by Des Darkin, U.K.
At the beginning of 1806 the military outlook for the British Government was not good. The latest European coalition had collapsed after Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, the Austrians making peace, the Russians withdrawing from Central Europe while Prussia was placed in a state of shock at the result of the 1805 campaign and backed away from a confrontation with Napoleon. What gave the government heart beyond reason was a small action in the Southern toe of Italy at the village of San Pietro di Maida. The British forces in Central Mediterranean were based in Sicily, under the command of Sir John Stuart. His orders were clear, to hold Sicily. However Sir Stuart was able to realise that in time the forces available to the French would soon invade the island and therefore it was imperative that the French forces in the Kingdom of Naples were tied down in protecting the mainland. This policy was supported by the exiled Bourbon Court who assured Stuart that once British troops were landed on the mainland the locals would flock to the colours. Stuart's plan was as follows;
2. A large force would land in Calabria to raise the population against the French and then advance to relieve the siege of Gaeta. Despite very little information on the French forces in the area the Expeditionary Force landed in the Bay of Euphemia on the 1st July, the Corsican Rangers and the Grenadiers acting as the first wave. The landing was virtually unopposed and Oswald's Brigade was safely landed before the first action occurred. The Corsicans advancing inland encountered a Polish force of 400 men who, after driving the Rangers off, were promptly forced to withdraw when Oswald's Brigade advanced to support the shaken Rangers. Oswald continued to advance and occupied the village of St.Euphemia while the remainder of the force landed. However, it was not until the 2nd that the artillery and stores were landed and taken to St. Euphemia, the British Centre of Operations. In the meantime leaflets were distributed amongst the curious Calabrian population calling for volunteers. What of the French? But what of the French? The commander of the area was General Reynier a veteran of the Egyptian campaign, and no stranger to the British. His forces were positioned to protect the main centres of commerce along the coast, while his Centre of Operations was at Reggio. Reynier, on hearing of the landings proceeded to force march his men to the British position, bivouacking on the ridge above the village of Maida on the night of the 3rd. Unfortunately for Stuart, Reynier had ignored the diversionary force and had called in the garrisons as he approached Maida. Meanwhile, Stuart had not been idle. the base at St.Euphemia was fortified with a garrison of three artillery pieces and the four companies of De Waterville's Swiss. However, the Calabrians were not so keen as the Bourbons had promised and so Stuart was forced to reappraise his position. He had three choices:-
2. To stay put, wait for the French and hopefully raise the reluctant populace in revolt. 3. Attack Reynier before French superiority in numbers made Stuart's position untenable. Stuart chose to attack Reynier despite not knowing the exact size of the force against him or its exact position. The Expeditionary force set out at first light on the 6th July. The force was in two columns, marching along the coast towards the River Lamato. In the first column was the Light Brigade and Cole's 2nd Brigade, in the second was Acland's 1st Brigade and Oswald's 3rd Brigade - designated as the reserve. There were three pieces of artillery in support. The columns reached the mouth of the River Lamato at about 6am and turned inland, deploying into line on the plain in front the village, Kempt's Light Brigade to the right, Acland in the centre, Cole to the left and Oswald reserve behind Acland. The line had a front of 1500 metres, the right against the river, the left against some scrub-land. The area between the two was cultivated land with drainage ditches running into the Lamato. The river was fordable at most points. Reynier was positioned on the ridge above the village, not with 4,000 men as Stuart had guessed, rather 7,000 infantry and 350 cavalry. His position was strong and is probable Stuart would have been forced to withdraw, but instead of holding his position Reynier crossed the Lamato and began to deploy into line in front of the British forces. It was 8.00 a.m. Engagement As the two sides began to advance the Corsican Rangers, the Light companies of the(absent) 20th and the flankers of the 35th crossed the Lamato and engaged the French tirailleurs stationed there by Reynier. In a to-and-fro affair the French fared worst and withdrew to Maida pursued by the Corsicans. Meanwhile the main action had begun. Because of the French deployment the first contact was made as Kempt's Light Brigade and Compere's Brigade. Volleys were exchanged at long range but no decision was reached until the 1st Legere charged the British line believing it to be retreating. In fact the Brigade had halted to remove their blanket rolls and as the Legere approached were able to fire a devastating volley which threw the unit back in confusion, Compere was wounded, and the 1st Legere promptly fled toward Maida, hotly pursued by the Light Brigade. This victory was a tactical nightmare for Stuart as he was forced to deploy Oswald to fill the gap left by the Light Brigade, even before the outcome of the fighting in the centre had been decided. In the centre Acland's 1st Brigade was facing Peyri's Brigade which included the 1st Swiss Regiment wearing their traditional red. As the two lines advanced the first exchange fell between the British 81st and the 78th, and the French 42nd Legere, the Legere were forced back with the rather dubious Poles giving way likewise. But as the 78th advanced it mistook the 1st Swiss as De Waterville's Swiss, allowing it to fire a volley at close range and charge them. The 78th were just able to loose off a volley which halted the charge. Reynier was now faced with defeat unless he could break the British right. He pushed forward Digonet's Brigade with the cavalry and deployed his artillery in support. Cole's Brigade was forced into square and was having difficulty in supporting Acland in the centre. At the same time losses began to mount due to French artillery fire and the tirailleurs who were deployed in the scrub land. At this critical point a staff officer arrived with the eight companies of the 20th who had abandoned their diversionary raid and just landed at the mouth of the Lamato. Colonel Ross immediately led them forward deploying on Cole's left, pouring volley fire into the surprised French. Cole and Ross then charged the French line causing it to disintegrate and with it Reynier's command. It was noon. Stuart decided not to pursue the French , rather leaving the job to the Calabrians. He also decided to reembark and head for Sicily abandoning Gaeta to its fate. Questions This mini campaign has many intriguing incidents and poses several questions and problems. 1. Why did Reynier leave his position? His troops were of good morale and reasonable training, but his experience in Egypt should have warned him of the perils of attacking a British line, especially one untouched. 2. Why was the British line so much more effective than the French? We know of the benefit of the two deep line, and the British training. But this is not the answer. It seems the timing of the volleys was critical. A case in point was the 78th who were nearly all new recruits, yet they managed to halt the Swiss charge in its tracks. 3. Why did Stuart abandon his original plan to relieve Gaeta? His victory had secured the support of the local populace and Reynier's command was in no state to intervene for the foreseeable future. I hope someone will investigate this campaign further, and perhaps their research will unearth answers to the following questions. 1. What type were the French cavalry and were they French at all? 2. How many guns did Reynier have at Maida and what calibre? (I assumed two batteries of 6pdrs and one company of Horse). 3. A painting of the battle in the Parker Gallery shows British horse artillery in action at Maida, possibly 6pdrs, yet other accounts of the battle describe the artillery as "mountain guns with a mule train". 4. Finally a more general question, did any British "Swiss" ever engage a French "Swiss" unit in the Napoleonic wars? Letter to Editor response (FE12)
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