In some gamers' eyes, the Civil War Brigade Series command system is merely a dark conspiracy to rob them of tactical control on the map. Nominally in charge, they protest that they are reduced to spectators at the scene of their own destruction. Perhaps this is an exaggeration, but it does cleave close to the truth: the command rules are designed to remove from you, the boss, much of that instantaneous control heretofore found.

This piece is not meant to be a general discourse on the merits of the system or delve into its underlying philosophy. Instead, I was to spend some time addressing a specific aspect of command control created by this system. I am talking about that odd period of little control that gamers discover in the opening phases of some CWB games: the time before the army commander arrives, and where no provision has been made to appoint a temporary replacement. As indicated by the title, this is truly the twilight zone of command. Who is in charge, and how do you get them to do what you want?

Only certain armies in particular games suffer from this malady. In Thunder at the Crossroads, the Union army always had an acting overall commander, while the Confederates start with none. The Rebels must rely instead on luck, in the form of initiative rolls, to alter their strategy prior to Lee's arrival in mid-afternoon.

August Fury leaves both sides initially leaderless, while Barren Victory reverses Thunder's circumstances and leaves only the Federals crippled. (The purists may differ, since the South had both Bragg and Polk at start-if that isn't crippled, what is?)

Why Done?

Before I offer some alternatives to this problem, perhaps I should spend a little time explaining why it was done this way in the first place. As evidenced by the selectivity of who did or did not get a temporary army commander to fill the gap, in each of these cases the decision was a deliberate one, based on my interpretation of the historical circumstances and actions of the rival commanders.

For instance, in Thunder, Meade went to great pains to ensure that each segment of his army would have unity of command in case of action. His predecessor, Hooker, had appointed wing commanders on the move north, and Meade wisely kept these arrangements active. When he learned of Reynold's loss, Meade dispatched Hancock forward to take over, further ensuring the continuity of this unity embodied in a general he trusted. With laudable foresight, Meade had made certain that, right from the opening guns, there was no confusion as to who was in charge.

Contrast this with Lee, whose men were converging on Gettysburg from various distant locales. The CSA corps commanders had a vague set of orders issued previously, (mostly instructing them to avoid fighting) but initiated and fought the first day's battle on their own. Ewell and Hill's Confederates worked in concert only due to an accident of placement, not through any coordinated tactical action.

In the game, I have presented these initial decisions made by the arriving divisional and corps commanders as the units' arriving orders. After that, any alternative strategy decisions should come only via independent initiative rolls, or wait for the Rebel commander himself to arrive later in the day.

In August Fury, much of the same applies. Jackson, of course, is technically independent prior to Lee's arrival to reunite the army. However, rather than force the player through the mental gymnastics of Jackson issuing orders to himself, I found that initiative would do nicely. Since Jackson commands all the CSA forces on-map at start, initiative control is made easy.

Even using the 2nd edition rules, where we have greatly reduced the efficiency of initiative, the delay difference between orders acceptance and initiative success for Jackson is marginal.

Conversely, the Union player must pay the price for Pope's complete ignorance of the true situation, and is penalized quite harshly. I acknowledge that this is liable to produce great frustration on the Federal side of the table, but offer in justification the verdict of history. Pope's army could not even getdivisions of the same corps to act in concert (Re: McDowell's 3V Corps) much less the larger elements.

Barren Victory, mirrors Thunder, but now it is the Union army that enters the map without unity of command. More significantly, the game situation is less set-piece than at Gettysburg, requiring greater flexibility. Also, the Union had elements of several different corps, and one unattached unit- a cavalry brigade up north-that does not even have the initiative option. Forget any major, coordinated attack by the Union player at start, unless you do abnormally well on initiative rolls.

Conspiracy

Overall, these circumstances conspire to place the initial burden of attack on Bragg rather than Rosecrans, which was my original goal. The Union commander is not that far away anyway, and should be along before a major disaster develops.

In each of the above games, one side does possess the necessary unity to take the initiative (though Thunder is unique in that the aggressor is the penalized party) and commence the game. From the historical perspective, this is an effective way to design an historically accurate game without resorting to arbitrary 'ironclad' rules, simply prohibiting this or that activity. There is still more than enough flexibility to allow for the players to take charge of their own game, starting from this historically correct perspective.

So, having dispensed with the background, what do you do if you have managed to assume command of one of these unfortunate forces? With no army commander in sight and noting that initiative (in the 2nd edition) is a weak reed, what options do you have? First of all, you can remain in place, using your existing orders and any successful initiative you do get to solidify a defensive position while waiting for the boss to show up. Defensively, you always possess freedom to act, in the form of an emergency Corps Retreat if nothing else. This rule was specifically designed for such situations, and is the ultimate safety valve to save a threatened force. The penalty you pay in stragglers each time should be more than enough to restrict this rule's use to necessity.

The defensive option is not too burdensome, nor should too many ECRs be declared, simply because this twilight zone is too short to really cripple a player' s freedom of action. At the start of a game, your troops are fresh, and the commander is in most cases only a few hours away.

Limited offensive action is possible, but only advised if you have a corps commander with a four rating, who can effectively use initiative and wield enough force to accomplish something. This option is more dangerous, since action on your part opens more doors for things to go wrong. Correction will require more rolls, with failure or, worse, a loose cannon. I am not saying never do it, since some opportunities are too good to pass up, but be aware of the risks.

In Thunder, for instance, the Confederates must attack early on, to inflict as much damage as possible. However, the Gettysburg situation requires that the Rebels adopt a risky strategy throughout most of the game, if they seek a victory.

Optional Rules

Below are two optional rules. One gives some initiative ability to detached units. The other allows the army commander to speak from beyond the map edge, for those players who need at least the illusion of control.

1. Detached Unit Initiative.

In order to increase the flexibility of detached brigades (usually cavalry but also infantry, where allowed by specific game) allow units who have been specifically assigned tasks taking them outside the normal command radii (divisional or brigade goals, etc.) to roll for initiative as well. In the rules, detached units have, for accepting new orders, an assumed receiving leadership rating of "2". During the command phase, these units may roll for initiative as well, using this same "2" rating.

All the normal rules for initiative apply, including any anti-initiative ratings. Units within the normal command radii of their superior officers, and units outside the radii but not having specific brigade goals (forced out via a morale result, for instance, or left behind during an advance) may never roll for initiative. These assumed leaders are never used for morale, rally, etc. nor do they ever roll for leader loss.

2. Off-Map Orders.

An army commander may issue orders to on-map units prior to his own arrival. Issue the order and calculate the costs in the normal manner. An extra delay in delivery time is imposed based on the number of turns prior to the actual commander's arrival.

First, calculate the number of turns of transmittal time between the receiving command's location and the commander's arrival hex. Next, add to this delay onehalf the number of turns (rounding up) left prior to the commander's actual arrival. For instance, if the commander is 7 turns short of arriving on-map, an extra 4 turns would be added to the delivery time. No more than one commander can ever issue orders per side in a turn.

In Thunder, for example, either the acting on-map commander can issue orders in a turn, or Meade can send in instructions from off-map, but never both at once.

Conversely, an on-map commander can issue orders to units who have not yet arrived, using the same concept.

Design Note: In the above rule, aide-delivered orders seem to travel faster than the leader when off-map, in direct contradiction of the on-map situation. The reason is simple. The approaching commander is usually not riding hell for leather to reach the field, but rather is moving at a more reasonable pace. In addition, delays result from halts, etc. that would be ludicrous to try to chronicle in order to present a completely accurate picture of a commander's movements prior to reaching the battlefield. Meade spent most of the first day at Gettysburg sitting in Taneytown coordinating the movements of his other off-map forces. The simplification seems a small enough price to pay.

Finally, I think the detached unit initiative roll has more historical merit than the off-map commander situation. The latter is aimed more at people who desire a greater control over their forces right from the start, no matter if this results in a decrease in historical accuracy. Feel free to pick and choose among them, tailoring the game to your own desires. Enjoy.

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