Blücher's Positions
Blücher's dispositions indicate that his priority was to hold open the major road to his rear which ran from Nivelles to Namur. Bülow's Corps was expected to arrive from the direction of Namur, whilst Wellington was due from the direction of Nivelles. Tactically, the Prussians were on the defensive and needed to play for time for their reinforcements and allies to arrive. Zieten's Corps, already bloodied in the fighting of the previous days, was to act as the anvil, absorbing Napoleon's hammer-blows until Bülow and / or Wellington flanked his positions.
Thus Blücher took up positions St. Amand and Ligny, turning them into mini-fortresses. Zieten placed his reserves largely in dead ground to the rear of his positions although it is possible that part of Jagow's Brigade may have for a time been exposed to artillery fire from Gérard's Corps. Ligny was the key to the Prussian position so to the rear of this town, Pirch's Corps was positioned to act as a reserve to Zieten, in the cover of dead ground, largely out of sight of the French and out of range of their artillery. Thielemann's Corps was positioned on the left flank of the Prussian position, 'dug in' in the towns of Sombreffe and Tongrinne with its artillery on the commanding heights and with the marshy Ligny Brook acting as a moat to the fore of this position. Were they to attempt to cut off the Prussian line-of-communication to Namur, then the French would have a hard time taking this position.
Had Bülow arrived here, as was expected, then the French right flank would have been in danger being rolled up by the advancing Prussians. Only Blücher's right flank was 'in the air', a clear indication that he was expecting substantial support from this direction. However, had Napoleon attempted to flank this position, Pirch's Corps was deployed in such a way that it could have countered such a move.
The terrain was well chosen. The whole of the Prussian front was covered by a marshy brook, the towns were small but substantial and formed significant defensive positions, the reserves were well placed, in cover and in dead ground but nevertheless not much more than 1 km from the front. The one major weak point was the right flank, but reinforcements were expected from this direction. In all, troops in this position could be expected to put up a spirited defence for several hours, allowing both Wellington and Blücher to complete the concentration of their forces, regaining part, if not all of the 18 hours lead Napoleon had over the Allies.
It is probable that Blücher hoped to hold out for the whole day in this position, allowing Wellington and Bülow to come up. What indicates this is that even knowing that Bülow was not going to arrive that day, he held open the road to Namur with Thielemann's Corps, and even not being certain that Wellington would arrive that day, he left his right flank 'in the air'. Was Blücher expecting Ligny to be a two day affair? Was he hoping to claw back all those lost hours by holding his positions until reinforced on 17th June?
Certain British historians are critical of Blücher's disposition, mentioning the comment that Wellington apparently made on it. This comment originates from Hardinge, who, speaking to Wellington, said: [30]
The Duke added: 'They were dotted in this way - all their bodies along the slope of a hill, so that no cannon-ball missed its effect upon them.' This comment has been used by certain historians since to underline the alleged rashness and ineptitude of Blücher and his staff. There are a number of points that can be made here.
Firstly, a physical examination of the terrain that Blücher chose and his dispositions on it do not support such a statement; the overwhelming majority of his troops were either in 'hard cover' or in dead ground. Most of those in effective French artillery range were in fortified positions or in dead ground, out of sight. Most of those out of effective French artillery range were also out of sight. Secondly, the Blücher-Gneisenau team consisted of highly experienced professional soldiers who had won a number of battles against the French in general and Napoleon in particular.
Finally, the positions taken up by the Prussians had been reconnoitred some months before hand and were carefully selected for the purpose of fighting a defensive battle. So why did Wellington make such a statement? The famous meeting between the two Allied commanders took place between noon and 1 p.m. at the Bussy mill, a couple of hours before the battle started and before deployments were completed. At this time, part of Zieten's troops were taking up positions behind Ligny. Part of these troops were marching or positioned across the French front, within artillery range, particularly Jagow's Brigade. Jagow later moved his troops to other positions. The author of this essay has yet to find any accounts which indicate that this brigade suffered at all from French artillery fire whilst positioned near Ligny. A physical examination of the ground shows that part of Jagow's troops were exposed, for a time at least, but this was the only part of Blücher's troops not in a strong position. These troops were in front of Wellington whilst he was at the mill, so one can only assume that he was referring to these six battalions and not the entire position. If Wellington's statement is to be taken as referring to the entire Prussian position then it is clearly erroneous. What is more likely is that Wellington and Hardinge invented such stories after the event as a ploy to cover their deception of Blücher.
Napoleon's strategy for 16th June was quite straightforward. Ney would play with Wellington, holding him up, whilst Napoleon, with the bulk of his forces would inflict a crushing blow on the Prussians. With Blücher beaten and in retreat, he would then turn on Wellington with the bulk of his army and crush him in turn. To achieve this end, the Prussian Army had to be defeated in the positions it had occupied. Some historians criticise Napoleon for not having turned the Prussian's weak right flank and thereby manoeuvre them out of their positions and separate them from Wellington by driving them back on Namur. As Napoleon himself said on this point: [31]
Put another way, Napoleon's plan was characteristically subtle. He was going to smash I and II Prussian Corps with sheer brute force. His dispositions indicate this quite clearly. He deployed his artillery in grand batteries before St. Amand and Ligny and massed his infantry behind them. He was going to attempt to hammer the Prussians into submission and wanted thereby to destroy half their army.
Napoleon was somewhat tardy in getting up that morning. He took much longer than necessary to send out orders. He lost several of the precious hours that he had gained by his rapid advance at the beginning of the campaign. The battle commenced at 2.30 p.m. Blücher now only had twelve hours to regain. By way of an aside, if Wellington had been quicker off the mark and had not dallied in Brussels for so long, then his forces could have been in a position to intervene at Ligny. As Clausewitz commented, Wellington could have concentrated his forces some twelve hours earlier had he been at the front and not in Brussels. Blücher was, in effect, attempting to rectify Wellington's error of judgement.
The first attack was by Vandamme's Corps, with Lefol's Division storming St. Amand and Girard's Division assaulting St. Amand la Haye. Jagow's three battalions were quickly ejected from St. Amand but the French advance was stopped by Steinmetz whose Brigade retook much of the village only to be thrown out by French reinforcements. By 4 p.m., all of the village was in French hands. Steinmetz's Brigade was by now shattered and fell back and Jagow's three battalions rejoined their brigade. St. Amand was at the bottom of a slope and the Prussian artillery at the top, firing downhill, was easily able to stop the French coming out of the cover of the village. Pirch's Brigade then retook St. Amand la Haye but was unable to hold it for long. A second attempt to storm the village resulted in Pirch falling back in disorder. Blücher himself, witnessing these events from the mill at Bussy, rallied these battalions and sent them off for a third and successful assault on the village in which Girard was killed and two other French generals severely wounded. In the meantime, Tippelskirch's Brigade had moved through Wagnelée and fell on the French left only to be repulsed by Habert's Division and thrown back in total disarray, beginning to rally at the far side of Wagnelée.
Fighting had also started for the village of Ligny, itself a small fortress of walls, hedges, solid farm houses and a castle. Three times Gérard's assaults were thrown back. Only when the French howitzers had begun to set fire to the village did the Prussians show any signs of weakening and let the French enter. The bitter hand-to-hand fighting went on for several hours whilst both sides fed in fresh troops.
It was becoming clear to Napoleon that he was going to have great difficulty in pushing back the Prussians with frontal assaults, so at 3.15 p.m., he sent his famous order to Ney to move onto the Prussian flank. Shortly thereafter, news arrived that Ney has heavily committed at Quatre Bras. It was then clear to Napoleon that it was unlikely that Ney could assist. Instead, at 3.30 p.m., Napoleon ordered d'Erlon to carry out the flanking march and awaited anxiously his arrival. At 5 p.m., thinking d'Erlon's arrival imminent, Napoleon formed up the Guard for the decisive assault on Ligny. On hearing news that a column of enemy troops was 4 km from his left flank, he delayed his orders. It took an hour to establish that this 'enemy' column was in fact d'Erlon and that this column had now turned around and was marching away. It was now 6.30 p.m. Napoleon would now have to make his decisive move with only those troops immediately available to him. He would not now be able to gain a decisive victory, destroying the Prussians totally.
In the meantime, Tippelskirch had managed to occupy the hamlet of St. Amand (not the village) and Marwitz's Cavalry Brigade had advanced to north of Wagnelée. The battle quietened down so much that the Prussians thought it was about to end for the day when Vandamme, with fresh forces, moved forward again, with the Guard in support. Blücher made a counter-move with Brause's Brigade, along with part of Krafft's, checking the Guard's first advance. Blücher, seeing a chance to decide matters for the day, put himself at the head of parts of the Brigades Steinmetz and Bose with which he managed to eject the French from St. Amand la Haye before the Guard forced him to halt. The battle was still in the balance.
With the sun setting, Napoleon struck the decisive blow against Ligny. His Guard Sappers laid a company-wide bridge across the marshy Ligny Brook over which the Old Guard, supported by artillery fire, advanced to take the Prussians by surprise. The French achieved the long-awaited break through.
Command of the Prussian army now fell to the next most senior officer, Gneisenau. Both St. Amand and Ligny were in French hands. The Prussians however still held Sombreffe and Tongrinne. They were indeed beaten, but not decisively, and continued to hold a good position on the field of battle. As Bülow was still too far away to arrive by the next day and as Wellington's movements were still uncertain to the Prussians, Gneisenau deemed that a retreat under the cover of darkness was in order.
German historians as well have made much of this fateful decision. They tend to see Gneisenau as the noble hero who threw caution to the wind by ordering the Prussian Army to burn its bridges and fall back on Wavre. Despite Wellington's treachery, the honourable Prussians of course kept their word, moving to a position from where they could advance to support the Anglo-Allies. Take, for instance, Ollech's account: [32]
Historians may write their flowery prose but the fact of the matter is that only one eye-witness account of this event, that by Reiche, and the accuracy of that is disputed by some. This account runs as follows: [33]
'At this moment, I met Gneisenau on the Roman road and he informed me of the new line of retreat. Although it was already quite dark by then, I could still see enough on my map to note that Tilly was not on it.
'As it was probable that several more officers were using the same map which would certainly create confusion and difficulties, I suggested that instead of Tilly being chosen as the point to fall back on, a town further along the line of movement likely to be on every other map should be selected instead.' Thus Gneisenau appear to have named Wavre as the point on which to retreat. Reiche and other officers formed a chain across the Namur road and redirected the retreating Prussians. Gneisenau then rode to Mellery to set up his headquarters where, by coincidence, he found the injured Blücher resting in a barn.
In the confusion of this retreat, it is difficult to establish beyond doubt what the actual facts are. That Gneisenau ordered a retreat on Tilly is not disputed. That Prussian officers blocked the natural line of retreat towards Namur and Liège that certain units were already following is recorded in a number of sources. These points indicate that the Prussian high command had every intention of doing its best to maintain contact with Wellington. These indisputable facts belie stories of the Prussian high command having any intention of abandoning Wellington's forces.
It would also be wrong to assume that the Prussians, in burning their bridges, were taking a great risk. It would not be an insurmountable problem to re-establish their lines of supply along routes further to the north of their current positions. The decision to retreat on Wavre was merely the logical consequence of the strategy of campaign decided on at the meeting at Tirlemont on 3rd May and that was maintained throughout the campaign. Reference to the diary of Blücher's ADC Nostitz underlines this point: [34]
Two pertinent points here. Firstly, the Prussian staff had not taken a decision on a line of retreat either before or during the battle. This decision fell to Gneisenau alone and was made on the spur of the moment. Secondly, it would appear that even disorganised groups of Prussians were making their way in the direction of Tilly and Wavre before Blücher was in a position to approve or disapprove. It was Gneisenau and Gneisenau alone who should be accredited with the decision to retreat on Wavre and it was Gneisenau alone who decided to maintain contact with Wellington. To describe him as an 'anglophobe' with an irrational mistrust of Wellington's intentions is not supported by an objective analysis of the available facts and particularly of the actions he took.
1) The two Allied armies had to deploy over a wide area for reasons of supply as well as the need to cover several possible lines of advance by the French. They would therefore have to concentrate their forces in order to defeat Napoleon and to do so, they would have to work in close collaboration.
2) The nature of their deployment made it inevitable that either one or both of these armies would have to fight one or more delaying actions to buy the time needed to complete their concentration.
3) The fact that Blücher's forces were closer to the French starting positions made it inevitable that his army would be the first to engage Napoleon with a view to fighting a delaying action. This is indeed what did occur, so the widely accepted myth of the 'rash' Blücher needlessly accepting battle for battle's sake is simply in conflict with a logical analysis of the facts.
4) The fact that Wellington was slow in concentrating his forces led to Blücher accepting this battle on terms less favourable than necessary. Had Wellington not been so hesitant, he may well have been in a position to join Blücher if on 16th June, thereby forcing Napoleon to fight a defensive battle at unfavourable odds.
5) Blücher accepted battle on 16th June expecting substantial direct support from Wellington. The Duke had made certain promises to Blücher that he knew he could not keep.
6) The Battle of Ligny, in the form it happened, occurred due to staff errors in Blücher's headquarters and deception of the Prussians by Wellington. The intention was that Ligny should be the decisive battle of the campaign. It was not. One can dispute the details of why this was, but what is beyond dispute is that Blücher's staff managed to get roughly 75% of their forces to the right place at the right time. Wellington's staff managed a poor 30%. Napoleon, lacking Ney and Lobau, had managed to concentrate around 66% of his forces for this engagement. If Wellington had been on the ball instead of at the ball, Napoleon may well have met his Waterloo two days earlier.
Finally, a parting shot from Chesney: [35]
Ligny Continued
Chandler, David G. "Campaigns of Napoleon" (London, 1966). A standard reference work with a particularly informative analysis of the Napoleonic system of warfare, but which unfortunately repeats as fact many of the myths surrounding Napoleon and his campaigns. Always a useful starting point for the general reader but not a source upon which one can place total reliance.
Charras, Lieut.-Colonel. "Histoire de la Campagne de 1815 - Waterloo" (Paris, 1869). An authoritative French work on the campaign. Well researched and clearly presented with only the occasional error.
Chesney, R.E., Colonel Charles C. "Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815". Fourth Edition. (London, 1907). A good supplement to Siborne's authoritative account. Chesney details his sources and exposes so many of the myths. The first edition appeared in 1868. The author of this essay refereed to the fourth edition as it contains a number of correction, particularly from German sources. Essential reading on the campaign, modern historians tend to ignore this work.
Clausewitz, General Carl von. "Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich" (Berlin, 1835). Oft quoted but really of less use than one might hope, the young Clausewitz lacked the analytical capabilities of a trained staff historian as well as the clarity of expression that one would have liked from such a well known participant in the campaign.
De Bas & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. "La Campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bays". 3 vols, (Brussels 1908). This remains one of the best researched and written accounts of the campaign. Its authors were Dutch and Belgian army officers.
Gourgaud, Général. "Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze, etc., écrite à St. Helène. Avec des notes d'un officier allemand". (Paris, 1818). Gourgaud accompanied Napoleon into his final exile on St. Helena. This account of the campaign of 1815 was actually Napoleon's but was written in the name of Gourgaud. As is to be expected, there is a degree of self-justification and excuse making, but as a primary source, attention has to be paid to it.
Gurwood, Lieut.-Colonel. "Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington". (London, 1838). An invaluable primary source. If only Blücher and Gneisenau had provided us with as much information!
Hamley, Col. Edward Bruce. "Hamley's Wellington's Career" (London, 1860). Some useful insights into Wellington.
Houssaye, Henry. "1815 Waterloo" (London 1900). One of the most detailed accounts written from a French perspective.
Kennedy, KCB, General Sir James Shaw. "Notes on the Battle of Waterloo" (London, 1865). Kennedy served on Wellington's staff. His account and analysis of the campaign are most valuable.
Lettow-Vorbeck, von. "Napoleons Untergang 1815. Erster Band. Elba - Belle Alliance". (Berlin, 1904). The official German history of the campaign produced by the Historical Section of the General Staff. Well researched if a little pro-Prussian in places. Refutes a number of the myths, but unfortunately not all of them.
Müffling, Friedrich Carl Ferdinand Freiherr von. "Aus meinem Leben" (Berlin, 1851). Important set of memoirs from a leading figure in this drama.
Müffling, Friedrich Carl Ferdinand Freiherr von. "Müffling's History of the Campaign of 1815". (London, 1816). A useful account by one of Blücher's staff officers who enjoyed access to both Wellington's as well as Blücher's headquarters.
Napoleon. "Correspondence de Napoléon 1er". (Paris, 1869). All works emanating from the pen of Napoleon Bonaparte have to be treated with a degree of caution and are best checked against other, hopefully more reliable works. However, this is a primary source which has to be examined when investigating this campaign.
Nostitz, General Graf von. "Das Tagebuch des Generals der Kavallerie Grafen von Nostitz". II. Theil. (Berlin, 1885). The diary of Blücher's ADC was particularly useful on the question of the line of retreat after the Battle of Ligny.
Ollech, General der Infanterie. "Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 nach archivalischen Quellen". (Berlin, 1876). The first major German work on the campaign based on archive sources. One has to be a little careful with this work as a degree of national bias creeps in.
Reiche, General Ludwig von. "Memoiren des Generals Ludwigs von Reiche". (2 vols., Leipzig, 1857). One of the few published accounts of an officer in Gneisenau's staff, this work leaves so many questions unanswered.
Ropes, John Codman. "The Campaign of Waterloo - A Military History". (New York, 1916). Where else can one go for an unbiased account of the campaign than to an American writing in the middle of the First World War? Ropes' comments are a little suspect in places but this account remains one of the better histories produced in the English language this century.
Siborne, Capt. W. "History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815". (London, 1848). One of the great classics, despite recent criticism, an authoritative and well researched work which is marred only by a failure to list its sources in detail and to footnote them.
Stanhope, Philip Henry, 5th. Earl. "Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington. 1831 - 1851". (New York, 1886). Another source of information on Wellington and his actions during this campaign. One has to be a little wary of such material as Wellington tended in private to tell tall stories to his friends.
Thiers, M.A. "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire". (Paris, 1862). A multi-volume reference work written by an infamous chauvinist. Of little value as a reliable source, some of the author's interpretations provide food for thought.
Wagner. "Plane der Schlachten und Treffen", Vol. IV (Berlin, 1825). This work is the first published using material from the Prussian Kriegsarchiv. In view of the latter's destruction in 1945, this is a most valuable source.
Wellington, KG, Duke of. "Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, KG", (London, 1863). Edited by the son of the first Duke, this work provides a number of insights.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.'When you had examined the Prussian position, I remember you much disapproved of it, and said to me, if they fight here, they will be damnably mauled.'
Napoleon's Plan of Battle
'The question in this battle was not that of separating the English from the Prussians; we knew that the English could not be ready to act till the next day; but here the point was to hinder that part of the III Corps of Blücher which had not joined him by 11 a.m. and which came by way of Namur, and also the IV Corps, which came from Liège by way of Gembloux, from uniting on the field of battle. In cutting the enemy's line at Ligny, his whole right wing at St. Amand was turned and compromised; while by simply becoming masters of St. Amand, we should have accomplished nothing.'
The Battle
Blücher, recognising the danger, ordered Roeder to throw in three cavalry regiments with which he hoped to stem the tide. Accompanied by his ADC Nostitz, he led the cavalry regiments in person, sabre in hand. Delort's cuirassiers repulsed this charge. Blücher's horse, struck by a bullet, fell to the ground, trapping the elderly Field Marshal under its dying body. It was only a counter-charge by Prussian cavalry and the ensuing confusion that enabled Blücher to be rescued from his peril. He was now hors de combat and the Prussian centre shattered.
Gneisenau orders the Retreat
'Gneisenau, with a commanding air of calmness, surrounded by several senior officers, paused near the paved road to the north of Brye. He threw an eye on the map and then decided with the authority and responsibility of a capable commander to: Retreat to Tilly and Wavre.'
'In the meantime, having taken up the reins of command on his own authority after Blücher's fall, Gneisenau issued the order to retreat on Tilly. This indicated his intention to move towards the English.
'I can maintain with utter conviction that neither before nor during the battle were any orders given regarding the direction of any withdrawal that may become necessary. Moreover, such orders could not possibly be given because they would depend on the particular circumstances current when such a retreat were ordered. I was therefore somewhat doubtful about choosing a route along which to bring the Prince [Blücher]. A conference with either General Gneisenau or Grolman was out of the question due to the growing confusion and darkness, to try to find either of them would have been a waste of time. ... A decision had to be made, and so I decided on the direction of Wavre and started off towards Tilly; both to my right and to my left there were groups of wounded and men separated from their units. Nowhere could I find a single body of formed troops with which to protect the Prince's person.'
Conclusions
7) Blücher's primary objective at Ligny was to buy time, time for the Allied forces to concentrate. He certainly hoped to fight the decisive battle on 16th, with Wellington falling on Napoleon's left. At the very least, he hoped to hold this position all that day to enable both Bülow to arrive and / or Wellington to complete his flanking march. Had Blücher held his positions for all of 16th June, then the battle would have become a two-day affair, with the Allies' superiority of numbers coming into play with the probable result of a defeat of Napoleon.
'Of the tactical faults of Blücher it is not necessary to speak further; and his strategical mistake at the outset, the loss of Bülow by imperfect orders, has been fully noticed before. Of Wellington, viewed individually, it is sufficient to say that his enemy, had matters been properly managed, should have attacked him with 20,000 men more, early in the afternoon; and that he at dark, thirty hours after his first warning, had only present at Quatre Bras three-eighths of his infantry, one-third of his guns, and one-seventh of his cavalry. Truly, in holding his own, the great Englishman owed something that day to Fortune.'
Footnotes
[30] Stanhope, p. 109
[31] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472
[32] Ollech, p. 156
[33] Reiche, Memoiren, vol. 2, p. 201
[34] Nostitz, Tagebuch, p. 31
[35] Chesney, p.129
Selected Bibliography
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