The Cavalry of the
Grand Duchy of Warsaw

by A. Ricciardiello, Poland

"For the cavalry man it's all the same to lose a man or a horse, the loss of the first or the other reduces the ranks." -- A. Fredro.

What follows are a few brief comments, and extracts from some contemporary observations on the Duchy cavalry, and the demands made on them in Russia.

In the early days of the Duchy Henryk Dabrowski set to work organising the army. He originally did so more or less using the system that Koszuszko, the insurgent of several years earlier, had used; i.e. 1 man from every 10 households to be placed amongst the various arms.

The areas of organisation for the fledgling army were in the departments of Poznan, Kalisch and Warsaw, where Dabrowski called on Poles to help their country by proclamations. The one of 19 November 1804, urged the people of Poznan to register their horses in case the country needed them and to sell what was required, to be paid for by the government to be. 18,277 were counted as being fit for service, of which 1 in 10 was taken for the cavalry. In Kalisch, a horse with a good rider was to be provided at the ratio of 1:40 households. Generally all working animals were left in the economy.

From November 1804 to March 1807 when all the horses and men were gathered, the required figures 812 men per regiment actually fell well below this. A lack of everything made itself felt even down to horseshoes. Desertions, excuses for not participating among the general populace, not donating as promised all contributed to the shortfalls, especially of horses.

They did cobble things together in the end and by 1808/9 the squadrons were dispersed on garrison duty, border patrols and mail service etc. The problem with this was that enlargement and further training was made very difficult. Added to this difficulty Gen. Rozniecki, inspector of cavalry, promised to write regulations, but never actually did so. During inspections Rozniecki would talk about manoeuvres that weren't written down. Effectively each regiment practised their own methods. Gen. Weysenhoff said that every decision Rozniecki made was to please himself. The lack of training and uniformity in the cavalry generally resulted in it being considered the worst of the three arms.

The many people who had dealings with Rozniecki had mixed perceptions of him. In some aspects he was considered a good cavalry leader, experienced, well educated (militarily too), generally competent, and capable of doing the job. On the other hand, others saw him as unsystematic in his approach, unconscientious, of questionable ethics, and of even having dealings with the Russians.

Of the actual training, recruits began by learning how to dress properly and how to maintain their uniform. They were taught how to stand, with their backs against a wall or a plank. The drillmaster made sure they were all upright, legs straight and slightly apart, chest out stomach drawn in but head and shoulders relaxed so as to turn naturally. They drilled on foot first; in lines, progressing to line drills with arms and target practice. At the same tune they also learned how to look after their horses. They were shown how to feed, water, clean and saddle them. They also learned how to mount, dismount and maintain a basic riding position.

The elementary things done, they then trained on mounting from either side of the horse, without stirrups, and from the rear. They practised shooting from horseback and of course with swords, both sabre and foil. The sabre was covered in straw to prevent accidental injury.

On the horses they started first with a walk going to a trot to a gallop. They learned how to turn and stop, and how to deal with obstacles. Importantly they trained in keeping line and the spaces within it. Further to all this they practised picking up hats from the ground and jumping. The commander would shout 'trench' and, the troopers would call out 'hop' to their mounts at the appropriate time and jump over ditches. With their arms, they attacked dummies at speed with sabres dangling by their knots, then slashing both left and right at the dummy heads.

The growing needs of the army stimulated the breeding of hoses in the Polish regions once again. Not only were rich families involved with large estates, but also small manors with just a few animals destined for the army. To Improve quality the larger estates brought Arab, Neapolitan, English and Turkish stallions: mares were brought from Moldavia and Ukraine. The stables of Sanguszko supplied pure Arabs, one of which was Poniatowski's famous mount 'Szumka'

Cavalry horses stood between 4' 5" and 5' at the withers. They were supposed to be between the ages of 4-8 years. Fresh horses for the regiments were usually bought when they were at 4-5 years old. NCOs' would collect them from rallying points, for transfer to the regiments, where to prevent exchanges on the way, they were branded, except for the officer's (bigger) horses. The quality was always decidedly mixed, and in practice many had to be rejected as unfit for service.

Training

At the regimental depot, training would begin. If the animals were spirited and couldn't be broken in or wouldn't get used to the people who looked after them they were denied sleep for 2-3 days and nights. After this they didn't usually resist.

Training started with basic line formations conducted up to a gentle trot. This then progressed with a saddle mounted on the horse with a sack of sand on it. When the basics were perfected, good riders mounted and taught them turns and withdrawals.

It was important that the horses became accustomed to various sights and sounds, in particular lance pennons, drums, trumpets and firearms. If this could not be achieved, no matter how good the horse, it had to be rejected. In caring for the horses, General Rozniecki was particular in the cleaning of them. He demanded the removal of hair from under the fetlocks and between their jaws. He also insisted on the removal of dust from nostrils, and puss from eyes. Expressly forbidden was excessive scrapping and cutting of hooves during re-shoeing.

Whilst saddling the troopers were taught to be very careful. The front bench of the saddle wasn't to cut into the shoulder blades or interfere with movement nor that the mane be caught between back and saddle. When crossing water, it was recommended that the girth be loosened to prevent it tightening and cutting into the horse.

Equipment

The preferred saddle in the light cavalry was of the Hungarian type. It was placed 5 fingers from the foremost part of the shoulder blades, usually on 4 folds of saddle blanket packed with beaten straw and hay. When properly placed, an upright palm could be put between back and saddle.

During the early years of the Duchy in particular, equipment shortage was a great problem, no less so than with saddles. Old saddles from manor houses were collected and repaired, captured ones with a few French examples were pressed into service. The situation was so chronic that it even hampered the training process; for example in November 1807 the 5th Chasseurs (eventually considered the best in the Duchy) had 650 horses (50 unfit for service), and only 300 saddles.

A project for a new saddle took some time to be realised, when it was, it was considered to be very good, sturdy and light, excellent for use with either sabre or lance. It was characterised by a deep seat and broad back with 2 brass fitted pommels. The front and back benches were made of beech; the whole thing being bound with very strong fittings The seat was stuffed with horse hair and covered with strong black hide, or more usually with just a caparison or sheepskin thrown over the top.

War of 1812

For the coming war of 1812, despite several years of 'armed peace' following the 1809 campaigns, matters seem to have been done in a rush. Only just prior to the invasion of Russia was consideration given to training in bigger than regiment formations. Although there were large numbers, these couldn't hide the lack of training and general preparation.

Dabrowski reported that due to a lack of horses, the 1st. regt. could only field 700 men instead of the supposed 1,000. The elite company didn't have one sabre fit for service or adequate sheaths. The whole regiment had horses of 8-10 years old, and they lacked fodder. A similar situation was reported in other regiments.

During the concentration prior to the invasion of Russia there was a shortage of fodder. The previous year's harvest had been bad and consequently the horses were fed on chaff and rye. Where possible the animals were moved onto pasture, but huge numbers had to be supported. Early on, in the initial phase of the campaign, the horses began to suffer, even described as emaciated due to the lack of proper fodder. The horses were fed rye grains and cut grass gathered on the march, each company was allocated 2 scythes for this purpose.

Food was not the only problem. Krasinski of the 5th. Chasseurs wrote, " the constant marching in July didn't allow for proper attention to saddling. " Fredro says that to look under a saddle after a few months of campaigning was a horror and one could smell the constantly pressured septic sores along the marching columns. The officers paid little attention or couldn't even be bothered to attend to the problem of worn saddle blankets and so on. Compounding this were the constant problems of foot founder and stiffness. As an example of the demands made, the 14th Polish cuirassiers were in the saddle m this early period for 36 hours whilst escorting: some guns. Krasinski goes on to mention how a day didn't pass without at least 20 horses dying. For the whole army, French statistics report 10,000 losses in the first few days .

The cavalry was in a state of constant alert and outpost duty which further exhausted the animals Throughout the campaign regiments frequently stood for hours in full battle array, with swords drawn in silence waiting for some attack that often did not materialise. In fact, it is also suggested that the early engagement at Mir (28th June) was lost due to tired horses. Although possibly a factor, this sounds like something of an excuse, especially when you consider that Rozniecki was in command with 6 lancer regiments and was possibly trying to execute his unpractised manoeuvres.

However, by the time Borodino came about, (Sept. 7th) the doctor of the 10th Hussars wrote that "skeletons were sitting on skeletons, horses trembled from weakness and hunger, many constantly coughing, and generally looking a very sorry state". Other reports state that the subsequent pursuit wasn't carried out well, again in part due to tired horses.

Charge

On the point of fatigue and weakness, Dembinski of the 5th wrote that a surprise attack on the 18th October (Winkowo), caught them whilst they were watering their horses. They managed a counter attack but tired the horses out in doing so. After this first charge General Sulkowski ordered another. Dembinski goes on "... the horses were weak and tired because of the first charge, so we reached a battalion as a group of seven people." This charge of seven was in fact pointed out to Sulkowski by Dembinski.

His remarks got the response, " Forward. Forward!" The rest couldn't initially keep up. They managed to beat the first element (skirmishers?) but came under heavy fire after the enemy rout from the initial contact. Dembinski's horse was killed by three balls, his coat was holed by seven.

Before these charges the regiment had 300 men but after was reduced to 100. The number doubled the next day after rider-less horses from the charges were rounded up.

Most charges at this time didn't have enough impetus, only having the capability of being conducted at a trot: the best speed they could manage. This forced the cavalry to attack after some infantry or artillery fire in close order, having the leading squadrons break away, and the up-coming squadron fire with their carbines - openly admitted as being ineffective.

I think what is described was a common tactic, especially against squares, but the implication is that any disorganisation that was caused by the infantry or artillery fire couldn't be exploited quickly enough and with enough force by the cavalry, therefore making their charges a lost cause.

With the worsening weather the casualty toll increased. During the night of 18/19 October, the Polish cavalry lost 150 horses that were in foal, wounded or simply exhausted from a hard frost. Not surprising when you could see entrails from [the horses] wounds when troopers dismounted.

In the retreat weakened horses cost the army a lot of equipment, too. Fredro remarked with reference to shoeing " .. if the horse is more exhausted it expects better shoeing, if it is weak it slips easily and dies hard. You need gold to cover the cost of a horse shoe which was patched up and nailed in a hurry. It wouldn't last a long time, in particular when it was really important, over rocky or muddy ground. In cavalry regiments there was just one saddler, one vet and one smith to attend to the whole company. If cavalry met a smithy on their way, there was always a crowd..." To make matters worse the French were ignorant of and often didn't even want to know about calked (plate like spiked) horse shoes, which were very familiar to the Poles.

Polish Cavalry

The Polish cavalry were called upon to be the 'eyes and ears of the army,' not least of all because of their horse shoes! They were considered the most capable of operating in the Russian conditions, especially against Cossacks. To exemplify the point, quoting Chlapowski of the Polish Guard Lancers "As soon as a report arrived from headquarters that there were Cossacks about, the order would come down, 'Poles off you go'. It was a rare night indeed that we slept undisturbed. "

In fact, on several occasions in the campaign, Cossacks turned away from a fight when they discovered they were up against Poles. Presumably the Poles commanded a healthier respect than the other allies did. An illustration of this was given when General Colbert ordered a squadron of Guard Polish Lancers to swap their white greatcoats with the blue ones of the Dutch Guard Lancers to see what would happen. The Dutch were constantly losing men in rearguard duties. When the Cossacks recognised the riding style, they retired shouting "Lachy", meaning Poles.

Much then depended upon the Polish cavalry during the retreat even though they too were greatly fatigued and suffered enormous losses. To put some of this into a manageable perspective, the 5th Chasseurs returned with 15 officers and 40 men from a total of 791. From an original strength of 456 mounted men entering Russia, the 14th Polish cuirassiers returned with only 31 horses.

I think it is clear from these observations that the Polish cavalry wasn't what it was supposed to be before the invasion, and certainly from very early on it rapidly began losing its effectiveness, and continued to do so as ever greater demands were made of it as the campaign progressed.

Sources

Memoirs of a Polish Lancer., Chlapowski.D. Emperor's Press.
Morawski. R. & Wielicki. H., Wojsko Ksiestwa Warszawskiego. Kawaleria.
Wydawnictwo Bellona. No date.


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