INTRODUCTION

By the early 1590's, the war between Spain and England had settled into an uneasy stalemate, with no prospect of a quick ending. For England, especially the West Country, an ominous new development had occurred in October, 1590, with the landing of Spanish forces in Brittany. This move seemed to increase the threat of an invasion of Cornwall, and led the English authorities to commence somewhat spasmodic efforts to fortify Plymouth and the Scilly Isles, regarded as the most likely targets for Spanish attack.

Control of local defence efforts in Cornwall lay in the hands of the Deputy Lieutenants, Sir William Mohun and Sir Francis Godolphin. In 1588, at any rate in theory, Cornwall had claimed to be able to furnish for its defence 5,560 men, including 1,395 shot, 633 corselets, 1956 bills and halberds, 1528 bows, 4 lances and 96 light horse, and the totals were probably roughly similar seven years later.

The main problem with the defence of Cornwall lay in its isolation, and the great length of coastline, with its many bays and deepwater inlets, such as Falmouth, which were potential landing points.

During the next few years, the Spanish threat remained a potential cause for concern. By 1591 there were reported to be 5,000 Spanish troops in Brittany, faced by a fairly inadequate English force led by Sir John Norris, which was able to prevent the fall of Brest, but could achieve little else.

In January, 1595, the English forces were withdrawn from Brittany, leaving the Spaniards with a freer hand for operations by land and sea. In the spring there were reported to be 4 galleys and 10 lighter warships based on the port of Blavet in Brittany, and there were increasing reports of Spanish vessels being active around the coast of South-West England.

For Expedition Information

To a large extent this increased activity was a result of attempts to gain information about the expedition to the West Indies which Drake and Hawkins were fitting out in Plymouth, and in May a light Spanish warship seized some Mount's Bay Fishermen for interrogation. By July 10th, Sir Francis Godolphin, conscientious, if no soldier, was writing to the Earl of Essex expressing considerable concern for the safety of the Scilly Isles, which he felt to be the most likely Spanish objectives, in order to set up a new base for their raiders. "I rest still of the same mind that it needeth a stronger garrison, for the gathering of those Spaniards seemeth as a cloud that is like to fall shortly in some part of her Majesty's dominions".

By the following week, the threat of invasion seemed imminent; Spanish galleys were reported to be off the coast at various points. An apparent attempt to land had been made on the North Cornish coast at St. Eval near Padstow, but had been deterred by the local Trained Bands, which had mustered on the shoreline in strength. On July 21st, Godolphin was sifting increasingly alarmist reports and rumours of large numbers of Spanish vessels being sighted along the coast, and can have been little surprised, when, early on the 23rd, news arrived that the Spaniards were landing in Mount's Bay.

THE RIVAL FORCES

The bulk of the militia and Trained Bands at Godolphin's disposal would have been "shot", probably armed with calivers, though their ability to used them must have been variable. His pikemen would, in theory, have been equipped with back and breast plates, tassets, and headpiece, and armed with sword, dagger and 18-foot pike. In reality, it seems that many or most had no armour, either because they did not possess it, or because they abandoned it in the panic and confusion of the moment.

Many of the Cornish would have been armed with bills, 6 - 8 feet in length, and in the face of superior enemy firepower, virtually useless. Much the same could be said of the bowmen, of whom a number still survived in the Cornish militia. Godolphin would also have had a few light horsemen at his disposal armed with back and breast, headpiece, carbine, sword and dagger. His main potential advantage lay in numbers, but how effective this would prove to be would depend upon how quickly his forces could be mustered, and the degree of their commitment to the fight.

The Spaniards, though considerably fewer in numbers, had a number of advantages. Firstly, so long as they remained close to the shoreline, they had the backing of the firepower of the highly manoeuvrable galleys. Each of these may have carried up to a score of guns of up to 51b calibre, which could be expected to have at least considerable moral effect on untrained opponents. The galleys were, of course, highly vulnerable to any intervention by the heavier ships of the Royal Navy, should wind conditions permit.

It is unclear what calibre of troops were embarked aboard the galleys, but it is safe to assume that they were men of some experience. There seems to have been about 400 of them altogether, a mixture of pike and shot. In theory the foot companies of the Spanish tercios were of two main types. One was formed from 10 officers, 219 pikemen (half armoured, half unarmoured) and 20 musketeers; the other consisted of 11 officers, 224 arqubusiers and 15 pikemen. Something along the latter lines seems perhaps most likely. The shot would have been unarmoured, and it seems unlikely that the pikemen, because of the need for easy movement in embarking and disembarking, would have worn more than half-armour.

THE LANDING

The four Spanish galleys, their movements partially concealed by early morning mist, had slipped into Mount's Bay and caused widespread panic among the local inhabitants, most of whom did not wait to dispute the landing. In fact, the Spaniards' intentions were by no means as far-reaching as the increasingly panicky English authorities were to suppose. Commanded by Don Carlos de Amesquita, and with the valuable local knowledge of an English renegade, Captain Richard Burley, the Spanish force had engaged on a normal raiding cruise along the Channel, in the course of which they had already raided a Breton fishing village, when they had been blown across the Channel by adverse winds.

Later, the Spaniards were to feed information to prisoners, before they released them, that their intention had been to raid around St. Ives, Padstow and against the shipping in the Bristol Channel, but it seems more likely that the real reason for their landing in Mount's Bay was a shortage of drinking water, and that what followed was an intelligent exploitation of the lack of effective opposition.

The galleys dropped anchor off Mousehole, and ferried ashore a force estimated at 200 pike and shot, which burnt the village and some surrounding hamlets, including the village of Paul. The inhabitants had made off in panic.

News of the landing had reached Godolphin at his home about half way between Mousehole and Helston, and he hastily mustered his household servants, and rode into Penzance, where he found a scene of milling fugitives, chaos and panic. He gathered such men as he could on a green to the West of the town, but discovered that most of them were virtually unarmed, presumably because they had left their weapons behind in the haste of their flight. Indeed the local inhabitants seem to have had little stomach to resist the invaders, in part, apparently (or so a cynical English professional soldier later claimed) because of a local tradition that any enemy would land at "Merlin's Rock", the Spaniards' actual landing point, and burn Mousehole and Paul! This has the sound of a piece of special pleading after the event; more probably the key factors were lack of organisation and effective leadership, and a realistic appraisal of the opposition.

Godolphin sent urgently to Plymouth with news of the landing, urging Drake and Hawkins "to consider what is to be done for your own safety and our defence". He pointed out that Cornwall might be faced with a full-scale invasion, and "here is assembled 200 naked men. I attend the coming of more and so to make head towards the enemy."

Spanish Re-Embark

The Spaniards now re-embarked, and moving slightly Eastwards, landed their full force of 400 men at Newlyn, and sent an advance guard of about 50 men on to the hill above the village, from where they could look down on the scenes of confusion and lack of preparedness in Penzance.

Covered by fire from the guns aboard the galleys, the full Spanish force advanced along the shore towards the town. Once again, the Cornish forces were seized with panic; Godolphin vainly tried to make them stand in the marketplace, beating at the fugitives with his sword, but found himself deserted by all but his own servants and four or five of the local gentry.

The Spaniards, largely ignoring his efforts, were occupying the town all around him, and putting it to the torch. As Penzance went up in flames, Godolphin and his followers retired in haste about 2 miles eastwards around the Bay to the village of Marazion, intending to defend the causeway leading to St. Michael's Mount, which was already garrisoned, but must have seemed a likely enemy objective.

The Spaniards, after reportedly celebrating Mass on a hillside above Penzance, had returned to their ships, which now lay at anchor in the Bay. By evening several hundred more of the Cornish Trained Band had arrived at Marazion, and were preparing, with an unknown degree of enthusiasm, to defend that place against any further landing. If the Spaniards had come ashore again that evening, the amount of effective resistance which they would have encountered must be questionable, but in the event they made no further move until next day, when they made an apparent attempt to land again on the West side of the Bay, but were deterred by the increasing numbers of Cornish militia now appearing, who opened fire on the Spaniards with sufficient effect as to cause them to draw further out into the Bay out of range.

Godolphin's situation was now improving considerably; he had been joined from Plymouth by a professional soldier, Sir Nicholas Clifford, with up to 200 regulars, and some ships from Drake and Hawkins' force were reported to be off the Lizard. Whether the Spaniards attempted another landing or not, their best opportunity had passed, and indeed their position was becoming increasingly perilous. Apart from the fact that the prevailing South Easterly wind favoured the English ships, making it impossible for the galleys to use their sails to get out of Mount's Bay, they were also still short of water.

But now, before the Royal Navy could come up, the wind suddenly shifted to the North West, and the galleys quickly headed for the safety of the open sea, having dumped ashore such prisoners as they had taken.

The remainder of Don Carlos de Amesquita's cruise was undistinguished; the galleys sighted a large fleet of hulks, and attacked some stragglers, sinking one, but one of the Spanish galleys was so badly damaged that its crew were forced to scuttle it, and the expedition returned to Blavet without further incident.

AFTERMATH

The affair at Mount's Bay is an interesting "might have been" of history, and for the wargamer provides an opportunity to fight some small-scale or skirmish actions of the period on home soil. It also possibly provides a not altogether encouraging insight for the English into what might have happened if the Spaniards had ever succeeded in making a large-scale landing on English soil. Although the regular forces saw no action, the lack of motivation displayed by the local forces, who played a key part in defence plans was a source of alarm to the authorities, who launched a full-scale enquiry into what had happened. Ralegh was sent on what he described as "a miserable journey into Cornwall" to recommend improvements in defence measures, though he pointed out that the main problems were caused by geography.

In the event there was a good deal of discussion, and numerous proposals made, but it is not clear that very much was actually done. If either of the later Armadas of the 1590's had succeeded in making a landing, it is arguable that Cornish resistance would have been no more effective than in 1595. But, though the galleys continued to prowl the Channel until the end of the war, no other landing of note ever took place.

Related Article

Later Elizabethan Defense Plans

Sources

Graham, Winston "The Spanish Armadas" 1972.
Historical .Manuscripts Commission "Salisbury MSS"
Rowse, A.L. "Tudor Cornwall" 1941.
Tincey, John "The Armada Campaign, 1588". 1988.

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