In his "Abrege des Services", which was a sort of C.V. submitted before his promotion to the marshalate, Vauban wrote:

"In 1697, Ath was besieged, an excellent fortress town of its kind, conducted with such skill that it cost the King no more than 100 lives to take this place, quite the best in the Low Countries".

Ath, situated on the River Dendre, on the road from Tournai to Brussels, was captured by the French in 1667, and fortified by Vauban on a regular octagonal plan. He considered it "...a truly royal fortress, to the point of having no parallel in Europe" when he had finished, and Louvois, Minister of War, was interested enough to have a detailed relief model made, thus beginning the collection which now forms the Musee des Plans Relcifs at the Invalides in Paris. At the Treaty of Nijmegen in 1678, Ath was one of the towns in the Low Countries which reverted to Spanish rule, and saw no further action until the War of the League of Augsburg.

The 1697 siege was considered to be something of a model of its kind; peace negotiations were in the air and the French were anxious to be in the most advantageous position. To this end the armies of Marshals Catinat and Villeroy were detailed to take Atli. On May 15, they invested the town with three detachments each of 4,000 cavalry, and on the night of the 16th 20,000 pioneers were set to work on the lines of circumvallation.

The Allied Armies commanded by William III, the Elector of Bavaria (Governor of the Spanish Netherlands) and the Prince of Vaudemont were to be observed by Marshals Boufflers and Villcrov, while Catinat commanded the siege operations. He was an agreeable and capable man and a personal friend of Vauban, who gave his distinguished colleague a free hand to direct the siege as he know best.

The governor of the town was the Comte de Roeux, with a garrison of some 3,610 infantry, 200 miners and "a large number" of engineers, the whole under the command of the Prince of Anhalt, who also had 31 cannon and one mortar at his disposal. It seems that the siege plans had taken the garrison to some extent by surprise, since a number of officers were absent. Some succeeded in passing through their enemies' lines but a number, including two senior officers, were captured trying to do so on the 18th May.

The French army numbered some 50 battalions and 50 squadrons of horse, the artillery train, assembled at Douai, comprising 32 pieces, mainly 24 pdr. with several mortars including 3 of the largest calibre. The governor, who had attempted to clear his field of fire by clearing away some buildings outside the perimeter, "showed his mediocrity", according to Vauban, by opening fire on the besiegers too early to be effective and showing the limitations of his artillery. Vauban, with characteristic humour, related in a letter how the Comtessc dc Roeux had sent a trumpeter with a message to obtain a pass for herself and other ladies to leave the beleaguered fortress and proceed to Brussels; she, being an impatient lady, sent a further message by drummer to Marshal Villeroy and finally, some clergy with whom he was acquainted, to intercede with Vauban. She then set out from the Brussels Gate, and Vauban had to persuade her to tarry until the evening, assuring her that "...the town would not be destroyed until after she had left". Villeroy's pass duly arrived and she left in the morning.

On the 21st Vauban and his engineers completed their reconnaissance and the first approaches were commenced, directed at the Brussels Gate and the adjoining bastions, Namur and Limburg. This was the normal practice in a formal siege. The night was wet and dark-, 1,000 men began the approaches, covered by 1,150 line infantry and a company of Grenadiers. The approach trenches were commenced at a greater distance than usual from the town defence, 4-500 toises. (The toise can be equalled roughly with the English fathom, i.e. 2 yards). The reason for this was that the ground sloped downhill towards the town. "The situation of the ground formed a counterglacis as wide as the whole Front of the attack and Vauban, ever economical with his men, insisted on breaking ground at this distance.

In fact, the work went so well that instead of occupying two nights it was completed in one, and it was possible to join the heads of the two approaches and establish the first parallel at "two hundred and seventy toises distance from the place". The parallel was extended laterally conforming to the line of the defences, extending to the right to some rising ground called La Cerise de Trahison and on the left to the inundation caused by closing a sluice in the course of the River Dendre, opposite the Bastion of Burgundy. This sluice was part of Vauban's original design, and controlled the flow of the river at the point where it entered the town ditch.

Vauban did not erect any batteries at this stage, with the parallel 600 yards from the walls, holding that "...Batteries at so great a distance only serve to embolden the Enemy and burn Powder to no purpose..." Sapping forward towards the Limburg and Namur Bastions and the Barbancon Ravelin between them enabled the second parallel to be drawn and the batteries were then established about 300 yards from the covered way.

There were five batteries in all "...disposed with singular Art. Everybody knows that the common practicc of Officers of the Train is to fire at all before them, with all the fury that is possible, ruining without distinction all objects that present themselves to view, whether Works, Batteries, Towers or Cavaliers; they even forget themselves so far as to fire on any building which affords a fair mark, as Gates, Bridges, Corps De Garde, Sentry Boxes on the Wall, sometimes Houses and Steeples, for the Mattresses only want to make Havock appear... Which was not to Monsieur de Vauban's taste, who had so frequently seen the fruitlessness of it at so many sieges.

He had therefore placed the Batteries in a manner very distant from such views, aiming more at annoying the Enemy and driving them from their Defences than at making Havock to no purpose, which leads only to the ruin of the Buildings without conducing to the taking of a Place. They therefore were placed in a quite different manner from all before them, for taking in the whole Front of the Attack, they traversed and enfiladed with plunging fire the Bastions, Ravelins and covered way of the Place in such a manner that after they were once well in play, the Enemy could no longer stand to their Defences; and they so effectively extinguished the Force of the Place that the Besiegers could pass and repass between the Camp and Trenches without Danger."

"It was not without difficulty that Monsieur de Vauban prevailed on the Officers of the Train to lower the charge of their Great Guns to batter a Ricochett with small charges, but after a good deal of pains-taking, they were at last reconciled to it. Bounce and Clatter and Readiness for action had hitherto composed the whole merit of Trains at Sieges; here the thing was altered, for never was known before so little noise with so considerable a number of Cannon as were fired at this Siege..."

Thus Vauban introduced his then novel method of firing on reduced charges so that the shot did not embed itself on landing but ricocheted along the defences during enfilade firing. Apart from causing casualties among the defences, one or two shot could with any luck dismount a succession of cannon.

The parallels were 12-15 feet wide, 3-4 feet below ground level with a parapet and firing- step at front and rear - the reason for this being to make it capable of all round defence from sorties of a relief force. There were in fact no further sorties because of the extent of the besiegers' well-manned lines and the smallness of the defending forces. Relief forces from outside did nothing. On the 26th May the Elector of Bavaria made some moves towards the town, to be confronted by the cavalry of Villeroy and Boufflers.

By the 31st the Allies had given up any attempt at relief, and were moving towards Oudenarde to reinforce that place - here they showed some foresight, as Louis XIV was about to suggest to Vauban that he should consider Oudenarde the next objective. Louis had ceased to go on campaign himself, but he followed developments closely and wrote personally to Vauban on the progress of his sieges. The withdrawal of any serious attempt at relief enabled Vauban to advise standing down the covering cavalry force, and enabled Villeroy and the Count of Toulouse (illegitimate son of Louis XIV, a sailor rather than a soldier), to visit the siege works.

These V.I.P. visits were, of course, a feature of formal sieges of any note, but Vauban found them something of an embarrassment and in his writing laid down fairly firm lines of guidance on the subject.

By the 27th May thirty cannon were in position to batter the defence directly, to establish a breach, having dismantled all the defending guns except two in a matter of six hours. During the night sapping (three saps) continued forward to within 50 yards of the palisades, and battery positions were set up to attack the Limburg Bastion, on the right of the attack, by enfilade. Two mortar batteries, with 12 pieces each, were established, as well, to concentrate on the left and right of the defences, and a third battery, with three of the largest mortars, was to shell the sluice which controlled the inundation. With no more sorties to worry about, Vauban advised Catinat that the cavalry who had hitherto patrolled the flanks of the attack, could stand down.

"...On the 28th the Saps had nearly reached the Palisade, as there was little artillery opposition left. Monsieur de Vauban, whose happy Genius was always contriving new expedients to facilitate the Approach, by shutting up the Enemy and keeping 'em in perpetual disquiet by a proper disposition of the several Fires of the Cannon, Shell and Small-Arms, thought fit to erect his new Batteries of four guns each, to keep the Troops in Awe in the Ravelins of Cambrai and the Recollets..." He also had a detached battery at Massle, on the far side of the inundation, covered by four Grenadier companies.

It is necessary, at this point, to consider the problems of a garrison commander under siege. Premature surrender was usually punished, sometimes capitally. The wars of those days contain several instances in ' which surrender was deemed, at the least, ill- advised. While the actions of Nathaniel Fiennes and in his turn, of Prince Rupert at Bristol during the English Civil Wars, do not seem to have been unreasonable to-day, both were bitterly criticised at the time. Charges of cowardice or treachery were levelled at the governors of Naarden (1673) and Dixmude (1695); the former was publicly and humiliatingly disgraced, and the latter executed.

On the other hand, even the most upright and able commanders would have difficulty controlling their men when a town fell to assault, and no governor would like to be responsible for the consequences of waiting too long before seeking terms. Moreover, a well-sustained defence against, as at Ath, greatly superior forces did tie up those forces and keep them from serving elsewhere. And there was always a chance that a sudden reversal in the enemy's fortunes elsewhere might bring relief. It cannot always have been easy for an honourable officer to decide, though once a breach was ready for assault it was generally held that terms could be sought. In this instance the one trump card left to the defence was the sluice.

On the 29th the trenches were on the glacis, and during the night the besiegers reached the covered way. Their problem was that further progress might be barred by the governor releasing the water at an appropriate time to carry all before it "...a vast head of Water ready to let in upon us with a full Tide through the Sluice upon a full Ditch at the time we should be busy in passing it with intent to break our Bridges and those above the Town which lay very convenient for our Quarters..."

The water in the inundation was about ten feet above the usual level, hence the continued bombardment to release it before the siege works reached the critical point where they could be overwhelmed by the rush of water. Vauban had seen this happen at Valenciennes in 1656, when the French had to abandon the siege. It is interesting that Vauban was usually up at the advanced trenches at 5 a.m. and it was in one of the forward positions that he was wounded by a musket ball in the left shoulder, fortunately, this was in fact a spent ball which had passed through a sandbag, but although he remained on duty the wound "...proved considerable enough to require some care to be taken of it".

This was nothing new. Earlier sieges bear witness to Vauban's disregard for personal danger, in letters from the King to various commanders telling them of his concern at the risks taken by the Sieur de Vauban, and of letters in reply saying they were pretty worried too, or words to that effect.

With the besiegers so near to the main defences, ricochet firing was now abandoned for fear of causing casualties on their own side. This enabled the garrison to return to a slightly more active defence, though it was remarked that the defences were so good that the "Works, not the Men, defended it, and that it was the great Guns, Shovel and Pick which took it..."

On the night of the 30th the besiegers' "gabions were set all along the Palisades", and that night cannon were in position to bombard the faces of both bastions and the ravelin between at short range, while miners started to tunnel through to the counterscarp wall "...by close saps or Blinds"; this procedure is well illustrated in Vauban's writing on siegecraft.

On the 31st at 6 a.m. the mortar battery at last scored a direct hit on the sluice, "notwithstanding the thick Planks and Dung with which the enemy had covered it", and the dammed-up waters of the Dendre poured uncontrolled into the ditch, flooding the town's cellars as well as causing some problems, not serious, for the besiegers themselves. Had the garrison commander been able to release the water at a time of his choice, real damage to the attack would have been inevitable. Now, however, once the normal water level was restored, the besiegers could follow the usual routine methods and the garrison was in no position to repair the damage.

It should be noted that while all this was going on, Vauban "...had all day taken great care to preserve the Town; a few shells had flown over the Works of the Attack and the same chance had likewise directed a few Bullets that way, but Monsieur Vauban had taken the Houses, Buildings, Gates etc. under his protection, all which made people imagine it was the King's intention to keep the Place, but the true reason was that devastation and burning contribute nothing to the taking of a Place, only consuming Ammunition to no purpose, and occasioning charges in repair afterwards..." The anonymous writer of this account of the siege cannot have been unaware that both Catinat and Vauban were among the most civilized and humane commanders of the age.

On the night of May the 31st to June the 1st, the miners were able to attack the ravelin, which fascines were thrown into the ditch, and the garrison countered with small-arms fire and grenades, also bringing their one small mortar into action, not very effectively. The troops in the ravelin withdrew into the 'Keep' in the gorge at this point. On the 1st June the King wrote to Vauban expressing his wishes for a speedy recovery and urging him that he send short memoranda by his secretary rather than fuller reports on progress.

By June the 2nd there were six 24- pounder guns in the covered way firing on the faces of the bastion and four more directed at the flanks, the objective being to "...cut the Wall in a direct line about six feet above the surface of the Water."

On the 3rd June the defenders of what remained of the ravelin offered to surrender, as the bridge to the town had been broken down, and they were "received Prisoners of War". About mid-day "...a great Pane of the Face of the left Bastion about fifteen Toises long, fell to the ground, beaten down by our Cannon". Vauban's next problem was that while static water could be crossed by simply building a dam across to the breach, in this case the river water was moving. Piers were therefore constructed by using piles and sandbags with fascines loaded with earth, and joined up with planks.

By night it was felt that the defence was almost adequately breached but firing continued on June the 6th, with some unexpectedly active response from the garrison, which caused some casualties, the embrasures for the batteries being "...a little carelessly made, as too frequently happens when one has a contempt for the enemy..."

During the following night a length of the revetment of the Limburg Bastion was destroyed, so that there were now two considerable breaches. At two o'clock in the afternoon of June the 5th, Catinat ordered the Comte De Marsin to lead twenty companies of grenadiers to the assault, but at this point a Major of Foot appeared on the breach to treat while a poor frightened Drummer beat the Chamade".

Catinat himself was on the spot and terms were readily agreed, hostages duly exchanged and the capitulation settled; that a gate should be given up to the French "that the garrison should march out on the 7th at ten of the clock in the morning through the Breach, with their Arms and Baggage and Drums beating, but without Cannon or Mortars, to be conducted in three days to Dendermonde .... to be furnished with fifty waggons, to carry their sick and wounded, some of which to be covered, but on condition they should be visited, all Deserters to be given up..."

It was also agreed to hand over "five Officers of Distinction", to be held till five officers in Allied hands, captured at Namur, had been duly ransomed.

Commissaries of Artillery entered the town to take over the Magazine, and officers of the miners to check the state of mines and galleries. The Major of the Regiment of Navarre (one of the Vieux Regiments - the besiegers included a number of elite units) inspected the gates while his Grenadiers occupied the Mons Gate. The garrison marched out at 9 a.m ..... in the van of all marched a fine Company of Grenadiers, with the State-Major on horseback; then the Prince of Anhalt, the Governor and the Major; the Governor saluted the Marshal and the Count of Toulouse, who were on the spot.

There were three Imperial Regiments of the Allies, pretty good ones, followed by their free Companies, three Regiments of Walloons, and lastly an Italian Regiment. A great part of the last deserted to us as soon as they came with- in the Line of our Troops, the usual prac- tice of the Neapolitans..." The cavalry and baggage obviously would have had difficulty leaving by the breach, and rejoined their comrades outside the town, leaving by the Tournay Gate.

In all, the garrison moved out 3,500 of all ranks. Eight battalions marched in to take over the town, and six thousand men were set to work to raze all the siege works, and start repairs to the defences. The French casualties amounted to some 50 of all ranks killed and 150 wounded, but this included seven engineers. Vauban stayed on for some days to convalesce and also to see to his correspondence. One of his priorities was always to ensure that his engineers received due recognition of their services, promotion, back pay, or special consideration for the wounded or disabled by service, and he wrote to Barbezieux' the War Minister, several times during the next three weeks on this subject.

There were also two letters, one very long, from Louis XIV, congratulating him and wishing well, and also pressing for plans to besiege Oudenarde next. But by now peace was near and the Treaty of Ryswick was concluded on 20th September 1697, and Ath reverted to Spanish rule in the same year, under the peace terms. In 1702, however, the French were back again with the accession of Philip V to the throne of Spain when the garrisons (Dutch, as part of the Barrier clause of the Peace of Ryswick) of the Spanish Netherlands fortresses were replaced by French troops.

In 1706, following the battle of Ramillies and the occupation of most of the Low Countries by the Allies, Ath was again besieged, this time by Overkirk's army. It was captured after a siege of 12 days, on the 2nd October, the garrison surrendering as prisoners of war, though the officers were allowed to retain "their Swords and Baggage, and the Soldiers their Knapsacks..." Atli continued to be a fortress town until 1858, when the fortifications were dismantled and replaced by boulevards.

SOURCES:

1. de Rochas d'Aiglun, A. Vauban, sa Famille et ses Ecrits 2 vols. Paris, 1910 Vol. II, pp. 11-22, 449467
2. Quincy, C. Sevin, Marquis de, Histoire Militaire du Regne de Louis Le Grand. 7 vols., Paris 1726 Vol. 111, pp. 291-300
3. The Memoirs of M. Goulon, to which is added a Journal of the Siege of Ath in the year 1697, under the conduct of M. Vauban, Ed. J. Heath, London, 1 745, pp. 91-144. This is a translation of the 1720 edition of the memoirs of the Huguenot engineer, Charles Goulon (sometimes spelt Goullon, or Le Goullon), first published in 1706 at the Hague. The siege of Atli was appended to later editions. Goulon was not here; by that date he was in the Imperial service.
4. Overkirk's report on the Allied siege of Atli is to be found in BRODRICK, T. -"A compleat History of the Late War in the Netherlands", London 1713, pp. 175-176. By Vauban's standards, casualties were high on both sides.
5. Vauban, Sebastian Le Prestre de, "De L'Attaque et de La Defense des Places". The Hague, 1737, passim.