Jeremy Black, Allan Sutton, 1990, 217 pp. illus., maps, bibliog.

My immediate reaction on learning of this title was "Why yet another book on the '45?", but Dr. Black's work is not just one more repetitious trip across familiar terrain. The author's expertise in the political history of the 18th century stands him in good stead as he places the '45 in the context of the whole Jacobite movement from 1689 onwards, and its place in European politics. (The actual battle of Culloden occupies only 11 pages, including illustrations.)

Unlike some previous general surveys, Dr. Black's book does not succumb to what was once described as "the cheap scent of the white rose", but attempts to give a realistic estimate of the strength of both the Jacobite and Hanoverian causes. In general, apathy towards both seems to have been the predominant feeling.

The author rightfully places emphasis on the effects on both sides during the '45 of French attitudes and the possibility of an invasion of England, and unlike some previous studies, he gives equal emphasis to the English governments attitudes and actions during the campaign.

Dr. Black shows that the English authorities were already in fear of a French invasion before Charles Edward landed in Scotland, and failed to realise how much his expedition was a personal initiative. This concern about a French landing was not so much because of any potential English Jacobite threat, which would probably never have amounted to very much, but because of the general indifference of the bulk of the population. The regime recognised that its survival rested on the support of the regular army and possession of London.

As a result the defence of Southern England was made a priority, even after the initial Jacobite successes in Scotland, which, it was rightly felt, could ultimately be reversed. Yet the North of England, with its rich potential in supplies and recruits, could not be totally abandoned to the Jacobites, though its defence was made more difficult by its being split into two by the Pennines. After a rather speculative excursion into cultural and subconscious influences, the author gives the practical reasons for the English government's decision to send Marshal Wade to Newcastle to defend the eastern invasion route.

The government's forebodings about the enthusiasm of the ordinary population were borne out by the miserable showing of the militia of North-West England when the Jacobite invasion began.

Dr. Black on balance believes that the Jacobites made a wrong decision in turning back at Derby, pointing out that Cumberland had been out-manoeuvred, and was unlikely to have been able to interpose his full strength between Charles Edward and London, whose population was unlikely to have put up any more active resistance than that displayed by other English cities, whilst the 4,000 troops in the Finchley camp were of very variable quality. Once London fell, the author claims that the logistical system of the regular forces would have collapsed, and draws parallels with the Revolution of 1688, (though it must be said that on that occasion the regular forces showed less enthusiasm to fight for the current regime than was to be the case in 1745).

The main cause of Jacobite failure was the breakdown of confidence between the Scottish leaders and Charles Edward, after the latter's optimistic promises of widespread support from the English Jacobites and French proved false.

It is fair to say that once the retreat began the Jacobite cause was doomed. It received a temporary reprieve when Cumberland was recalled to meet a renewed threat of French invasion, and by the incomplete Jacobite victory at Falkirk, of which Dr. Black gives a good analysis, pointing out the opportunity which was lost to re-occupy Edinburgh.

He is also good on the frequently neglected operations leading up to Culloden, in which the Jacobites achieved some measure of success in strengthening their position in the Highlands and Perthshire, though it is difficult to agree with General George Murray's claim that they could have held out for several years, and eventually gained reasonable terms. In an~ case, lack of funds with which to pay his troops left Char es Edward with little choice but to fight Cumberland whilst he still had an army with which to do so, though he chose the, wrong place and time. Dr. Black aptly sums up Culloden as a "killing ground", where the Jacobites were defeated by superior discipline and firepower.

A postscript traces the final eclipse of the Jacobite movement, as it lost credibility and support both at home and abroad, and finally ceased even to have any "nuisance value" for England's enemies.

The book is well-illustrated and produced, and based upon extensive use of both primary and secondary sources. Recommended to all interested in the Jacobite Risings.