Successful as a general but a failure as a statesman? Few could argue with the first opinion, but as for the second, I believe him to be a failure. Napoleon's many success on the battlefield are meaningless if they are not joined to equal success on the diplomatic front. One without the other is just a useless sacrifice of lives. But first I must explain why he was so successful as a general. To do this I must take us back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the era in which Napoleon lived.
The Political and Military environment
that existed prior to the French Revolution.
Europe prior to the French Revolution
of 1789 was an intricate web of Dynastic states competing for
territory and resources. The main players were Great Britain,
Austro-Hungary, Prussia, Russia and France. Not in the big league
but never-the-less important players were Spain and the Ottoman
Empire. Additionally there were a host of medium sized states
such as Portugal, the Netherlands and the Baltic states. In the
middle of the continent there was the mosaic of German Kingdoms,
Principalities, Grand Duchies, Arch-Bishoprics and Free Cities
that were loosely encompassed by the Holy Roman Empire. Warfare
between these states has been described as, 'limited warfare'
by many authors. [1]
There are two reason for this. The objectives
of Dynastic rulers were usually limited. It was only rarely that
the object of a war was the total destruction of a state. In
addition armies were an expensive commodity and they took a long
time to raise and train. Clausewitz has two salient comments
to make on this situation;
'Even the most ambitious ruler had no greater aims than to gain a number of advantages that could be exploited at the peace conference.'
and
'Even a royal commander had to use his army with a minimum of risk. If the army was pulverised, he could not raise another, and behind the army there was nothing. That
enjoined the greatest prudence on all operations.' [2]
A prime exponent of this type of warfare was Frederick the Great of Prussia. He had as his Strategic objective in the Seven Years War (1756 to 1763) to gain a lasting recognition
of his seizure in 1740 of the Austro-Hungarian province of Silesia. He achieved this limited objective with the Austro-Prussian Treaty of Hubertusburg in 1763. Luck certainly played a part in this achievement, the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth in 1762 removed an implacable enemy and replaced her with Peter III who admired Frederick and pulled out of the alliance against him. Nevertheless Frederick's achievement of attaining his Strategic goals as Head of State marks him out as a successful general and statesman.
The events in France from 1789 onwards marked a turning point in European political history. Instead of Dynastic states which had an agenda geared to the requirements of a monarch, a new player had arrived whose agenda was radically different. The relationship between those states and revolutionary France was changed completely by the new French concept of the'Nation'.
The people were the Nation and in the French concept of the Nation the people included anyone who ascribed to the ideals of the Revolution whether they be French, German or Hungarian. The cry of Equality, Fraternity and above all Liberty was heard from one end of Europe to the other. This was a doctrine that attacked the very foundations of every Dynastic state.
Alliances were made between past enemies to cut out this dangerous cancer in the heart of Europe. The French response of conscription with Carnot's levee en masse in 1793 introduced yet another change in the operation of war. Previously manpower had been scarce, armies had been counted in tens of thousands. Now the French had hundreds of thousands. Combining this with the pre-Revolutionary reforms of Comte de Guibert that introduced Divisional and Corps
formations and made the use of these increased numbers possible marked a turning point in European Military history. Brian Bond, in The Pursuit of Victory, describes the impact of these events thus;
'... the French revolutionary armies enjoyed immense advantages against the monarchist coalitions... Nationalist fervour and revolutionary ideals were combined with innovative tactics, ... and a modernised staff system which made possible the control of widely dispersed but mutually sup-porting divisions and corps. Consequently the French enjoyed some striking
successes against politically brittle coalitions ...' [3]
If the criteria used to determine the success of a general is the number and scale of his victories then Napoleon is without doubt a successful general. In over 45 battles, sieges and major actions he was only defeated four times, Acre, Aspern-Essling, Leipzig and Waterloo. Some battles could be counted as draws, Eylau and possibly Borodino, but however you re-assess the individual facts Napoleon's is still a remarkable record of victory.
An examination of this success has to start by looking at the man himself. He was born on 15th August 1769 at Ajaccio, Corsica into a minor aristocratic family. A glimpse of his early life can possibly be found in an article by Harold T. Parker, [4] especially in a remark he made in 1813 to his own two year old son.
'Lazybones, when I was your age I was already beating up Joseph, [his elder brother].' The picture drawn for us by Parker is of a competitive second son, determined to climb in the structure of his family. The family was equally determined to rise in the social climate of Corsica, as Parker says they were 'scheming and conniving...use(ing) every opportunity to get
ahead'. It would have given the young Napoleon a determination to win, to put every effort into the conflict. All necessary qualifications for a successful General.
Another qualification, as Napoleon admitted himself was luck, one of his most quoted remarks was his question about a general, 'But is he lucky?' Napoleon had more than his fair share of luck, especially in his training as a young man.
His father obtained a scholarship for him to the Royal Military School at Brienne in 1778 and from there in 1784 to the Ecole Militaire in Paris. For the young Napoleon the Ecole Militaire was a revelation, it was here that he started to think of himself as French rather than Corsican. After graduation in 1785 he had another of piece luck in being posted to the Regiment de la Fere. This was one of the premier Artillery units in the army and provided
the young lieutenant with excellent experience. Finally he was posted in 1788-89 to the Artillery School at Auxonne where he would come under the influence of General Jean Pierre du Teil. Du Teil exposed Napoleon to the writings on military reform by a number of authors. It would be from these writings that much of the operational doctrine identified with Napoleon would come. [5]
Concentration of Artillery
Du Teil's brother, Chevalier Jean de Beaumont du Teil wrote, L'Usage de l'artillerie nouvelle dans la guerre de campagne, 1778. This emphases the use of massed artillery against specific points that would prepare the way for the decisive attack. The general himself felt that artillery should be used at the start of the battle and then moved quickly around to vital
points. Previously artillery had usually been a close support weapon for the infantry.
Speed of March and living off the land
Count Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert wrote the Essai general de tactique, 1772 and Defense du systeme de guerre moderne, 1778. From this Napoleon learnt the importance
of speed and that the army live off the land. This would greatly reduce the army supply column which slowed down the rate of march to that of the slowest wagon.
Pierre Bourcet's Principes de la guerre des montagnes, 1780 In this paper would be found the idea of marching the self contained divisions by separate routes, avoiding hold
ups on the route of march. The divisions should be no more than two days march from each other and be capable of a quick concentration on the field of battle.
Divisions had been originally used by Marshal Victore-Francois de Broglie in 1759. From 1780 they had become standard in the French royal army, and had continued to be used after the revolution. Importantly each would be self contained, all arms formation, that would have its own staff to organise and plan the details of its existence.
Attack in Column and order mixte
The writings of Guibert and others developed the standard formations that would be used by Napoleon. Attack Columns were used extensively by the revolutionary armies to bolster the young volunteers and conscripts. The Column was in reality a lozenge shape, usually some 60 by 20 strong with the longer side moving towards the enemy. It harked back to the Phalanxes used by the ancient Greek Hopolites. Napoleon used this formation more frequently in his latter battles as the quality of his troops deteriorated after many years of war.
As the revolutionary armies gained in experience they moved on to use the order mixte. This
required some battalions to move forward in Column while others formed a three deep line. The idea was to use both the shock value of the column with the firepower of the line. To perform such complicated manoeuvres on the battle field required a high degree of proficiency in drill and above all discipline.
Here we have the main reasons for Napoleon's success as a general. He had a thorough grounding in these techniques, he was operating with vast increases in manpower and there were
improved command structures and staff systems. With these he was in a possession of a dynamic new weapon. Moreover it was a weapon that he was ideally suited to hone and use. Napoleon's real genius was not as an innovator but as the supreme implementor of these ideas.
Training
During its time in the camps at Boulogne from 1803 to 1805 the Grande Armee had time to learn the intricate requirements and details required to fight war on the scale and speed required by Napoleon. Thorough preparation, training and staff work were the hallmarks of his success. This work was helped greatly by Berthier, the archetypal Chief of Staff. In addition Napoleon possessed the ability to inspire his troops. Revolutionary fervour and large numbers had carried the French through the wars of the revolution. Now would be added the charismatic leadership of Napoleon as First Consul and Emperor, a man whose troops would perform prodigies of marching and fight determinedly when they arrived at the battlefield.
His mastery of war can be best seen in his campaigns of Ulm-Austerlitz, 1805, against Austria and Russia and Jena-Auerstedt. 1806, against the Prussians. In both these campaigns his speed of manoeuvre and concentration of force against the enemies principle army brought about the decisive battle he sought. His campaigns were not clock work drill manoeuvres where every detail was worked out in advance. In another of Napoleon's oft repeated phrases, 'No plan survives contact with the enemy'.
His Corps marched in a formation he called a 'Battalion square.' [6] Up to four corps made up of two or three divisions moved within a day's march of each other. When one made contact with the enemy it would fight a holding action while the others marched towards the battle area. Indeed much of his success as a general would come from his subordinate's ability to drive on the troops under their command. Desaix at Marengo, (1801) whose timely arrival turned defeat into victory, Davout at Austerlitz, (1805) and again at Auerstedt performing prodiges, fighting and beating the larger part of the Prussian army while Napoleon defeated the smaller force at Jena. After Jena-Auerstedt it was the vigorous pursuit
of the disintegrating Prussian army by Murat's cavalry which turned a major victory into a crushing defeat.
No Withdrawals
Napoleon was not manovering to force the enemies withdrawal which a general trained in the methods of the 18th century might do. Napoleon would concentrate force against the enemies flanks and communications. By these methods, and as important a ruthless pursuit, he could fight the campaign of annihilation which was his main objective. It was this objective to destroy the enemies army, the countries ability to resist, that realy sets Napoleon apart from the generals of the eighteenth Century. Where they would fight for an advantage at the negotiating
table, a fortress here or a province there, Napoleon fought battles of destruction so that the enemies ability to resist was broken. Then he could dictate his terms.
However victory and success can be ephemeral and illusory. By 1808/09, the composition of the French army began to change. Losses were being made up by younger conscripts. Further wars in the Iberian Peninsula (1808/14) and again with Austria (1809) and fatally with Russian (1812) drained off the more experienced soldiers. Less and less training was being given and more contingents from dubious allies were being used. The Grande Armee was no longer the brilliant performer of 1805/06.
As time and more wars went by Napoleons enemies were learning the hard lessons of war. They were adapting and overcoming their own problems. Napoleon was running out of time, while he could still defeat his enemies in battle he needed to make a lasting peace with them.
Success as a general is of no use if
you cannot put those success to good use as a Statesman. Clausewitz
tells us that, '...war is only a branch of political activity;
that it is in no sense autonomous'. [7] Was Napoleon successful as a Statesman? If we define a Statesman as a far-sighted practical politician then on the whole I must say that he was not a success. He was seemingly unable to subordinate his military successes to his political needs. The main, if not the only, criteria for success in this area would be that his regime survived, which it plainly did not.
The reality was that he was decisively defeated in 1814 and again in 1815. The image and ideals of Napoleonic France continued to live on in men's minds and inspire future revolutions against the restored Bourbons. However that is not the criteria for success we should apply to Napoleon as a statesman. The Dynastic states of Europe had learnt the rules of Inter State
politics between themselves. There were rules, which it is true each of them was prepared to ignore some of the time. Frederick the Great's capture of Silesia without a declaration of war is an example. However the idea of bargaining and compromise was essential if the system was to work. Some gains would be sacrificed so that other more important ones could be persevered.
Napoleon changed this. His outstanding military successes enabled him to forge alliances and dictate treaties to most of Europe. But where was the Grand Strategic plan for operations on the political/diplomatic level that Military Strategy was supposed to serve? Each new victory produced another disaffected state to be forced into providing troops, money and territory for Napoleon and France.
Keep Fighting
The fact that Napoleon had to keep fighting wars to maintain his regime means that he was failing as a statesman. Take Austria as an example, not counting those of the Revolution, he fought and won three successive wars against Austria in less than nine years. Each culminated in a so called decisive battle, Marengo (1801), Austerlitz (1805) and Wagram (1809). After each war he dictated a peace harsher than the one before. Despite this, and even more importantly possible because of those harsh terms, each time Austria rebuilt its forces and awaited a chance to get its revenge. Again with Prussia prostrate at his feet in 1807 he dictated terms that were so harsh that the flame of German Nationalism was kindled. A flame that would burn so fiercely that the Prussians would be his most vengeful enemies in the succeeding years.
His complete misreading of the Iberian and Russian peoples as well as the Russian Tsar led to
horrendous campaigns in both countries. As for Britain, could any one but Napoleon devise a stratagem like the Berlin Degrees that forbade trading with her, without expecting her to become
his most implacable enemy. After that no amount of statesmanship could have reconciled Britain to Napoleonic France. Finally in 1813, after the disaster of the 1812 campaign in Russia, Napoleon managed to get every major power in Europe line up against himself. The battle of Leipzig and Napoleons abdication in 1814 were the result.
Was their an overall strategic diplomatic plan that could be complimented by the military strategies he devised? A remark Napoleon made to Dalberg in 1806 is revealing.
'You ideologes, you act according to a system, prepared in advance. Moi, I am a practical person. I seize events and push them as far as they will go.' [8]
Key
Here I think we have the key to Napoleons failure as a statesman that lead to his eventual defeat as a general. By pushing events as far as they would go he forced his enemies to form a string of alliances that he had to continually defeat. Like a gambler he pushed his luck too far.
After his disaster in Russia in 1812 it was the sixth roll of the coalition die that
produced the Sixth Coalition that eventually defeated him. It is a tribute to his powers as a general that it required the joint efforts of Great Britain, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Prussia, Austria, Sweden and a number of the German states to bring him down. It is a damming enditement of his powers as a statesman that he could bring all these squabbling, competing counties together in a coalition against him.
In this articale I have tried to demonstrate that their were many reasons for Napoleon's successes as a general. His early family life with its struggle for recognition. The training
he received which gave him a thorough grounding in the developing arts of war. His mastery of those arts and his brilliant implementation of them. However those same reasons worked against him when it came to his role as a statesman.
Why bargain, why compromise when he had the ability to compel his enemies to his will? The answer is that no one nation or one man can stand against the world. By pushing his enemies further and further he forced them together. Eventually the threat posted by Napoleon was so great that they formed an alliance that for all its fragility and ineptitude lasted just long enough to bring him down. Wars are not fought in a vacuum, they must serve the overall strategic objectives of the state. Napoleon's failure was in not allowing the needs of the statesman
to be paramount.
[1] See War in History, Vol. 1 No. 2 1994,
"Eighteenth-Century Warfare Reconsidered," by Jeremy Black, especially footnote no. 3 on p. 216.
[4] Harold T. Parker, "Why did Napoleon
Invade Russia?" The Journal of Military History, No. 54 April 1990, p.134.
Jeremy Black, War in History, Vol. 1 No. 2 1994, "Eighteenth-Century Warfare Reconsidered."
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.The effect of the Revolution on the States of Europe
and how it changed their relationship with France. Napoleon's successes as a General.
March in Divisions,
concentrate for BattleNapoleon as a statesman.
Conclusion
Footnotes
[2] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Ed M.
Howard and P. Paret (1976), p. 590.
[3] Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory,
Oxford University Press, (1996) p. 28
[5] Much of the following information
comes from Owen Connelly's, Blundering to Glory, Scholarly Resources Inc (1987). p. 13.
[6] Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of
Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, Indiana University Press, 1978, p. 147/8.
[7] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited
by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 605.
[8] Harold T. Parker, "Why did Napoleon
Invade Russia?" p. 141 quoting from Fugier, La Revolution francaise et l'empire napoleonien (Paris: Hatchet. 1954), p. 219.
Bibliography
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Ed M. Howard and P. Paret (1976).
Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory, Oxford University Press, (1996).
Harold T. Parker, "Why did Napoleon Invade Russia?" The
Journal of Military History, No. 54 April 1990.
Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory, Scholarly Resources Inc (1987).
Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, Indiana University Press, 1978.
Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #33
© Copyright 1997 by First Empire.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com