Wargamers are very familiar with the concept of combined arms. Unfortunately, that familiarity is based on a faulty conception of what it is and how it works. Based on games, one would come away thinking that "combined arms" is something that automatically happens when the different arms fight in close proximity and therefore get the "combined arms bonus" which makes them fight better together than the sum of their parts.

Here, I hope to get beyond such a simplistic notion and into the root of what combined arms really is and give a suggestion of the game mechanics for simulation. At any rate, a deeper look is warranted than has been given in the past.

Robert Leonhard in his book The Art of Maneuver gives a decent discussion of the real-life nature of Combined Arms. He divides Combined Arms theory into three components: A) The Complementary Principle, B) The Dilemma Principle, and C) The Alcyoneus Principle. For our purposes, let' s look at each and give ideas for game simulation of each.

The Complementary Principle

This is the one that wargames do well. This principle is based on the simple fact that all arms have strengths and weaknesses. To take advantage of this principle, a single commander would be assigned units of different arms so that he can support one arm's weakness with another's strength.

A force comprised of both armor and infantry allows the complementary principle to be applied. The tanks provide the shock and long range armor piercing fires the infantry lacks and the infantry can provide the close in protection needed by the tanks in denser terrain.

The complementary principle can be adequately simulated by the current "combined arms bonus" form of game mechanic.

The Dilemma Principle

This principle is more interesting and likewise difficult to properly simulate. The dilemma principle is based on another property of combined arms at work. This is that to protect oneself from one arm, the force may become vulnerable to another. Furthermore, in the combined arms sense, a force attempts to give an unsolvable dilemma to the enemy.

Take the example of a minefield covered (as they should be) with direct fires. Upon confronting the mines, the enemy must either remain in the open slowly working his way through the mines, or sprint across the mines taking their punishment. In the first case, the enemy will be subject to the direct covering fires for a prolonged period. In the latter, in order to decrease the time under enemy fires, the minefield is ignored and losses will result from that decision.

A further example can be had with a large scale enemy attack being launched on the flank of a friendly force. The catch, however, is that the enemy has a Allied-1944 style air superiority. The mass of the friendly force is a distance away from the enemy attack and to counterattack would entail leaving whatever cover and concealment the reserves have available so as to move under the enemy air umbrella and attempt to stop the enemy ground attack.

For the reserve to stay in its proverbial bunkers would allow the ground attack to go unchecked, to emerge might cause the entire reserve to be destroyed just getting to the crucial sector. That is a combined arms dilemma and it is not easily solved.

Napoleonic Combat

Napoleonic combat abounds with dilemma style combined arms effects. Protecting one's infantry from enemy cavalry was done by forming square. Doing so, however, left the infantry vulnerable to attack from enemy infantry and artillery. Failing to do so will protect you from the adverse effects of being in square during fire combat, but leaves you open to the original cavalry threat.

A combined arms attack using all three arms will cause the defender to have to choose between a number of poor options and leaves no good one. Failure to do an attack in this manner (Ney at Waterloo springs to mind) allows the defender to pick one clear-cut defensive method for the threat at hand (squares, in this case) and the other arms are not available to take advantage of the choice.

Many cases cited as combined arms violate the dilemma principle. Many commanders and gamers think that they are exercising combined arms when they call an air strike and artillery on the same target. Not so!

The folks in the target unit (while very unhappy, mind you) do the same thing to protect themselves for both kinds of fires-burrow into the ground. A much better example of a dilemma is the brewing tank in the middle of a battle-does the crew get out and potentially get machine-gunned? or do they stay inside and cook?

Even further back in history, examples can show the dilemma principle in action. Many ancient and medieval infantry forces had to fight in strong dense blocks so as to provide mutual protection and to work together with their hack and slash weapons.

Troops inside the block were out of range of the arms length weapons and formed something of a reserve to call on. If you add archers to the mix, the dilemma pops up. Staying in a tight block is a good idea when countering the hack and slash weapons, but it makes a dreadfully good target for archers. Does one split up or stay in a mass?

Other than Napoleonic games, games do a rather poor job of handling the dilemma principle. Some effects occur almost by accident due to the tum sequence or opportunity fire rules, but rarely is the player in the position to force a dilemma on the enemy. There are ways in existing games to apply the principle, but these are very subtle and require the player to be fully aware of the position he is trying to maneuver his opponent into.

Positional dilemmas, however, are pretty easy to come up with. All that is required for one of these is to force an attack on him at some point and leave a strong reserve opposite his forces at another. He will be faced with a choice of stripping the line in front of your reserve (and leaving it open for attack) or in taking his lumps with the original attack so as to protect himself from your possible attack. This sort of maneuvering, while fun and useful in a game, is not the sort of dilemma the above is about.

The Alcyoneus Principle

This principle, named by Leonhard, refers to the giant Alcyoneus which Hercules had to fight and kill. Alcyoneus was impossible to beat in his home country, so Hercules lifted him up, carried him to another country and slew him there. As Leonhard puts it, the Alcyoneus principle is based upon "moving our foe into terrain in which he is most vulnerable."

The best example of the Alcyoneus principle is the use of armorand infantry. It is often said that "the best anti-tank weapon is another tank". This, of course, implies meeting enemy tanks in a 'fair fight' battle in open tank country with the side with the slightly better tanks and better crews winning via a 'favorable loss ratio'-in other words, through raw attrition.

As students of maneuver warfare, this should be a repulsive way to win and we should look for a better way. The Alcyoneus principle gives us just the sort of way we want. Tanks are abysmal in tight terrain, both in offense and (to a lesser degree) defense.

Infantry, on the other hand, is at its best in close terrain. This would imply that the best way to kill a tank force is to drag it into dense terrain and confront it with infantry. It will not be a fair fight, the infantry will win and to do so they need not rely on the sort of optimum performance the fair fight open terrain tank battle did.

The opposite is also true. Place infantry out in tank country and the tanks will have a field day with them. I'm thinking here of WW2 style infantry with its limited AT support, not the modern mechanized-neither fish nor fowl- version. Having been in charge of light infantry elements which can do little than sit helplessly by and watch the tanks run by, through, and past us at 45 mph, and then be stuck with foot mobility trying to get back to where the war is-deep in my sides' rear.

Staff Exercise

An interesting example of both the Alcyoneus principle, the ideas of hitting the enemy at a critical weakness, and the other concepts of Maneuver Warfare (namely Dislocation and Disruption) is shown by Leonhard's example of a staff exercise he observed.

The exercise anticipated an enemy attack by an armor division which had to cross two rivers. The approach used by the staff in the exercise was to allow the enemy to cross the first river and attack them inbetween the two rivers in a large tank country engagement area Basic attritional warfare.

Leonhard's proposed solution was to strike the enemy while undergoing the river crossing operation and to specifically target the support and logistical assets which would be the last to cross. This would leave a logistically starved tank force on the wrong side of the river to affect their own fate (dislocation) and the lack of support will quickly give disruption to that force, too.

Meanwhile all of the artillery units and trains which are being attacked will be confronted by "unlike systems" and be the easy target of attack by the friendly force. An unfair fight will be fought which dislocates and disrupts the enemy strength. The terrain will provide the Alcyoneus principle by literally keeping the enemy armor from so much as participating in the battle.

Games rarely address the Alcyoneus principle, even though it must be the easiest to deal with in a game sense. In GB, I applied it very easily as a strength modifier for combat based on the type of terrain in the defender's hex.

In that game, an armor unit is doubled when attacking in the open (but not when defending, since I believe armor to be used best as an offensive weapon and that it doesn't hold ground well), but is penalized when operating in a forest. In that game, when confronting a armor heavy enemy, it is best to drag him into the forest and make him fight there.

Combined arms forces, such as the German Panzer Divisions, are able to take better advantage over different types of terrain than a pure arms force would. How is the complementary principle shown in that game? Quite simply, armor is 'protected' by infantry in the tight terrain since while the armor strength drops radically, the infantry remains the same, so the hex will retain a decent combat strength.

Conclusion

Games can model all of the different sides of Combined Arrns effects well, but heretofore have concentrated all effort on only one of the three principles (except Napoleonic games which traditionally get the dilemma principle right). I can easily see applying the Alcyoneus principle in games and have done so in the OCS.

I am less certain about the dilemma principle and encourage you to give it some thought and let our readers know through either letters or articles what you come up with. A careful, thoughtful, synthesis of all three facets would be an excellent advance in game design and I will be fascinated by anyone's ideas on how to accomplish it.

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