The Strategic Background
The campaign of 1812 opened promisingly for the Angle-Portuguese army as Wellington exploited the winter dispersal of Marmont's Armee de Portugal to seize first Ciudad Rodrigo, then Badajos. Hill's destruction of the bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz effectively isolated Marmont from Soult in the south; while the operations of Spanish guerrillas similarly cut communications with Dorsenne in the north and with King Joseph at Madrid. Wellington deployed his recent reinforcements in heavy cavalry, which had doubled his mounted strength to some 3,500 horse, to move into the open plains of Castile and Leon. After the fall of his Salamanca forts, Marmont fell back behind the River Douro. But with the arrival of Bonet's Division from the Asturias the Army of Portugal reached full strength and parity with the allies. By staging a feint eastwards to Toro, then counter marching to Tordesillas, Marmont arrived with overwhelming force opposite Wellington's isolated right wing, which the Peer only extricated after a perilous retreat back to his main position at Castrejon. After unsuccessfully prodding at this position, on 19th July the Marshal initiated a succession of attempts to manoeuvre around Wellington's right flank, threatening the latter's vital communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. These manoeuvres were to lead, through chance and miscalculation as much as anything, to the violent climax at Salamanca.
Prelude to Conflict
For three days the two armies side-stepped south, the French demonstrating a slight but definite superiority in their speed of march. On the morning of the 22nd, both hosts were over the River Tormes east of Salamanca itself. Benet's seizure of the key Greater Arapile hill enabled Marmont to push westwards three of his eight divisions, threatening the Ciudad Rodrigo Road. Wellington massed almost his entire force in a compact L-shaped position, while bringing the Third division behind them through Salamanca to take up a covering position on his far right at Aldea Tejada. These dispositions were mostly concealed by intervening ridges, unlike those of the French whose movements, especially those of the overextending left wing, were plain to see. At 3pm, exclaiming "By God, that will do," Wellington seized the opportunity to throw the equivalent of four infantry and two cavalry divisions against the French left.
"Drive everything before you...."
The Third Division had barely reached Aldea Tejada and were prepared their cooking fires when their Commander-in-Chief rode up, accompanied only by the Quartermaster-Genera1 De Lancey. His orders to Pakenham were characteristically laconic; "Edward, move on with the Third Division - take the heights in your front - and drive everything before you." The disbelieving troops watched as the cooking pots were overturned and the orders were shouted for the force to form up in four march columns. They made off through the concealing valley of the Zirguen stream, towards the hill that marked the apex of the French advance, the Pico de Miranda.
General Thomieres' dilemma
As the Third Division moved off at 15.45, the van of Marmont's army reached the Pico de Miranda hill at the western end of the Monte De Azan. General Thomieres, commander of the 7th Division, was with his leading regiment the 101st Ligne. The remaining units, the 62nd and 1st Ligne had been dropped off a half mile and a mile behind respectively, the latter in order to maintain contact with Maucune's stationary division opposite Arapiles village. So casual were the French dispositions that the "supporting" cavalry, Curto's light division, were ambling through the wooded groves of the safe southern side of the Monte de Azan. When the Third Division erupted from the valley of the Zirguen at 16.30 Thomieres sent frantic orders to hurry up the 62nd Ligne to his support.
Clash of Arms
Pakenham's flanking force emerged from the valley of the Zirguen to the north of Thomieres, but threatening to pass around the western end of the French position. They came under fire from Thomieres' artillery; Captain Douglas' battery found a suitable ridge on which to unlimber, and returned fire. Douglas was soon joined by Bull's Horse battery from Le Marchant's cavalry to the east, both enfilading the French as the latter repositioned to face north and east.
D'Urban's Portuguese Dragoons were accustomed to acting independently and appear to have become detached from the main force, almost certainly approaching the village of Miranda from the west. Here in D'Urban's own words,
- "Upon clearing the verge of a small clump of trees, a short way up the slope, I came suddenly upon the head of a French column of infantry, having about a company in front and marching very fast by its left. It was at once obvious that as the columns of the Third Division were marching on our left, the French must be already beyond their right and consequently I ought to attack at once."
D'Urban galloped unseen back through the trees and returned at the head of the 200 strong 1st (Oporto) Dragoons in two deep line. The isolated French battalion had time only to close its second company up on its first, making a six deep line. The left and centre Portuguese squadrons were volleyed to a standstill, their Colonel, Watson, falling wounded before the bayonets. But the right squadron swung into the open flank, penetrating between the rear companies and routing the whole unit.
Meanwhile, Wallace's and Campbell's infantry brigades advanced in two open columns, each company in line, one behind the other. As they reached a position below the north-western slopes of the Pico each company pivoted on its left, forming up in two deep lines facing the French. Thomieres sent down his light companies to disrupt the manoeuvre. A spirited skirmish ensued, the Lt Colonel of the 12th Cacadores had two horses shot from under him. But the much heavier allied skirmish screen was impenetrable, pressing the voltigeurs back.
But even as Wallace's brigade moved up to the attack, taking early casualties from grape and long range musketry, Curto's light cavalry swept around the Pico de Miranda. Detailing six or seven squadrons to keep Arentschildt in check, Curto flung several others into the redcoats' open right flank. It seems that most, if not all of Curto's two brigades took part in the ensuing fight.
Neither the 45th line of Wallace's brigade, nor the 5th of Campbell's had time to form square. Private Brown in the right company of the 45th recorded;
- "ranks were broken and thrown into confusion. Several times the enemy rode through us, cutting down with their sabres all who opposed them....."
But the main weight of the charge swept diagonally behind Wallace's brigade, onto the unfortunate 1st/5th behind them on lower ground. A hurried volley from the three right companies thrown back as a refused flank failed to halt the Chasseurs, who swirled over the infantry, driving the survivors back in a huddled, confused mass onto the regiment's centre companies. Here Pakenham and Campbell restored a semblance of order behind a clump of bayonets; and before the French cavalry could reorganise to mount another cohesive attack, aid arrived from the right in the form of Arentschildt's light cavalry.
Arentschildt had seen Curto's advance to his front and filing the KGL Hussars across a steep ravine, formed them in line and charged the French flank guard. The 14th Light Dragoons followed up in support but then met the KGL streaming back in disarray, the Germans having broken the first line but been overwhelmed by the reserves. The KGL rallied behind the shelter of the 14th, and a combined attack by the whole brigade was successful. As the scattered French horsemen were pursued off to the south and east, the depleted 1st/5th formed up and continued the ascent of the ridge in line with its parent brigade.
As Wallace's brigade lapped around the ridge on a mile-wide front, Thomieres' infantry moved forward to the crest to meet them, yelling the customary shouts of "Vive L'Empereur." By this stage the 62nd Ligne had almost certainly joined the 101st, making a line of four intact battalion columns. On the Allied left, the pipes of the 74th Highlanders wailed in apparent lamentation for dreadful events to come. In the centre, Majors Murphy and Seton led the 88th, the incorrigible Connaught Rangers, from the front on horseback - a display of resigned bravery evidently reproduced by officers all along the brigade.
When the opposing lines had closed to close on fifty yards the French brought up their muskets. The perspective of each participant narrowed to the individuals directly opposite. Lieutenant Moriarty, holding the regimental colour of the 88th, exclaimed indignantly, "That fellow is aiming at me!"
"I hope so, I thought he had me covered," replied D'Arcy, carrying the King's Colour. The French then unleashed a fearsome volley, felling perhaps a hundred of the six hundred Rangers and momentarily disorganising the battalion. Major Murphy tumbled dead from his horse, his corpse dragged by the stirrup along the ranks. Lieutenant Grattan recorded;
"The brigade staggered back from the force of the shock, but before the smoke had altogether cleared away, Wallace, looking full in the faces of his soldiers, pointed to the French column, and leading the shattered brigade up the hill, without a moment's hesitation, brought them face to face, before the French had time to witness the terrible effect off their murderous fire." Having endured days of seemingly unnecessary retreat, the reproaches of the abandoned Salamancans and the loss of their lunch, the Rangers were clearly a "roughhouse" unit in a particularly aggressive mood. Grattan continues;
"Astounded by the unshaken determination of Wallace's soldiers, Thomieres' troops wavered; nevertheless they opened a heavy discharge of musketry, but it was unlike the former it was irregular and ill-directed.... (note the value of an aimed first volley.)
"...Pakenham, seeing that the proper moment had arrived, called out to Wallace to "let them loose!" The three regiments ran onward, and the mighty phalanx, which but a moment before was so formidable, loosened and fell in pieces before 1500 invincible British soldiers fighting in a line only two deep. Wallace, seeing the terrible confusion that prevailed in the enemy's column, pressed on with his brigade, calling on his men to "press on to the muzzle."
They Advanced with a Cheer
"The effect was electric; Foy's (sic) troops were seized with a panic, and as Wallace closed against them, his men could distinctly remark their bearing. Their moustachioed faces, one and all, presented the same ghastly hue, a horrid family likeness throughout;... (tanned, dusted and gunpowdered?); ...and as they stood to receive the shock they were about to be assailed with, they reeled to and fro like men intoxicated."
The 74th and 45th on either side of the Rangers had not suffered as severely from the musketry, and probably overlapped Thomieres' front, contributing to a sudden collapse of morale. There are no indications that the British fired a volley at all. Due to the very speed of the French disintegration, their divisional battery was overrun before it could limber up. Thomieres was mortally wounded trying to rally his routing troops, who streamed away to the east, pursued by the exultant Third Division.
Within minutes, the advancing infantry found the French trying to form up on the next height, probably around units of the 1st Ligne. But the French did not attempt to stand when approached and moved off again to the east. Both Wallace's brigade and the German Hussars in their eagerness to keep up with the routers soon outdistanced their supports and encountered a second French defence. This was a refused flank formed by Maucune's division, with its 66th Ligne. Curto's last formed squadrons, from the grey-clad 3me Hussards, supported their southern flank. As Wallace's brigade attempted to form squares, the dry grass ignited by burning cartridge papers billowed smoke and a tremendous cannonade could be heard from the left front.
One of D'Urban's regiments, accompanying Wallace on his right, attempted to charge the French but was repulsed. Finally, a cheer and drumming of massed hooves was heard from the brigade's left rear and through the banks of smoke and dust advanced Le Marchant's heavy dragoons, many filing through the infantry lines. The French infantry began to form square, but....
- "The column hesitated, wavered, tottered and then stood still! The motion of the countless bayonets as they clashed together might be likened to a forest about to be assailed by a tempest."
It is likely that their division was already disintegrating from the front under pressure from Leith's 5th Division, and that the officers compounded the confusion in trying to deploy to meet threats from several directions at once. The Dragoons broke into the disturbed formation, hewing and scattering the blue clad infantry. Sundered groups of exhausted "fantassins" found refuge from the marauding heavies only by scurrying through the ranks of the Third. Grattan again....
- "Hundreds of beings, frightfully disfigured, in whom the human face and form were almost obliterated - black with dust, worn out with fatigue, and covered with sabre-cuts and blood - threw themselves amongst us for safety."
Enough parties of Arentschildt's and D'Urban's cavalry were collected to drive off Curto's Hussars, who were the last French horse to be seen on that part of the field. As Le Marchant's Dragoons continued their mad career on through Maucune's division and into the lead units of Brenier's oncoming forces, Pakenham paused to unite his division with that of the wounded Leith. Captain Campbell, Wallace's Brigade Major;
- "The Third Division again advanced steadily. We saw before us our foe completely overthrown. Thousands of them were taken prisoner by the Dragoons, numbers cut down, and the remainder in total deroute were running as fast as their legs could carry them towards another height, where a considerable number of their troops were posted, and from whence they kept up a heavy fire upon the divisions engaged on our left. They soon after however, began to retire under a ruinous fire from our artillery and sharpshooters, who intermixed with some of our dragoons, gave them not a moment's respite."
His only regret was that had the Third moved more to the right it would at the end of the day have come up behind the French flank and cut them off from the River Tormes. At this point, Wallace's brigade moved into the second line, and Campbell's led the advance as far as Ferey's rearguard action which brought the battle to a close.
An Assessment
When Clausel, the acting commander of the Armée de Portugal, was eventually able to take stock after a week of retreat, on 1st August, he found that Thomieres' division had been reduced by a third to 3057 officers and men, even after being bolstered by drafts from the various minor garrisons and detachments picked up along the line of communications. Worst hit were the 101st Ligne, down to one merged battalion from three, and the artillery, which had disappeared, guns and crews in entirety. Curto's light cavalry had lost 300 men. The 62nd Ligne reported 868 casualties to the Ministry of War, though by 1st August it had been made up to almost its previous strength, (presumably from detachments along the line of retreat).
Worst hit on the allied side were the 88th, with 135 casualties and the partially overrun 1st/5th with 126. Particularly interesting is the "lowish" proportion of dead, 44 out of 487 killed, wounded and missing in the Third Division, or 1 in 11. The absence of the true murderer of the battlefield, massed medium or heavy artillery, was clearly a factor in this. Not unusually in a Napoleonic context, cavalry proved more effective through its disruptive and psychological effects than in terms of its destructive power, though one should not discount the difficulty of inflicting fatal wounds with a sabre from horseback on a dodging, cowering infantryman!
The most successful charges were those made from out of initial concealment. Arentschildt's and D'Urban's cavalry lost just 26 and 37 casualties respectively. Given their advantage of numbers over Arentschildt, Curto's Chasseurs did not perform well. The poor physical state of their horseflesh was an increasing handicap to the French cavalry as the Peninsula war went on.
With hindsight, Thomieres' tactical position was almost beyond salvation from the outset. Marmont's protestations that Thomieres had exceeded his orders, and that his own wounding had prevented him from retrieving the situation, lacks credibility. Clearly Curto's Cavalry should have been leading the advance, and in position to cover a retreat on Maucune's and Brenier's Divisions. Even then, with most of Wellington's army descending on the French left, their situation would still have been perilous.
The Commanders
Edward Pakenham 1778-1814:
Picton's wounds at Badajos resulted in the command of the Third Division being handed to the inexperienced "Ned" Pakenham, a brigade commander in the Fourth Division only since September 1811. Though a good-natured and well-liked Anglo-Irishman, it is doubtful that he would have risen so quickly had he not been Wellington's brother-in-law. But the Peer knew from Pakenham's year on the staff that he could be trusted to do precisely as he was told and with resolution; qualities often lacking amongst the Peninsula Army's general officers.
Jean-Guillaume-Barthelmy, Baron Thomieres 1771-1812
With a wealth of combat and staff experience since 1793, first on the Spanish border, then with Napoleon's Armée de Italie, Thomieres had a classic Grande Armée pedigree. He served on Marshal Lannes' staff in Austria, Prussia and Poland in 1806-1807. As a general de brigade under Junot and Massena, he was an old peninsula hand, well used to facing defensive Angle-Portuguese opposition.
Notes:
[1] The precise location of D'Urban's fight is uncertain but must have been to the north-west or north-east of the village of Miranda. Since D'Urban apparently avoided entanglement with Curto, and was "behind" Pakenham's flank, I favour the former.
Bibliography
Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsula War, Vol 5
W F P Napier: History of the War in the Peninsula, Vol 4.
Though unquestionably still the definitive study of the war, and no less readable for that, Oman's masterpiece should not always be taken as "gospel", For example in this scenario, he follows Napier for his understanding of the sequence of events. Both asserting that Curto's cavalry attacked after Thomieres' infantry had been routed overlooks Private Brown's account that the charge came in "As our brigade was marching up to attack a strongly posted column of infantry...." Probably most of Wallace's advancing brigade was never aware of the brief plight of their (unseen) rightmost company, as they closed with Thomieres' column.
Lt William Grattan: Adventures with the Connaught Rangers 1809-14
Though prone to "adding battlefield colour" in the Napier style, and to some puzzling statements, (how Major Murphy came to be shot by the Colonel of the 22nd Ligne is anyone's guess!), Grattan provides a valuable insight into regimental life and unit psychology.
Wylly: History of the Sherwood Foresters
Walker: History of the Northumberland Fusiliers
LB Gates: The Emperor's Chambermaids (14th/20th Kings Hussars)
Fortescue: History of the British Army, Vol VIII.
Arentschildt's Despatch: Wellington Papers WP1/349. Southampton University.
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