's division was ordered to advance on Bierge, Pecheux's division attacked the Prussian centre and Hulot's division moved against the Prussian right in the Rixensart wood.Vichery's division remained in reserve. Pajol and his cavalry were ordered to turn the Prussian right flank. Each French infantry division had an artillery battery at the front and was preceded by a column of skirmishers.
To counter this threat General Thielemann strengthened his right wing with two infantry companies and his left by one battalion. He met Grouchy's advance with a counter-attack of his own and this initially had some successs, forcing the French back. In turn though this Prussian attack was repulsed and the French troops resumed their advance and reached the outskirts of Bierge. [60] Throughout the fighting there had been no sign of General Vandamme's forces. Vandamme had ignored Grouchy's order of the night before directing him to Limal. In the morning he renewed his attack on Bierge from across the river with the same unsuccessful results as on the previous day. [61] Grouchy was thus deprived of a sizeable force that could have considerably strengthened his attack.
Teste's division then made an assault on the village of Bierge itself. This was beaten off by the Prussian defenders there, reinforced by two extra battalions. Thielemann was now though finding himself under increasing pressure and he was forced to order a redeployment of his forces. Six battalions from the 10th and 12th brigades moved to a small wood behind Bierge. The remainder of the 12th brigade concentrated at the exit of the Rixensart wood, supported by three battalions of the 11th brigade and fifteen guns. The Prussian cavalry remained on the right flank, Lottum's brigade at Chambre and Marwitz's brigade to its left. [62]
Between eight and nine o'clock Thielemann received final conclusive news that Napoleon had been defeated at Waterloo. He was also informed that the Prusssian 2nd Corps under General Pirch 1 was moving southwards to threaten Grouchy's rear. This news lifted Prussian morale and they launched another attack, possibly thinking that the French would also have heard about the disaster at Waterloo and thus would be preparing to fall back. The Rixensart wood was retaken in this attack. However the French troops, contrary to Prussian expectations, did not retreat but returned to the offensive once more. They pushed the Prussians out of the Rixensart wood and then launched another assault on Bierge. This was beaten off by fierce Prussian resistance but by now the French left wing had managed to advance as far as the road to Lowen. Thielemann's right wing, weakened by the fighting of the last few hours, was thus in danger of being outflanked. [63]
It was now almost 10 o'clock. For the last seven hours the Prussians had conducted a skilful defensive action. By defending and then counter-attacking in turn they had held up Grouchy's assault and prevented any breakthrough. Ground had been given up only slowly and Thielemann still held the key positions of Wavre and Bierge with their strategic river-crossings. Grouchy's attack had been weakened by the absence of Vandamme's corps, still on the south side of the Dyle. Despite all this the French had still kept pushing forward and now Thielemann faced the fact that, with this constant pressure, he would be unable to hold both his right flank and the Dyle bridges for very much longer.
The Prussian 2nd Corps was still too far away to be of immediate assistance. It appears that some sort of conference was held by the Prussian commanders. The 3rd Corps Chief of Staff, General von Clausewitz, suggested that they should retreat towards Lowen in the hope of drawing the French 11th Brigade (Von Luck)after them. Grouchy would thus be exposed to an attack in the rear by Pirch 1's 2nd Corps when it arrived. The Prussians planned not to retreat one step further than they had to and they wanted to be ready to immediately follow the French if they too began to withdraw. Contact should thus not be lost with Grouchy's troops. [64]
The decision made, at just after 10 o'clock Thielemann ordered his troops to retreat.
The Prussian right wing, the 12th brigade, departed first of all for Otten-bourg, followed by the 11th brigade and the 10th brigade from Bie-rge. Colonel von Zeppelin was easily able to eva-c-uate the town of Wavre as it had not been att-acked all morn-ing. Last to depart were the cavalry, Marwitz's bri-gade forming the rear-guard. [65] General Thielemann ordered Marwitz not to pull out until Wavre was completely evacuated. [66]
Vandamme's 3rd Corps was now able to cross the Dyle. Berthezene's division went over at Bierge while the other two divisions crossed at Wavre. [67] Advancing onwards from Wavre, Vandamme's troops pushed forwards as far as the hamlet of La Bavette, skirmishing several times with the Prussian rear-guard. Meanwhile Pajol's cavalry on the extreme French left advanced to beyond the main Wavre - Brussels road. Command of this strategic highway thus passed to Grouchy. With the Prussian 3rd Corps falling back towards Lowen, he was now ready to march towards Napoleon's forces, whom he assumed were probably heading towards Brussels after having defeated Wellington. [68]
Reality
Reality caught up with him however. At about 11am a messenger arrived bearing news of the French defeat at Waterloo and the complete rout of Napoleon's forces. This immediately changed the whole situation. Grouchy now faced the prospect of being attacked in the rear by Prussian troops coming from Waterloo. Also he knew that Thielemann would go onto the offensive when he saw the French withdrawing. Grouchy could thus find himself threatened from two directions. After some discussion with his corps commanders Grouchy decided to retreat southwards to Namur. Grouchy's retreat to Namur and his subsequent march to Paris form another story in themselves. Suffice it to say that Grouchy conducted a skilful withdrawal, fighting several rear-guard actions until he reached Paris on the 29th of June, his army still in good order. [69]
Thus ended the battle of Wavre. Grouchy's troops had marched for over a day and then fought a prolonged battle with the Prussian 3rd Corps, finally forcing them to retreat. In the end though it was to no avail, Grouchy immediately had to withdraw when he heard about Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. Was Grouchy to blame in any way for this debacle? Only slightly, if one looks at the evidence. It was Napoleon who sent Grouchy eastward at lunchtime on the 17th. [70]
It was Napoleon who made no further communication until 24 hours later, and even then he just ordered Grouchy to march upon Wavre. The last order, instructing Grouchy to attack Bulow's Corps, arrived too late to have any chance of success. Grouchy did not move particularly quickly, but one must also note the appalling weather, the poor state of the roads and the fact that he was moving into the unknown, chasing a Prussian force larger than his, something that even if only unconsciously must have produced caution.
One can perhaps criticise Grouchy for lack of speed and unimaginativeness, but he cannot really be criticised for just obeying his superior's orders. The blame in the end must fall on Napoleon for setting in motion a chain of events that ensured that Grouchy's detachment was unable to play any decisive part in the final stages of the campaign.
The Prussian resistance on the afternoon of the 18th and the following morning was equally instrumental in thwarting Grouchy. It is true that the defensive nature of the terrain at Wavre mitigated against an attack. However Thielemann's forces fought extremely well, both tactically and with tenacity. Grouchy was lucky to find an undefended river-crossing at Limal; otherwise he might not have been able to make any penetration of the Prussian defences, so fiercely did the Prussians resist the French attacks.
Even on the morning of the 19th, when four French divisions were across the River Dyle, Thielemann's troops held out for almost seven hours before being finally forced to retreat. Such a determined and tenacious defence ensured that Grouchy had no chance whatsoever of coming to Napoleon's aid, either by marching to attack the other Prussian corps or at the worst helping to rally Napoleon's troops when they were fleeing from the battlefield of Waterloo. The action at Wavre thus further emphasises the decisive role of the Prussian army in defeating Napoleon over the course of the Hundred Day's Campaign. [71]
Space precludes a full bibliography; all the books referred to in this article are cited in the footnotes. For the English reader a general introduction to the Wavre campaign can be found by reading W.H. Kelly, The Battle of Wavre and Grouchy's Retreat, (London 1905), though it is heavilly biased against Grouchy. The best English-language work in the author's estimation is still though Siborne's classic, History of the Waterloo Campaign, (London 1848), which has several chapters on Wavre. Another important work from that period, Chesney's Waterloo Lectures, (4th Edition London 1907), provides a useful strategical analysis and a more balanced appraisal of Grouchy. All three of these books have been reprinted recently and are obtainable from good bookshops.
The classic French historical view on Wavre can be found by consulting Houssaye's, 1815 Waterloo, (London 1900), an English translation that can be found in the British Library. Despite the author's fondness for Napoleon this is an invaluable work, particularly for the wealth of infomation contained in its footnotes. The reader who is interested in studying Prussian accounts of the battle can only consult German - language works. Von Ollech's, Geschichte de Feldzuges, (Berlin 1876), provides a lot of information on the whole Wavre campaign including many original documents.
For a really detailed account of the actual combat at Wavre it is essential though to read Wagner's, Plane der Schlachten und Treffen, Vol 4 "Enthalt den Feldzug in Belgien im Jahre 1815". This describes the Prussian actions at battalion level and shows an attention to detail that few English authors, with the exception of Siborne, can match. Interested readers can again find these two volumes in the British Library.
Wavre Order of Battle [1] Letter Napoleon - Ney, 17th June 1815 - quoted in W Siborne History of the Waterloo Campaign, (London 1848), p. 557.
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