Tactics occurring within the abstraction of the CWB unit formations are handled at a level the player never notices, regimental or lower. It is sufficient that the brigade attacks when you want it to, retreats when called upon to do so and generally takes care of business without a lot of minutia from above. You can get on with prosecuting the battle as a whole. Which brings me to my next point. There is a larger tactical scope to examine-grand tactics, or the art of divisional and corps handling.

I have written elsewhere about sound game tactics, and I'm sure most gamers have their own favored techniques. However, I thought it would be interesting to look at things from an historical perspective. A difficult aspect of the CWB is mounting and maintaining a sustained, powerful attack. This is consistent with history. Let us examine some of the more successful assaults of the war and analyze them is some detail.

CSA Lt Gen James Longstreet's reputation as a soldier has undergone several revisions by historians in the last 130 years. I have no intention of re-hashing those postwar battles. However, even the strongest of his defenders seem to regard him as a 'defensive' general, best at stubbornly holding a position.

I do not dispute the fact that Longstreet, better than most of his contemporaries, understood the power of the defense and chose to use it to his advantage. But, this is too simple an analysis. It glosses over the fact that the four most powerful, successful Confederate attacks of the war (of corps size of larger) were made under his direct command. Few other officers of commensurate rank and position in either army displayed the grasp of battlefield tactics, offensive as well as defensive, that he did.

Prior to delving into the specifics, a more general overview of the Civil War command technique would help. The war can best be divided into three major tactical phases.

Phase One: On the Job Training

From the start of the war until July of 1862, both sides not only had to raise armies, but also teach its leadership how to handle them. All of the senior officers of the Mexican War soon proved too old to take the field. This left the command positions to junior officers who had rarely led more than a company at a time. Even Lee was only a Colonel. His largest pre-war command was a regiment. It is no wonder that the first battles of the War were fumbling affairs. For instance, First Bull Run saw the Union Army collapse after an aggregate loss of less than 10%.

The Rebels fared little better, though they did manage to keep the field. The first two major eastern offensive actions for the Confederates were Seven Pines and the Seven Day's Battles. They were poorly coordinated, crudely commanded battles although the men had at least learned to bleed profusely.

In the West, Shiloh was a combination of the greenness of Bull Run and the bloodletting of the Richmond actions. It took over a full year (dearly paid for in lives) for the generals to learn their trade.

Phase Two-Warfare by Maneuver

From July 62 until May 64, almost two years, both sides sought decisive victory through maneuver, culminating in climactic battle. At the same time,a realization that defensive works were too valuable to ignore worked its way into the practical application of generalship. Throughout this period, increasing use of hasty field works was common, but had not yet evolved into the full trenches of the war's end. (Interestingly enough, this defensive ascendancy was realized before the war. Observers returning from the Crimea in 1857 noted the strength of the defense, and theorists speculated quite accurately about the effect of rifled weapons on warfare.

Unfortunately, it took three long and bloody years to reaffirm this point in practical terms.) In fact, the Wilderness is the last battle in the East where both sides fought a battle of maneuver. A week later, Spotsylvania saw the Army of Northern Virginia revert to trench warfare, and it never abandoned it until the final disaster of Appomattox. Likwise in the West, Joseph Johnson, in command of the CSA Army of Tennessee, stuck to defensive works throughout the spring of 1864.

Phase Three-Into the Trenches

From May 1864 on, the South abandoned maneuver out of sheer necessity. Rebel commanders could no longer afford the luxury of costly assaults. John Bell Hood chose to ignore this reality and his men paid for his folly at Franklin and Nashville. The war had taken a grim turn. Traditional tactics failed. The last year of war was a Union search for a tactical solution to the defensive problem. It was never fully found.

The first phase can barely be called organized warfare. (I'm sure Von Moltke had this period in mind when he dismissed the Civil War as a brawl between 'armed mobs'.) The last phase took tactics into uncharted territory. Therefore, I will confine this article to examining the middle phase when both armies sought that decisive clash.

In general, the assault tactics of the day dictated attack by a succession of lines. The lead battleline advanced, supported by a second line at anywhere from 50 to 300 yards distance. The most common interval was probably 150 yards. This was far enough to avoid a repulse disorganizing both lines at once and yet close enough to lend the support required. The support line's mission was to fill gaps in the leading wave, bolster threatened flanks and bring greater strength to bear on particularly stubborn knots of enemy resistance.

Civil War attacks (indeed all attacks, no matter the historical period) tended to lose impetus as they progressed. Units lost their organization, leaders lost track of their commands, etc.. Finally, the advance broke down completely. The involved units needed regrouping prior to resuming the attack, provided they had not already suffered too severely in casualties. Close terrain only exacerbated this degradation.

Ideally, fresh troops would be available to replace the disorganized formations, but reinforcements often had difficulties passing through the lead forces. The onset of darkness guaranteed the halting of an attack. No army or leader of the war managed to launch or continue a large-scale assault after nightfall, though darkness was used effectively to mask an approach march or deployment on several occasions.

With variable success, period commanders struggled to hold this increasing confusion inherent in any advance to a minimum.

Few attacks were strong enough to actually drive significant portions of an enemy army from the field of battle. None ever achieved the kind of decisive rout seen in Napoleon's time. However, in two separate instances (Second Bull Run and Chickamauga), Longstreet put half or more of the enemy army to flight.

At Gettysburg, on the afternoon of July 2nd his attack struck the Union Army of the Potomac with such force that it took almost twice as many Federal troops to halt the Rebels. Finally, in the Wilderness on May 6th, his attack came close to disorganizing the entire Union 2nd Corps, almost a third of the Federal Army, with the glimmer of accomplishing even more before he was wounded.

Each of the following descriptions is necessarily limited. Greater detail can be found by referring to the applicable CWB games. August Fury covers Second Manassas. Thunder at the Crossroads deals with Gettysburg. Barren Victory addresses Chickamauga. Finally, Bloody Roads South examines The Wilderness. I suggest referring to the maps or better yeL comparing the starting deployments for each attack.

Suppressing Pope

In August of 1862, Lee took the Army of Northern Virginia northward to 'suppress' Pope. Longstreet, by virtue of a solid performance during the Seven Days, was in command of Lee's largest defacto corps, the Right Wing. Jackson had been previously detached and destroyed the Federal supply depot at Manassas, following which he established his Rebel troops in a strong defensive position in an unfinished RR cut overlooking theFirst Bull Run battle field. On the29th, Pope's Federals unsuccessfully attacked Jackson's line. Longstreet arrived on Jackson's right flank about noon, but did not become engaged.

On the 30th, Pope organized a 'pursuit' of Jackson. Pope believed that Longstreet's reinforcing column had been repulsed at Manassas Gap, and discounted Union General Porter ' s report that the Rebel Right Wing was actually massed on his fronL His entire Federal army was massed north of the Warrenton Turnpike to attack Jackson's RR cut position. Only four Union brigades-Reynolds' Division of Pennsylvania Reserves plus Warren's Brigade of the 5th Corps-were assigned the job of screening the Union left. About 1 p.m., the main Federal force advanced.

Pope's men attacked for about two hours but failed to dislodge Jackson. At about 3 p.m., Lee ordered Longstreet's wing to attack. Longstreet instructed the courier to inform his Commander that the order had been anticipated and the Right Wing was already advancing. His men were deployed over a 2,000 yard front that ran from the Brawner Farm to the Cole House. Some troops were further south to guard the flank.

His force, numbering about 26,600, consisted of 15 brigades, organized into five divisions and one separate brigade. Each division advanced on a two brigade frontage.

Hood's Division of two brigades deployed astride the Turnpike, all regiments in a single battle line. Kemper' s two brigades (Corse was detached to Jones) were placed in line just south of Hood, but with the regiments formed into a double line. Jones' division held the southern flank. Drayton was detached further south as aguard, and Corse was added to Jones to strengthen his advance. Benning and Anderson's Brigades were deployed next to Kemper, arrayed in a total of three lines. Corse was positioned adjacent to the south, and formed his regiments into two lines.

The remaining seven brigades were massed in line along the Warrenton Turnpike, behind Hood's men. At its point of furthest depth, Longstreet's attack column had no less than six battle lines supporting Hood's lead line.

The Rebel advance caught Pope by surprise. It forced him to try to shift major elements of his command to meet the new threat. Longstreet advanced on a northeasterly angle and swept most of Jackson's front clear. Jackson's left flank, held by A.P. Hill's Light Division, then joined the advance.

Longstreet's deployment extended far enough south to outflank the initial Union defenders and continually overlap each new Federal line that was hastily erected to halt him. When Jackson committed A.P. Hill to the fight, the same thing occurred on the north flank. The Union army never again found its balance.

The depth of the Right Wing at the center of action, along Warrenton Turnpike, gave Longstreet the power to overwhelm Union defenses in the center. The attack maintained enough momentum that it was not brought to a halt until after nightfall. The Union army retreated over the Stone Bridge and limped back to Centerville.

Longstreet' s deployments greatly enhanced the attack. No division had more than a two brigade frontage. The compact formation proved much simpler to control. The depth piled up along the Warrenton Turnpike ensured a continuous supply of fresh troops. Longstreet spent most of his time coordinating the efforts of the force because the men of three separate divisions were engaged. His timing was excellent, waiting until the Federals committed their last reserves to the attack on Jackson.

Longstreet was lucky because Pope never accepted the fact of his presence on the field until his men started forward, a mistake that greatly aided Rebel success. Pope's blindness was partly due to the coordinated nature of the attack in which all but one of the 15 brigades advanced as one and delivered simultaneous blows on the Federal forces. Only Drayton, of Jones' Division, failed to advance expeditiously.

It was posted on the far south flank with a defensive mission anyway. Longstreet soon ordered Drayton forward, but he never really caught up with the rest of the command.

Successful Attacks at Gettysburg

When people talk of successful Confederate attacks, Gettysburg is not usually used as an example. However, the afternoon of July 2nd merits a second look. Longstreet called the attack "the best three hours' work done by any troops during the War."

That statement smacks of exaggeration, but the CSA First Corps, using only 11 brigades, rocked the Army of the Potomac to its foundation. Starting at noon on July 2nd, Longstreet made an approach march of about six miles and deployed his divisions from road column into attack positions. The march took about 3 hours, including the countermarch to avoid observation. The final deployment consumed about 45 minutes more.

Considering that Longstreet and his two divisional commanders were forced to completely alter Lee's original instructions once they reached Warfield Ridge and found that the Federals were not positioned as expected this was a surprisingly rapid, rather than excessively delayed movement.

Longstreet's deployments reflect his feeling that he lacked troops for the job. The eight brigades from his own corps, the divisions of Hood and McLaws, were only augmented by part of Anderson's division of the CSA Third Corps. Once modified, the plan called for a staggered assault which aimed at overlapping the Union southern flank.

Then, wheeling north, Longstreet was to roll up the Union line towards Cemetery Hill. The CSA Second Corps would make a supporting attack from the north against Culp's and Cemetery Hills when Longstreet's men becameengaged. The signal was the sound of battle.

Hood's and McLaws' divisions deployed in a rectangular formation. Hood's four brigades were placed along an 1100 yard frontage. Law and Robertson's Brigades comprised the first line, from south to north. Benning and Anderson, respectively, made up the supporting line behind the lead formations.

McLaws' deployments to the south mirrored Hood's. Kershaw and Barksdale led with a frontage of 1250 yards. Semmes and Wofford were the suppon. Further north, three of Anderson's brigades supported the attack deployed in a single line.

Longstreet's deployments lacked his customary depth with only one supporting line each. They reflected the need to cover a larger frontage than at Second Bull Run with significantly fewer troops. In addition, he possessed neither the overlapping flank advantage nor tactical surprise. (The men in the front ranks of the Union 3rd Corps were well aware of Longstreet's presence.

However, at army and corps levels, the Federals were clearly caught off-guard.) The most effective aspect of his arrangements was the alignment within the divisions themselves. Standing at the center of each divisional box, Hood or McLaws could reach any of their four brigades in a matter of minutes.

The attack stepped off about 4 p.m.. Hood was wounded within a few minutes of the advance. Not surprisingly, his division had the most difficulty in coordinating efforts between brigades. Robertson and Laws' regiments became intermingled. To further complicate the problem, Hood's men ended up covering a larger frontage, engaging troops from the Wheatfield, down to Devil's Den and up the slope to Little Round Top.

McLaws' men had the advantage of shorter approaches and narrower frontage. Union artillery severely hammered Kershaw's brigade, but Barksdale smashed the Federal Peach Orchard position and rolled up the Union 3rd Corps' flank. Anderson's three supporting brigades joined in and at one point, pierced the Union center.

Longstreet's 11 brigades took 17,300 troops into action, lost almost 7,000 casualties in three hours ' fighting and failed to drive the Union army from its final defensive line. However, Meade committed 22 brigades, numbering 28,500 men, to stop the attack. An additional three brigades of the 6th Corps (4,700 men) engaged lightly towards the end of the fight. This force represented almost half of his infantry, including all of 3rd and 5th Corps, as well as two divisions of the 2nd Corps and one of the 6th. 9,000 Federals were lost.

Longstreet' s repulse occurred because the attack was under-strength and the rest of Lee's Army failed to deliver anything like Longstreet's concentrated blow in their own attack. Longstreet again employed narrow divisional frontages (no longer than two brigades) and ensured support of the front line forces by their own divisions.

Even so, the presence of only one supporting line hurt. This was especially true around Devil's Den where the Rebels had to spread out to cover the extra frontage. The attack needed at least one more division to ensure greater strength in the penetrations.

To be continued next issue

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com