A tricky one to start with. Mr. Quarrie having complicated the fire mechanics of his rules by inclusion of some overly detailed reductions in the volume of fire in relation to movement and timescale. However, if we take as the base line of capability the fire factors from the now famous National Characteristics (Bruce was the first one to use the concept) we find some interesting data.

Firstly on a basic level British centre companies enjoy a simple 2:1 advantage over French fusiliers. Grenadiers stretch this to 3:1 and Guards 4:1. Now that's what I call a "universal superiority". While the text says the factor reflects accuracy, steadiness and rate of fire when it comes to rule writers rationalisations I am afraid I don't care what the reason is it's the result that counts. In this case I don't accept that Guards units in the British army were twice as good as their Line counter parts yet alone four times more likely to hit something as the average Frenchman !

There are also the traditional plus and minus factors for shooting at columns, first fire etc but these are only minor alterations to the original factors. Hand to hand combat highlights more national stereotypes, the French showing more élan, the British more staying power.

Wargames Rules 1685 to 1845- Wargames Research Group

WRG take a different approach other than outright fire power. In these rules there are no national differences to performance but the difference between British and French is handled in a more subtle manner. English/Scots and those under the control of a British general are not classed as "shaken" by the close approach of French columns. This means not only are they more likely to stand in the face of a charge and to charge home in turn but also they then count as a "steady" unit for fire. This gives each element within a unit a 5:1 chance of a hit as opposed to just even money for lesser mortals in continental armies. However if the French were to approach in line both sides would count equal.

Napoleon's Battles - S.Craig Taylor Jr. and Robert Coggins

Stepping up a level in command and control terms we come to the first of our American cousins. Here we have the unique adversarial dice throwing system to contend with. Line and Column have no bearing in these brigade level rules for Fire purposes so all we have to go on is the plus one on the dice throw for the British line over their counterparts. Craig and Robert take a more balanced view of Guards performance giving them no more advantage than the line.

As the game system requires one side to throw in direct competition to the other it is obviously a permanent advantage to have an addition to the dice throw for one side. In Hughes's terms I would place this as the edge of better training for the British. Of course it is very easy to score 6 (5+1), for example, only to have the opposition throw a straight 7 but it does give a certain edge to the British player.

In the rules Fire is deemed to be long range volleys. For Combat, close range volleys and hand to hand, different factors are used. Here we again have an advantage of one on the modifiers although because they are deemed to take melee into account there are this time differences for column and line. The one higher being granted to the British in line verses line. There is a plus three to minus one advantage over French columns but as the British also have a minus one when in column this I assume to be more to do with the formations than anything else. One interesting point in these rules is while they share the disadvantage in Fire the Old Guard are rated above the British Guards in Combat. Which given the amount of active service you had to of seen to get in the OG seems fair to me. A fact often over looked by rule writers and players a like.

Empire V- Jim Getz and Scott Bowden

This being the current version to all those unbelievers out there (the Roman numeral is entirely unofficial). As you might expect from the most complicated Napoleonic rules this side of Alpha Centuri this one's going to take some explaining. Now, to start with, the Empire small arms fire revolves around ten fire classes running from Untrained Militia up to Old Guard. Each of these has one set of percentages for three rank formations and one for two rank (except Old Guard naturally). Here you will find that both nations Guards are equal although not included in the same class. As in all things Empire only the Old Guard has Old Guard rating no matter what you are comparing (quite right too, in my completely biased opinion). Sad to say from here on, it goes some what down hill.

The problem is not that the inherent mechanics are at fault but rather that the Bowden & Getz axis seem to think that on the basis of winning the Peninsular War several games to nil (apologies to all Portuguese and Spanish readers) the average British infantryman and his KGL mates were a combination of Davy Crockett, Annie Oakley and a Cyberdine Systems T1000. In consequence they over rate the British Fire Class by several hectares thereby jacking up the damage they can inflict in a big way.

For not only do they get the appropriate additional percentage for the two rank formation but their quality is way above the French. Even at the low point were they are classed as Veterans the two rank classification gives parity with the top 10% of French line and a 2:1 superiority over the bottom 10%. Where French conscripts in line meet the British, at close range they have a 6% per figure chance of a kill. The British have 12% in reply. If our unfortunate Fantasins run into anyone in the Light Division the damage shoots up to 23% chance per figure or a tad under 4:1. Once again a "universal superiority".

Nine years ago George Nafziger wrote a series of articles published in the journal of the, now sadly defunct, British Association of Empire Players. In these he drew up a table of alternative lower ratings for the British based on his usual level of statistical analysis of historical data. If this is applied it brings down the overall ratios to a more Hughes like structure.

These ratings are very important to Empire as like Napoleons Battles there are two types of fire activity. Ordinary fire and 'Firefight' the latter being the toe to toe exchange of volleys by formed bodies at eighty yards. The importance of this is that in Firefight the higher your moral/fire class the higher you start up the table that expresses your percentage chance of wining.

The British therefore start with an advantage. This is further increased by the fact that each figure casualty you inflict on your opponent pushes them two steps down the chart. So no prizes for guessing what happens to the French after the British fire at them. Yes, you got it, the chance to win the Firefight gets even bigger ! Standing to trade shots with a British line is suicide.

Finally, one more historical advantage ( this time, a la Nosworthy) exists. The classification of certain infantry as 'shock' infantry. As all but British 2nd Battalions are classed as such and only members of the Guard (in the broadest sense) are for the French, you can soon see where this one's going. However, as this status gives advantages in pressing home a charge and additional ability in countercharging an opponent stalled by shooting, at least it gives some recognition to the bayonet theory.

Shako- Arty Conliffe

Finally, we come to the most recent of my sample. Shako, like the WRG set does not include any national modifiers for fire. In fact it does not have any for melee either, come to that. Instead confines itself to advantages in manoeuvre and restrictions as to formation use and formation changes. In this area the French have the advantage which is probably correct. So it would seem, if you follow Hughes, is the absence of advantage in fire terms. However, this non advantage is, as it is in WRG, universal and therefore in my view poorer for it. Not only do the British not outshoot the French they would not outshoot the Russians or the Neapolitans either. Who knows this might have been be true if they had ever met as foes but I doubt it.

It is possible to "doctor" these rules in an historical manner in that the key to battlefield performance is in the moral rating. As it stands the British have an advantage in this area, if the Army Lists are followed, in that unlike the French they have no Second Rate infantry and in the Peninsula the French are not allowed Guards or Elite. The overall quality of the British can therefore be brought to bear in a way that differs from the all round superiority of Empire. While you may not be able to out shoot your French opposition you can at least take more damage and fight better in hand to hand.

Finally, there is one more trick for the British in a similar mode to Empire's "Shock" rating. All British Regulars are permitted to counter charge units they have "staggered" by volley fire. When they have been the subject of a charge and they themselves have not moved that turn.

This is only an option for Elite class infantry of other nations. Such a tactic is of course very much Nosworthy, although you will note it is not intended as an attacking manoeuvre, only a counter stroke.

Conclusions

So what can we draw from all this. Well for the most part the fire aspect is well covered. In some cases, to well covered. It would seem that the rule writers have followed the Nafziger line that firepower in itself was sufficient to allow the British their victories. There are attempts to take a more Nosworthy view but the ability to effectively combine the volley and charge in the attack, rather than in defence, seems limited. This generally represents itself by limiting a units ablity to fire and charge in the same turn, somehow seeing this as a distinct difference from a fire and countercharge manoeuvre. Empire probably comes closest in all round ability to emulate Nosworthy but in unmodified format is Nafziger with knobs on!

Firepower is, in general terms, over stated and the ability to assert moral ascendancy underplayed. However there also is a wide variation as to the importance, or otherwise, placed on the nationality of the unit shooting that makes comparative judgements as to relative realism very difficult.

There also seems to be an assumption that the French will always close in column. Writers gearing factors toward the interaction of line and column in a manner that would lead readers to believe that this was always employed.

Perhaps this is "where we came in" as they used to say. Should rule writers not really be encouraging people to be more flexible in their tactical assumptions of the period by employing the French in line more while being more aggressive with the British, without making them dependent on over factored firepower?