Instructions for Officers
Commanding the Rear Guard

by David Commerford, UK

There are many ways of playing wargames and many reasons for doing so. You can play just for fun or you can play with a specific purpose. One of the things I have found over the years is that it is possible, given the right rules (this tends to be a subjective use of the word "right") to recreate some of the problems faced by commanders of the period, all be it on a limited scale. Of course there is no death or deprivation to cloud ones judgment but on the other hand you can screw up, big time, without fear of a firing squad or the loss of thousands of lives to haunt you in your declining years! I believe that wargames as tactical research does have possibilities. Not research in the classical sense but in a form of modeling problems and solutions of the period, in a manner that is not really available by other means. Messieurs Watkins, Barstow and Moore, amongst others, have commented in these pages on how re-enactment (in the latter case, including film making as well) has given them insight into the every day problems of the man in the field during the Napoleonic era. However there are limitations to this, in that their experience is focused at ground level. While there are obviously real difficulties in maneuvering bodies of real people over real terrain, in some sort of order, nobody is trying (or at least I hope their not) to kill them. Although I am sure there are times when the fear is real enough. Also lacking is the real decision of command in that, of necessity, re-enactments are choreographed thereby further divorcing the experience from reality. 1814 Groundwork Recently, along with my fellow wargames regulars, I have been doing the groundwork to set up an 1814 campaign. As those of you familiar with the actions of this year will be aware both sides were constantly trying to hold, river crossings and other places of importance, stop opposing forces join each other etc. This naturally lends itself to a lot rugged defense. Particularly if you are the French trying to make light of inferior numbers. This has led me to some investigation into the tactics of the rear guard, hence the title of this piece. They best visual image I can give of a rear guard, or more correctly holding action, is from the film "Gettysburg" where we see General Buford and his cavalry "Force them to come on line" and thereby "Stack them up for miles." As it says in the script. Not our period I grant you, but the tactics hadn't changed that much and the principal not at all. The basic idea being that the pursing forces, after approaching in March Column, would be forced into line of battle as Heth's Division were on that day. Causing maximum delay was the prime intention. All those of you who have seen the film or watched it on video will appreciate the image of those long columns, doubling by the right flank, into line and the time that it took. A good example of how large scale re-enactment (the films extras were all re-enactors) can assist our visual understanding, I hasten to add. Rearguard Views The rearguard can be viewed, both in terms of history and gaming, at several levels. From small detachments, a battalion or two with a section of guns and a few squadrons of cavalry right up to the road from Moscow with Ney and Davout taking turns to dig each others Corps out of seemingly impossible scrapes. There are also opportunities for British players in the Peninsular. The long trek to Corunna and the many exploits of the Light Division to name but two. Before discussing, what and what not to do. Let me start with a quote from a man who was not only "there at the time" but appeared for both sides. Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini. In his celebrated The Art of War, published in 1838 Jomini says "I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves." Well thanks a lot Baron, don't call us, we can't call you. In fairness, he does go on elsewhere to recommend that the command be given to "an officer of great coolness" and that staff officers should be attached to "select suitable points for occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check." However, I feel that overall his work illustrates that staff officers make better talk than action and appear to be good a stating the obvious. If you want period background you are probably better off going to a lower level of soldier for your first hand accounts of what really happened. Better still find out for yourself what was required with a little practical experimentation. Force To begin with, what about the force? Up to a point 'the Baron' had the right idea in that cavalry in these affairs is most certainly useful. I differ here from Jomini's fairly open statement in that I generally assume that Curassiers ,or the equivalent, are part of the cavalry reserves and I would suggest that dragoons are as heavy as is required. For the most part we are talking "Hit and Run" here, not glorious battle winning charges. Also regardless of my earlier illustration this not 1863 we are talking about, so forget any ideas of carefully co-ordinated dismounted fire action. As we all know carbines of our period are not up to holding off formed infantry. The role of our cavalry element is to threaten and harass the advance by forcing unplanned deployment and with a bit of luck providing some lovely squares to shoot at. Horse Artillery is always, repeat, always welcome on these occasions. The other prime directive for the mounted arm is to keep the opposing "Donkey Wallopers" of the necks of your own infantry. This is of great importance, for without them, you won't hold up anything for very long. Of course it is perfectly practicable to fight a series of delaying actions with a combined cavalry/horse artillery rear guard (Lord Uxbridge en route from Quatre Bras on 17th June is a good example) but this tends to rely on mobility rather than immobility for effect. Therefore it cannot be readily used where the trading of space for time is not possible. Content I have already mentioned Horse Artillery and indeed it is the ideal branch of this service for the rear guard. However where a more substantial force was needed commanders were forced to deploy the Foot batteries associated with the formations detailed for the action. The primary difficulty this gives you is the trade off between the greater range and hitting power and the problems of escape for less mobile equipment. In general terms, a mixture of terrain and availability governs the options. If your chosen defensive position has clear fields of fire out to engagement range, for the weapon available, as well as a good line of retreat then a Foot battery can have some advantages in terms of pinning the opposition at a distance that will maximize delay. In most instances the rearguard would have an infantry content. This of choice and again dependent on the size of the force involved would need to be as mobile as possible. The employment of Light Infantry and Rifles was a great advantage. The British in the Peninsular, for example, often used the Light Division, or it's elements in this role. Here their high standards of performance and discipline were ideally suited for the task. Possibly the best known example of this being the action on the Coa, near Almeida in July 1810. Where the infantry force, operating in difficult terrain, covered the withdrawal of its cavalry and artillery support in the face of Ney's VI Corps. They themselves crossing the single bridge with a loss of only 36 killed, 214 wounded and 83 missing. This in spite of being outnumbered 5:1 and having at one stage allowed five companies of the 52nd to become separated from the main body. These having then to be rescued by a counter attack lead by Major MacLeod of the 43rd and Colonel Sidney Beckwith of the 95th. The latter incidentally, was something of a real life Sharp. Earlier that same year on the night of March 19th while the 95th were holding the narrow Roman bridge over the Agueda at Barba del Puerco, their small piquet was over run by 600 French infantry. The alarm being raised, the 95th rushed from their billets in various states of undress with Sidney resplendent in nightgown, slippers and red nightcap at their head. Just in time they caught the French struggling up the steep, rocky slope in disorder and with the aid of some large boulders and accurate shooting, drove them back across the river. Now that would make an interesting scenario. Does anyone do a rifleman in nightgown I wonder? The mention of terrain in the above passage (no pun intended) brings me to the next piece of advice. Whether we are talking about a one off games, campaigns or real life the ground selected for the action is very important. Terrain The historical feel of a rearguard action is dependent on the ground available. Given that the rearguard would have to make the most of available numbers, experienced commanders would select the ground to give a combination of good fields of fire while retaining the possibility for concealment, both for surprise and to hide the size of their force from the enemy. To this end, river crossing, towns, defiles and woods were all employed to slow down the enemy and restrict the effect of superior numbers. If you are playing a campaign such features should be looked for on the map or sort from the umpire. If a one off game allowance should be made for the defending side to have choice of ground or the game will be over almost as soon as it starts. The subject of use of terrain and concealment reminds me that I should mention the role of an umpire in simulating these actions. It is often debated that any wargame is never likely to approach a meaningful level of realism with out the use of an umpire. I confess that there is a lot of truth in this. For without one, all sorts of rule systems, markers, maps etc. have to be employed to cover hidden movement. Otherwise there is no satisfactory way to introduce the level of uncertainty and lack of information that real commanders experience. Perhaps the ultimate way of recreating this effect is using Kreigspiel. This does require an umpire but gives good results. Unfortunately it also requires extra resources. As you also need two tables with some form of screen in between or alternatively the real Kreigspiel approach of two rooms with the umpire moving from one to the other. It also requires two identical forces for both players and the terrain to be exactly the same on both tables. The opposing players then set up only their own force on their respective tables. The umpire receives their instructions, checks the movements and judges line of sight for revealing opposing forces. When revealed, only those troops that can be seen are placed on the table, thereby giving opposing commanders a piecemeal view, of their own side and those units of the enemy that can be seen by them. This leads to more cautious tactics on behalf of the approaching commander and the opportunity for skillful deception and counter attack by the rearguard. This method takes a little getting used to, even for the defender. It is easy to forget that your troops cannot be seen in the way they would be in a normal game. So you can some times sit in a position, forgetting that you would have concealment while moving to a more advantageous one. Back to Tactics Returning to tactics. Perhaps the greatest test for a rearguard commander is timing. How long can you hold on to a position and still get some, or all, of your force away is the most difficult skill to learn. Too soon and you give up ground to cheaply, too late and you lose valuable men and even worse you (or your command figure) will end up in the cage. I have found that it is an interesting exercise in looking at the problems of the Napoleonic commander to contrast the same situation with those faced by Generals fifty years later. If you have two sets of rules you trust, one for Napoleonics and one for the American Civil War, try fighting the same action on the same terrain with the same numbers. It throws up some interesting, if not altogether surprising, anomalies. For instance, that which can be accomplished with the aid of longer range artillery and cavalry that can shoot their way out of trouble, can often prove impossible for a 4pdr Horse Battery and a Brigade of Chasseurs! Indeed, I can safely say that Mr.Spencer's little device is as much a delight to my Union Cavalry as it must have been to their human counterparts, as many an angry Reb will tell you, but that as they say is another story. However, what I will also vouch for is how much easier it is on the nerves to conduct a rear guard when the range and firepower at your disposal allows you to force deployment, inflict damage and still have good time to effect your escape. The final area that a commander must tackle is that of sacrifice. Now, I don't mean none of that devil worship, biting the heads of chickens, or some such goings on, Young Master Jasper. Whoops, I was off there for a minute! What I do mean is having to face up to the fact that somewhere, at some point, one or more of your prize units is going to have to "stop one for its mates", so to speak. Over the years I have seen numerous occasions where tabletop players have hesitated to throw in one or two units to allow others the opportunity to escape and have ended up losing the lot! Sorry but there are times, particularly during campaign battles when it just has to be done. No matter how many hours of careful painting you have lavished on the unfortunate victims of fate. Death or Captivity Through out history gallant individuals and formations have been called on to face death or captivity under these circumstances. Sometimes they have found themselves doing it unwittingly as others have been withdrawn without their knowledge and on other occasions through bad planning and panic, as at Leipzig. The latter, incidentally, was a classic example of how not to conduct a rear guard. Not only was an important decision (the blowing of the bridge) delegated too far down the chain of command (meaning the officer in charge of the engineers, not the dope who actually did the deed) but the withdrawal also reversed a basic principal. The Allies had four gates into the city, the French only had one to get out! Why not dust off your figures and see if you can do better. You might just learn something! Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #39 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com