Although the battle of Craonne had been extremely hard fought it had only been something of a sideshow. It involved only around a fifth of Blucher's forces and the utter failure of Winzingerode's flanking attack to even develop would have made it almost a non- event from the Allies' point of view had it not been for the intensity of the fighting. To Napoleon the battle was more sig-nificant: It had disrupted his plan of a quick advance on Laon (thus failing to maintain the pressure on Blucher's retreating army) and for no strategic gain he had suffered unacceptably heavy casualties to his best formations.
As Blucher's army concentrated at Laon, Napoleon spent a little time reorganising, as the battle at Craonne had unbalanced his own move on that town. He mistakenly believed that Blucher had been heavily defeated and confidently resumed the advance thinking that Blucher would leave only a rearguard at Laon whilst continuing his retreat. In fact Blucher not only reached Laon in good order but was able to offer battle with all his forces, which now included the corps of Bulow and Winzingerode and num-bered just over 100,000 men. Against him Napoleon could field only 40,000; 30,000 under his own hand and 10,000 under Marmont.
On the morning of the 9th March Napoleon sent his troops forward against Laon, expecting to brush aside a Prussian rearguard. As the day wore on and the fighting became heavy he realised what the true real situation was, but felt too weak to attempt a sudden withdrawal in daylight. Napoleon was no doubt helped by Blucher's ill health and his belief that Napoleon's weak attack was only a feint. After a desperate day's fighting the line had hardly moved. As the French settled down for the night Marmont was attacked in strength in the gathering darkness and
disastrously defeated. His men were broken and their retreat cut off by Prussian cavalry. Marmont was not able to restore order until his troops had routed as far as Berry-au-Bac by which time he had lost 3,500 men, 45 out of 55 guns and 131 caissons.
On the morning of the 10th Napoleon decided to hold firm to give Marmont a chance to reorganise by attempting to bluff Blucher as to his real strength and intentions. That he was successful in fixing Blucher's army in place was due more to the sudden collapse in the old Field Marshal's health than the brilliance of the plan. Eventually Napoleon ordered a retreat on Soissons. Due to the lack of direction from Blucher's Chief of Staff Gneisenau there was no effective pursuit. However, his two days in front of Laon had cost Napoleon a total of 10,000 men.
Quick Victory
As Napoleon reorganised in Soissons and the Allies dithered at Laon news reached him that Rheims had fallen to the corps of St. Priest. Sensing a quick and easy victory he marched on that city. St. Priest, unaware of Napoleon's intentions was totally surprised. On the 13th he was comprehensively beaten with the loss of 3,000 men and 23 guns. Napoleon's Old Guard had marched 43 miles in 14 hours to reach the battlefield upon which Napoleon engaged only 8,000 or 10,000 of his 20,000 men against St. Priest's 14,500. St. Priest himself was mortally wounded.
Napoleon's latest brilliant achievement shocked the Allies into inactivity. He now planned to march to gather the garrison of Lorraine to reinforce his dwindling army, but news of
Schwarzenberg forced a change upon him. When Napoleon had left this front with Schwarzenberg in retreat he ordered Macdonald and Oudinot to march on Bar-sur-Aube. Oudinot had duly done this but then exceeded his orders by actually crossing the river with the bulk of his forces. Here he was attacked on the 27th February by 26,000 men, but despite having 27,500 of his own, his faulty dispositions resulted in a substantial defeat, losing 3,500 men.
Oudinot and Macdonald were then persistently pushed back as far as Troyes and then towards the Seine as their army slowly shrank from 40,000 to 30,000 through casualties and stragglers. Luckily for the two of them as Schwarzenberg reached Troyes he received news of Napoleon's success at Rheims. This threw him once more into indecision and it was only on the 14th March that Bray and Villenauxe were reached. On the 16th March Macdonald had retreated as far as
Provins and Montereau. At this stage the advance of the Allies ground to a halt as indecision and discontent swept their headquarters. Eventually Schwarzenberg decided to concentrate on Troyes and Arcis proclaiming that this would leave him with the most options. Either way another retreat was called for, even before Napoleon's arrival.
Napoleon was driving in Schwarzenberg's cavalry screen on the 18th as the Allies were concentrating around Troyes and Arcis. Schwarzenberg intended to retire further, to Bar-sur-Aube, but by this time Napoleon was in contact with Wrede's Bavarians at Arcis. Schwarzenberg did not know what Napoleon's plan was but in view of the action around Arcis he decided to concentrate be-tween Troyes and to the south of Arcis. This turned out to be a critical decision as Napoleon believed him to be retreating rapidly rather than concentrating and hoped that this would allow him to gather his garrisons and thus increase his army to 90,000 men. He was certainly not expecting a battle at Arcis.
Arcis
In many ways the battle at Arcis on the 20th/21st March resembled the battle at Laon: Napoleon was not expecting a battle as he was sure the Allies were in retreat and that only a rearguard faced him. Consequently he was not properly concentrated and inevitably he was considerably outnumbered, despite the ineptitude of the Crown Prince of Wurtemberg denying Schwarzenburg the use of three corps (3rd, 4th and 6th) on the first day of the battle.
In fact on the 20th, with Wurtemberg's three corps away, the action, though fierce, involved only 16,000 Frenchmen against 25,000 Allies. However, on the 21st Schwarzenberg had managed to concentrate upwards of 74,000 of his men whilst Napoleon could face them with not much more than 30,000. Once Napoleon realised the reality of his position he ordered an immediate withdrawal across the Aube which stood at his back. With such a numerical disadvantage the withdrawal through the town and over Arcis's wooden bridge and a bridge of boats was a recipe for disaster. It was only thanks to the determined resistance and sacrifice of Leval's division of 6,000 Peninsular veterans that saved the army from disaster. As the French army streamed across the Aube Leval's men held Arcis against 50,000 allies. Napoleon was therefore able to escape certain disaster and destroyed the two bridges behind him.
By destroying the bridges Napoleon had bought himself some time. He now planned to march towards the Meuse and Moselle fortresses in order to gather up his garrisons to reinforce his fast disap-pearing army. This would have the particular advantage of cutting Schwarzenberg's communications with Switzerland and throwing an already doubt-ridden Allied Headquarters into panic. To facili-tate this Napoleon marched on Vitry and although Ney failed to take this place he ordered his cavalry to continue to St. Dizier where they destroyed two Prussian battalions and captured a large convoy.
Of Blucher
After Napoleon had left Marmont and Mortier after Laon they had retreated slowly south before Blucher causing him some delay by destroying the bridge over the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac. From there they retired to Fismes in order to cover the road to Paris, where they prepared to conduct a holding action by standing on the line of the River Vesle. However, by this time Blucher had determined to join Schwarzenberg and to then make the march on Paris in overwhelming numbers. By moving on Fismes Marmont had left Blucher free to march towards Schwarzenberg via Chalons and earned a reprimand from Napoleon. Consequently Marmont travelled to Etoges via Chateau Thierry where Mortier arrived on the 23rd, Marmont being at Vertus. On the 23rd Napoleon felt his plan was working. He believed that Blucher's move to Chalons was in response to his move against the communications of the Army of Bohemia. He now decided to give up the idea of marching on the fortresses, and proposed to seize Bar-sur-Aube and open a new line of communications for himself by Troyes to Paris.
Unfortunately for Napoleon his isolated position meant several French despatch riders fell into the hands of the Cossacks. From various correspondence the Allies were soon able to learn of the Emperor's movements and intentions. A Council of War was called at Pougy. They realised they could not prevent him intercepting their communications and at first it was decided to march to meet Blucher at Chalons, although by this time his advance guard had already passed it. They could then march after Napoleon 200,000 strong. However, during the night of the 23rd/24th more captured correspondence revealed the disaffection in Paris and the shortage of money and arms.
There is no doubt that even Schwarzenberg realised the obvious thing was to march on Paris but he seemed not to have the courage to make a final decision. That this decision was finally taken was thanks to Czar Alexander who upon examining all the captured correspondence realised that Paris, and not the Emperor, should be the objective. Schwarzenberg was finally convinced and orders immediately given. The new plan was communicated to Blucher who was delighted. He planned a concen-tration of his army at Meaux on the 28th.
Summarizing
Before we follow the Allied march on Paris it is worth summarizing the positions of both sides on the 24th : The Army of Bohemia was concentrated to the west and south of Vitry except for the 3rd Corps which was at Mailly. Blucher, with Langeron, Woronzow and Sacken was around Chalons whilst Kleist and Yorck were just south of Chateau Thierry. Napoleon had Macdonald at St. Dizier, Ney at Vassy and the Guard at Doulevant; his cavalry covered the gaps in between and to the south. Marmont and Mortier were in a much more perilous position; Marmont was at Soude St. Croix await-ing Mortier who was marching from Vertus. At Vertus were Amey and Pacthod with two small divisions of National Guards totalling 4,300 men and 16 guns.
On the 25th the Army of Bohemia started it's march towards Meaux to link up with Blucher. It's route took it towards Fere Champenoise. Before this village lay Mortier and Marmont who were at Soude St. Croix and Sommesous endeavouring to join Napoleon. The two marshals were overwhelmed, mainly by a large force of cavalry, and only escaped when the allies paused to bring up their infantry. Out of a force of around 19,000 the marshals lost 2,000 killed and wounded, 4,000 prisoners, 45 guns and 100 ammunition wagons. As this action was going on Amey's and Pacthod's small force of National Guards were also attacked by a large and constantly reinforced body of cavalry supported by artillery.
With no cavalry of their own they gallantly formed square and resisted as best they could, slowly moving towards the great marsh of St. Gond where they hoped to escape. Turning down repeated offers to surrender the National Guards fought like veterans and only surrendered when Pacthod was wounded and their squares were broken. Few escaped and on this day the total loss to Marmont, Mortier, Amey and Pacthod was some 10,000 men and over 60 guns. The allies only lost 2,000 men.
Napoleon, expecting the Allies to pressure his rearguard was surprised when Macdonald sent no indication that this was happening. Perhaps he began to believe that Schwarzenberg had called his bluff and turned for Paris. In the afternoon of the 25th Macdonald reported artillery fire against his rearguard, and Ney that 10,000 cavalry, coming from Vitry, were arriving at St. Dizier. Napoleon did not know whether this was an advanced guard of the Army of Bohemia or a rearguard to cover their advance on Paris. Either way Napoleon intended to attack them the next day. Winzingerode, who commanded this cavalry force supported by a little infantry, formed up on the farther side of the Vitry-St. Dizier road.
Napoleon's troops went straight into the attack and the Russian cavalry was soon in full retreat. In just a couple of hours Winzingerode had lost 1,500 men and 9 guns. Napoleon's concern that this was a screening force rather than an advance guard was soon confirmed by prisoners and now there was no doubt in Napoleon's mind that the Allies were marching on Paris.
Napoleon faced a dilemma. Was he to move to collect his garrisons, for which arrangements had already been made to make 11,000 experienced troops available to him, or should he march towards Paris on the rear of the Allied armies? The Allies had made his mind up for him, as 11,000 extra troops were of little use to him if his enemies were occupying his capital. At 11pm on the 27th March orders were issued to march on Paris by the longer, but clearer, route through Bar-sur-Aube, Troyes and Fontainebleau.
After the disasters at Sommesous and Soude St Croix, Marmont and Mortier had also set off for Paris. Although their route was indirect, having found the road to Meaux barred, some reinforce-ments were picked up along the way.
Towards Paris
On the 29th the Allies were only 15 miles from Paris at Claye. Napoleon's troops were marching hard in order to save their capital; the Guard marched 43 miles that day. Marmont and Mortier were now back in Paris with all their troops trying to co-ordinate a defence with Joseph; Napoleon's brother who had been appointed to prepare the defences. Little had been done and no one had dared to believe that Napoleon would not save them. The following day, the Allied armies, totalling 107,000 men, arrived before Paris. At the same time Napoleon left his troops and hurried forward with orders for the remainder to follow him as quickly as possible. By the time he reached Fontainebleau it was too late.
To defend Paris, Joseph had only about 40,000 men and 154 guns. Some of these were of excellent quality; the depots of the Young and Old Guards, 4 divisions of Young Guard and some Guard cavalry and artillery. However, others included firemen, veterans, gendarmes and even the pupils of military schools. The Parisian National Guard numbered 20,000 although it is believed that no more than 12,000 took part in the fighting due to lack of equipment. The major part of this force were the corps of Compans, Mortier and Marmont who had struggled back to Paris pursued by the Allies.
There was also no shortage of volunteers from the working class inhabitants who were prepared to take an active part in the protection of their capital but they would have been of little fighting value and there were no muskets available anyway. When they pleaded for arms all they were offered were pikes, so they quickly dispersed to cries of 'treason'.
Uncoordinated Enthusiasm
In their enthusiasm to take the symbol of Napoleon's power, the initial Allied assaults were unco-ordinated. They were not fully concentrated and could not bring their superiority of numbers to bear. However as their troops came up so the pressure on the French increased across their whole front. The French fought desperately to defend their capital and even the majority of the National Guard fought splendidly. The Prussian Guard had not been engaged during the campaign since they had crossed the Rhine and were eager to make a glorious contribution in the decisive battle: This impressive corps went into the attack 4,000 strong but after initial success they were swept with musketry and grape and suffered over 700 casualties.
Despite the courage and desperation of their defence the French were slowly but surely overwhelmed. Joseph quickly handed responsibility for the battle to Marmont and Mortier and deserted the capital leaving the Marshals to decide when it was time to concede. The fighting had broken out early, around 5 am, but despite early encouragement it slowly became clear it would be impossible to hold out until the next day when Napoleon would surely arrive. By 4 pm the whole French line was being pushed back into the city. The battle was lost and Marmont felt he had no option but to capitulate. It was agreed that the Allies would march into Paris the next day whilst the French withdrew to the south towards Fontainebleu. The French had fought hard for their capital; the Allies had suffered 9,000 casualties, the French as few as half of that number. It had been the bloodiest battle of the campaign.
At Fontainebleau, Napoleon met General Belliard and a troop of cavalry. Here he learnt of the battle of Paris and it's final capitulation. At first he seemed determined to gather all his troops and drive the Allies out again but he was gradually overwhelmed by a sadness and despondency.
By the 4th April Napoleon had gathered 60,000 men including his own men and the survivors of the battle for Paris. The Allies meanwhile were 'stuck' in the capital and showing little inclination to deliver the coup de grace. Instead of marching straight on Foutainebleau on the 1st April and crushing the small body of men Napoleon had with him at that time they had merely taken up a defensive position and given him time to recover himself and concentrate his army. Now that this was done Napoleon immediately started to plan the counter-stroke; the soldiers, regimental officers and younger generals were full of enthusiasm, and the reverses had filled them with grim determination.
However, throughout these preparations the marshals had been plotting and eventually they confronted Napoleon. They had nothing to gain from further fighting; they had all the titles and wealth they needed, but not the prospect of peace in which to enjoy them. Led by Ney the marshals demanded Napoleon's abdication. After a short and apparently calm discussion the Emperor felt he had no choice but to agree. The matter was settled by the unwitting defection of Marmont's 6th Corps on the night of the 4th April; the campaign of 1814 was over and Napoleon faced a lonely future banished to the island of Elba.
Fascinating
I hope this brief account has stimulated some interest in what I feel is the most fascinating of Napoleon's campaigns. There are a number of books giving more detailed accounts available through advertisers in this magazine. My own particular interest is the seemingly impossible task of piecing together the constantly changing composition and organisation of Napoleon's army as it struggled to fend off the overwhelming if unco-ordinated masses of the Allied armies. I would be delighted to hear from anyone with a similar affliction!
IIn the last issue I described the Campaign in France from Napoleon's arrival in Chalons in January up to the end of the battle at Craonne on the 7th March. I would now like to continue my narra-tive of events up to Napoleon's abdication on the 4th April.
The Final Phase
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