Over this past Memorial Day weekend, I had intended to wargame the last ARMATI scenario and so complete my exploration of that rules system. I would have then taken the month of June and typed the final battle report of a four-part ARMATI series. The reader may recall the first ARMATI battle - Marian Romans versus a Pontic force. This final scenario was to revisit that engagement, but with a twist: the army size would be tripled, Sulla and his legions facing a combined Pontic-Galatian force. However, the wargame was not played. One could suggest that Sulla had been delayed in crossing the Adriatic Sea, but in truth, my attention was instead turned to a long-term project - the rewriting of a home-grown set of Horse and Musket Period rules. In addition to the weighty concerns of ground and time scale, I was also looking very closely at the procedures involved with, and the resolution of, fire combat. And so, it was back to bookshelf and file cabinet, pulling books, grabbing legal pads, and donning the old thinking tricorne.
Historically, the evidence points to the relative ineffectiveness of the musket as a weapon to produce casualties in enemy formations. In Napoleon at War: Selected Writings of F. Lorraine Petre, editor Albert A. Nofi notes, "Under the best conditions musketry was inaccurate. In battle it became even more so." (52) Mr. Nofi further cites the Prussian Musketry Trials of 1790, suggesting that the results of the trials are skewed for a variety of reasons - the most important: no enemy was firing back at the firing battalion! (52) Though he does not cite the source of the evidence, Mr. Nofi states that, "more practical statistics suggest that in actual combat no more than 15% of the rounds fired hit anyone . . ." (52)
Accordingly, in my home-grown rules set (a conglomeration of wargaming experience, exposure,
and the reading of many a periodical dedicated to the hobby), the effects of musketry are based on a percentage system. In its most simple form, the number of figures firing is determined, an eight-sided die is rolled, and depending on various modifiers, a percentage of hits is determined. For example, if 30 line infantry figures are firing at an opposing battalion, and the die yields a number of hits at 25%, then 7.5 figures in the opposing battalion are deemed casualties. (Please see Table I.) At the same time however, the historical evidence also points to the effectiveness of the musket as a weapon used on the morale of
an opposing force. 1
Table I: 7.8 Small Arms Procedure(s):
7.86 Small Arms Fire Percentage Table:
Note: The reader can see that the percentage of hits increases with the higher die roll. While the percentage is much larger than that quoted by Nofi, the present game turn sequence represents approximately 30 minutes of actual time. If ONLY flIing were taking place during that 30 minutes, then one might expect 60 volleys from a firing line battalion. But of course, that is not the case. And indeed, there is more at work on the battlefield than a simple equation of numbers of muskets or cannon brought to bear on a target.
The Impact of Artillery Fire
Turning to a consideration of the impact of artillery fire, it may also be said that this was, primarily, a weapon against morale. In a sub-section detailing the various types of
combat on the field of Waterloo, Mr. Keegan writes of the contest between artillery and infantry:
Several examples are then provided, detailing the havoc such offensive fire wrought on waiting formations of infantry. (160-161) In a defensive posture, the effect of artillery was perhaps even more terrible. Though I cannot find any reference to trials conducted on the effectiveness of such fire, the Nofi text does provide an interesting table which details the volume of fire a single, unsupported battery may "throw-out" against advancing enemy troops.
Note: Nofi describes: Some idea of the potency of such (fire) may be gained by considering the capacity of a single unsupported batteny of six 8 or 9-pounders and two howitzers to resist a frontal attack at 1,200 meters, which can be covered by cavalry in three to five minutes and by infantry in seven to ten minutes, depending upon the nature of the ground and the condition of the troops". (61)
In the present version of these home-grown rules, certain compromises had to made in order to
maintain a level of playability. To an extent then, "realism" was sacrificed for "fu". For example, if the game move sequence is said to represent 20 minutes of actual time, then an advance against any artillery - supported or not - becomes unthinkable. Historically however, such advances did take place.
Resolution
How then, to best resolve such situations on the table top?
Under this present system, the number of cannon in a battery are considered to be the firing
''figures'' of that battery. This factor may be increased by a factor, depending on the range to target. For example, if an eight-gun battery is engaging a column of infantry at canister range, then the eight-gun battery becomes 24 ''figures'', and firing is resolved as small arms fire - with some slight modification. (Please see Table II.) Admittedly, the artillery fire rules are more in need of revision than the musketry rules.
In a hypothetical play-test of these same rules, consider the following: A typical French eight-gun battery is firing on an Allied line infantry battalion, approximately 800
yards distant. For the sake of the hypothetical, it will be the artillery versus the infantry ONLY. One objective of the play-test is to determine the accuracy of the number of casualties incurred during the bombardment, which will be six game turns - the equivalent of three hours 'real time'. Modifiers for this hypothetical are assumed to be 0. In the six die rolls for the firing battery, it is determined that the target of this fire loses a total of 10.75 figures/castings. At a "figure" scale of 1:20, this equals a loss of approximately 220 men from the target unit. Comparing these results to both the Nofi text and Keegan's work, the results do appear inaccurate, even ahistorical. 2 Then again, the conditions of the hypothetical also seem rather ahistorical.
It was during this stage of the rules rewrite, that I happened across "The Average is Mean and Extreme" by Bob Jones in MWAN No. 78. I read the short piece once, and then again the next day. Later in the week, I read it through again. No, I am not a forgetful reader - the piece has helped me to define what I need to address in the neverending rewrite of these rules.
Apparently, the system that I presently use to resolve fire combat is "inelegant and baroque". That label aside, the more interesting question concerns my (and apparently many other gamers and game designers) misconception of small arms, artillery, and melee combats as falling into a bell-curve pattern. I would argue that while the bell-curve pattern may indeed be present, I, as a gamer cannot "count on the fact that in a certain situation, a certain result will be produced." Further as an amateur game designer, I would argue that the guarantee of an average result for every situation is not built-in to the rules system. I do agree with Mr. Jones however, on the point that by increasing the advantages (plus modifiers in a baroque system) one can expect a corresponding increase in the optimum expected result. This seems
borne out by the historical evidence and should be rightly included in any rules set.
Table II:
7.1 Artillery Fire Procedure(s)
7.2 Range Table:
7.3 Casualty Table:
7.4 Modifiers to Artillery Fire:
For example, a veteran line infantry battalion, in place behind a stonewall, getting ready to fire their first (carefully loaded) volley, and having friendly support as well as being in the presence of the charismatic and competent divisional commander, should really "tear-up" and opposing unit. However, while this may be the most expected result, it should not always be the case. The unit, despite all these positive modifiers, may fire too soon or too high. And true enough, in any set of variables, the average result is the most expected event. I shall be the first to admit that mathematics are not my strong point. However, just because the average result is the most expected, that does not mean that the expectation will be met.
Using the equation cited by Mr. Jones, if I roll a six-sided die 10 times, where (6) is the
optimum and (1) is the minimum, then I should expect the result of (3) more often than any other result.
The results of this die rolling were: 2, 3, 6, 6, 2, 4, 1, 4, 5, and 2. Taking a total of the rolls and dividing by 10, one does arrive at a pretty average result: 3.5.
Mr. Jones raises another interesting point; that being his argument on the composition of battle. Here too, I am in agreement - albeit a tempered agreement. Ironically, it would appear that my "tedious" system of plus and minuses does provide for a sequence of generally inconsequential results, as well as for the occasional "violent extreme". The tables for resolving small arms and artillery are in fact, complimented by morale tables that may turn an otherwise "ordered" unit into a bunch of running refugees.
The line infantry unit described above, even with all its positive modifiers, may still turn in a poor performance. Indeed, there is an optional rule at work within my present system, where any unit on any turn, may discover that its supply of ammunition is running low. This element adds another level of realism to the rules system that is often ignored. 3
Returning to the historical evidence, I would suggest that the frequency of this - the extreme event - was not as significant as Mr. Jones advances. Even if it did take place on the battlefield, more often than not, it was a localized affair, and did not usually spell the end of an army.
Unfortunately, I cannot look back on an extensive wargaming history. In some 15 years in the
hobby, I have had the pleasure to umpire and/or game perhaps 60 battles. In that record, I have never gamed the First World War. In that same record, I have never felt like I was constrained to "going over the top" because of the rule system. Indeed, I was always struck by the way the rules set had captured the "feel and flavor" of the period. The burden of "realism" cannot be placed fully upon the rules set or combat system however. To a large degree, the wargamers assume responsibility for the conduct and direction of the wargame.
Linear Battles
In the Horse and Musket Period, with a few exceptions, battles were linear affairs. Weapon
capability and tactics dictated this approach to battle. 4 Because the actions were linear, they were grinding matches where one force attempted to wear down the other. This was not only accomplished in a physical sense, but in a moral sense as well. 5 To label this occurrence as "boring" is completely acceptable and an understandable assessment. However, history - even military history - is sometimes boring. It would be interesting to see the proof that Mr. Jones offers in support of his theory that "grinding matches" were not the rule. In a brief look through an admittedly small library of military history texts, I see map after map and account after account of engagements where two forces have lined up on opposite sides of a plain, and then have marched toward the center. The Ancient Period is replete with examples, as is the Medieval Period. The Horse and Musket Era, from The Thirty Years War all the way through to the American Civil War, is also filled with similar accounts.
Upon review, perhaps a more appropriate sub-title for this piece is, "A Considered Response to Bob Jones", for the pages in MWAN No. 78 did serve as the impetus. I would call it "considered" as I am not trying to debate the issues with Mr. Jones. Like him and numerous other gamers, I am struggling, experimenting, and exploring.
The effect of small arms and artillery fire are indeed integral to wargaming. But, how does one affect the effect? By definition, wargames are games of war, or games at war. What are games, then? It seems that all games share some basic characteristics: they are fun, they have rules, they are competitive, and because they are so, they result in a winning side or effort as well as a losing side or effort. At least two and perhaps three of these characteristics are at odds within the definition. If one does the research and applies the "strict" historical lessons, how much "fun" will one have in that particular table top game.
Further, how "playable" is that game under the weight of the objective historical rules? Unless one is completely detached from the "play aspect" of the game, it would appear that this approach is not really feasible. At the same time, a certain degree of "reality" must be present otherwise the effort becomes ridiculous and the sense of "fun" is readily lost. Put another way, if the ground scale is one inch equals 50 yards, it is not realistic to state that the Brown Bess Musket has a range of 12 inches. It seems that war too, shares these basic characteristics.
In his excellent commentary, "The Game of Wargaming", Mr. William Biles disagrees with the
above comparison. He states in The February 1991 issue of HISTORICAL GAMER MAGAZINE:
"Wargames have little to do with real war." (32) I would maintain that wargames do have something to do with real war, that indeed, that is the central attraction. In closmg, Mr. Biles writes that, "We are, after all, wargamers - not warriors." In closing, I would suggest that this is a fine distinction. To be sure, the attraction is not in the "actual" killing, pillaging and taking of territories, for wargames, unlike real war, are very clean enterprises. The attraction, as Mr. Biles does mention, is the historical aspect. It is in the experience of "play" command, of exercising strategy and tactics, and even in the celebration of "pretend" killing, pillaging and taking of territories. And of course, there is also the attraction of "playing with fire".
Notes
1 The first full paragraph on page 171 of The Face of Battle documents this effect completely. Indeed, the majority of the paragraph reinforces the conclusion that musket fire was rather ineffectual - even at close quarters. Our concern is with the morale effect: the subsequent pages ( 172-177) of Keegan's treatment help to explain this disintegration of the Imperial Guard. A Reply to this Considered Response
Back to MWAN #83 Table of Contents
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7.81 Declaration of firing unit, and target of volley.
7.82 Determine number of "figures" firing.
7.83 Determine range to target unit. Range falls into one of two categories: "Battle", or "Effective". Range is measured from front edge of counter to front edge of target element/unit/counter.
7.84 Firing unit rolls a ld(8) and adds or subtracts modifiers to determine percentage of
hits based on number of "figures" firing.
7.85 Casualty Table is consulted to determine final number of "hits" or casualties scored
against the target unit.
Die Roll 1d(8) "Battle" "Effective" 1 10% 05% 2 15% 05% 3 20% 10% 4 25% 10% 5 30% 15% 6 35% 20% 7 40% 20% 8 45% 25% For though the eighty-odd guns in Napoleon's 'grand battery', seven hundred yards distant from the British line, could not do any particular infantry formation the same concentrated harm as could a 'galloping battery' firing grape or canister into it from close range, the arrival of their cannon-balls was so frequent, the effect of the balls on human flesh so destructive, the apprehension of those temporarily spared so intense that the cannonade came as near as anything suffered by the British at Waterloo to breaking their line. (The Face of
Battle, 159-160)
ARTILLERY VOLUME OF FIRE
ATTACKER BALLS SHELLS CANISTERS TOTAL
Cavalry 24-36 3-5 12-24 39-65 Infantry 48-60 8-10 36-48 92-118 7.11 Firing side declares which unit is firing, and the target of said firing unit. Range
to the target is determined.
7.12 Firing Ranges: Artillery range falls into three categories. The first is "canister", the
second, "battle", and the third, "effective". "Canister" range is extremely close or point-blank fire. "Battle" range refers to the most common distance of engagement. "Effective" range describes the maximum range at which artillery may engage
targets.
7.13 The number of guns/cannons in the firing battery is multiplied by a factor that is determined by the range at which firing is commenced.
7.14 Roll a ld(8). Add or subtract modifiers on following table.
7.16 The total modified number determines the number of casualties inflicted."Canister" Range= number of guns/cannon x 3
"Battle" Range= number of guns/cannon x 2
"Effective" Range= number of guns/cannon x 1
Die Roll 1d(8) Percentage of Hits 1 10% 2 15% 3 20% 4 25% 5 30% 6 35% 7 40% 8 45% Circumstance Modification to 1d(8) Roll "Canister" Range +2 "Battle" Range EVEN "Effective" Range -1 Experience Rating 1 +3 2 +2 3 +1 4 EVEN 5 -1 6 -2 Consecutive Fire on Target +1 (per turn, to +3) New Target (1st Fire) -1 Moving Target (+ 6 inches) -1 Flank of Line / Enfilade + 1 Head of Column + 1 Infantry in Square Formation + 1 "PointBlank" Fire +2 Target Cover Class: "Soft" EVEN "Medium" -1 "Hard" -2
2 In the space of three hours, assuming the supply was present, a Nofi battery could put out an estimated 1800 cannon-balls. In that same time period, Keegan reports that the 1st Battalion, Inniskilling Fusiliers suffered 61% casualties on the field at Waterloo (305) - effectively ruining the unit. It seems safe to state that the 568 casualties taken by the Fusiliers were not the exclusive property of French artillery.
3 See "In Search of the Realistic Wargame" by Jason Monaghan,
MINIATURE WARGAMES, No. 82, pages 10-12. Such a rule can also slow down the speed of a game however.
4 Grand-tactics and strategy were the 'fields' upon which
maneuver and the breakthroughs occurred. Napoleon's use of the central position is an excellent example of this. Even here, the concern was the assault against a flank or to threaten the line of communication.
5 As Keegan writes, "Battle...is essentially a moral conflict." (296-297)
© Copyright 1996 Hal Thinglum
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