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The Waterloo Campaign, probably the most written about event in the Napoleonic Wars, remains today still one of the most controversial. Ligny, the first major battle of this campaign, was the last military victory achieved by Napoleon in his career. Two days later, this career came to a violent end on the fateful field of Waterloo. The events of that short period were of sufficient significance to change the direction of history. The climax of this campaign tends to attract the most attention despite the fact that an examination of the opening act is more likely to show the reasons for Napoleon's subsequent defeat than an examination of the Battle of Waterloo itself.
The research conducted into this campaign was an interesting exercise in itself. Much has been written on the subject over the years and it was fascinating to notice the way in which it has been treated has varied according to fashion and the contemporary political circumstances.
Historical Accounts
French historians right from the day after the battle have tended to want to rewrite history and make excuses for their Emperor. French participants, particularly at the higher levels of command, have engaged in a considerable degree of back-covering, self-justification and excuse-making. Their accounts, and the various and differing accounts produced by Napoleon, have little value to the historian.
British accounts however fall into three groups. Firstly, those serious accounts and histories written to the middle of the 19th century. These tend to be balanced, well-written and thoroughly researched works which are of considerable merit to the study of the campaign, the most notable of these being Siborne's History. Secondly, in the latter half of the 19th century, relations between Britain and the newly founded German Empire were clearly deteriorating. It was at this time that the myth of the campaign being a British (as opposed to an Allied) victory was most apparent. Certain historians invented the myth of the 'anglophobe' Gneisenau, and the accounts of this period give an impression of conflict and hostility between the Allied headquarters, so the response of German historians was to play on the alleged unreliability of Wellington.
Finally, modern accounts in the English language tend to be shallow, superficial works which repeat selected myths without bothering to refer to the better accounts of the campaign. Most German writings on the subject were produced prior to the First World War and were authored by historians trained by the General Staff. These works were not written for popular consumption but for the training of officers in the art of warfare. A degree of national bias creeps in, but as a whole, these accounts are among the most reliable. Of a comparable quality is the history of the campaign produced by a Dutch and a Belgian officer, namely De Bas and T'Serclaes de Wommersom.
Background
The historical background to this campaign is well enough covered not to need any further comments other than to briefly mention the salient points. Further details can be obtained from any of the works listed in the bibliography at the end of this essay.
Napoleon abdicated his throne in 1814 on the approach of the Allied armies to Paris. He was exiled to the Mediterranean island of Elba whilst the Allies attempted to redraw the map of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. This Congress dragged on with it looking ever more likely that the former Allies would be going to war amongst themselves to settle the issue. However, Napoleon's escape from exile and his subsequent landing in France galvanised the quarrelling Allies into action. Napoleon attempted to talk peace with them but the Allies were resolved to overthrow his regime no matter what. Preparations for war commenced.
The French Army
Napoleon had probably the best army available to him since the victorious campaigns of Ulm and Jena. Popular support for the war and conscription was at a characteristically low level in France - the French were happy to support Napoleon's wars so long as it brought them victories and they did not have to do too much of the fighting themselves. Since the first abdication, many French prisoners-of-war had been released and had come home. A part of these men had been away from home for ten years or more and were having difficulty fitting back into civilian life. They did welcome the return of their Emperor and joined his colours.
The size of the army available to Napoleon was not as he had hoped, but most of his men were veterans - in sharp contrast to the 'Marie-Louises' with which he had to fight the unsuccessful campaigns of 1813 and 1814. The conscripts and national guards raised for the campaign showed a decided lack of enthusiasm. Desertion was rife and royalist uprisings, particularly in the Vendée, distracted Napoleon's attention from matters at the front.
Although the rank and file were enthusiastically behind their Emperor, there was a question as to the loyalty of the officer corps, particularly at senior level. Too many of Napoleon's former marshals and generals made the change from loyal servants of Bonaparte to enthusiastic career soldiers in the Royal Army and back again much too easily. Napoleon did not readily trust them and neither did his soldiers. The fear of treachery within his own ranks affected Napoleon's choice of subordinate in a number of cases and this resulted in certain officers of unquestionable loyalty being placed in positions for which they were not entirely competent.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to treat the organisation of the French Army in great detail. More thorough orders-of-battle can be found elsewhere. The army available to Napoleon in the northern theatre was as follows:
| 1st. Corps | d'Erlon | 20,000 |
| 2nd. Corps | Reille | 24,500 |
| 3rd. Corps | Vandamme | 19,000 |
| 4th. Corps | Gérard | 16,000 |
| 6th. Corps | Lobau | 10,500 |
| Guard | 21,000 |
| Reserve Cavalry | Grouchy | 13,500 |
| Train | 3,500 |
| Total | 128,000 |
The totals given are in round figures and include non-combatants. [1] Of this force, 22,000 were cavalry and 10,000 artillery.
These corps were deployed as follows:
1st and 2nd on the frontier with Belgium
3rd near the Ardennes
4th to the south of this on the Moselle
6th, Guard and Reserve Cavalry between Belgium and Paris
The Anglo-Allied Army
Wellington probably had the most difficult task as a commander with his army consisting of troops of several nationalities, varied levels of experience and mixed loyalties. His multi-national force consisted of German, British, Dutch and Belgian troops. For most of the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch, Belgians and part of the Germans had fought as allies of the French and indeed the Low Countries along with parts of Western Germany had been incorporated into the French Empire. Wellington could not count on the loyalty of all of his army and as such was in a similar position to Napoleon. A major defeat would probably lead to its disintegration. Part of his Peninsula veterans had gone off to America to fight there, being replaced by raw recruits. Amongst his best troops were the Hanoverians of the King's German Legion. His field army consisted of the following:
| 1st Corps | P. of Orange | 25,000 |
| 2nd Corps | Hill | 24,000 |
| Reserve Corps | Wellington | 21,000 |
| Cavalry Corps | Uxbridge | 14,000 |
Artillery and Engineers
(distributed amongst all the corps) | 10,000 |
| Total Field Army | 94,000 |
| Garrisons | 12,000 |
| Total forces available to Wellington | 106,000 |
The formation of the Anglo-Allied Army looks straight forward on paper but it reality it was a most difficult and complex task. [2] Wellington's forces consisted of six divisions of British troops, partly recruits, the rest veterans, mixed with the élite King's German Legion formations; five brigades of raw Hanoverian levies; three and a half divisions of Netherlands with a conflict of loyalties; the young and inexperienced but reliable Brunswick division and a brigade of Nassauers. Each of these larger formations had their own command structures which had to be left intact.
Wellington faced the same sort of command and communication problems that NATO have today. He dealt with the situation by mixing formations of unreliable troops with steadier ones. Each of the five British divisions of line infantry was allocated one brigade of Hanoverians with the 1st or Guards Division being the only to consist entirely of British troops. The 1st Corps was formed from the 1st and 3rd British divisions along with Chassé's and Perponcher's divisions of Netherlanders. The 2nd Corps consisted of the 2nd and 4th divisions along with the remainder of the Dutch-Belgians whilst the Reserve was formed from the 5th and 6th Divisions, the Brunswickers and the Nassauers. The cavalry were combined into one command.
The 1st Corps was deployed along the line Mons, Enghien and Nivelles, in continuation of the Prussian line. The 2nd Corps west of there towards the River Scheldt. The Reserve was held around Brussels and the cavalry was deployed in support of the 1st and 2nd Corps.
The Prussian Army
The army available to Blücher was probably the worst in terms of quality and training that the Prussians fielded in the entire Napoleonic Wars. While certain of the line formations contained a good number of enthusiastic veterans of the recent campaigns in Germany and France, a substantial part of the army consisted of raw militia from provinces which until recently had either been part of or allied to France. Moreover, certain Saxon formations recently rebelled against coming under Prussian command and been sent home in disgrace before the campaign had even begun. Another part of the army was to desert after the Battle of Ligny. The cavalry was in the throws of a major reorganisation when war broke out and this reorganisation could not be completed in time. Finally, the artillery was in the process of re-equipping and part of it did not arrive with the corps until after Waterloo.
However, the Prussians did enjoy the benefits of two main advantages. Firstly, an experienced, trained and determined general staff superior to that of any other army in this campaign and secondly a national army with a single, coherent chain of command.
The army was divided into four corps of all arms as follows. [3]
| 1st Corps | Zieten | 31,000 |
| 2nd Corps | Pirch | 32,000 |
| 3rd Corps | Thielemann | 24,000 |
| 4th Corps | Bülow | 30,000 |
| Total | 117,000 |
The 1st Corps was deployed around Charleroi, the 2nd around Namur, the 3rd around Ciney and the 4th around Liège.
Napoleon's Plan of Campaign
The situation facing Napoleon was relatively clear cut. On the borders of France, a hostile Europe was assembling a variety of armies whose intention was clearly to snuff out any attempt to re-establish the Bonaparte dynasty on a long-term basis. These forces would greatly outnumber the troops available to defend France. The Russians, being geographically the most distant, would clearly be the last to concentrate their forces. The Austrians, the next most distant would also not be an immediate threat. The German States, too weak to pose a threat on their own, would be concentrating on the Upper Rhine and linking up with the Austrian army. The Prussians would be the first continental army to be in a position to invade France and the British only had to cross the Channel.
The immediate threat therefore came from Wellington and Blücher so this was the danger that had to be dealt with first. The problem however was that the army available to Napoleon was not large enough to deal with both of these armies at once and he would therefore have to deal with them individually. As these two armies were in cantonments in close proximity in the Low Countries, Napoleon would have to concentrate his forces rapidly and in secret and, using the element of surprise, strike at them one at a time before they could either concentrate or join forces. That is what he attempted to do.
Napoleon remained in Paris until the last possible minute to give his enemies the impression that business was running as usual. He then stole away, joined his army on France's northern border, deciding that now was the time for his offensive and that Blücher was to suffer the first blow. As Gourgaud, Napoleon's ghost writer on St. Helena, put it:
'If Blücher were to have only two battalions available, he would have used these to support the English army, whilst one could take it for granted that Wellington would not attack the French army in support of Blücher until he had concentrated his entire army. For this reason, it would be desirable to direct the first blow against the Prussians.' [4]
Napoleon attempted to take the Allies by surprise, stole a march on them and went over to the offensive.
There were five possible routes that Napoleon could have chosen for his advance. Three of these, by Lille and Ath, by Mons and Hal and by Beaumont,
'... had he advanced by either of them, it is quite clear that it was impossible that they could have been in junction at any point between him and Brussels, so as to have covered it by opposing their united force to him in a general action.' [5]
The only way the Allies could gain the time necessary to achieve a junction was to fight a delaying action with part of their forces. The route of advance most favourable to Napoleon was along the axis running from Charleroi north through Quatre Bras, Genappe and Waterloo to Brussels. This road ran between the two Allied armies and to advance on it would have the effect of forcing them apart so that they could be fought individually. Moreover, the Prussians were positioned much closer to the border than the Anglo-Allied army. Wellington's headquarters was at Brussels. Blücher's headquarters was at Namur. His lines of communication ran by way of Liège and Maastricht to the Rhine. The Anglo-Allies were supplied via Ostend and Antwerp. If either or both armies were forced to retreat, Napoleon reckoned on them falling back along their lines of communication, thus pulling apart. It was on this premise that Napoleon based his plan of campaign.
Allied Plan of Campaign
The Allied plan of campaign was equally straight forward. To concentrate all their forces and advance on Paris. This would, however, take time; more time than Napoleon would allow them. It was equally clear to the Allies that the first blow was likely to fall against Wellington and Blücher in the Low Countries. A watchful eye was kept on Napoleon's movements and intentions but due to Napoleon's largely successful security, he was after all able to steal a march on them.
Clearly, neither Blücher nor Wellington on their own would be able to defeat Napoleon. Close co-operation was a prerequisite to a successful conclusion of the campaign. However, for reasons of supply and logistics, the Allies had to disperse their forces for as long as possible and could only concentrate for combat once it was certain that Napoleon was going over to the offensive.
This situation was evident in Allied planning and talks that went on throughout April and May 1815. Take, for instance, Wellington's report on his meeting with Blücher in Tirlemont on 3rd May 1815:
'My meeting with Blücher was very satisfactory.' (Letter to Prince of Orange, 3rd May 1815).
'I met Blücher today in Tirlemont and received a satisfactory assurance of support.' (Letter to Clancarty).
'As it seems that Prince Blücher and the Prussian officers are not disposed to let me be beaten by superior forces, I am satisfied.' [6]
Müffling confirms this, mentioning that it was considered likely that Napoleon would advance through Charleroi. As a counter-measure, it was agreed that the Prussian army was to assemble between Sombreffe and Charleroi whilst the Anglo-Allied army was to concentrate between Marchienne and Gosselies. [7] Had these positions been attained, the Allied armies would have been in close contact with each other and in a position to aid each other with a flank attack which ever way Napoleon would have attacked.
Allied Deployment
The Allied deployment in the Low Countries was based largely around two criteria. Firstly, the need to disperse so that local supplies were not exhausted and secondly to cover all the possible lines of advance that Napoleon may use. The result of this deployment was that Napoleon's troops would have less marching to do to reach Brussels than the Allied troops would have to do in order to concentrate their forces. It was most likely that once Napoleon's intentions became clear, the Allies would be obliged to fight at least one delaying action to buy the time for their armies to concentrate.
Wellington, for obvious reasons, was particularly tied to his lines of communication with England. He feared that the French would move to cut him off from the Channel coast and deployed part of his forces accordingly. Blücher also needed to cover possible lines of advance as well as his lines of communication to the Rhine. The net result was that the Allied forces were spread over an area of more than 150 km from east to west and sixty from north to south. Once Napoleon's intentions were clear, the Allies would have to react immediately and with a degree of urgency to achieve the concentration of their forces necessary to bring a successful conclusion to the campaign. Any delay could well have fatal consequences.
The First Moves
Napoleon chose to advance along the line Charleroi - Quatre Bras and deal first with the Prussians. As Gourgaud put it: [8]
'The Prussian Army, having intimation of the enemy's intentions eight or ten hours before the English, would accordingly be first concentrated. Hopes were even entertained of attacking the Prussians before their four corps were united, or of obliging them to fall back in the direction of Liège and the Rhine, which was their line of operations; and by thus separating them from the English, to create an opportunity for new combinations.'
He firmly believed that he had caught the Prussians unawares and that his offensive was going to take them by surprise: [9]
'In the night between the 14th and 15th, confidential messengers returned to the French headquarters at Beaumont, and announced that everything was tranquil at Namur, Brussels and Charleroi; this was a happy presage. To have thus succeeded in concealing from the enemy the movements which the French Army had made for the last two days, was to have already obtained a great advantage'.
Accounts from the Allied side, particularly that of Müffling whose responsibility it was to know what was going on in each of the Allied headquarters, make it clear that Napoleon's movements were known to them: [10]
'... on the 13th and 14th, it was positively known that the enemy was concentrating in the neighbourhood of Maubeuge. The Duke of Wellington did not deem it expedient to make any alteration in his position, until the enemy should develop his mode of attack, as from Maubeuge it might be either upon Mons, Binche, and Nivelles, or upon Charleroi.'
Wellington was clearly being his very cautious self and was waiting for Napoleon to make a clear move before reacting himself. It was this hesitation that led to Blücher being forced to fight Napoleon with only part of his forces and with no direct help forthcoming from Wellington. The Prussians were not so hesitant. Zieten's scouts had noted the French concentration at Charleroi despite Napoleon's attempts to hide it.
'Whoever has once campaigned cannot fail to know that fires of this sort lighting up the whole atmosphere are seen far enough off and render this kind of precaution very useless. So in this case, the fires were distinctly noted from the Prussian outposts.' [11]
On the night of 13th June, Zieten had reported the French concentration at Beaumont and Solre and had been ordered to send his heavy baggage off to Gembloux, an indication that battle was being prepared for. Blücher ordered Ziethen to fall back and hold Fleurus whilst instructing his other corps commanders to concentrate at that point. [12]
As Chesney put the situation on the evening of 14th June: [13]
'So passed the short night which preceded Napoleon's last campaign: the French, impatient for the light in which to fall upon their foes, and redeem, by some new Austerlitz or Jena, the disasters of the last three years; the Prussians, no less vigilant, preparing in all haste to meet the shock; the English, save only their reticent chief and a few trusted officers, resting unconscious of the gathering storm before them.'
Time was running out for Wellington to react to developments and concentrate his forces. The likelihood that Blücher would have to fight a delaying action to make up for Wellington's lack of action was growing.
The Events of 15th June 1815
At the meeting held by the commanders of the Allied armies at Tirlemont on 3rd May, the possibility of a French advance along the Charleroi road towards Quatre Bras and Sombreffe had been discussed. The danger of such an offensive by the French forcing the Allied armies apart had been recognised and the necessary counter-measures agreed. In such an event, the Prussians were to take up position between Sombreffe and Charleroi whilst the Anglo-Allies were to concentrate between Marchienne and Gosselies. Had the Allied armies taken up these positions, they would have been in close proximity and, in the event of an attack by the French, been able to come to the aid of each other by means of a flank march. The Allied plans however came nowhere near being executed; by 3 p.m. on 15th June, only one Prussian corps was anywhere near the chosen position and only one of Wellington's divisions (Perponcher's Dutch--Belgians) was within reach of it, yet 40,000 French had crossed the Sambre at Marchiennes and nearly 70,000 more were entering Charleroi.
It was left to Zieten to fend for himself as best he could and do all possible to slow down the French advance, to buy the time necessary for the Allies to complete their concentration and this he did well before being forced back on Fleurus by Reille. One important effect of Ziethen's forced withdrawal was to leave the road from Charleroi to Quatre Bras open. Ney was placed in charge of the left column and advanced to Frasnes where he met elements of the Dutch brigade of Nassauers under the command of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar who had drawn his brigade together on hearing of the French advance through Charleroi. He prepared to hold the Quatre Bras position whilst Ney halted his men on the evening of 15th June at Frasnes.
Meanwhile, Blücher set about bringing his forces together. News of Napoleon's advance was sent to Blücher in his headquarters in Namur at daybreak on 15th June. By the end of that day, Pirch's corps had advanced to Mazy, four miles from Sombreffe whilst Thielemann had reached Namur, a further ten miles away. Bülow, being further away, received his first orders only at 5 a.m. on 15th. These orders instructed Bülow to form up his corps in such a way that it could reach Hannut in one march. At 10.30 a.m., a further set of orders a.m. on 15th. These orders instructed Bülow to form up his corps in such a way that it could reach Hannut in one march. At 10.30 a.m., a further set of orders from Gneisenau (sent out at midnight) ordered Bülow to move on Hannut. In these orders, there was no mention that hostilities had commenced so Bülow did not hurry to carry out his orders and planned to move to Hannut on 16th June. He sent an officer to Blücher in Namur, informing him of his intentions. This officer arrived in Namur at 9 p.m. only to find that Blücher had moved his headquarters to Sombreffe. Meanwhile, further orders from Blücher to Bülow arrived in Hannut and were forwarded to Bülow only on the morning of 16th June. [14] Blücher, now committed to battle on 16th June, was going to have to fight without one of his corps, only Blücher did not know this yet.
It was now left to Wellington to retrieve the situation. Zieten sent a message to Wellington at 4.45 a.m. on 15th, informing him of the outbreak of hostilities. [15] Wellington received this report by 9 a.m., but attached no significance to it. [16] This was despite the fact that Zieten had requested the Duke to carry out the promise made the day before, that is, in such an event, to move his army on Nivelles. [17] Further reports came in that afternoon. Around 3 p.m., a message from Zieten to Müffling reporting the fall of Charleroi arrived. [18] Confirmation of the outbreak of hostilities reached the Prince of Orange in Brussels from his headquarters in Braine--le-Comte. [19]
Around 5 p.m., news came in from Blücher in Namur that he had ordered a forward concentration of his troops, in effect implementing his part of the plan drawn up at Tirlemont on 3rd May. About 6 p.m., Lieut.-Colonel Berkeley, Wellington's representative in the Dutch headquarters sent in confirmation of the events at the front together with the information that there was, as yet, no French movement on Mons. [20]
On the basis of this information, Wellington did decide to place his troops on alert and begin to concentrate certain of his divisions. (1st and 3rd at Ath and Braine-le-Comte respectively; Chassé and Perponcher at Nivelles). Perponcher was directed from corps headquarters to keep one brigade (Prince Bernard's) at Quatre Bras. Wellington's subordinates were clearly better informed than their commander and making the necessary movements on their own initiative. Had the Netherlanders carried out Wellington's orders to the letter, then the vital road from Quatre Bras to Brussels would have been left open, and communications with the Prussians threatened. About 10 p.m., Wellington received a report from Blücher that he was concentrating in the Sombreffe position (near Ligny) and was intending to accept battle the next day. [21] He issued his 'After Orders' in which part of his army was to move towards the front. [22]
The Duke directed the 3rd British division on Nivelles, the 1st to Braine, the 2nd and 4th and Reserve Cavalry to Enghien. Prince Frederick's Netherlanders were ordered to concentrate at Zottegem, the Dutch-Belgian cavalry was to move from its position near Mons to Arquennes. Valuable time was lost that night. These orders would take several hours to reach the troops and thus could not be implemented until the next morning. Wellington's actions were simply too little, too late. He had lost vital hours by not having issued such instructions, or better still, orders for a movement on Nivelles at 9 a.m. He then went to the famous ball in Brussels. Had Wellington been at the front instead of socialising, he would probably have moved his troops much earlier. As Clausewitz commented: [23]
'... it was now certainly the time to fully concentrate all corps so that they could be on the field of battle in less than 24 hours. ... it would have been an important advantage if the Duke of Wellington's headquarters and corps were nearer to Field Marshal Blücher, in the area of Nivelles. That alone would have gain at least 12 hours and avoided several mishaps.'
Müffling was of the same opinion, and stated that: [24]
'... if the Duke had left Brussels on 14th, at nine o'clock on the 15th he would have heard the cannonade. In that case Napoleon would have fallen into the Caudine Forks on the 16th.'
Even British writers criticise the Duke on this point. Hamley considers that by going to the ball, Wellington: [25]
'... was throwing away golden minutes. By riding himself towards Charleroi at the first alarm, he would have seen himself that this was no feint, and by the next morning assembled troops there sufficient to check Ney and aid Blücher.'
The situation at 'close of play' on 15th June was therefore as follows. Napoleon had moved nearly 100,000 men over the Sambre and was only a little behind plan. Blücher had one of his corps in position already and two on their way; the fourth, as yet unbeknown to him, was not going arrive the next day. Wellington had not moved a single man, instead ordering a concentration which would have left the road to Brussels open to Ney. Instead of going to the front, he went to a party. The advantage was clearly on Napoleon's side and the worst strategical errors had been made by Wellington who was clearly not taking the situation as seriously as he should have done.
The Events of 16th June 1815
Napoleon had caught Wellington metaphorically napping on 15th and now decided on the morning of 16th to have a literal nap himself. Certain historians put this down to illness but there is no concrete evidence that Napoleon suffered from ill health at any time during this campaign and even chauvinist historians like Thiers do not defend this point of view. Instead, Thiers actually refutes it. [26]
A more plausible view is that Napoleon, pleased with his successes on 15th and not believing that Blücher's concentration was so well in hand, decided he could have a well-deserved rest. Orders for 16th were issued at 8 a.m. at the earliest. [27] Napoleon paid back a good six of the twenty-four hours that Wellington had lost. However, he still had an advantage of eighteen. 16th June was going to be a tough day for the Allies.
Napoleon believed that Blücher had no more than 40,000 men available and that he could be pushed out of the way quite easily. Ney was to push on beyond Quatre Bras and move towards Brussels. Once Blücher had been dealt with, the Emperor himself was planning to march on Brussels, arriving there on 17th June. Napoleon had clearly misjudged the situation and underestimated his opponent. By the time he issued his orders that morning, Pirch and Thielemann had reached the ground chosen by Blücher for giving battle. Blücher was facing what he believed to be the entire French army with 85,000 men. He was relying on active support from Wellington.
Wellington and his staff let Brussels for Quatre Bras that morning. At 10.30 a.m., on the heights behind Frasnes, he sent the following message to Blücher: [28]
'My dear Prince!
'My army is drawn up as follows. The Corps of the Prince of Orange has one division here and in Quatre Bras and the rest at Nivelles. The Reserve is on the march from Waterloo to Genappe where it will arrive at noon. The English cavalry will be in Nivelles at the same time. The Corps of Lord Hill in Braine-le-Comte.
'I see nothing of the enemy before you [he means "us"] and await news from Your Highness and the arrival of troops so that I can decide my operations for the day.
'Nothing has appeared either from the direction of Binche nor on your [he means "our"] right.
'Your very obedient servant
Wellington.'
This letter is an important piece of evidence. Its content is largely nonsense and highly misleading. The remainder of the Prince of Orange's Corps was certainly not in Nivelles. Cook's Division arrived there at noon, receiving further orders to march on Quatre Bras at 3 p.m. Picton's Division, which Wellington had actually ridden past on his way from Brussels, would not be able to arrive until that afternoon, so only part, and not all, of the Reserve would be in Genappe at the time mentioned. Uxbridge's cavalry received its orders at 6 a.m. so, due to the distance which would have to be covered, could not arrive until so late at Quatre Bras that evening that it would be unable to participate in the battle. Finally, Hill's Corps was nowhere near Braine-le-Comte; 2nd Division arrived there around midnight and only parts of 4th Division could be expected that day.
With this letter, Wellington gave Blücher to believe that he could expect much more support than would be possible. As Wellington had orders issued to his troops that morning before writing this misleading letter to Blücher, then there can be little dispute that he knew he was giving the Prussians faulty information. As the Prussians accepted battle largely on the basis of the Duke's promises of support, then there can be little doubt that Wellington was deliberately misinforming Blücher so that the latter would make a stand which would gain the Duke enough time to concentrate his army. Wellington did not keep a copy of this letter in his records and never mentioned having written it. Around midday, Wellington rode to Blücher's headquarters at the windmill of Bussy, near Brye, for a meeting.
Windmill of Bussy Meeting
The famous meeting at this windmill has attracted much comment from historians. Unfortunately, there is no verbatim report or even minutes of it. However, all of its participants, with the exception of Wellington and Hardinge, make mention of the Duke's promises of active support that day in the forthcoming battle of Ligny. Such promises are consistent with the misleading letter Wellington had recently sent Blücher, so it is safe to assume that they were made. That the Duke failed to mention these promises later is consistent with him not having kept a record of the misleading Frasnes letter. However, it seems likely that the Duke had every intention of giving Blücher more support than he did. The facts are that neither Wellington nor the Prussians doubted that the bulk of Napoleon's forces were before Ligny. [29]
Neither Wellington nor Blücher thought that the Duke would suffer a major attack by the French that day. Both Wellington's statements at this meeting along with his letter to Blücher of 10.30 a.m. led Blücher to accept battle when it would have been more prudent to fall back, fighting a delaying action which would allow Wellington to complete the concentration of his forces. To argue that Blücher was rash in accepting battle at Ligny does not correspond with the facts; he accepted battle because of the assurances Wellington had given him, assurances the Duke knew he could not keep.
In any case, Blücher could not expect all of Wellington's troops to arrive that day to support him. Moreover, that morning, it also became known to Blücher that Bülow was not going to arrive on 16th. Blücher would have been to hold the Ligny position long enough for both Bülow to arrive and for Blücher that Bülow was not going to arrive on 16th. Blücher would have been to hold the Ligny position long enough for both Bülow to arrive and for Wellington to concentrate. Wellington would then have been able to advance with his entire army on Napoleon's left flank on the 17th, leading to a decisive battle which would most probably have ended in favour of the Allies.
Ligny Continued
Footnotes
[1] Thiers, xx. p.23, Charras p.56
[2] Supplementary Dispatches, x. p.517
[3] Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 476
[4] Gourgaud, p. 42-43.
[5] Kennedy, p. 170
[6] Gurwood, xii. p. 345
[7] Müffling, Leben, p. 232-233.
[8] Gourgaud, p. 42-43
[9] Corresp., p.197
[10] Müffling. History. Introduction.
[11] Wagner, p. 7
[12] Ibid, p. 9
[13] Chesney, p. 67 f.
[14] Statement of Below (officer on Bülow's staff) printed in Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 279 f.
[15] Militaerisches, Heft I: Januar 1896 (Leipzig), p. 252.
[16] Gurwood, xii, p. 473.
[17] Geheimes Staatsarchiv preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin; Rep 92, Gneisenau, A48 f 32.
[18] Müffling, Leben, p. 228.
[19] Supplementary Dispatches, x, p. 524.
[20] Supplementary Dispatches, x, p. 480.
[21] Pflugk-Harttung, Vorgeschichte, p. 63.
[22] Gurwood, xii, p. 474.
[23] Clausewitz, p. 46
[24] Müffling, Leben, p. 228
[25] Hamley, Wellington's Career, p. 77
[26] Thiers, xx, p. 59
[27] Charras, p. 117
[28] Ollech, p. 125.
[29] Müffling, Leben, p. 233, f.
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