by Stephen Bull
Article first appeared in
The Ordnance Society Journal
Reprinted with permission
There can be little doubt that powder quality and production were major keys to the development of early modern artillery. The mixture and reliability of gunpowder determined the force of the explosion and this, in turn dictated the velocity of they projectile and the stresses on the cylinder of the gun. In action these factors had a direct bearing on range, penetration, and the weight of the piece Contemporary authorities, both English and Continental, were agreed that of the three vital
ingredients of powder, saltpetre was the most critical. Robert Norton likened the constituents
to the 'soul', 'life' and 'body'. In this analogy saltpetre, the motivating force or active
ingredient, was the soul; sulphur, which engendered the flame, was the life; and charcoal the body, for it maintained the flame. Francis Malthus, Pietro Sardi and Jacobi von Wallhausen all concurred that it was saltpetre that was 'der Effectnant' or the 'material cause of the violence'. The philosopher soldier Rene Descartes most perceptively suggested that the explosion of gunpowder was the result of 'the extremely swift combustion and expansion of saltpetre'. ( 1 )
In modern terms, saltpetre is a product of the action of soil bacteria in air, on proteins. Ideal environments for its appearance therefore included tombs and dungheaps where the
bacteria, air and proteins, in the form of dung or corpses, was present. As early as 1562 Peter
Whitehorne observed of the phenomena: 'saltpetre is a mixture of manye substances, gotten out with fire and water of dry and durtie grund, or of yt flower, that growest oute of newe walles, in sellars, or of that grounde which is found lose within toombes, or desolate places, where raine cannot come in; In the which ground ... the same is engendered of an ayrie moistenesse drunke up, and gotten of the yeathy drines; whose nature ... I cannot tell how to be resolved, to say what properly it is.' ( 2 )
The morbid and scatological connections of the powder maker did not go unnoticed. Popular
speculation and theological debate links him with necromancy and dameonology - and may well
have given birth to the story of Berthold Schwarz, 'black' Berthold, who made and exploded powder at the instigation of the devil. ( 3 )
The actual method employed for the extraction of saltpetre, around 1600, was as follows. Likely places in dungheaps, pigeon lofts, under floors and in crypts were inspected. Tell-tale whitish stains could be tested by the tongue as saltpetre did actually taste salty, and then all hopeful 'earth' was dug out. This was then placed in layers in tubs with lime and ashes. Water poured into the tubs ran out through a hole or tap in the bottom.
Across the egress was a linen cloth or 'fine twiggs' to act as a filter. The soluble saltpetre dissolved and ran out in the water and was collected whilst impurities remained behind in the vessel.
The resulting liquid was allowed to settle, and racked off any remaining solids. The next
stage was to boil it and reduce its constituency to a puree which could be spread out to dry. This was often done in shallow brass pans, with a large surface area to allow easy evaporation. ( 4 )
Warm climates with reliable dry periods were best for the production of saltpetre, and importation into the English market was soon common, particularly from the East Indies. In the 16th century however national control of long range shipping routes could prove extremely tenuous and so supplies were frequently sought closer to home. Some came from the Netherlands
and in the early 1560s Sir Thomas Gresham shipped considerable amounts out of Germany, sometimes disguised as other less warlike cargoes. ( 5 )
These useful short-term measures were not seen as particularly reliable nor desirable by successive Tudor and Stuart administrations. What was required was volume home production, state regulated and free from interference by foreign powers.
Crown Monopoly
The obvious answer was a crown monopoly and 'Commissioners of Saltpetre' were appointed by the monarch, usually through the Privy Council. These men presenteo commissions to saltpetremen authorising them to collect in specified counties or groups of counties. The amount to be gathered was usually expressed in so many hundredweight per area, per week. Thus it was in 1637 that, for example, John Giffard was permitted to collect nine hundredweight per week from
'Gloucester and the neighbouring counties' whilst Nathaniel Sykes was allowed seven
hundredweight from Essex, and William Burrowes six from Nottinghamshire. ( 6 )
The petremen in their turn appointed deputies and hired teams of contractors workmen to dig. The total of all the petremens' quotas was the estimated requirement of the licensed powdermaker, who was himself a monopolist. The powdermaker paid the petreman and then sold
on his product to the state; the amounts of saltpetre received were noted by a crown official at the storehouse at 'The Bell' in Southwark.
Initially the license to dig applied to all dovecotes, barns, stables or outhouses in
the land, excepting the five northern counties and the City of London including and area two miles around. In 1599 the patent was extended to take in the north and in the next century London and Westminster were also dug. ( 7 )
Whilst there was no major war and 'unofficial' powder industries were allowed to continue, particularly in the West Country and Bristol, the shortcomings of the system were unlikely to be exposed. Arguably those operating the monopolies had a considerable financial interest in
things continuing just as they were. There is evidence to suggest that the petremen made considerable profits, and that not all of their production was declared. They in their turn provided, 'incentives' to the commissioners, one of whom was the Duke of Buckingham. William Richardson, saltpetreman for Worcester, Hereford and Shropshire, frankly admitted that he had
paid 100 pound for his commission and complained that it had since been given to someone else. It was once suggested that Buckingham made 1,700 pounds a year from this particular privilege. ( 8 )
In many ways the Stuart saltpetre industry seems to have been a disaster waiting to happen. Such monopolies were less and less acceptable, more powder was needed for bigger fleets and the wars of 1625 and 1627. The activities of the petreman themselves seem to have become more outrageous, being compared to the billeting of troops. Ultimately local complaints regarding damage to property and disturbance obtained little redress, and often there was recourse to passive resistance; sometimes even to violence.
Typical Complaint
The report made in April 1630 by Sir William Russell, Sir John Wolstenholme and Sir Kenelm Digby on the conduct of petremen Thomas Hilliard and Nicholas Stevens was quite typical:
'According to the proofs there is no part of their commission which they have not extremely abused. As digging in all places without distinction, as in parlours, bed chambers, threshing and malting floors, yea in Gods own house they have not forborne; so they respect not times, digging in the breeding time in dove-houses ... and without respect to harvest time ... and in bedchambers placing their tubs by the bedside of the old and sick, even of women in childbed, and persons on their deathbeds.' ( 9 )
The state papers are full of such examples and worse. Nicholas Stevens dug up the floor of
Chipping Norton Church and Thomas Thornhill turned his attentions to the floor or St. Paul's, with the specific permission of the Privy Council. Not satisfied with this he undermined the pigeon house of the Dean of Windsor and then returned the opinion that it was collapsing as the result of a strong wind. Subsequent investigation found that the walls of this sturdy building were three feet nine inches thick and that the whole inner lining of one side could not possibly have fallen down 'by casualty of wind or tempest'.
Edward Thornhill by contrast, specialised in the molestation of the lower orders of society, digging up the houses of the poor in Hertfordshire. In north Wales Robert Leight's men 'disquieted and amazed' the locals not by digging but by their drunken carousing at
night. ( 10 )
No one was exempt from the burrowings of the petremen. The Mayor of Norwich watched in
horror as his Council chamber was undermined and began to disappear into the ground. Nathaniel
Sykes, the petreman brought to book for this misdemeanour, protested that it was none of his
doing. On the contrary he said that he had been impeded from his lawful work by the mayor and
aldearmen who had regaled him and his men with 'many reproachful speeches, calling them rogues
and saying they were set upon by Deviles'. ( 11 )
Even the king was not entirely spared; Richard Ragnall sought permission to dig his house at
Woodstock, although he promised to replace any floorboards afterwards. ( 12 )
Another set of grievances centred on the petremen's right to commandeer transport at fixed rates for the removal of their plunder. Strictly speaking the owners of horse and carts were to be paid between 4d and 8d per mile, up to a maximum of nine miles, and a loading of 2,000lb
per vehicle. The owners complained that the carts were kept waiting and underpaid. At Pimperne
Hundred in Dorset it was alleged that some men had been forced, instead of hiring out carts, to pay others to carry the petre on their backs. Thomas Thornhill partly denied these accusations but did admit to paying two poor men in beer for carrying it when a cart had broken its axle. ( 13 )
Suspicion
There was no real guarantee that all this digging and carting would actually result in an
increased supply of powder for the crown. The main suspicion was that large quantities of
saltpetre never reached the King's powdermaker. Saltpetreman William Richardson was removed
for this reason and Thomas Hilliard was accused of conveying it away at night in 'close sacks and barrels' to the unlicensed manufacturers in Bristol. ( 14 )
Unsurprisingly, resistance to the petremen grew. Passive measures included paving or pitching the floors of pigeon lofts, and spreading gravel on stable floors. Sometimes petremen were
denied access, because it was harvest time or otherwise inconvenient. Local Justices or other
officials dragged their feet or sided with their neighbours when called upon for help by the
petremen. In Norwich an officer of the parish of St. Peter's intervened to help a householder, and in return, the petreman's labourer John White attempted to throw him down a well. He was
saved when other locals joined in. ( 15 )
Occasionally the resistance was both organised and violent. At Hereford John Giffard
complained that he had been intimidated by Humphrey Bennington whom he said had his servant 'Black Harry' to the works to throw down and smash the refining tubs. At Beaksbourne in
Kent, James Wilford attacked the workers with a cudgel and then locked them in the stocks. George Mynne's pigeon house became the centre of a regular running skirmish with both sides
taking up arms and the local men finally chasing off the diggers with pitchforks and bills. By 1640 the saltpetre problem was well on its way to becoming a significant grievance against the
Stuart monarchy. ( 16 )
There were also other more ordinary economic problems facing the petremen. They were entitled to a fixed rate of £ 3 3s 4d per cwt to be paid by the powdermaker. With lack of funds under the 'personal rule' of Charles from 1629, the king was not always able to pay the powdermakers. These in their turn could not, or would not, pay the providers of the raw material. In 1636 the saltpetremen claimed that the powdermaker owed them the incredible sum of £ 23,000 and that he had 36A tons of unpaid for saltpetre. Government response to lack of supply and money was to extend crown control further and to insist that all powder production in excess of national requirements be sold only at fixed rates. ( 17 )
Foreign Imports
Foreign imports of saltpetre were also putting pressure on the home industry. Cheaper material, mainly from the East Indies, was already being used to supplement English production but by 1639 the Commissioners were forced to admit that home supply was too small for demand and
recommended that foreign imports be regularised and government controlled.
One more obstacle was that whilst the rates for petre and powder were fixed, the costs and
materials varied. A particular instance singled out was ashes, for which the petremen were in
competition with soap boilers and potash makers. Richard Poole, the crown receiver of saltpetre,
estimated that over the past few years the cost of a bushel of ashes had risen from 4d to 10Ad or 11d. ( 18 )
Given these shaky footings the supply of saltpetre was becoming reduced rather than more
certain. In 1639 and 1640 it was raised as a specific problem by the Scots during the Bishops
Wars, and clearly little had been solved by the extended monopoly of 1636. From this date the
Crown claimed total control of all petre production as well as the right to fix the price of
powder. The result was a dramatic, if shortlived, rise in prices with gunpowder going from 1s to 1s 6d per pound. The centuries long slow downward trend in the price was therefore broken and, as a result, it was calculated that the king made a profit of £ 6,620 between 1635 and 1637.
( 19 )
The price of keeping the English industry going and creaming off a small profit was
considerable, not only in terms of popular discontent but also in terms of efficiency. When
John Evelyn senior, the king's powdermaker, died in 1636 it was estimated that he had fallen short of his targeted production for 1621 to 1635 by no less than 1480 lasts (35,000) barrels. Half of this had actually been made but had been sold privately because it had never been paid for by the state. ( 20 )
With England sliding into one of is most serious political crises, and war with the Scots
likely, a vital part of the munitions industry was on the verge of collapse.
( 1 ) See Robert Norton, The Gunners Dialogue, London 1643,
p.72, and The Art of Great Artillery, London 1624, p.l3; also Pietro Sardi as translated and enlarged by H Stubbe, Legends No Histories, London 1670, p.79; Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen, Archiley Kriegkunst, Hanau 1617, p.3; and Thomas Malthus, Pratique de la Guerre, Paris 1650, pp.5-7.
Stephen Bull is curator of the County and Regimental Museum, Stanley St. Preston.
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