Published by Constable, 540pp. 16 drawings and 8 pages of illus. Hardbound 25 pounds
Having had the opportunity to read Brent Nosworthy's new book I felt it would be useful to expand on Peter Hofschroer's review in FE 26 as I believe this is an outstanding book which required a more detailed analysis for prospective purchases.
Nosworthy's stated aim is to "answer questions about how troops fought during the Napoleonic Wars and the reasons why these practices were adopted..." His inspiration seems to have come from John Keegan's "The Face of Battle" in which Keegan tries to explore the realities of battle by studying 3 major engagements (Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme). Whilst acknowledging the originality of this approach Nosworthy attempts to expand this theme by using examples from across the whole spectrum of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and not restricting it to a single battle from which false lessons may be learnt. The result is a fascinating collection of battlefield narratives and experiences. Their analysis gives the reader a vivid impression of the physical and psychological dynamics of early nineteenth century fighting.
Nosworthy has attempted to go beyond the traditional narrativetype description of battles and look at how the tactics and grand tactics developed, and how the realities of the battlefield bore little relation to what was taught during the peacetime drill laid down in manuals and regulations. In this respect his book compliments rather than challenges the tactics chapters in Chandler 's "The Campaigns of Napoleon" and Elting 's "Swords Around the Throne."
Having stated his case for the more detailed study of tactics and grand tactics in the first 2 chapters he then introduces the psychological perspective of battle (which wargame s tend to absorb into "morale"). It is this, he argues, which generates the fundamental differences between the theory laid down in manuals and the reality of how men react on the battlefield. In this chapter he gives some fascinating accounts of how units and formations reacted in such a way as to avoid physical contact with the enemy, despite the best efforts of the officers and the psychological advantages deliberately designed into various formations and manoeuvres. It is interesting to read how the more faint-hearted slunk to the rear of a column so that it got deeper and deeper, and consequently narrower and narrower, as it advanced.
The Development of Tactics
Nosworthy then goes on to examine how tactics developed in the way they did and how they varied from one nation to another. He makes it clear that virtually all the tactics used by Napoleon's armies were "inherited" by him after gradual evolution from Frederick the Great's era through the experiences of the various nations to the Revolutionary Wars. Napoleon's genius was in his strategic concepts rather than the dynamics of the battlefield. To illustrate this Nosworthy examines the development of the infantry tactics from the time of Frederick and the various influences on the way they evolved. From this analysis he introduces the reader to the "Impulse" system of warfare:
That is the breakdown of the use of linear tactics (the army functioning as a single entity along a single axis of operations) for the new flexibility offered by the use of columns of "waiting" and attack, and mixed order. The use of these formations offered a more effective use of reserves and in particular the opportunity to use multiple axes of operations. Having established the validity of this new tactic Nosworthy then applies it to the development of its use by the French armies in it's battles from 1792 to 1802, culminating in it's zenith of 1805 to 1807. It is during this latter period that the author believes the French Army had the manpower and expertise to fully exploit its advantages which ultimately led to the victories of Austerlitz, Jena/Auerstadt and Friedland.
It is from 1807 onwards that 2 factors combined to erode the French superiority. Firstly there was the dilution of French expertise through their inevitable losses (particulary NCOs and officers) which could not be eff ective ly replaced by poorly trained conscripts, and an awareness of the new system by the various allied nations which resulted in either the adoption of a similar system or the development of an effective counter. It is this reaction by France's enemies that Nosworthy next examines.
Shortcomings
However, this examination falls well short of what the title of the book promises and is the basis of Peter Holschroer's main complaint: Although the Austrians get comparatively comprehensive coverage, the Prussians are dealt with rather summarily and the Russians not at all! Although the physical and psychological dynamics explored through French experiences are no doubt equally applicable to these other nations there is little effort to explore their own tactical evolution. The dropping of the second part of the book's title would almost entirely solve this problem and perhaps encourage someone else to explore this subject in a similar way to Nosworthy's approach to the French Army.
Nosworthy then examines infantry, cavalry and artillery in detail. He draws heavily on a number of first hand accounts and experiments to examine the real effectiveness of both small arms fire and artillery. This section of the book looks at the formations, manoeuvres, weapons and tactics of each arm in as much detail as contempory accounts allow and are by far the most lively of the book and easy reading: I found those on the cavalry particularly intriguing. Nosworthy uses a substantial list of sources although these are rather restricted to French, with some help from English accounts. This does not detract from the book providing the reader keeps this in mind.
The infantry section leads into a chapter devoted to British tactics and examines how their tactics consistantly confounded the French and how they established their reputation for effective musketry and the telling bayonet charge.
Nosworthy finishes with a final look at how the full range of parade ground manoeuvres were considerably trimmed down during war to these that were most effective on the battlefield.
This is an outstanding book which I thoroughly enjoyed reading, will no doubt read again frequently and would heartily recommend to any Napoleonic enthusiast. It throws down the gauntlet to wargame rule writers to re-examine the problems of calculating morale and the likelihood of 2 forces actually engaging in melee. It has certainly inspired my own thirst for further knowledge and research as it does leave questions unanswered: Apart from its failure to look in detail at nations other than the French and British, with my own particular interest in Napoleon's later campaigns I would have liked to have seen the period after 1807 given similar detailed treatment to that beforehand.
These last eight years get only rather superficial consideration. It is therefore fair to say that this book examines in detail the evolution of Revolutionary and Imperial tactics and grand tactics up to the zenith of French achievement from 1805 to 1807; in this it succeeds superbly and I rather feel that any further study would have required a second volume! In his conclusion Nosworthy admits that there is still much research to be done and if this encourages Peter Hofschroer, or another authority of those areas not comprehensively covered in his own book, to fill these gaps in a similar way then he will still have done us amateur enthusiasts a great service.
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