Brent Nosworthy [388 pp], Hippocrene Books, New York 1990,

Very much a curate's egg this book begins badly with a less than convincing discussion of 17th century tactics but soon moves on to a rather more authoritative examination of mid-18th century tactics. The author, a game designer, professes himself to be chiefly interested in the development of "Napoleonic" tactics from their roots in the supposedly staid mid 18th century doctrines, chiefly French and Prussian. If these limitations are accepted, the book is both interesting and valuable but as a general survey of infantry and cavalry tactics in this period it rather falls short of expectations with insufficient discussion of Austrian, Russian and to some extent British usages, to make it a truly comprehensive survey This is particularly unfortunate in the light of the French and Prussians not fighting each other on the same battlefield after Rossbach in 1757.

Nevertheless, it would probably be fair to say that this concentration upon the French and Prussian armies reflects the published literature rather than any real want of application by Mr. Nosworthy. Within its limitations his study is nothing if not thorough and he draws the very important distinction between the theoretical doctrines and the sometimes rather different practices actually followed in the field. Thus one learns that while Frederick's generals were careful to follow his Instructions [republished by Partisan Press] when the great man's eye was upon them, they usually did their own thing when he wasn't looking.

Similarly it is heartening to discover that although all manner of methods of "firing" were recommended the British were not alone in delivering an initial volley by the fancy "Platoon Firing" and then simply blazing away as fast as possible without regard to any such nonsense.

One important point which emerges very clearly from this book is the degree of real difference between the various armies. Whether or not you accept the proposition that British soldiers were stolid and reliable, French ones bold and excitable, Prussians perfectly disciplined, Austrians slow and ponderous and Russians too thick to notice when they'd been killed, is neither here nor there. The point is that their officers did and framed their tactical doctrines accordingly.

There are to me some irritating errors, chiefly as to terminology, such as referring to NCOs as subaltern officers ja deadly insult to anyone who has been a member of a sergeants' messl but the inauspicious start aside this book has much to recommend it and it ought to be essential reading for anyone seriously interested in mid-18th century warfare, with the caveat that it ought to be a basis for further discussion and research rather than taken as holy writ.