The Myth
While several of the "Waterloo Myths" had their origins in the 19th century, coming particularly from Wellington's tall stories told in private fireside chats with his old chums which the Duke did not intend to be published, as well as Napier's drug-inspired hallucinations, this particular myth would appear to originate from the latter half of the 20th century. Indeed, the first mention of this alleged dereliction of duty by Lieut.-General von Zieten, commander of the 1st Prussian
Army Corps in 1815, that the writer of this article could find
comes in Lady Longford's Wellington - Years of the Sword,
published in 1969, where she wrote: [1]
'It was for his [Wellington's] Prussian
allies, however, to warn him of the first sign of such an attack.
'They failed to let him know that on
the night of 13-14 June advanced Prussian patrols under General
Zieten had seen the twinkling lights of innumerable camp fires
in the direction of Beaumont, a few miles from the frontier on
the French side of the River Sambre'.
Lady Longford gave no reference for
the basis of this claim, and despite extensive reading of printed
sources, the writer of this article has yet to discover its origins.
More recently, Schom, in his One
Hundred Days has repeated this myth, like-wise giving no
source for this statement. [2] As he however refers to Longford elsewhere
in his work, one assumes that this was indeed his source.
The record shows that there was an established
line of communication between Zieten in Charleroi and Wellington
in Brussels. [3] As Zieten's outposts were on a most sensitive area
of the front, the Duke placed considerable value on the information
received from that source and cultivated a good working relationship
with the Prussian. They corresponded in French, exchanging information
regularly, and these messages included the following:
May 10: 'I have found the means to procure
the number of the enemy to be found in Maubeuge, around this fortress
and up to Beaumont ... I send herewith the report of the people
coming from Condé.' [4]
This report was a most valuable document
containing dates, places and numbers of French troops. Wellington
wrote back at 9 am on 11 May to thank Zieten for this information. [5]
May 12: 'The news I have just received
from the border confirms that the enemy is on the defensive.' [6]
May 15: 'I have the honour of placing
before the eyes of Your Highness the report of a person who, coming
from Chaumont, arrived today at Charleroi.'
Wellington noted on the despatch: 'Write
him that I am very much obliged to him.' [7]
May 23: '... the enemy from Givet to
the North Sea amounts to around 60,000 men ...'
Wellington noted on this despatch: 'Acknowledge
the receipt; and I am very much obliged to you for the news you
have given me, which agrees with that I have received.' [8]
June 6: 'A French officer, lieutenant
of 11ème Chasseurs à Cheval, has arrived here ...
The officer claims that Vandamme's corps is only 18,000 men strong...
He claims that d'Erlon's corps has 60,000 men, Reille's 25,000
...'
June 8: 'According to the reports of
many French soldiers, the troops between Maubeuge and Sédan
amount to 102,000 men ...' [9]
June 9: 'A young man who left Paris
on 4th assures that Buonaparte has not dared to leave the capital
...' [10]
This message is the last from Zieten
contained in the Supplementary Despatches. Also, there are no
further unpublished messages from Zieten in the Wellington Papers.
From the above, it most clear that the relationship between these
two commanders was most amicable and ran without any friction.
If Lady Longford's version is correct, one wonders what sudden
unexpected event caused Zieten to suddenly start behaving in such
a strange manner and break off communications with the Duke.
The writer of this article has yet to find any cause for this
apparent breakdown in communications.
If the record as shown by Wellington's
published papers is to be taken at face value, then the last message
apparently send by Zieten to the Duke was on 9 June 1815. As this
was the day that information received from the front started to
indicate the increasing likelihood of a French offensive shortly,
it would seem strange that the Prussian commander on the most
sensitive part of the front would, in breach of direct orders
from his senior commander, suddenly stop informing Brussels of
the situation. Had he actually done so, then one would expect
Wellington to have complained to Blücher immediately that
Zieten was no longer complying with his orders. There is no record,
either in the Dispatches, nor in the Supplementary Despatches,
nor in the unpublished Wellington Papers of the Duke ever having
made such a complaint, so what can explain this apparent gap in
the account of this campaign?
By cross-referencing the records of
various senior officers in this campaign, it is possible to establish
that a number of messages were sent to or received from Wellington's
headquarters of which no copies can be found in the Duke's own
records. These messages included the following:
1) Zieten to Wellington, 14 June. He
reported that the French were concentrating on his section of
the front, and asked the Duke what his intentions were? [11]
2) Wellington to Zieten, 14 June. In
answer to the above, Wellington promised to move his army to Nivelles
to support the Prussians. [12]
3) Zieten to Wellington, around midnight
14 June. He reported a large number of camp fires to his front,
indicating the concentration of French forces there. This, and
other information coming from the Prussian headquarters in Namur
indicated that Zieten expected to be attacked at dawn on 15 June. [13]
This message apparently arrived in Brussels about 7 am the next
morning. [14]
4) Zieten to Wellington, about 5 am,
15 June. This reported the news of the French attack on Zieten's
outposts. [15] This message arrived in Brussels by 9 am. [16]
Messages of a similar content were exchanged
between Brussels and Blücher's headquarters in Namur. As
far as the Prussians were concerned, the French offensive was
going to take place on 15 June at dawn, and was going to be against
their positions in and around Charleroi, and Wellington had indicated
that he would move both rapidly and in force to support the Prussians.
The above indicates quite clearly that
Zieten did indeed keep the Duke informed of the developing situation
on his section of the front, that Wellington was aware of what
was happening, and that he even made promises of support. Examination
of other documents on record show that Wellington's promises of
support were without substance because the Duke did not start
to issue orders to concentrate his army until after 6 pm on 15
June, [17]
that he did not take the situation seriously until midnight, [18]
and that he did not complete issuing movement orders to his army
until 10 am on 16 June, [19] over a day after the Prussians had first
been engaged with the main French forces. The documents which
indicate Wellington's error of judgement and his insincere promises
made to his allies are all missing from the Duke's records. One
wonders if that is merely a filing error.
As neither Longford's nor Schom's version
of these events is supported by a reference to any documented
source, one has to consider their accounts as being unreliable.
As the available documentary evidence
shows that Zieten sent a number of reports, both directly and
indirectly to Wellington's headquarters in Brussels, and that
the Duke responded to these, then the accusations made by both
Longford and Schom are unfounded.
It is also on record that Zieten did
indeed report the sightings of camp fires to Wellington. As this
information was published years before Longford's unsupported
account, then one wonders why this historian chose to include
such an unsubstantiated accusation in her work.
It would thus appear that the Duke of
Wellington, for whatever reasons, failed to keep copies of a number
of despatches received from and sent to Zieten. The Duke is on
record has having been selective in which of his papers were kept,
and which he published, and was known to have had records destroyed. [20]
The despatches in question, if published, would have shown the
Duke to have misled the Prussians, and to have made promises to
them that he knew he could not have kept. Thus, is it any surprise
that he did not keep copies in his records?
[1] p 407.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.Wellington & Zieten
Wellington's Despatches
Zieten's Messages
Conclusions
Footnotes
[2] p 247.
[3] See Wellington's Dispatches [WD],
Vol X, p 269 ff and Wellington's Supplementary Despatches [WSD],
Vol XII, p 367 ff for the details of this exchange of correspondence.
[4] WSD, vol X, p 269.
[5] WD, vol XII, p 373.
[6] WSD, vol X, p 280 f.
[7] WSD, vol X, p 303.
[8] WSD, vol X, p 318.
[9] WSD, vol X, p 429 f.
[10] WSD, vol X, p 437 f.
[11] Geheimes Staatsarchiv preußischer
Kulturbesitz, Berlin [GStA], Rep 92, Gneisenau, A 48 fol 32.
[12] GStA, Rep 92, Gneisenau, A 48 fol
32.
[13] See WSD, vol X, p 476 where Hardinge
forwards information from Zieten to Wellington.
[14] Gleig, The Life of Arthur Duke of
Wellington, (London, 1903), p 258 f. 'Intelligence came in from
Charleroi, at seven that morning, that the fires of numerous bivouacs
were seen the previous night to blaze up suddenly ....'
[15] Militärisches, Heft I, January
1896, p. 252.
[16] WD, vol XII, p 473.
[17] WD, vol XII, p 472 f.
[18] United Services Journal, (London,
1844), vol II, p 173. This account is largely confirmed by Webster's
own recollection of the affair as given in A Memoir of Charles
Mayne Young, 2nd Edition, (London & New York, 1871), p 307.
[19] Dörnberg, in his report on the
Waterloo Campaign, as printed in Pflugk-Harttung's Vorgeschichte
der Schlacht bei Belle Alliance - Wellington, (Berlin 1903), p
292 f, mentions witnessing Wellington writing orders to Uxbridge
from Quatre Bras about 10 am on 15 June.
[20] Dudley Ward, C. H. A Romance of the
Nineteenth Century, p 180 ff.
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