Have You Heard The One About
The Englishman, The Austrian
And The Russian?
National Characteristics
by Major A W Field, UK
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In the last couple of issues of FE the subject of "National Characteristics" has raised its head a number of times; not least when David Commerford wondered why British lines defeated French lines when Prussian lines did not. In a recent newspaper article, John Simpson, when comparing the suitability of various nations' armed forces for Peacekeeping wrote "Armies are national characteristics in uniform". As a professional soldier of twenty years I have worked closely with, and observed at close hand, the armed forces of many nations and it is startling how different each is from the other for many reasons. It therefore follows that the same was true during the Napoleonic Wars and this no doubt has an effect on how armies perform in war. I have identified six areas which I believe may set armies apart and are likely to have an impact on their performance. I do not intend to examine how each applied to all the protagonists but will use examples where I feel they are useful. There are a number of excellent books which cover the various armies in some detail such as Elting's Swords Around a Throne and Rothenberg's The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. National CharacterI thought I would start with the most contentious and the one open to the most sweeping generalisations (after all, not all Irishmen are stupid are they?!). However, there is no doubt that culture, religion, social attitudes etc. do set the peoples of various nations apart and affect their suitability or performance as soldiers, even if they do encourage stereotypes. Such stereotypes can be useful providing they are not taken to extremes; there are many examples of French élan, Russian stubbornness and British steadiness, but also some when the opposite was true. History And TraditionIn most armies there is a tradition and history which is held up for the present generation to emulate. This is particularly true in the British Regimental system. This inheritance of a proud and glorious history is still used to motivate soldiers and to give them a feeling of pride in their regiment and a desire not to let their fellow soldiers down. The maintenance of this military ethos is guarded jealously and is found in all armies of the world. Belonging to a regiment that has distinguished itself in previous encounters with the enemy is a powerful incentive and confidence builder for a new recruit, just as joining a recently decimated or poorly regarded regiment is likely to be an ill omen. Discipline And MotivationThe British, Russian and early Prussian armies had a reputation for the harsh enforcement of discipline: "The ingrained habit of unhesitating obedience". There is no doubt that in the cauldron of a Napoleonic battle there was no place for debate, and instant obedience was indeed a key requirement. This was equally true to ensure soldiers did not start drifting away when the fire got hot. The French, and various German states, had a rather more relaxed approach, in line with their more revolutionary ideals. This relied on the motivation of the soldier to keep him in the line of battle rather than the threat of retribution if he did not. British and Russian soldiers on the other hand were not motivated by such nationalistic or revolutionary fervour. However, I would contend that it is no coincidence that those armies with the most severe discipline were generally the ones most noted for their stubbornness and the ones whose drill manuals placed a greater number of officers and NCOs in a position where they could control rearward movement. Savage and inhumane it may have been but for some, "the scum of the earth", perhaps it really was a necessary evil. Whilst the British persisted with a small, all volunteer army which was perhaps motivated by pride and the threat of severe punishment, all Continental States were forced to raise large conscript armies. Each ones soldiers had their own motivation, whether it was the simple devotion of the deeply religious Russian serf to the Czar, or the more dubious loyalty of a member of the heterogeneous Austro-Hungarian Empire. The strength of this loyalty will have determined how hard they were prepared to fight and what hardships they were prepared to endure. There can be no doubt that nationalism played no small part in the resurrection of Prussian arms in 1813/14. TrainingIt goes without saying that a well trained soldier is far more likely to perform well on the battlefield than one who is not. Almost without exception the armies, formations or even regiments who made a name for themselves during the Napoleonic Wars were those who had a reputation for having had good training: The British Light Division drilled by Sir John Moore in Shorncliffe is an excellent example and it is no surprise to discover that the British reputation for devastating musketry only reflected that they fired more rounds during training than the other armies. Having had two years training in preparation for the invasion of England in 1803/4 the Grand Army was at peak efficiency when it gained the victories of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena/Auerstädt, and Friedland. without the same opportunity to train the replacements for the casualties incurred in these battles the French were never able to exert the same superiority over their rivals in future campaigns. Tactical DoctrineNapoleon inherited an outstanding military machine from Revolutionary France; forged in war and with a tactical doctrine that had been tailored to the requirements of large conscript armies. The "Impulse" system, as Brent Nosworthy calls it [1] , introduced columns of waiting and attack and greatly improved French battlefield mobility. In the earlier years of the wars this instrument enabled Napoleon to run rings round his opponents who practised linear tactics; with the sole and notable exception of the British.
Defeat or failure is a hard but sometimes necessary catalyst for change and improvement, and one by one the Continental powers copied the tactics, organisation and procedures that had been used so successfully against them. It is essentially this reason, although tempered by numerous others, that ensured that later campaigns lacked the sweeping victories Napoleon was able to gain between 1805 and 1807 and made many battles mere slogging matches.
The continued success of British linear tactics over French columns (or lines) is an anachronism which has subtleties beyond a simple argument between line and column and perhaps goes furthest in proving how it is an indefinable blend of all the factors being discussed here that produce success or failure on the battlefield. To ask therefore, as David Commerford did a couple of issues ago, why a British line always defeated a French line but a Prussian one didn't, is to ask a question far more complicated than the issue of how many ranks each was formed in.
It does not matter how good individual soldiers or even units are, if they have weak leaders they will almost certainly lose. As Field Marshal Montgomery said; "there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers". Whilst this may be a slight exaggeration the message is clear and true. A good example here is the Battle of Albuera where the pick of Wellington's veterans were almost led to defeat by Beresford on 16 May 1811. When Wellington visited the wounded of the 29th after the battle he said; "Men of the 29th, I am sorry to see so many of you here". A veteran replied, "If you had commanded us, my Lord, there wouldn't be so many of us". [2]
The French Marshals enjoyed an enviable reputation on the battlefield, but Napoleon's close control of them in this environment had it's shortcomings: In the later campaigns of 1813/14 the large numbers of armies involved meant Napoleon was forced to give many of them independent commands. After years of detailed direction from Napoleon he had effectively stifled all initiative and very few of them proved up to the mark: All the advantages achieved by Napoleon's victories were lost by the defeats of his Marshals.
The Prussian generals who were thrashed by Napoleon in 1806 were rightly blamed for the catastrophe. However, the fact that they were relatively old is not the reason per se, the problem was that they were fighting the last war rather than learning it's lessons in order to win the next. As Liddell Hart said; "the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military is getting an old one out".
That the British system of purchasing commissions worked so well is still a wonder to me, although the British had at least their fair share of duffers! Once again the various national traits and imperatives influenced the capabilities of those chosen for high command: Whether it was political considerations, family connections, election, wealth or, seemingly most unusually, ability, it is inevitable that the quality of leadership had an overwhelming influence on the success of battle or campaign.
One thing that can contribute to improving command and control is an efficient staff system. Napoleon was once again lucky to have inherited a rather effective system, although there is no doubt that he perfected it. Once again the other nations tended to play catch-up and some were way ahead of others by the time the wars ended.
There is no doubt that there are many other factors which determine how well armies fight and which might set them apart from others. I was tempted to include "technology/equipment" (but felt that all in all the differences were so little that the effect was probably negligible), and "experience" (but felt that again there was little to chose between the protagonists to make a significant contribution) That is not to say that these did not have an influence on performance. Certainly the importance and applicability of each of these factors will be different from year to year within each army as circumstances changed and problems were addressed.
All these National Characteristics affect morale, and it is morale that ultimately separates the fighting qualities of various nations. The fact that many are immeasurable and almost indefinable should not make us lose sight of the fact that they all make a significant contribution to success or failure in war.
[1] Nosworthy, B. Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies.
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