Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies
by Brent Nosworthy
Published by Constable, 540 pages, hardbound
16 line drawings and 8 pages of illustrations
Price 25.00 pounds

Since George Jeffrey's work went out-of-print some years ago, there has been a gap in the market for a book which explains in detail and with authority the battlefield tactics of the armies involved in the Napoleonic Wars. Although this work certainly goes a long way to filling that gap, it does not do so entirely.

Those of us who know Nosworthy's earlier work are familiar with his style and the level of his research. This hefty tome contains chapters on grand tactics, infantry, cavalry and artillery tactics. The work is well presented with detailed footnotes, a substantial bibliography and a useful glossary of terms. One cannot help but be impressed with the effort this author has put into this book.

Compared to other material currently available on the market, Nosworthy's is by far the best. As such, it should be in the library of every Napoleonic enthusiast. However, it would be wrong to view this work as the "bible" of Napoleonic tactics. The view of the writer of this review is that no one person possesses sufficient knowledge of the subject matter and source material to produce the definitive work on the subject. While Nosworthy has made every effort to produce a work of the highest quality, his knowledge of source material and languages leads to certain deficiencies and misinterpretations.

Non-English Source Material

As with so many Anglo-Saxon historical writers, Nosworthy's knowledge of relevant source material in languages other than English is, in the view of the writer of this review, insufficient to deal with the battle tactics of certain of Napoleon's enemies, particularly the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians.

In the case of the latter, this is particularly annoying as the better sources on the subject have been reprinted recently and can be obtained from any specialist bookdealer. These works include the 1812 regulations for the infantry, cavalry and artillery; Jany's essays on infantry and cavalry tactics; Jany's history of the Prussian Army; and the German General Staff's history of the Prussian Army in the Wars of Liberation which includes a substantial chapter on the 1812 drill regulations. Although this source material is but a phone call away, it has not been used.

By failing to use easily available source material in the German language, Nosworthy's fine effort falls short of its objective. Sadly, it ends up being another one of those Francocentric Anglo-Saxon interpretations based on one-sided and inaccurate third-hand English language publications. Certain unsubstantiated hypotheses favoured by this school of thought are repeated.

Nosworthy is another one of those historical writers who expound the "black and white" theory. To explain, they hold the view that is until 1806, the Prussians were bad and unreformed, but after 1807, they were good and reformed. The writer of this review disagrees with that, but would be quite happy to accept a view different to his own if the exponents of that view would simply base it on primary and good secondary source German material. He cannot accept a fourth-hand regurgitation of false interpretations as being valid. As Sebastian Haffner so eloquently put it: [1]

'For this myth, that even today is firmly implanted in many heads, the twenty years of Prussian history from 1795 to 1815 fall into two sharply contrasting penods as black and white as the Prussian fiag. The years of the Peace of Basle with Revolutionary France were, according to this view, a period of stagnation and decadence for which the collapse of 1806 was payment. The period from 1807 to 1812 was thus a time of courageous reform, regeneration and preparanon for the uprising which one could say occurred according to plan, being rewarded with the Victorious Wars of Liberation.

'We must get away from this myth. It is not only an oversimplification, it is a falsification of actual history. The whole period is in reality one unit. The same people and the same forces were at work the whole time. The two most important reforming ministers, Stein and Hardenberg, were Prussian ministers prior to 1806. Scharnhorst, the most significant military reformer was already deputy chief-of-staff ...'

The writer of this review would also dispute the view that the French column and skirmisher tactics were the panacea of the linear style of warfare. This is another oversimplification of history. The basis of this theory is that as the French armies fighting with their infantry battalions formed in columns won battles against their opponents fighting in line, the secret of their success lay in the use of these formations.

This hypothesis does not stand up to detailed examination. If the column was innately superior to the line, then why did the French have such difficulty in overcoming the British in the Iberian Peninsula? If the column was such a superior formation, why was it not used on the battlefields of the 18th century and why did it not see so much use in other 19th century wars? If the Prussian tactics were so much inferior to those of the French prior to 1806, then why did the French have such a tough time against the Prussians in the Revolutionary Wars? Any examination of the tactical developments of this period should surely be considering the above questions.

Considerations

The simplistic views held by the Francocentric school may well hold sway in the Anglo-Saxon world, but so much more has to be taken into consideration before coming to any reasoned conclusions. What if the Prussians had gone to war on the side of the Austrians in 1805? This would probably have resulted in a French defeat. Would these same historical writers then being arguing that the line was innately superior to the column because the French lost? Any analysis of the reasons for the dramatic French victories in the early days of the First Empire has to first examine social, political, economic, historical and strategic considerations before coming to a reasoned conclusion. Nosworthy pays little attention to such matters. This is a shame in view of his earlier work on tactics in the 18th century.

Taking such matters into account, one can come to a more balanced view of the nature of the Prussian Army and the reasons for its defeat in 1806. The first and prime cause of its defeat in 1806 was the fact that it went to war alone against France. That was a political error. Had the Prussians entered the campaign of 1805 on the side of the Austrians, or, in 1806, had waited until the Russians were in place to give full support, matters may have ended quite differently.

The second mistake was to divide their forces into three in face of the enemy. That was a strategic error. These two errors alone were enough to lead to a catastrophic defeat. When it came to battlefield level tactics, the major Prussian deficiency was not their failure to use attack columns, but their lack of expertise in inter-arm tactical co-ordination. They had indeed taken note of recent developments in warfare, implementing certain reforms such as the introduction of the division as the grand tactical unit. However, as Gneisenau pointed out in his 'Memorandum on the War of 1806': [2]

'... those practices of the French that were imitated were exactly those that should have been avoided, such as dividing the army into divisions without considering if there not enough generals capable of commanding them ...'

Any analysis of the results of this attempt at a reform has to be based on reports made by the participating officers. Both Jany [3] and Bressonnet [4] do this. Their conclusions can be summed up as follows:

1. Although the Prussians used divisions, their failed to co-ordinate the interaction of the skirmishers, line infantry, cavalry and artillery.
2. The Prussian divisional commanders tended to be at the front, leading the regiment of which they were colonel-in-chief, rather than being at headquarters commanding their division.
3. The French had a hard time overcoming the Prussians and at one stage of the battle of Jena, were almost defeated.
4. Against formed Prussian troops offering resistance, the French battalions used the linear formation.
5. Against Prussian troops that were capable of offering little resistance due to the disruption of their formation or a lack of ammunition, the French battalions did not usually deploy from column into line.
6. Viewed from a tactical perspective, the French victory at Jena was due to the better co-ordination of the use of their reserves and the expertise of their divisional commanders in inter-arm tactics.