Wave after wave of gray-clad Confederate troops surged onto the open field before the Union positions at Franklin, Tennessee. The rebels advanced as they had at Gettysburg, Shiloh and a dozen other battles -- a gray wave rolling toward the "blue bellies." The southerners surged forward with fierce rebel yells and all the Confederate elan they could muster. Suddenly, the Federal troops opened fire. Union rifles and cannon poured shot and shell into the Confederate lines. The withering fire shattered the first wave, but it was replaced with another and another after that. Confederate General John Hood watched passively as his army, the Army of Tennessee, was ripped to shreds before his very eyes. Despite the futility of the attack against the strong Union defensive positions, Hood ordered attack after attack until his army lay decimated before him. The general's action that day would not be forgotten by any who witnessed his incomparable military blunder.

Since the end of the battle, historians have sought to explain why Hood, an experienced and dedicated commander, launched a virtual suicide assault at Franklin. Several interesting theories have been put forth. Some say that Hood ordered the charge because he thought his own army was displaying cowardice in the face of the enemy. Many think that Hood used the charge as a punishment for his men. Others say that Hood, who had fallen in love with Ms. Sally Buchanan Preston, was out to impress her with a brilliant victory. When he could not achieve that, he launched his army in a final pyrrhic charge.

Still others say that Hood was just a bad commander. They argue he didn't do well in his studies at West Point, was aggressive to the point of recklessness and generally didn't care about small details. All these deficiencies, say experts, point to the flaws that led Hood to order a suicide charge.

All of these theories hold an element of truth, and present us with an insight into the thought processes going on inside General Hood's mind. However, overlooked and perhaps the most important factor governing Hood's action during the campaign, were his previous war wounds and his use of morphine to ease the pain. A look at Hood's actions from July to November 1864 show a man increasingly tormented with pain and suffering from the exhaustion it caused. Quite simply, General Hood was suffering from battle fatigue during the battle of Franklin.

Early Life

John Bell Hood was born in Kentucky in 1831. He was the son of a wealthy doctor. At age 18 he received an appointment to West Point. He graduated 45th out of a class of 52 in 1853, and was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division in California. Two years later he was transferred to the 2nd Cavalry, which was an elite, hand-picked unit composed of the finest officers in the army. Young Hood learned his early military lessons under the tutelage of Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee, who were two of the top leaders of the unit.

When the South seceded from the Union, Hood was so disgusted his native state of Kentucky would not secede, he moved to Texas, became a resident and enlisted in the Confederate Army. During the war, Hood again served with General Johnston, and then with Lee. He gained fame as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia's Texas Brigade and was considered one of Lee's better brigade commanders. His courage and aggressiveness on the battlefield resulted in his constant exposure to enemy fire. At Gettysburg he received a wound that permanently disabled his left arm. After the battle he was transferred to Richmond to recuperate from his wound. There is no doubt that the pain of the wound was considerable and that he used morphine, a common pain killer in those days, in order to ease the pain and get much-needed rest.

His recovery was not yet complete when, in September, his division was sent to join General Bragg in the Battle of Chickamauga. Unwilling to relinquish his command, Hood returned to lead his division and had his leg shattered by a minie ball during the battle. The wound was so severe that many thought Hood would die, however, the doctors saved the general, but had to amputate his leg.

At thirty-three years, he was old beyond his years. He was exhausted from the combination of his wounds and his long campaigns. Although he would "appear" to make a strong recovery, there is no doubt that he suffered much pain and needed morphine to rest, at least in the initial stages of recovery. Hood was promoted to two-star general and should have been retired from active duty. However, the Confederacy was desperate for good leadership and Hood became an advisor at GHQ in Richmond. His efforts there were certainly worthy of note. As long as the duty wasn't too strenuous and he had an opportunity to rest at the end of the day, he performed well.

March to the Sea

On May 5th 1864, a Union Army Group of 100,000 men under General Sherman advanced into Georgia and began its attack on Atlanta. The Union intended to capture the crucial Confederate transportation and manufacturing hub and then cripple any other production facilities they could reach. The Union army was opposed by General Johnston and the 60,000 man Army of Tennessee. Johnston did not want to engage Sherman in open battle. Instead, he positioned his army in solid defensive positions hoping the Union would attack. If Sherman took the bait, the Confederates would inflict grievous casualties on the attacking infantry and force the Union army to retreat or at least stop to regroup. Johnston found and occupied good defensive positions in Dalton, Resaca, Cassvile, and Allatoona. Sherman however, would not bite.

The Confederate Army was not large enough to occupy a continuous line and the Union had only to find the flank and move around it. Sherman was only moving about a mile a day, but he was not taking any losses and each day's advance brought him closer to Atlanta. Finally, on June 27th, Sherman attacked a solid Confederate defensive position outside of Marietta at the battle of Kenesaw Mountain. The results were predictable. The Union lost 3,000 men, while the Confederates lost 800. Sherman had relearned his lesson about attacking heavily defended positions.

After the battle he sent his troops in a wide sweeping movement and turned the Confederate flank. Johnston had no choice but to retreat to the Chattahoochee River, the last natural defensive line before Atlanta. The Confederates occupied a strong defensive position but on July 9th, Sherman sent his troops on another flanking maneuver, crossed the Chattahoochee River and turned the Confederate position again. The Confederates retreated to the outskirts of Atlanta and prepared for a counter attack. President Davis was unimpressed with Johnston's delaying tactics and relieved him of command on July 17th.

The South needed an aggressive commander who would at least fight to defend Atlanta. President Davis had his choice of several commanders. Generals Lee, Hardee or Beauregard were all available and would have been excellent choices. However, believing there was still fight left in General Hood, he assigned him to take charge of the Army of Tennessee in front of Atlanta and stave off the inevitable defeat.

Hood took over the army at Atlanta and realized how tenuous his position was. If he stayed in the city and did nothing, he was sure to be surrounded and besieged. If he fell back looking for a better defensive position, Sherman would push the Confederate Army all the back to Florida. His only option was to attack. Knowing Sherman would advance on a wide front, he looked for the weakest part of the Union Army and attacked.

Battle of Peachtree Creek

On July 20th, Hood engaged the Union forces at the Battle of Peachtree Creek. His attack fell on, and surprised, Union General Thomas' men. The attack might have been successful, had not the veteran Union troops recovered their composure, turned to face the Confederates and driven them off. The battle involved about 40,000 men. Hood lost 2,500 casualties in the battle. Thomas lost 1,600. Hood tried again on July 22nd and the 28th. He lost a combined total of 12,000 casualties to the Union 4,500. Despite his efforts, though, the Union would not be denied. On August 27, Sherman again swung around the open flank, cut the last surviving railroad into Atlanta and cut off the Confederate defenders. On the 31st, Atlanta was evacuated. The next day Sherman and his men marched into the city.

Hood is much criticized for the defense of the city. His critics point out that Johnston, while conducting his withdrawal, had suffered few casualties while Hood, in his reckless manner, threw away valuable troops in a futile attack. General Hood certainly suffered many casualties while attacking the superior Union forces. However, he was trying to defend one of the South's major cities. The loss of Atlanta was a great political, economic and military blow. The city certainly warranted a spirited defense and the losses were inevitable.

After the fall of Atlanta, both armies were exhausted. General Sherman settled down in Atlanta to rest, while General Hood and the Army of the Tennessee moved to Palmetto, Georgia to rest and regroup. On September 28, President Davis arrived at Hood's headquarters. His visit had many purposes but the primary reason was to confer with Hood about his future plans. When the President met Hood he found him very depressed about the loss of Atlanta.

In fact, he was so depressed he offered Davis his resignation. Davis would hear none of it and wanted to know what Hood planned to do next. Hood suggested the Confederate army move north of Atlanta and attack Sherman's 400-mile long supply and communication line. Once the line was cut Sherman could not advance. He would have to move north, over ground he had already occupied, and fight the Confederate army again. With a little luck the Union army might be defeated in detail. The plan was quickly approved and put into motion.

On October 1, the Confederate Army moved north and west to attack the railroad that connected Atlanta to Chattanooga. Hood had taken the initiative away from Sherman. The Union had no option but to pursue and try to bring the rebels to battle. Hood had stolen a march on Sherman. Before the Union could react, the Confederates had attacked and captured several small garrisons along the railroad. By October 13, the southerners had captured over 1,000 Union troops and destroyed miles of track and rolling stock.

The Union Army could not be everywhere at once. Trying to catch the elusive Hood was driving the army mad. At this point, Sherman decided to cut himself off from his supply line and, while living off the land, cut a wide swath of destruction across the south. His destination was the Georgia coast where he would be resupplied, if necessary, by the Navy. On October 22, Sherman withdrew and headed back toward Atlanta to begin preparations for his famous "March to the Sea." Hood was left without an enemy.

Hood was obviously tired at this point. His fatigue is reflected in his planning during the period. On October 8, Hood presented one plan for cutting Sherman's supply line. The next day he radically altered the plan. Suddenly, when Sherman withdrew, Hood began talking of an even bolder plan. He would move north, invade Tennessee, defeat the Union Army, capture Nashville and move across the mountains to join Lee at Petersburg, Virginia.

Many historians have pointed out how unrealistic this plan was. There are some who argue that Hood was trying to recapture lost glory or trying to impress in girlfriend in Richmond. There is no doubt some truth to both theories. However, when one realizes that the plan was devised by a man who was suffering the early stages of battle fatigue, the origin of the plan begins to make sense. However, despite the factors that drove Hood to conceive such an unrealistic plan, it was approved by both General Beauregard, Hood's nominal superior, and President Davis. The Army of Tennessee prepared for its last invasion.

Winter Invasion

During the early part of November, as the Confederates prepared for the invasion, Hood is much criticized for his lack of attention to command and control and supply matters. Hood was never good at staff work and now, suffering as he was, these critical areas received even less attention. General Beauregard noted that Hood was not behaving rationally. Still with all the obvious signs of a man about to collapse mentally, if not physically, Hood was allowed to continue in command of an army about to embark on an invasion in the dead of winter.

Hood led his army northwest from Gadsden, Alabama to the Tennessee river. He was searching for an unprotected crossing site. By the time he found it at Florence and got his army across, it was November 21, and his army was advancing in the middle of a raging snow storm. Despite the obvious pain the snow and cold must have caused Hood, he ordered his army forward in a series of brilliant flanking maneuvers. He outflanked the Union army stationed at Pulaski and forced it back to Columbia on November 24.

On November 29, with the Union firmly entrenched in Columbia, Hood deployed his artillery in front of the town, as a demonstration, and then outflanked the Union position causing the Federals to retreat.

On the afternoon of the 29th of November the lead elements of Hood's 54,000-man army attacked the small Union garrison in the town of Spring Hill. The Union had been reinforcing the town but the main Union army, the 34,000-man Army of Ohio, was still ten miles south in Columbia. If Hood could cut the main Columbia Pike, the Union forces would be surrounded.

At about 3:00 pm, Hood arrived on the field and, unaware that his generals were preparing for an attack, ordered the nearest infantry division into the advance. The advance caused much confusion as several commanders thought this was the beginning of the main attack, while others thought it was some sort of diversion. The confusion caused the entire attack to collapse and the Confederate command was now hopelessly muddled.

The confusion was understandable. The invasion was now a month old and during that time, the army had been constantly on the move. The constant marching, fighting and tension of the campaign had worn out the men. By the time they reached Spring Hill, they had shot their bolt. They were exhausted. Now in late afternoon of November 29, the Confederate Army just stopped. Units designated to attack, failed to find their jump-off points. Others received orders and counter-orders and spent the afternoon marching and counter-marching. The attack never materialized and by dusk the Confederate Army was ready to set up camp and get some rest.

At about 6:00 pm, Hood retired to his headquarters. He was under the misconception that his army extended across the Columbia Pike along the southern and southeastern side of Spring Hill. He firmly believed that the Union Army in Columbia was cut off and surrounded. Unfortunately, the Confederate Army had not cut the road and the Union Army had already begun its retreat from Columbia, along the Pike, through Spring Hill to Franklin, a town about ten miles to the north. Hood took morphine late in the afternoon and was in no shape to tour the front to find the error in his position. He was obviously in much pain and needed rest. In fact, his condition is best exemplified during the last staff meeting he held during the day, which took place around 8:00 pm.

At this point, Hood, having been finally told that his forces had not cut the Columbia Pike, asked General Cheatham if he could spare a brigade to close the route. Commanding generals normally do not ask subordinates to do things. However, Hood was probably already feeling the warming effects of the morphine. When General Cheatham said his unit was incapable of performing the task, Hood acquiesced and asked General Forrest to occupy the pike. Forrest promised to try. With that, the matter was settled and Hood went to bed.

Shortly after midnight, a private entered Hood's headquarters to report that the Union Army was moving smartly down the Columbia Pike through Spring Hill, and heading north. At this point, Hood should have been on his feet issuing orders to close the gap in the lines. However, he was incapable of doing anything other than issuing a muddled order and going back to sleep. This from a commander who was known to be overly aggressive, speaks volumes about Hood's state of mind and command abilities the day before the Battle of Franklin.

By morning the Union Army had passed completely through Spring Hill and was setting up its defenses around the town of Franklin. When Hood awoke and was appraised of the situation he went into a rage. He met with his generals and accused them of incompetence. The meeting was so heated that Hood was almost challenged to a duel by one of his irate commanders. This overt aggression was unusual for Hood. However, the conduct is quite in accordance with a man suffering from exhaustion and the after-effects of taking morphine. There was nothing left to do but to get the Confederate Army on the road and pursue the Union forces. The army assembled and covered the ten miles, arriving south of Franklin at about 3:00 pm.

The Battle of Franklin

As the Confederate Army arrived south of Franklin, it massed just below a series of small hills known as Winstead Hill. When Hood arrived at Winstead Hill, he could clearly see the general lay-out and strength of the Union position. He had a pretty good idea of the enemy's order of battle and knew many of the enemy generals he was fighting. However, despite all this knowledge, Hood ordered an immediate attack. Several of his generals argued that the position could be out-flanked. Hood would have none of it. He again ordered the attack and the Confederate Army moved out to assemble for the charge.

The Union position at Franklin was quite strong. The Union forces were occupying positions that had been prepared a year before during a previous battle. In addition, the Union artillery was well placed while the Confederate artillery was still strung out on the road south of Franklin. Hood's attack was a virtual suicide attack.

The Confederates bravely charged into the teeth of the strong Union defensive positions. As they advanced, their formations were raked by concentrated artillery fire. The Confederate casualties were staggering. The one-sided battle lasted until 9:00 pm and cost the Confederates almost 7,000 casualties. The Union lost about 2,000.

While the attack was still going on, Hood retired to his headquarters. This is a rather extraordinary move from a man who was famous for leading his troops into the thick of battle. This was not the John Bell Hood of old. He was, in front of Franklin, an exhausted and confused general. He needed rest and escape from the pain of his old war wounds. He would not get much of either on that day in front of Franklin.

In the morning, the Union Army had retreated again. The Federals were now back in Nashville and had been reinforced with even more Union troops. They were prepared to take on Hood should he be foolish enough to approach the town. Hood and the remains of the Army of Tennessee stumbled forward to the gates of Nashville. They had lost many fine officers and noncommissioned officers at Franklin and the units were disorganized and disheartened. When the Union forces sortied out of the city on December 15 and 16, they had little trouble crushing the remainder of the Army of Tennessee. Hood lost an additional 5,300 men while the Union lost 3,000.

Hood's actions during the period from July to November, 1864, have been much criticized by historians and military men alike. His actions, however, are always viewed in light of the actions of J. B. Hood at Gettysburg and Chickamauga. By 1864, all that had changed. Hood was but a shell of his previous self. His wounds, coupled with the effects of fatigue and the use of pain killers, had muddled his thinking and left him with extreme mood swings. He would speak of conquering Tennessee one day and the cowardice of his army the next. He was never good at attention to details, but during this campaign, he was visibly worse. His ability to think straight, concentrate on details and plans was being hindered by his fatigue.

Hood was always aggressive, but his order to charge at Franklin was not the result of an insidious plan to punish his troops or impress his girlfriend. Rather, it was simply a case that he could not think of anything else to do. Exhausted and in pain, he chose the simplest course of action and charged. General John Bell Hood was suffering from battle fatigue when he began his campaign in July. All of the signs are there, they simply were not recognized in a man with such a prestigious reputation as Hood's.

If there is fault in this story, it must rest firmly with Jefferson Davis for asking General Hood to do more than was humanly possible. General Hood certainly made many grievous mistakes during the campaign, but his Herculean effort to give his all for the southern cause certainly deserves recognition.

Battle Fatigue in the Modern Army

Currently, the United States Army teaches that battle fatigue cases may be the first and best source of replacements in a battle. This statement may sound odd at first, but if battle fatigue is treated quickly and properly, most soldiers will recover and return to full duty. These soldiers will be readily available as replacements and all will have been exposed to combat. They will, at that point, be tested, veteran troops. It is no wonder, then, that the Army spends a great deal of time studying battle fatigue.

Currently, battle fatigue is classified into mild, moderate and severe type cases. In the most severe cases, the soldier collapses under the stress and fatigue and has to be returned to a major hospital for long-term care. However, the mild and moderate cases are ones that concern us. The signs of both are the same: only the severity differs. In the early phases of battle fatigue, the soldier becomes disoriented and easily confused.

He or she may become aggressive or aggravated at the smallest event or occurrence. Communication between exhausted soldiers becomes difficult as they have difficulty expressing themselves and understanding orders. If these and other symptoms are not recognized the soldier will fall into a deeper state of depression which finally ends in the "thousand yard stare" and complete collapse.

Both mild and moderate battle fatigue can be treated at or near the front by simply allowing the soldier to relax from the strain and stress of battle. A hot meal, shower, and clean clothes, all help to bring the exhausted soldier back to reality. However, if leaders do not recognize or treat these two types of fatigue properly, it is likely that the soldier will suffer a total collapse and experience severe battle fatigue.

Sources

Cox, Jacob D., The March to the Sea: Franklin to Nashville. Broadfoot Publishing Co., Wilmington, North Carolina, 1989.

Jewell, Carey C., Harvest of Death. Exposition Press, Hicksville, New York, 1976.

McDonough, James L. and Thomas L. Connelly, Five Tragic Hours. The University of Tennessee Press. Knoxville, Tennessee. 1983.

Woodworth, Steven E. Jefferson Davis and His Generals. University Press of Kansas. Lawrence, Kansas,1990.

Author's Biography

Timothy J. Kutta earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in History from Lock Haven State University. He is the former Head of the History Department at the United States Army Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Virginia.

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