The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain
Author: John Lawrence Tone
Pages: 239 pages
Illustrations: none
Maps and Diagrams: 1
Footnotes: 563, many notes are expansive and interesting
Appendices: none
Bibliography: 19 archival and manuscript listings, 5 Spanish periodicals, and 174 books and articles.
Index: 208 listings
Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill
Publication Date: 1994
Binding: Cloth (hardbound)
ISBN: 0-8078-2169-1
Price: $34.95

Rod of Iron: French Counterinsurgency Policy in Aragon during the Peninsular War
Author: Don W. Alexander
Pages: 260 pages
Illustrations: none
Maps and Diagrams: 16 maps and 11 statistical tables
Footnotes: 932
Appendices: none
Bibliography: 180 published sources and 10 listings of archival material.
Index: 284 listings
Publisher: Scholarly Resources, Inc., Wilmington
Publication Date: 1985
Binding: Cloth (hardbound)
ISBN: 0-8420-2218-X
Price: $42.50
Summary: These two books focus on the insurgency in two neighboring regions of Spain, rather than on the more conventional campaigns involving Britsh operations. Each is well-written and deeply researched. Taken together, these two books enable the serious student of the Peninsular conflict to have a better understanding of the complex forces that contributed to Napoleon's "Spanish ulcer."

Like many people, my primary impression of the Peninsular War was that of an outnumbered British Army advancing and retreating according to the fortunes of war, while being assisted by the Spanish peasantry who ambushed couriers and supply trains. Given that the overwhelming majority of the English-language works on the war are British, and given their natural focus on their own army, this narrow perspective is understandable. Two books on the war, however, allow the Napoleonic scholar to achieve a more balanced view, and additionally provide some understandings that will help explain the Spanish revolt in its larger context, particularly in those areas where there were little or no British operations.

Alexander's book, Rod of Iron, is largely a traditional campaign summary. It addresses the conflict in Navarre and Aragon primarily as a French resource allocation problem. French troops could be dispersed to garrison the countryside, in which case taxes were collected and friendly local officials protected. However, this left the initiative in the hands of the guerrilla leaders and tied up French troops from conventional operations. On the other hand, if the French troops were concentrated to act against the larger partisan bands or the conventional enemy armies, friendly local officials were murdered and food and tax collection suffered severely. In Alexander's view this dilemma, and its lack of a viable solution, determined the fate of the French forces in Spain.

Alexander recounts this war primarily from the French viewpoint, and cites predominantly French sources. For example, only eleven out of ninety-nine citations in chapter 8 include non-French sources. Despite this, he attempts to present a balanced picture of the war and, surprisingly, he largely succeeds.

Tone's book is more of a socio-political account of the war in Spain, and concentrates on the personalities, primarily Spanish, that he feels were decisive in the struggle. In his opinion, it seems, the result of the war was less of a matter of resources than it was a matter of will. Tone's thesis is to prove that the Spanish will to resist was ultimately decisive.

As opposed to Alexander, Tone tells his story from the Spanish viewpoint, and he relies mainly on Spanish sources. In his chapter 8, sixteen out of fifty-two citations include non-Spanish sources. In five of these, the source is Alexander's book. In the rest, it is primary and archival French sources. While Tone attempts to present a balanced picture, occassional lapses occur. For example, on page 86, he describes the French procedures for deporting anti-French clerics by noting, "Fortunately, [the French] were able to enforce these measures only in areas either occupied by or within easy reach of a garrison." The French would probably dispute how fortunate that fact was for them.

The differences between the two books in terms of sources and viewpoint led to significantly different interpretations of the details of the war. For example, Rod of Iron notes that the "3,500 imperial soldiers killed, captured, or wounded during this period of four and one-half months [September 1811 through January 1812] nearly equalled Suchet's losses for the previous two and one-half years." Adding in the 2,500 losses sustained until the French evacuation, Alexander estimates that French losses were in the region of 9,500, although "the reported number of casualties was undoubtedly low, since subordinates could easily account for their soldiers' disappearance as desertion." Tone estimates that losses inflicted by the Navarrese guerrillas (which included French losses both in Navarre and Aragon) "could not have been less than 50,000." To make Tone and Alexander both correct, the much smaller Navarrese garrison would have to yield 40,000 caualties, an extremely improbable number. Thus, a serious discrepancy exists in these two works over the casualties inflicted by the guerrillas.

Rod of Iron uses maps to illustrate the areas of operation covered in each chapter. These maps have the admirable trait of showing each significant place and area mentioned in the text. They have two minor flaws: they show only towns and rivers, and they use confusing symbology for the locations of various troop types (e.g., rectangular shapes are used for both French garrisons and Allied field armies while solid shapes are used for both French and guerrilla units). Once you get used to the symbology, however, the clean and clear maps are very useful.

The Fatal Knot includes only one map, which is in the frontspiece, and which shows only Navarre. For a reader who does not have the Rod of Iron or other map resources, the lack of maps in The Fatal Knot would pose a serious drawback.

To illustrate the difficulties one encounters when attempting to reconstruct history, a comparison of the Tone and Alexander accounts of the Battle of Rocaforte, outside the Navarrese city of Sanguesa, will prove illuminating. This battle pitted French troops from Navarre, under the command of General Abbe, supported by additional troops from Aragon against the guerrilla "Division of Navarre" led by Francisco Espoz y Mina, the most famous guerrilla leader in Spain. Since the battle occurred on the border between Navarre and Aragon, and involved men from both provinces, both books mention it in some detail.

The two accounts differ, for instance, on whether or not Caffarelli's troops were present. Tone assumes that he was, and assumes that he took losses equal to those of Abbe. If he wasn't there, French and Spanish losses are equal. Alexander makes a compelling case for Cafarrelli's troops being absent, including a citation of a Napoleonic rebuke towards Caffarelli for not supporting Abbe. Given their differences in opinion on which French commanders were present, their differences over the odds Abbe faced are surprising.

Tone holds that the French were outnumbered three to one. Alexander notes that "Mina, with only a slight numerical advantage, had challenged a force supported with guns and cavalry and routed it." [Italics added.] The wording used by each author for the outcome of the battle is also illustrative of the differences between their sources. Tone calls it "destruction", while Alexander calls it a "rout." Tone cites four Spanish and three French sources for his account, but admits that he changed the losses presented in the French accounts to compensate for the perceived non-inclusion of losses from Caffarelli's troops. Alexander cites one Spanish and four French accounts, but does not annotate his sources. Which account is more accurate is impossible to say ( if either). Despite the differences in the details of the battle, both authors agree that the outcome was that Mina exercised almost complete freedom of action in Navarre henceforth, and the French were restricted to heavily garrisoned cities and very large convoys.

Two key questions concerning the Napoleonic Wars in Spain are one, why did the Spanish resist so fiercely, and, two, why did the French fail? The Fatal Knot provides the most complete answer to the first question (at least for Navarre if not the rest of Spain). Rod of Iron provides the most complete answer to the second question. Serious students will wish to synthesize the ideas of the two books in their search for a better understanding on the War in Spain.

More Book Reviews:

With Musket, Cannon and Sword by Brent Nosworthy

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
The full text and graphics from other military history magazines and gaming magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com