Note: Although this is a letter to the editor, it was so extensive, we moved it out as an article in its own right.--RL While conducting research in the French military archives at Vincennes recently, I uncovered several reports and letters which provide additional detail to my piece on the engagement at Gefrees in July 1809 (Issue 12). The principal changes are in the French order of battle. In addition to the detailed strength returns shown on the revised order of battle (from the Reserve Corps' 'situation journalier' of 8 July), Junot's comprehensive reports make it clear that there were three provisional dragoon regiments on the field during the battle. The 6th Provisional Dragoons, composed of depot troopers from the 22nd, 25th, 26th and 27th regiments, evidently marched with Rivaud's infantry when Junot's little corps departed Hanau in late June. Arriving in Bamberg on 5 July, the regiment was placed under General Delaroche along with the 1st and 5th regiments. Delaroche's command also included the famous Berg Chasseurs-à-Cheval regiment (converted to lancers later in 1809), but this regiment had been left at Nuremberg when Delaroche rode on to Bamberg, and Junot sent it off to Amberg to watch the roads out of Bohemia while the remainder of the army marched on Bayreuth. Junot Organization Moving out of Bamberg on 6 July, Junot organised his force as follows: a) advance guard under Colonel Reiset: 1st Provisional Dragoons, IV/28 Ligne, one gun; b) GD Delaroche with 5th and 6th Provisional Dragoons, 3 guns; c) GB Lameth's brigade (minus IV/28), 4 guns; d) GB Taupin's brigade, 4 guns; e) train and baggage escorted by 200 dragoons. This organisation was basically maintained over the next two days, so that the French force south of Gefrees on the morning of 8th July consisted only of Reiset's little advance guard. Dela-roche and Lameth were back near Neudorf and Taupin further behind at Bindloch (some 9 to 10 kilometres from Berneck). There is no indication that the French expected an engagement on the 8th, but Reiset wisely kept his vedettes alert. With only around 1,400 men, however, he was in no position to resist the main Austrian attack when it developed around noon. He fell back toward Berneck, apparently receiving support from Lameth's infantry somewhere en route. Retiring south of Berneck around 5 p.m., Reiset met Junot who had just arrived from Bayreuth and whom Reiset described as 'very perplexed' by the Austrian advance. Junot deployed his men as described in the article, but, believing themselves outflanked and badly outnumbered, the French were relieved when 'the heavens themselves came to our aid' (Rieset's words, Junot's reports are similar) sometime between 5:30 and 7 p.m. Fearing for his flanks and mindful of his mission to shield the Danube valley, Junot ordered his army to withdraw at 2 a.m. on the morning of 9 July. Losses According to Junot's strength return of 11 July, the fight on the 8th cost his small corps 7 dead, 70 wounded and 108 captured. Lameth's infantry took most of these casualties (6, 47 and 76 respectively), with the 1st and 6th Dragoons suffering the next highest number (1, 21 and 22). In addition, about 12 men of the 1st Provisional Dragoons were wounded during the skirmishing on 7th July as the French pushed Radivojevich out of Bayreuth. Note that M. Clos (in his letter published in Issue 14) is quite correct: Martinien makes no mention of any French officer losses on 8 July. Junot's report, however, gives a total of 7 officers wounded on the 8th (6 infantry and 1 dragoon). Junot's reports and Reiset's memoirs also describe fairly heavy officer casualties on 7 July (4 of the 12 wounded); Martinien lists only one. In addition to errors Martinien may have made in undertaking his herculean task, the discrepancy may result from the definition of 'wounded'. Martinien may have catalogued only those officers who suffered severe or even debilitating injuries, whereas Junot's strength reports probably included men with less serious wounds. Troop Quality Junot and Reiset explained the number of officer casualties by stating that the dragoon officers had to exert themselves to provide an example for their troopers. Despite this, Reiset stated that he was 'very satisfied' with his fresh-baked regiment and Junot warmly praised its performance on the 7th and 8th. Junot was also pleased with the esprit of his young soldiers in general and wrote that they needed only adequate leadership to match the capabilities of veteran troops. While this may have been hyperbole, there was a painful lack of officers; some of the companies in the 1st Dragoons, for example, had only one officer per company. The ad hoc Bavarian battalion, on the other hand, was described by the French as completely useless, capable of neither marching nor fighting. Another problem was the poor quality of the corps' artillery pieces and caissons. Taken from the arsenal at Mainz, they were described as possibly of use in a fortress, but totally unfit for campaign: the carriages of two pieces, for instance, apparently collapsed after their first shots and Reiset had to use local wagons to rescue them from the pursuing Austrians. Officers Marie-Antoine Reiset, a competent cavalryman, respected by Junot and destined for promotion to general of brigade in 1813, left interesting comments on two of his fellow commanders in 1809. He was very glad to go into combat with Charles Lameth, a 52 year-old veteran recalled from retirement, but recognised that Jean Delaroche, though `a brave and excellent man', was also `a little exuberant and excitable'; `one needed to know him to appreciate him'. The `poor General Delaroche' was injured when his horse fell and rolled on him during the night of the 8th and Junot replaced him with the senior cavalry colonel, Rozat of the 6th Provisional Dragoons. Delaroche's departure could not occur quickly enough for Junot, who regarded his cavalry commander as foolish and hot-headed -- quite a judgment coming from a general whose fiery behaviour had earned him the sobriquet `The Tempest'! Principal Sources: reports and situations of the Reserve Corps, Colonel Reiset's memoirs, A. Martinien's `Officiers Tués et Blessés (1805-1815)'. Revised French Order of Battle Commander: GD Jean-Andoche Junot, Duke d'Abrantes 1st Division of Reserve Corps: GD Olivier Rivaud de la Raffinière 1st Brigade: Général de Brigade Charles Lameth IV/19 Ligne (756) IV/25 Ligne (656) IV/28 Ligne (761) Bavarian Infantry (510) from depots of 4th and 8th Inf Rgts and 5th Lt Bn 2nd Brigade: Général de Brigade Eloi-Charlemagne Taupin IV/36 Ligne (858) IV/50 Ligne (744) IV/75 Ligne (877) Dragoons: GD Jean Delaroche* 1st Provisional Dragoons (Colonel Reiset) (651) 5th Provisional Dragoons (Colonel Prévost) (427) 6th Provisional Dragoons (Colonel Razot) (853)** Artillery det. 5th Foot Artillery (61) det. 7th Foot Artillery (60) det. 6th Horse Artillery (59) French train troops (128) 14th Ouvrier Company (4) Würzburg train troops (26) Bavarian artillery and train troops (24) French: 2 x 12-pdrs, 8 x 6-pdrs, 2 x howitzers Bavarian: 2 x 3-pdrs Notes: * Delaroche's command also included the Berg Chasseurs-à-Cheval regiment (607) detached near Amberg. ** The 6th Provisional Dragoon regiment was made up of troopers from depots of the 22nd, 25th, 26th and 27th regiments. 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