I would like to thank Rod MacArthur for his article in First Empire No. 19 concerning tactical deployment in this period and I would like to clarify a point or two. Firstly concerning file width, Mr. MacArthur states quite correctly that the British infantry regulations 1792 (Dundas) stress that each man in the ranks maintains elbow contact with the next man in the rank as a means to ensure dressing.
Mr. MacArthur says that the French Reglement 1791 dictates that each man in a rank under arms should have a frontage equivalent to 26½ British Imperial inches. He deduces from this that French troops deployed on foot would be less able to maintain the dressing (i.e., the straightness) of the rank when marching because there would be no elbow contact between the men in the rank.
I have read the relevant chapters of the French Reglement 1791 several times in the original French from a facsimile copy and I have participated in and organised a dozen or more exercise over several years to test the practical application of those regula-tions. I can confirm once and for all that French troops were trained to keep elbow contact on the march. The Reglement of 1791 stresses meticulously that NCOs must ensure that the troops acquire this skill. Indeed, when marching in the correct manner of the period, with arms rigid at the sides, straight leg, eyes fixed ahead and the toes pointed downwards so that the sole of the foot is always parallel with the ground, one soon realises that elbow contact is an indispensable aid to maintain dressing even over favourable ground.
The 1791 Reglement (which was in use throughout 1792-1815) contains sections whose sole purpose is to set out exactly how the soldier is trained and I can further confirm that nowhere in these sections is a file width of 26½" (or equivalent) specified. On the contrary it is patently clear from the said text that the file width is the width of the man (elbow to elbow with his neighbours in the rank) and no other.
Frontage
With regard to the frontage occupied by each man however this is not the whole picture.
Each soldier was trained to hold the arms in a set position always when under orders. The reason for this is simple, if some men have their elbows sticking out and others keep them close in, it becomes impossible to maintain dressing in the rank and simul-taneously keep the files aligned (one can see this perfectly demonstrated every summer by many reenactors.)
Therefore the soldier was trained to keep the arms at a regular position and the fact is that the position was with the elbow held in close to the body, even at shoulder arms. This is so of all nations at the time, including Britain.
Not only was the soldier, when marching, keeping elbow contact with his neighbours, left and right, but simultaneously he was trained to keep a light contact between his elbows and his sides. Does the phrase “packed like sardines” spring to mind? It should do!
The next point that needs to be borne in mind is one of general rather than military history, but which does have a profound bearing on military history.
If you were born in say 1770 into the kind of family whose sons would end up serving in the rank and file, during the first 10 years of your life the cumulative effects of untreated disease, poor sanitation, unbalanced diet and repeated periods of outright starvation would produce one overriding effect - they would stunt your growth. Your skeleton simply would not grow to the maximum potential permitted by your DNA. In preindustrial Europe perhaps two-thirds or more of every population suffered in this way. Quite simply the majority of the men in the ranks would be con-siderably smaller than todays men. Furthermore the grinding physical routine of military life and the extreme hardships of campaign marches would sweat every last gram of spare fat off you. The dimensions of surviving uniforms, headgear etc. confirm this. We must also bear in mind that in every army, systematical-ly or otherwise, the taller and better built recruits were often siphoned off to the cavalry and artillery. So when considering the frontage of deployed centre companies of infantry we are left with a picture of short, scrawny, starved men standing quite literally shoulder to shoulder. I estimate that each file would occupy roughly 18" frontage, quite possibly even less, on aver-age, in any combat formation.
It is quite correct that on route march both files and ranks would open up considerably, but this would never be done in a combat situation.
Rod MacArthur’s article does not make the point that there were very simple reasons to explain why a file width of 22 or 26½" was not used on the battlefield (and bear in mind even today that even today few men are so big or fat that with their arms straight at their sides they measure 22" elbow to elbow, let alone 26½"!) and we should now look at those reasons.
The reasons are ultimately technological. In the 1750's when these linear tactical systems were being perfected the mass produced smooth bore flint-lock (to which that of 1792-1815 was in principle identical) made almost no impact except as a giant collective shotgun. The battalion or company volley was the supreme decisive weapon, sometimes one really good volley was the blow that turned the tide of a battle. (I can hear Maitland nodding in his grave now). If gaps opened between files and if ranks became uneven and began to merge, then when the battalion halted and fired the power of the volley could be diminished. Let us look at a simple example: you are a grunt in the third rank of your platoon marching forward; while marching the second rank man in front of you, drifts over one space till he is in front of the man on your right. You halt and the order comes to take aim. Normally you would aim your musket on the right of the second rank man, but he has drifted over so the man on your right will now aim on the right of him. If simultaneously the front rank has drifted half a file to the left, then when you do find a gap to fire through the second rank you find the front rank man kneeling with his shako in the way of your musket.
Result: confusion - and a poor volley. The only way to use the smooth-bore flint-lock to effect is if every man is sure exactly in which rank and file he is in, and the only way to ensure that the battalion arrives in this condition in the combat zone through the smoke and obstacles of battle is to march literally shoulder to shoulder. Quite simply your life could depend on it and every seasoned soldier knew it.
Where does this leave us for the 22" file width laid down in Dundas? As with the file widths laid down in other military regulations of the period this is simply a nominal ideal, which, like so many other regulations, turns out to have virtually no meaning in practical application, except perhaps on a full dress parade.
Rank Depth
If we now move on to the subject of rank depth we will see a similar principle at work.
Mr. MacArthur also states in his article that if a company in ranks with each file occupying 22" frontages pivots 90° left or right (so that the files now become ranks with each rank occupying 22" depth) it will be inhibited in its marching because 22" depth is insufficient to allow normal marching. I can only suggest that Mr. MacArthur puts a Bess on his shoulder and a Trotter on his back and tries it for himself. All the Nations in fact trained their troops to march, when necessary, so that the left foot of the second rank landed beside the right foot of the front rank (to make a pace forward on the left foot).
Not only is 22" more than ample depth for a rank to march in, but in fact it is possible to march (in the correct manner for the period of course) with no more depth to the rank than the width of a file shoulder to shoulder.
And why were troops trained to march in such close order? The answer is again the volley. The only way to deliver the volley with all three ranks of the battalion simultaneously was if the front rank knelt and the third rank was sufficiently close behind the front rank for the muzzles of the third rank to protrude in front of the heads of the kneeling front rank. Again the reasons are technological.
The flint-lock is always prone to "windage" - gas escaping around the ball as it is propelled down the bore - and one result of this is that the discharge at the muzzle as the ball exits cab be very wild. If the muzzles of the third rank were not in front of the heads of the first rank there would be a constant danger of scorching the front rank men with flashes from the discharge.
The only way to ensure that the battalion could deliver a three rank volley at a moment’s notice was if it could march with the ranks close enough to fire. Whenever there was a prospect of combat it was imperative for the ranks to march as close as this in order to deliver the all important volley whenever necessary. This is precisely why the march pace of the period was so con-strained with the arms held still at the sides, the leg straight so that the knees would not rise, the toe pointed down, the whole thing was designed to permit the ranks to march close enough together to fire the three rank volley at the chosen moment.
It was too complicated to teach the soldier one march pace for marching in open ranks and a constrained march pace for firing ranks. He was taught the march pace he would need in the combat zone and he used it always, because, by the time he was under enemy fire he would need to do it literally without thinking.
Similarly, it made no sense to march habitually with the ranks spaced out, when the most essential skill the soldier needed was to march in close packed ranks in the combat zone; unless there was some reason to do otherwise (e.g., an inspection, a parade) the troops habitually drilled with ranks close enough for the three rank volley, again because in the fury of battle it had to be second nature... or you were dead!
I will stress at this point that this is not a matter of guess- work. The Reglement of 1791 leaves no doubt whatsoever that the soldier will be trained to stand shoulder to shoulder, pivot (i.e., face) 90° left or right and march off at ordinary pace without opening up the ranks at all. Dundas prescribed an identical exercise. I have not read the Prussian or Austrian regulations but I am assured by those who have that they are similar in these respects.
Wargame Frontages
All this has some interesting implications for wargamers. Most of you use a ground scale of 1mm to 1 metre; if so take a piece of paper and draw a straight line on it 20mm long. Now take suffi-cient infantry figures to represent 120 men (for most this will be 4 or 6 figures). Now try to fit the figures in one rank onto the line you have drawn. The line represents an accurate combat frontage for 120 men in 3 ranks using a ground scale of 1mm to 1 metre. They don't fit do they?
Incidentally using the same ground scale the depth of the forma-tion should be 2mm, maybe even a little less for a firing line. Enough said.
With all this in mind we can return to Rod MacArthur’s theme of march speeds on the battlefield. Again the reason why the ordi-nary pace was so slow (75 or 76 per minute) comes back to ‘King Volley’. The overriding necessity to arrive within enemy musket range in sufficient close order to deliver the three rank volley left no alternative. With the battalion’s three ranks so close and every file shoulder to shoulder only such a slow pace would enable the second and third ranks to negotiate obstacles and falling casualties without disordering the formation. I would conclude that only the direst necessity would induce a Colonel, in any situation where his battalion might have to fire, to march at anything other than the ordinary pace, as Mr. MacArthur rightly indicates.
So the very reason why the tactical march speeds were so slow was exactly the same reason which caused the files to march shoulder to shoulder and the ranks to march so close up in all the armies of this period, including the French. King Volley was an absolute monarch.
I cannot stress to highly to all readers that the tactical sys-tems of this period can never be understood from texts alone. Without looking in detail at how the individual soldier was trained on can never properly grasp why the company did what it did and in turn how the battalion operated. It is one thing to read how the soldier carried his musket to march, but you will never fully understand the implications of it for a marching battalion until you have actually done it. Now amount or reading can substitute for it. Units specialising in drill can be con-tacted through the secretary of the Napoleonic Association.
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