"Divisions were not stronger than brigades ought to have been,
nor brigades than regiments."

--Jubal Early

By 1864, things were looking pretty grim for the Confederacy. Grant and Lee were about to begin their face-off at Petersburg. Desertion and attrition had taken a terrible toll on the Army of Northern Virginia. Jubal Early's Corps had dwindled down to about 8,000 men.

Ironically, the idea of an invasion can be attributed to Union Major General Hunter. Hunter was moving through the Shenandoah Valley hoping to divert some of Lee's troops from Petersburg. He had captured Staunton and Lexington, burned the Virginia Military Institute, and now he was advancing on the railroad center at Lynchburg. Lee, meanwhile, had decided that a diversion was necessary in order to draw some of the pressure Grant was applying. Because Early's Corps was the smallest, it was the one Lee could most afford to do without. Early's Corps also contained the remnants of Stonewall Jackson's Valley Army. These men would prove useful, because they were all too familiar with the ground they would be covering -- the Shenandoah Valley.

On June 13, before sunrise, Early's Corps left the Confederate lines unnoticed by Union troops. Their orders were to advance through the Valley, join up with Breckinridge's Division, strike the Union forces under Hunter, cross the Potomac near Leesburg, at or above Harper's Ferry, with the ultimate objective of threatening Washington. By doing this, Lee hoped Grant would be recalled, just as McClellan had been,or at the least Grant might be compelled to remove troops from the front.

Meanwhile, General Lew Wallace had been placed in command of the Middle Department, which included the defense of most of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the eastern shore of Virginia. He was formerly an Illinois lawyer and had begun the war as commander of the 11th Indiana Volunteers, a Zouave regiment that won prominence by defeating a superior Confederate force at Romney, Virginia.

By the end of 1861, he had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general. He helped the North win its first major victory at Fort Donelson. At age thirty-four, he had become the youngest major general in the Union Army. But, a few weeks later, at the Battle of Shiloh, he was made the scapegoat for the Union disaster in the first day of fighting. Federal Chief of Staff, General Henry W. Halleck, removed Wallace from field command and attempted to keep him inactive for the rest of the war.

The Confederate march up the Valley Pike was rapid and unopposed. On June 19, Union General Hunter spotted Early's Corps. Thinking that he was facing a major offensive, he retreated into the mountains. Early redirected his troops to the northeast, rather than pursue Hunter. The troops paused at Lexington, where they passed the grave of Stonewall Jackson. They finally encountered some resistance at Martinsburg, where Franz Sigel opposed them with 5,000 men. Living up to his recently acquired nickname, the "flying Dutchman," Sigel fled across the Potomac and entrenched his force opposite Harper's Ferry at Maryland Heights. This enabled Early to cross the Potomac above Harper's Ferry and bypass Sigel's force, but not before the Confederates would help themselves to the Union equipment and stores held at Harper's Ferry.

In response, only one man took decisive action -- Lew Wallace. Wallace first received warnings of Early's movement on July 2 from John W. Garrett, president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, whose agents reported Early's actions in the Valley. Other than Sigel's troops, Wallace knew that there was nothing substan-tially blue between Early and the Capital.

On July 3, he learned that General Hunter was in the Kanawha Valley, leaving the Shenandoah undefended all the way to Winchester. On July 4, he received a telegram from General Sigel reporting his encounter with Early and told him he had evacuated Martinsburg. Washington first learned of Early's invasion on July 4, when fugitives from around the Harper's Ferry area had arrived with rumors of at least 10,000 Confederate invaders. Unable to get accurate figures or information, Halleck dismissed the reports as exaggerated accounts of a minor raid.

Wallace decided not to sit, wait, and hope things would work out. He set off with Tyler's brigade, which consisted of Baltimore militia, and rushed to the Monocacy River to block Early's route to Washington. He left at midnight in secrecy so that General Halleck would not attempt to stop him from going to the front. Wallace planned to find the enemy, determine his numbers and his objective, and delay him as much as possible. At daybreak, Wallace surveyed the unfamiliar terrain that was shortly to become the Monocacy Battlefield.

By the evening of July 5, Early was across the Potomac and back on the march again. The troops marched past the old battlefields of Antietam and South Mountain. While the infantry made their way east, the cavalry went along collecting ransoms from the towns. These were to be paid in order to spare the towns the fate suffered by so many towns in the Shenandoah Valley during General Hunter's march south. Hagerstown was only forced to pay $20,000 instead of $200,000 through a misunderstanding between Early and McCausland. When they arrived at Frederick, Early told the city authorities he would spare the town, if they would contribute $200,000 to the Confederate cause. The mayor, William G. Cole, said an amount that high could not be raised by a town of only 8,000 people. Early did agree, however, to give them some time to come up with the money. After all, artillery had begun firing, and this meant someone was trying to prevent his troops from crossing the Monocacy, just two miles away.

On July 6, Wallace learned that Colonel David Clendenin and the 8th Illinois Cavalry were near the mouth of the Monocacy River, looking for Mosby's raiders. Wallace asked him to join, although he was not authorized to issue him orders. Two days later, Wallace had also been reinforced by Ricketts' Division. Later that same day, Wallace received word that it would be at least more two days before reinforcements could reach Washington. This meant he would have to attempt to hold off Early here at the Monocacy River and delay him long enough so that he would not reach Washington before reinforcements would.

At a first glance at the Union positions, Early was convinced that July 9 would be a long day. He did not like he idea of a frontal assault, and while he was calculating which flank to attack, McCausland had found a ford uncovering the Union left. Reacting quickly, Early sent Gordon's Division across. After some heavy fighting, the Union troops were in full rout. Early chose not to pursue him though, because prisoners would only slow his progress. He was still a day's march from Washington.

Although Wallace had been driven from the field, and had suffered 1,880 casualties, he had accomplished what he had hoped to do. He had mauled Early's army too badly for it to continue marching. Wallace had succeeded in delaying Early by one full day. Back in Frederick, the word got out of a smashing Confederate victory, prompting the town officials to hand over the $200,000 levy to save their town. The next day, as Early continued toward Washington, he began to realize what could be accomplished by capturing the capital, even if for just a short time. He saw his troops putting the torch to the navy yard and its ships, seizing millions of bonds from the Treasury Department, and looting storehouses full of medical, military, and commissary supplies.

Early arrived at the outskirts of Washington on the evening of the 11th. He held a meeting with the other officers to decide on the best course of action. Washington, though heavily undermanned, still had dozens of forts and cannon surrounding it. Careful scouting must be done to find out exactly how many troops were left to defending Washington. On the morning of the 12th, Early learned that two corps from Grant's army had just arrived to bolster the defenses by some 10,000 men, with 15,000 more still en route. This news ended Early's chances of capturing Washington. He stayed the whole day, but began to pull out that evening under the cover of darkness. Union troops unsuccessfully tried to trap Early before he could make it back to Lee.

Early returned with 1,000 prisoners and $220,000. He had defeated the North in a battle just a day's march from Washington and, more importantly, he had forced Grant to shift troops from Petersburg, thus delaying the inevitable fall of the city. Foreign observers were impressed by the bold maneuver, even though they gave little more than encouraging words. Furthermore, Northerners began to wonder why the South, which was supposedly losing the war, could continue to launch invasions into the northern states. In hindsight, it is easy for us military history buffs to see and understand just how badly wounded the South was by this time. But it was not this obvious to voters in the North, who were quickly becoming the only weapon the Confederacy had left if it was to survive.

As for Wallace, he was blamed for not defeating Early at Monocacy. Halleck and Stanton belittled him and Lincoln sent a cold dispatch to Grant informing him of the defeat. Wallace was initially relieved of command, but was later reinstated by Grant when it became clear what Wallace had accomplished, and how important that delay had been. About thirty-five years later, Wallace met General Gordon, then a U.S. Senator, at the White House, and they discussed Monocacy.

Gordon said he had wished for a long time to make the acquaintance of "the only person who had whipped him during the war." Wallace reminded him that the Confederates were left holding the field. "But," said Gordon, "you snatched Washington out of our hands -- there was the defeat."

On one of the monuments at Monocacy battlefield is the inscription, "These men died to save the National Capital, and they did save it."

The Opposing Generals: Early vs. Wallace at Monocacy

The Battle of Monocacy

Bibliography

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: Red River to Appomattox. New York, Vintage Books, 1974.
Hand, Stephen. Run 5: The Battle of the Monocacy: Defending the Capital. Issue 22, 1993.
Johnson and Buell (editors) Battles & Leaders of the Civil War. Volume IV.
Morsberger, Robert E. Battle Chronicles of the Civil War: 1864. "The Battle that Saved Washington." New York, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1989.
Vandiver, Frank E. Jubal's Raid. New York, McGraw Hill, 1960.

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