Garry Wills asked a number of
questions in FE19 which I intended to attempt in a single response. What
evolved grew 'like Topsy' into three quite separate answers of 'article
length', one of which parallelled a review of the section on Austria in my
article in FE 17, which contains some errors (4 zuge in a company, not 2,
for example).
To forestall those tempted to write in, I have a detailed examination
of Austrian column to line evolutions, including the so called 'mass', as
described in the 1807 Exercier Reglement and 1806 Abrichtungs
Reglement (Training Regulations) in preparation, which should put things
to rights. Similarly, the answer to Garry's question about wheeling and
moving pivots evolved into an article in its own right and that too is
nearing completion. Suffice to say at this point that George Jeffrey's
analysis is, somewhat, misleading in this context.
[1]
It seems appropriate to attempt an answer Garry's last question
first because to do it justice really requires an explanation of how the
tactical and operational art of the early 19th Century evolved from that
of the previous century. Although the prolific use of columns in the
tactical environment, that is to say on the physical battlefield, is but one
manifestation, it is a beguiling and shallow interpretation of Napoleonic
tactical doctrine and, as we shall see, columns also appeared in the tactical
environment of the linear battlefield too. The answer to this question is
nearly as complex as 'The Meaning of Life' and entire books have been
written on the subject.
Anything I say here, therefore, is bound to be somewhat
generalised and superficial. Indeed, nothing I have to say is original
thought and I acknowledge my debt to the works listed in the bibliography
to this article.
It is, nevertheless, a very pertinent question because I don't think
it is fully appreciated that it is in the mid to late 18th Century that one
finds the beginnings of what became Napoleonic tactical and, indeed,
operational art, a comprehensive and readable exposition of which can be
found in Chandler [2] So, despite a
degree of trepidation, I'll certainly offer to fire a volley or two with the
intention of broadening and continuing the most interesting tactical
'forum' currently running in the magazine.
The first thing that needs to be said is that at the tactical level,
Napoleonic warfare had very little, if anything, to do with Napoleon.
Indeed, it has been pointed out by many by many historians, from Colin
onwards, that his record is marked by a dearth of originality in this
context and it is also true, as we shall see later on, that he inherited the
tool which had been fashioned by others before him.
[3]
Napoleon's leadership skills and his ability at the highest levels of
command are so blindingly obvious that no further comment is necessary,
besides, those are not what this article is about.
If one consults a dictionary, one will find that tactics are defined as
"the art and science of the detailed direction and control of movement or
manoeuvre to achieve an aim or task" [4] or "the art5 of disposing military or naval or air forces in actual
contact with enemy" [5] Other
dictionaries offer
similar explanations and none are really adequate, although they do offer
some clues.
Tactics are the art of war at battalion level and below, that is to
say the disposition and control of forces at unit level of command on the
battlefield. Grand-tactics are the art of war at Formation level of
command, that is to say Brigade, through Division, Corps and above. The
term grand-tactics is not much used nowadays and I will use the modem
term 'operations' to denote this activity, because it saves two letters and a
hyphen and, in my view, is a more accurate description.
The object of both is to bring one's own forces into contact with
the enemy under the most favourable circumstances possible. A
comprehensive explanation of all these terms can be found in much
greater detail Chandler's Atlas of Military Strategy. [6]
It is not very useful to examine the tactical and operational
methods of any era in isolation because it is always from preceding decades
that current doctrine evolves and in the case of the early 19th Century it
is necessary, initially, to return to the first decades of the 18th Century.
At that time, although soldiers already marched to a uniform length of
pace, the principle of cadence marching had not yet been adopted and,
thus, it was not possible for bodies of men to march to a specified number
of paces in the minute.
The physical effects of this were essentially threefold. In the first
place in meant that ranks, and files, had to march in open order at
approximately four, sometimes as much as six, paces distant. In the second
it meant that the unit command element spent a large proportion of its
time making sure that dressing was maintained, including frequent halts to
adjust it as it inevitably deteriorated, because, in the third place, bereft of
cadence it was impossible to march in step [7]
It also meant that the because the command element spent so
much of its time making sure that units did not fall into disorder, it had
little opportunity to develop or exhibit much tactical leadership, not that
much was actually required of it, thus the tactical doctrine that evolved
specifically de-emphasised this function.
The Comte de Guibert has been credited by some modem com-
mentators with the invention of the formations and conversions found in
the French 1791 regulations. [8]
Comments are often made to the effect that
Guibert's "system" allowed more rapid deployment and that under it
perpendicular deployment, that is to say a line fonned from a column
facing the direction in which the column was moving, was now possible,
as if it was some kind of innovation. That Guibert introduced closed
columns, and that he made French methods of deployment superior to the
Prussian by allowing the march of files to a flank, as if that too was
something new. [9] Unfortunately,
none of this is correct.
The first ghost which needs laying is the idea that the formations
available to the French Napoleonic foot soldier were either unique to him
or to the period. They were not.
The French 1791 regulations were a virtual repetition of those of
1776 and although Guibert may have been influential in the adoption of
the linear and columnar battalion evolutions contained therein, they were
not his. [10]
Far from being new and revolutionary, all had been in the
Prussian repertoire since the 1750s, even the column formed on the centre
division, as in the French colonne d'attaque, was a Prussian 18th
Century experimental innovation. [11]
If this is true, what exactly was Guibert's contribution? It was, in
fact, absolutely crucial and simply this. He took the formations devised by
the Prussians to meet the problems apparent in linear tactical doctrine and
applied them to a different operational doctrine in a way that had not
been envisaged for them. It is somewhat analagous to the use of armour in
1940. Both the Allies and the Germans had tanks but used them quite
differently. This needs some considerable amplification.
18th Century Deployment
Throughout most of the 18th Century, the deployment of armies
was usually conducted in like manner. In generalised terms an army would
march onto the battlefield, usually from the left, in a number of columns
of battalions, usually one column for each line of battle, each battalion
usually, though not necessarily, in strict hierarchical order within the
column. On reaching the place where the line of battle was to be formed,
the column wheeled 90 degrees to the right and marched parallel to the
enemy until the right of the alignment had been reached by the lead
battalion.
Each individual battalion was itself in column open to deploying
distance, each rank marching in open order for reasons of dressing already
discussed. This meant that the column of battalions was longer than the
line of battle it was intended to form, some two to three times. On
reaching the right of the line a signal would be given, the ranks closed up
and the distances between sub-units adjusted. The sub-units had to remain
at deploying distance, however, because in the next movement they would
wheel left simultaneously, forming the continuous line of battle .[12]
The disadvantage of this method is obvious in that it presented
the flank of the army to the enemy during the process of deployment.
Deployment in the absence of cadence was also extremely slow, it taking
hours to deploy an entire army. Because deployment was slow it had to be
conducted at such a distance as to prevent the possibility of surprise
whilst doing so. This meant literally miles from the enemy. [13]
So, the army is now deployed, in two, sometimes three, lines,
with very little depth or operational reserves, something like 300 paces
apart but close enough to provide mutual support, probably with the
cavalry on the flanks and artillery supporting the infantry lines. There
were essentially two things it could then do - receive an attack or deliver
one. In simple terms attacks were usually delivered along the entire
length of the line but lack of cadence meant that the complicated
manoeuvring, which increasingly distinguished warfare from the late 18th
Century onwards, was simply impracticable. A bit like a clockwork toy,
once having been wound up and pointed in a particular direction, the was
little possibility of doing anything else. Warfare was stereotyped and
predictable.
The next important development has already been alluded to -
the use of cadence marching. At the risk of being repetitive, cadence
marching was absolutely critical. Without the beat of a drum, or the time
being indicated in some other way, it is simply not possible for soldiers to
march in step for any length of time. Completely and utterly impossible.
It might be appropriate at this point to describe what cadence
marching was like in those, and Napoleonic, times. It was executed in
similar fashion to the modem British army's slow-march, arms remained
still by the side, legs straight and the toes pointed so that the foot
remained parallel with the ground. Most Napoleonic cadences were
not very much faster, indeed, the quickest in general use in those days,
approximately 120 paces to the minute, is not fast at all by modem
standards.
A contemporary instruction for the soldier reads thus,
The instruction concedes, however, that
Wonderful stuff. Try walking down hill on your toes, or, indeed,
uphill on your heels! The concession to bending the knee is of interest
though, for it demonstrates that the difficulty of rapid movement with it
locked was well recognised. Once bending the knee is allowed, the faster
cadences become less of a problem.
A plate from the Westphalian army's translation of the French
1791 regulations, identical with the original French version and used here
forease of reproduction, shows the style of marching at this period. It is
reproduced at Figure 1. [15]
Cadence
With cadence came the ability to maintain a universal number of
paces in a minute, increase them, or decrease them, as need be, according
to the rhythm given. Essentially, it enabled ranks to march in close order,
dressing could be maintained more easily and over much longer distances,
and the process of deployment was speeded up because there was no longer
any need to close-up open ranks before wheeling. It also meant that the
length of the column, be it of a single battalion or of multibattalion size,
was the same as it was when in line.
So, a battalion column marching onto the battlefield still did
open to full interval, to enable the wheel of sub-units for parallel
deployment, but the ranks and files of the sub-units now marched in close
order, with something like a pace between them, rather than the four, or
thereabouts, previously. The columns were, therefore, shorter and more
manoeuvrable and the time saved in deployment meant that although the
principles of parallel deployment remained the same, it could be executed
much closer to the enemy, at approximately 2,000 to 1,500 paces.
Time is a commodity so valuable in battle that the importance of
cadence marching, and with it close order ranks, cannot be overstated.
Marching in step with close order ranks increased speed and
manoeuvrability. Speed and manoeuvrability meant surprise, another
priceless commodity, manifested in the Prussians' operational use the
oblique attack, be it in line or echelon of battalions. Without cadence and
all that it bestowed, the oblique attack would have been quite impossible to
execute, indeed, it was difficult enough with it and performed, it would
seem, on far fewer occasions than legend would have us believe.
The approach march described above remained, however, an
extremely difficult thing to choreograph. Battalions had to be arranged in
the same order in the column as they would be when in the line of battle,
thus the senior battalion of the senior regiment lead the column when
deploying from the left, so that it would occupy the right of the line.
Intervals between the marching battalions had to be maintained so that no
compromise of the line would occur upon deployment. The operational
plan was not susceptible to change and, as a consequence, had to be
conducted without interruption to its conclusion. A failed attack
frequently meant a lost battle.
The Prussians of Frederick the Great were both tactically and
operationally superior to their opponents, the record speaks for itself. The
reasons lay partly in the diverse nature of the human material. In very
simplistic terms, in order to order to prevent desertion it was necessary to
maintain discipline. Part of the maintenance of discipline involved drill,
lots of it, which in those days, unlike now, was inextricably linked to
tactics. It meant that the Prussians became extremely skilled, perhaps, it
could be argued, by accident rather than design. They fought the way they
did, because they could. Paret puts it thus,
The men moved instinctively and the command element, the
officers and NCOs, that vital part of battalion integrity, were thoroughly
familiar with what was required of them, which, however, was not actually
very much in comparison with later times.
A frequent criticism of Prussian doctrine is to the effect that it
stifled individual initiative at the tactical level of command. Indeed, it
could also be argued that it had a similar effect on operational art at
subordinate levels, This, in my view, rather misses the point. Individual
initiative was about as necessary to l8th Century tactical and operational
art, as it is to formation ballroom dancing.
To review what we have so far then. Parallel deployment was
essentially unchanged, tactics remained exclusively linear and relatively
simple. Cadence marching, however, had made the whole process faster. A
by-product of cadence was the ability to march in step to a uniform pace
with close order ranks, which resulted in further increases in speed of
deployment and manoeuvre. Deployment was able to take place closer to
the enemy and, therefore, the advance to contact, still in line, was over a
shorter distance.
It may be pertinent at this point to mention infantry firepower.
Although cadence was also applied to the manual of arms, which speeded
it up, musketry remained what it always had been, a relatively inefficient
weapon system. Even the Prussians with their theoretical one round every
eleven seconds rarely seem to have maintained this rate for long, if at all,
and seemed to have discharged no more than three rounds a minute in
practice. [17]
Bearing in mind the steady decline in the powers of his infantry
towards the latter part of the 18th Century, one is tempted to suggest
that the legendary Frederican musketry might yet be another myth. It has
certainly been said that even in its hey-day, the high rates of Prussian
musketry also meant less accuracy and the object seems to have been
intimidatory as much as anything else. [18]
Napoleon concurred,
This confirms, yet again, what has been said by numerous other
contemporaneous, and earlier, comentators, that the first volley was the
one that really counted, to which it is worth adding that these same people
were also of the opinion that firing first, but not decisively, being left with
unloaded muskets whilst one's enemy had yet to fire, was likely to result in
almost certain disaster. Clearly the decision when to fire was not one to be
taken lightly!
There would, nevertheless, be no fundamental changes in
methods of delivering musketry throughout the remaining years Qf the
black powder smooth-bored era. They had already changed as much as
they would, largely being simplified and tending more and more away from
comparatively complicated methods to firing by ranks, independent firing
becoming more prevalent once initial volleys had been exchanged. Indeed
it is possible to argue that musketry must have become even less effective
during the middle and later Napoleonic period, perhaps the least effective
of any during the black powder era, with mass conscription and relatively
poorly trained infantry.
All About Movement
All the technological advances had already been made, iron
ramrods, conical touch holes, bayonets and so on, nothing new would
appear until the introduction of percussion ignition some time after
the close of the Napoleonic period. Although 18th Century musketry
may well have been improved by the application of cadence, the spin-offs
of marching in step and close order ranks had no bearing on firepower per
se. These were all about movement.
Close order ranks had always been used for firing for obvious
reasons. Clearly it was not a good idea to have a black powder muskets
discharged two or three feet behind one's left and right ear, in the hope
that the ball will pass between your head and those of the soldiers beside
you.
What marching with close order ranks did for musketry was
simply to allow the first volley to be delivered more quickly, in so far as it
was no longer necessary to halt and close-up open ranks first. Once all
armies marched with close order ranks, as they did by the time of the
Napoleon period, any tactical advantage was lost.
The tactical gap between archetypical 18th Century warfare
and early 19th Century warfare now needs to be crossed. Two separate
developments had begun to take place. The first, predictably, was
Prussian, and principally at the tactical level. The other, at the
operation; level, occurred in France. When the two were combined, the
seeds what we may call Napoleonic tactical and operational art were
sown.
With the discovery of cadence, minds were eventually set to
examine evolutions which might make use of the advantages it bestowed
principally ways of deployment that avoided presentation of a flank to
the enemy, unavoidable in the parallel method. The answer was
perpendicular deployment.
At the tactical level this was accomplished by either the quarter
wheel of sub-units and diagonal march onto the alignment from colum
at deploying distances, or the flank march of files en droir from close
column, or a variation of one or other of these two methods. The
principles, however, also began to translate themselves into the
operational level where an entire army could use perpendicular methods
to deploy into line. A column of battalions could now deploy its
battalion by use of a diagonal march, in exactly the same way that the
battalion deployed its sub-units by means of the quarter wheel.
[20]
A further development was perpendicular deployment of battalions
from a column evantail (in the shape of a fan), where alternate battalions
marched diagonally left and right onto the alignment. A diagram is at
Figure 2. [21]
Difficulty with Perpendicular Deployment
The difficulty with perpendicular deployment at the operational
level was that it required much greater skill and precise timing than
parallel deployment. It is clear that with latter there was less danger of
battalions loosing dressing between each other or their places in the line as
the main column marched onto the new alignment, they simply followed
each other crocodile fashion. With perpendicular deployment, however, a
clear reference point was needed as each battalion marched diagonally, and
individually, onto the new alignment. This was usually provided by an
officer who posted himself on the right flank of the alignment on which
his battalion was supposed to deploy. The difficulties of choreography are
obvious and magnified in the en eventail manoeuvre because here the
battalions, if seniority was to be maintained in the line, had to be arranged
differently in the column. The great advantage of perpendicular
deployment en eventail, however, is obvious in that a column could now
march onto the battlefield from the centre and was not confined to one or
other of the flanks.
All this, however, did not alter the fact that it was designed to
facilitate one thing and one thing only. Ultimate deployment into the
familiar linear order. The fact of the matter is that although speed of
deployment was further increased, the associated difficulties of
perpendicular deployment at operational level, so long as the importance
of linear tactics remained paramount, were such that it was not practised
often. Nosworthy identifies only three occasions when the Prussians
attempted it, and not at all after 1757. Parallel deployment, despite all its
disadvantages, remained the principal operational method of deployment.
[22]
Perpendicular methods, however, could be used tactically by
individual battalions to 'ploy' quickly into column to avoid obstacles during
the march to contact, and to deploy back into line again once they had
been passed, in a manoeuvre called breaking. Descriptions of how and
when to do this are piven specifically in all regulations subsequent to
approximately 1756 [23] and are
evident in both the Prussian 1788 regulations and 1798 instructions [24]
So, the possibility now exists of battalion columns, albeit non-
tactical in nature in so far as soldiers could not fight in them, within the
tactical environment.
How prevalent was the Prussian use of columns generally
though?
Yorck is quoted, in the context of his instructions for the
Prussian Jdger, as saying that all deployment should be conducted from
company or battalion columns, but, as late as 1800, according to Parer
this evolution although "basic practice in the French anny, was new to
Prussia." [25]
It does not seem likely to me that Yorck would have issued an
instruction to his soldiers that they did not know how to execute.
Battalion columns, and deployment from them, are, indeed, described in
the 1788 regulations as we have already established. What certainly did
not exist was an official doctrine for using them in conjunction with line
and skirmishers in the classic 'Napoleonic' fashion and perhaps this is what
is being alluded to. Despite the efforts of Prussian refonners it is true to
say that although some change had already taken place and the process
was continuing, the Prussians fought the 1806 campaign with a tactical
doctrine in which the line remained the dominant formation.
We are getting a little ahead of ourselves though. Lets return to
the latter half of the 18th Century for concurrent with the Prussian
tactical innovation and experiment, tactical and operational experiments
were also taking place in France.
Towards the middle of the century French military thought had
concentrated into two distinct camps. The first contained the followers of
what became known as ordre mince, the other those of ordre profond.
The former were the conservative advocates of the old linear order, the
latter advocates of columnar formations manifested in the multi-battalion
columns of Chevalier Folard designed, apparently, to suit the charateristics
of the French soldier and "infinitely better suited for shock and coups de
main than for standing still and firing." [26]
To which one is tempted to point out that the Prussians tended
not to stand still and fire.
It is in the smaller, more flexible, columns of Maurice de Saxe's
legion, however, and the appearance, at approximately the same time, of
a light infantry element in the order of battle of the French line infantry
battalion, that one finds the embryonic tools with which 'Napoleonic'
operational art was conducted, even if the doctrinal seeds of it had yet to
be sown. [27]
It was not until 1749, however, that the French adopted cadence
but despite having done so, the French continued to march with open
ranks, the advantages of cadence marching not, apparently, being
recognised. In brief, although the French anny attempted to emulate
Prussian linear methods, and improve upon them by incorporating
columnar devices of the order profond school, it was not the practical
equal of its theoretical aspirations. It was simply not trained to the same
high standard as its peers, particularly the Prussians.
Still unfamiliar with the various innovations of the 1755
regulations, on 5th November 1757 the French army and its Imperial allies
were surprised and decisively defeated by the Prussians at Rossbach, a
defeat so cheaply obtained that Frederick would refer subsequently to the
French as "the quarry of Rossbach", such was the contempt in which they
were held. In the aftermath, naturally enough, the French set about
improving their army and the 1764 regulations whilst further embracing
the Prussian methods incorporated the single battalion assault column for
manoeuvre, this in turn resulted in what would later become notorious as
ordre mixte, simply a mixture of the order profond and ordre mince,
appearing the French repertoire. [28]
The French, nevertheless, remained comparatively unskilled in
deploying and in an attempt to overcome this defect, the influence of
Mardchal de Broglie resulted in the French adopting deployment from a
number of smaller columns, rather than the two large ones that had been
the custom previously. Although the French use of a number of smaller
columns increased the speed of deployment, it also made it more
complicated to perform.
It became necessary for reasons of consistency
and familiarity that these columns be formed from the same battalions, at
least for the duration of a campaign. Thus, each of these small columns
became a 'Division', with its own integral artillery, the component parts
of which became used to serving together. [29]
A new operational formation had been arrived at, more, apparently,
by accident than design. It was still, however, intended to facilitate linear
deployment.
In 1772 Guibert published his famous Essai. In it, two principal
formations were proposed. The three rank line, which remained the
principal fighting formation, and the column which now was to be used
as the manoeuvre element and, if necessary, a means of assault. He also
proposed that every infantryman should be equally capable of fighting in
formed and skimiish order, thus removing the need for specialist units
and, indeed, specialist elements within the battalion. None of the for-
mations proposed by Guibert were new. None of the methods of
converting from line to column and vice versa were new. All had their
origins in Potsdam. In 1778 the French army actually went to the trouble
of holding exercises where the column was pitted against the line, in an
attempt to resolve, not only the efficacy of the two formations, but
whether large columns were preferable to small battalion columns
advocated by Guibert. [30]
No longer was the precise choreography of linear doctrine
appropriate, with its lack of depth and single effort along the entire front.
This was to be replaced by an attacking element consisting of a mixture of
columns and lines as appropriate, supported by further columns, in depth,
ready to manoeuvre, exploit or reinforce. This is order mixte, not the
misleadingly stylized single battalion line flanked by a battalion in column
on each flank, so often used to represent the concept in modem popular
works.
There was no longer any dogma in the context of formations to
be adopted, this was entirely dependent upon the initiative of the local
commander based upon enemy, terrain and circumstances. No longer was
the attack to take place along the entire front as had been the case in linear operations, it now took place selectively, first at one point, then
another, as need be, keeping the enemy off balance. At the critical
moment force, in the shape of an operational reserve, was concentrated at
a vital point and the breakthrough made.
What this needed to be successful, in addition to fine judgement,
was command and control at the operational level of a kind that was
entirely absent in the linear system. What the army corps system offered,
in addition to a much more flexible operational organisation generally, was
a properly consititued operational chain of command from the army
commander down to the brigade commanders. In order to be successful,
however, it required the kind of initiative in subordinates at operational
level that was unnecessary in the strict choreography of the linear system
and, therefore, entirely absent from it.
Command now devolved upon Formation commanders in a way
that it never had before. Not only was the necessary operational chain of
command system absent in armies trained in the linear doctrine of the
Ancien Regime, the operational commanders were simply incapable of
the kind of individual initiative and lateral thinking displayed by their
French peers, not because they were stupid, simply that it had never been
expected of them before and they were not prepared for it.
What can be said of the allegedly radical French 1791
regulations? Simply this. They were the product of Prussian practice and
experimentation during the last half of the 18th Century. What then of
Guibert? His contribution must not be underestimated and was undoubtedly
this. He defined a tactical doctrine, already emerging in French late 19th
Century tactics, that used existing Prussian drill methodology in a way
that had not been envisaged. The ultimate result, it could be argued, were
the 1791 regulations, but, and I cannot emphasise this too much, these
were not a radical departure in terms of drill from anything that had
preceded them. It was the way that the tool was used, not the tool itself.
To return to the basic question about the willingness of the
French to manoeuvre in column under fire, it is impossible to define the
differences in doctrines in such simplistic terms. Prussian 18th Century
doctrine allowed columns in the tactical environment, but principally as a
temporary 'ployment' to avoid terrain features. In general terms, however,
linear doctrine at operational level, as practised by the Prussians, called for
an attack in line on a broad front with little depth, by the entire available
force and with comparatively few, if any, operational reserves.
Napoleonic doctrine called for whatever formation was
appropriate to solve the tactical or operational problem, the attack
being concentrate on a narrow front, switched from point to point as
appropriate, conducted in much greater depth and with substantial
operational reserves.
Typically this meant manoeuvre in column throughout the
tactical environment deploying into line if need be, essentially where
the enemy had not been intimidated into flight and ideally outside the
effective range of musketry, an advance to within musketry range and
exchange of fire then took place followed by 'ployment' back into
column and further manoeuvre necessary. This was supported by further
columnar formations, in second 'line', ready to reinforce and exploit
success, and an operational reserve. If linear doctrine was analogous to
formation ballroom dancing, this was 'Rock and Roll'.
It is also necessary to point out that in the linear system
operatio command was centralized in the hands the army commander.
This me that, because no operational chain of command existed such as
found the army corps system, orders had to be passed direct from the ar
commander, in detail, virtually to individual units. This was slow.
In army corps system, command was decentralized. In
generalised terms, orders given to Corps commanders would be broadly
stated, what would call mission orientated orders today, and having
received them, Corps Commanders would be responsible for conduct of
their particular mission and would, in turn, give their Divisional
command equally broadly stated orders. The Divisional commanders
would likewise, giving orders to their Brigade commanders who actually
patrolled the fighting units. [31]
The benefit of the comparative speed transmission of orders,
both on and off the immediate battlefield, speed of reaction and
flexibility on it, was that of time and, therefore manoeuvrability and
surprise.
It was this ability to translate an operational plan into
operational reality with unprecedented speed that lay at the heart of
Napoleonic tactical and operational art and "was the essential secret of
French mobility on which in turn Napoleon's strategy depended .. ... the essence of which was, that no matter what the enemy did, or did not do, Napoleon was certain to unite a
numerical superiority against him". [32]
The concept, however, that Napoleon, or any other army
commander, was actually able to influence what happened tactically once
contact had been made is illusory.
Divisional commanders, and to an even lesser extent Corps
commanders, did not need to concern themselves with the minutiae of
tactical decisions on the battlefield. I can do no better than to quote
Richard Riehn again,
Before concluding, it is necessary to point out that the effects of
the campaigns between 1805 and 1807 meant that the French infantry was
never able to repeat such tactical excellence again and, indeed, a steady
decline was seen thereafter. This was parallelled by a steady
improvement in the capability of France's opponents as they too
adopted the new tactical and operational concepts, even if they never
did quite equal the flair of the French at the operational level.
In an attempt to describe the developing tactical and
operational doctrine of formed infantry, this article has ignored
the contribution that skirmisher tactics had on the Napoleonic
battlefield, a subject worthy of a study in its own right. It also
completely ignores the tactical changes that took place in the other two
arms, both of which affected the way the infantry went about their
business; the operational use of artillery on the Napoleonic battlefield and
cavalry superiority, the vital ingredient to the success of offensive
operations.
What I hope it has done is illustrate the point again that
although drill and tactics were so closely connected at this period as to
blur the distinction sometimes, the former, and the formations
and conversions it allowed, really did not change much during the 50
years or so that preceded the Napoleonic period. What did change, out
of all recognition, was the tactical application and in this context the
two are separate and distinguishable.
I make no apology for closing with a final quote from Brent
Nosworthy's remarkable book [35].
There are numerous histories of the armies and campaigns of the
period, Fortescue, Jany, Stein, Wrede and so on, not to mention histories
produced by Continental General Staffs, essentially as text books for the
instruction of officers. Those dealing with the narrower subject of tactical
and operational art, and doctrine, however, are probably less prolific. The
following is a list of those either recommended for further reading
or consulted during the preparation of this article, and which are either in
print or can be obtained through public library services. It is not exhaustive
by any stretch of imagination, nor should it be imagined that the only
books on the subject are in English.
The list is a reflection of the limitation of my personal 'library' in
which context I should point out that I do not own a copy of Colin. It is
worth trying to get sight of it through the local library since it is
undoubtedly the most famous analysis of the subject. It is possible, and lots
of fun trying.
First you will be met with incredulity, it being in a foreign
language! Being more than a few years old also adds another dimension!
Persevere, it will eventually arrive. Do not expect to be allowed to take it
home though.
L'infanterie au XVIlle siecle: la tactique. Jean Colin. Paris 1907.
This is the best known and most frequently quoted modem work
on the subject of infantry tactics in the context of the Napoleonic period.
Oriented towards an explanation of the tactical phenomenon that was the
French infantry during the hey-day of the Grand Army, it could be argued
that Colin gives Guibert rather more than his due at the expense of
Prussian contribution to tactical change. This book remained until recently
in a class of its own and is, nevertheless, still the standard work on the
subject. Unfortunately, it is useless without some knowledge of French.
Don't worry though, get a copy of Nosworthy. See below.
A Review of the History of Infantry. E.M. Lloyd. London
1908. More than a third of the book is devoted to the
18th Century and Revolutionary/Napoleonic period. It does not
contain the specific kind of detail found in Colin and is painted
on a much larger canvas. It provides, nevertheless, a balanced and
accurate overview of the strengths and failings of the various
nations' am-ties. One wonders how certain subsequent 20th
Century authors arrived at some of their conclusions about
the Prussian army in 1806, for example, and column and line in
the context of the British in the Peninsula. The bibliography is also
comprehensive and very useful. It is a very competent, albeit concise,
account of how tactical and operational art evolved in the way that it
did, and why, from ancient times to the early 20th Century. Its broad
appeal would probably make it a worthwhile reprint.
The Background of Napoleonic Warfare. Robert Quimby.
New York 1975.
This work is very well known. It could almost be described as an
English language summary of Colin. It is long out of print and although
there are more recent and better books on the subject, it is worth having
if one crops up. Don't shed any tears if you can't find one though. Ross and
Nosworthy are just as good, the latter better. Alternatively it can be
obtained with relative ease through the public library service. Another
worthwhile reprint I would have thought.
From Flintlock to Rifle, Infantry Tactics 1740-1866.
Steven Ross. London 1979.
A small book whose size does not reflect its usefulness. It bridges
the tactical gap from late l8th Century to early 19th Century infantry
tactics in an easily assimilated and readable fashion. It is also very useful in
the context of the subject subsequent to the Napoleonic period. It
does, nevertheless, give Guibert unambiguous credit for innovations that
are rightly Prussian; the influence of Colin I suspect. It is a useful primer
which still appears in lists.
Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars.
George Jeffrey. Brockton, MA 1982.
This book goes beyond the subject of infantry tactics and includes
chapters on the other arms. It explains with the use of numerous diagrams,
which makes it all the easier to understand, and also deals with the
operational (grand tactical) levels of command in similarly easily
understood detail. It is dated not without considerable flaws. Guibert is again
given credited for innovations that are not his and the French 1791
regulations are used, apparently, to the exclusion of others. More
importantly, the so called "Prussian system" it compares with the so called
"French system", is essentially that of the period prior to approximately 1750. It completely ignores the Prussian tactical innovations subsequent to
that date, those which so influenced Guibert and other French advocates of
the ordre profond school and, indeed, the 1791 regulations. Use with great
care.
The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689-1763.
Brent Nosworthy. New York. Undated.
Do not be deceived by the title of this book, it really is about the
background to Napoleonic warfare and concludes with a chapter that
touches on the subject specifically. It describes in detail the evolution of
18th Century tactical doctrines, together with examples of the drill
involved and accompanied by explanatory diagrams where relevant. It is
shows, without doubt, that the infantry drill and formations used by the
French during the Napoleonic wars, had their origins in the Prussian
innovations of the latter half of the previous century. This is simply an
outstanding book and quite the best on the subject since Colin. It is in
print now. Nobody who has the slightest interest in how the foot soldier
went about his business should be without this book. I cannot recommend
it too highly. Get one.
Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815. Peter
Paret. Princeton, NJ 1966.
The title of this book is also deceptive and treats the entire
period from the late 18th Century, through the debacle of 1806 to the
end of the Napoleonic period. It is not a biography. The narrative is about
Ludwig von Yorck only in so far as he was inextricably involved in the
evolving doctrinal and organisational reforms of the Prussian army during
the Napoleonic period. As such it is the story of the Prussian army of the
period too. It is the only worthwhile English language study of the subject
still, I think, in print.
Peninsular Preparation, The Reforms of the British
Army 1795-1809. Richard Glover. Cambridge, 1963.
If there was a single army that went from the ridiculous
to the comparatively sublime during the period it has to be the
British. Richard Glover does for the British army what Peter Parer
did for the Prussian. Lacks a bibliography, which is a shame. Another
standard that ought to be on every bookshelf. Reprinted by Ken Trotman
in 1988.
Napoleon's Great Adversaries, The Archduke
Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814. Gunther E.
Rothenberg. London, 1982.
A poorly named title that implied the promise of a series but
which never materialised. It should have been called 'The Archduke
Charles and the Reform of the Austrian Army', or something similar. A
well known work, and justly so, it compares with Paret and Glover,
forming, to all intents and purposes, the third volume of a 'trilogy'. It has
become the standard starting point in the English language. It is due for a
reprint in 1995 1 think. Get a copy. There is nothing else readily
available on the subject in English which is worthwhile.
Von Austerlitz bis Koniggratz, Osterreichische
Kampftaktic im Spiegel der Reglements 1805-1864. Walter
Wagner. Osnabruck, 1978.
An extremely well researched comparative study of the
respective Austrian regulations and their tactical application.
Chapter 1 deals with the Napoleonic period, containing a
comparison between the 1769 and 1807 regulations, which shows,
more or less, that the latter was not radically changed from the former.
Useless if you do not have at least a little German. In print.
The Campaigns of Napoleon. David G Chandler. London,
1966. I don't suppose there are many who do not own of
have not heard of this work. Although it is now dated in parts, it
remains the general starting point for the English reader. It also
includes useful chapters on the art of war during the period.
The Jena Campaign. F. N. Maude. London, 1909.
This campaign history, whilst being far and away the best
there is in English, also contains one of the most balanced discussions of
the tactical doctrines of the respective protagonists as has been written
anywhere. Again one wonders how modem authors arrived at their
conclusions in this context. This one is well overdue for republishing. It
is a shame that Maude's title on the 1813 campaign was chosen for a
recent reprint since it is not so useful.
1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign. Richard K Riehn. New York, 1990.
If I was to recommend a single account of the 1812 campaign, it
would probably be this one. It also contains as succinct and readable at
analysis of Napoleonic tactical and operational art as you will find
anywhere. Still in print, I think. Get one if you can.
[1] 1 Jeffrey, George. Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars. Brockton, MA, 982. pp42-44.
"tread neither on his heels or his toes but to bring his foot
flat down with a straight knee, so as to leave the mark of the full foot upon
the ground. The knee may indeed be somewhat bent in the deploying
march in order to allow the files to lock up closer".
"In ascending a hill the toe will be set down first, in
descending a hill the heel, circumstances which are already known as
exceptions to the general Rule"
. [14]
Figure 1. Positions adopted by Soldiers Under Arms
and when Marching
"Close linear formations seemed to answer most
adequately not only the requirements of tactical control and effect, but
those of disciplinary control as well"
. [16]
"There is no necessity for firing veryfast; a cool well
levelledfire with pieces carefully loaded is much more destructive and
formidable than the quickest fire in confusion"
. [19]
Figure 2: Deployment en eventail
"The commander in chief might set the tasks for his corps
and division commanders, but it was left to the brigadiers to actually carry
them out upfront. They were the men who made the final dispositions of
their combat elements and who decided in precisely whatfashion a given
objective was to be attained"
.
[33]
"each battalion, each brigade - every tactical unit - was an
articulatedfighting entity that could change its shape and the direction of
attack virtually at will. Most importantly, these constituent units of the new
order were in the hands of tactically self-reliant officers who knew how to
make use of this flexibility and how to use their own judgement in
adapting themselves to whatever a situation demanded. It is impossible to
over-emphasize this point"
. [34]
"Napoleonic warfare on the battlefield was the
amalgamation of the French grand tactical (operational) aspirations as
displayed during the Seven Years War with the Prussian tactical systems
that had evolved between 1748 and 1756."
Bibliography
References
[2] Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon. London,
1966 pp 133-201 and pp 332-367.
[3] Chandler. op. cit. pp 136-143.
[4] The Collins Concise Dictionary. London, 1986.
[5] The Concise Oxford Dictionary (New Edition). Oxford, 1978.
[6] Chandler, David. Atlas of Military Strategy, The art, theory and practice of war 1618-1878. London, 1980. pp7-11.
[7] Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689 - 1763. New York, n. d. ppl02- 103.
[8] Ross, Steve. Flintlock to Rifle, Infantry Tactics 1740-1866. London, 1979. pp36-37.
[9] Jeffrey. op. cit. pp27-28.
[10] Lloyd, EM, Col. A Review of the History of Infantry. London, 1908. pp 182-183.
[11] Nosworthy. op. cit. p252.
[12] Lloyd. op. cit. ppl56-158. Jeffrey. op. cit. pp105-108. Nosworthy.
op.cit. pp 65-77.
[13] Nosworthy. op. cit. p287
[14] Instruction for the Infantry. Berlin, 11th March 1798. p10.
[15] Reglement das Exercitium und die Manbvres der Franzesischen Infanterie betreffend, vom Isten Ausgust 1791. Aus dem Franzbsischen fur die Koniglich-Westfdlischen Regimenter.Braunschweig, 1812. Die Soldaten-und Ploton-Schule, PII, pvii.
[16] Parer, Peter. Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform,
1807-1815. Princeton, NJ, 1966. p16.
[17] Ibid. p14.
[18] Lloyd. op.cit. p158 (discussing Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, Abtheilung fur Kriegsgeschichtliche (Military History Section of the Prussian General Staff). Berlin, 1890-1893)
[19] Napoleon 1. Correspondence. 1870. Vol 31, p430. (quoted in Lloyd).
[20] Nosworthy. op. cit. pp243-250.
[21] Dalrymple, C. A Military Essay. London, 1761. p185 (as
reproduced in Paret).
[22] Nosworthy. op. cit. p249.
[23] Nosworthy. op. cit. p249
[24] Instruction for the Infantry 1798. op. cit. pp2-27.
[25] Parer. op. cit. p105.
[26] Lloyd. op.cit. p142.
[27] Marshall-Cornwall, James. Napoleon. London, 1967. p27.
[28] Nosworthy. op.cit. pp334-337.
[29] Nosworthy. op. cit. pp329-331.
[30] Ross. op. cit. p38.
[31] Maude, F.N. The Jena Campaign. London, 1909. p46.
[32] Maude. op.cit. pp47-48.
[33] Riehn. op.cit. p94.
[34] Riehn. op. cit. p126.
[35] Nosworthy. op. cit. p352.
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