Airborne Forces in The Peru-Ecuador War (Part 1)
Airborne Forces in The Peru-Ecuador War (Part 3)

Nonetheless, it should be noted that while Peru's technical development of a force Of paratroopers may be attributed to the ltalians, the inspiration for their use may have come from the spectacular success of German airborne forces during the beginning of the Second World War. Prior to the outbreak of serious fighting between Ecuador and Peru in July of 1941, German 'Fallschirmjagers' (paratroopers) had been employed in the invasions of Norway (April 1940), Holland (May 1940) and the Greek island of Crete (May 1941) (Gregory 1979). By contrast, the Italians only conducted a modest airborne assault on the Greek island of Cephalonia in April, 1941 (Gregory 1979. 54; Lundari 1989, 92).

In addition, the employment the German General W. Faupel in 1935 as a Military Advisor of Peru's 'Escuela Superior de Guerra' (Higher War College) may have also had some bearing on the use of airborne forces. General Eloy G. Ureta, who served as the overall commander of the forces on the Zarumilla Front was also the forrner director of the Escuela Superior de Guerra. The Escuela paid particular attention to the problems presented by the border with Ecuador along the Zarumilla River, Gen. Ureta himself visiting this area in connection with a study commissioned by the Minister of War in 1936. In his autobiography, Gen. Ureta even stated "The conflict of 1941, especially on the Zarumilla River, was won in the classrooms of the Escuela Superior de Guerra" (Wood 1978, 66).

Whatever the origins of Peru's airborne forces, they were available for the build up on the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border which occurred between late 1940 and early 1941. As noted above, considerable attention was paid to the military situation along the Zarumilla in the 1930s, which included the building and improvement of barracks and airfields near the border during the late-1930s (Wood 1978, 69). Although build up of Peruvian forces began around October or November of 1940, the 105th Transport Squadron (presumably with the paratrooper unit) appears to have remained at Chiclayo until transferred to the airfield at Tumbes in January, 1941 (Megee 1942, 7; Zook 1964, 159; English 1984, 375; English 1991, 2-3).

This corresponds with President Manuel Prado's authorisation of the formation of the 'Agrupamiento del Norte' (Northern Group or Front) under the command of Gen. Eloy G. Ureta on 11 January (Wood 1978, 75).

At his headquarters in Tumbes, twenty kilometres from the border, Gen. Ureta wielded full control of all land, air, and naval forces in the Zarumilla Theatre of operations (Megee 1942, 7). His stated intentions were to push Ecuadorian forces out of what was identified as Peruvian territory and, "if circumstances are favourable, he [the Ecuadorians] should be pursued into his own territory in order to reach and hold bases of strategic value which would facilitate future operations" (Wood 1978, 76-77).

Outbreak of Fighting

The first major outbreak of fighting along the Zarumilla River occurred between 5-7 July, during which fire was exchanged, including the use of Peruvian artillery and fighter-bombers. The principle action of the war, however, began sixteen days later, on 23 July. Within two days Peruvian troops had overrun the Ecuadorian outposts along the Zarumilla (Wood 1978, 105). Gen. Ureta, however, was concerned that the Ecuadorian forces might succeed in regrouping at Arenillas the railhead behind the Zarumilla from which the Ecuadorian outposts had been supplied.

On 24 July Gen. Ureta received instructions from the Minister of War that he should "finish mopping up operations" and that "Your outstanding action, and the confidence the government has in your leadership, give you freedom of manoeuvre" (Wood 1978, 106). Having been given complete freedom of action, Gen. Ureta decided to isolate Arenillas by seizing the vital road and rail terminals to its rear, including Santa Rosa, Machala, and Puerto Bolivar (Wood 1978, 106).

The Air Force, however, was not entirely pleased with Gen. Ureta's handling of their forces. During the push across the Zarumilla on the 23 July, fighter-bombers had been used to strike at Ecuadorian outposts along the front line. Because of a low ceiling, the aircraft had been forced to fly dangerously close to the ground, resulting in the loss of one Northrop NA-SOA fighter bomber to enemy fire (Megee 1942, 7). Shortly afterwards Col Cesar Alvarez Guerrero and an Air Force Staff was dispatched to Talara to assist Gen. Ureta in the use of the air elements of the Agrupamiento del Norte (Megee 1942 7; Zook 1964, 178).

It is not clear who conceived of the use of airborne troops to seize control of Santa Rosa and Machala. However, it appears that the paratroop drop on Puerto Bolivar was planned by Col Guerrero of the Air Force and Col Luis Vinatea, commander of the Primera Division Ligera (1st Light Division) and subsequently approved by Gen. Ureta (Arana 1969, 254).

Air Mobile

Coming in low from the South, a group of Northrop NA-50A fighter-bombers from the 'XXI Escuadron de Caza' (21 st Fighter Squadron) appeared in the skies over the town of Santa Rosa at 11:45 on 31 July (Adrian English incorrectly identifies the date of the airborne operations as 27 July) (Arana 1969, 255; English 1984, 375; English 1991, 3). As the fighter-bombers strafed and bombed ground targets, five Caproni CA 111 transports from the 105th Transport Squadron landed at Santa Rosa's airfield and discharged their cargo of infantry from the 1st Infantry Battalion of the 1st Light Division (Megee 1942, 8, 63; Zook 1964, 183). Apparently there was little or no resistance encountered in the town, so that the Peruvian Infantry, armed with Mauser rifles and Thompson submachine guns, rounded up ten Ecuadorian soldiers armed with rifles and one machine gun (Megee 1942, 8; Arana 1969, 249, 255; Wood 1978, 93; English 1984, 376).

Earlier that day Peruvian troops had reached Arenillas and were driving northwards towards Santa Rosa. On the south side of the town the air landed troops met an officer and two cavalrymen, the vanguard of a motorised column that would link up with the men in Santa Rosa (Zook 1964, 183; Arana 1969, 250). However, six other Ecuadorian troops, equipped with a single machine gun, barred the road to Machala (Arana 1969, 250).

Repeat Air Landing

Whether because of this, or through prior arrangement, the air landing at Santa Rosa was repeated at Machala. Flying low and following the railroad from Santa Rosa, the Caproni transports touched down on the dry lake bed that served as Machala's airfield at 15:00 (Megee 1942 8, 63; Zook 1964, 183; Arana 1969, 255). One Peruvian soldier may have been killed in securing Machala, but the town was soon in their hands (Megee 1942, 63). The air landed force consisted of an Army detachment responsible for securing the town and an Air Force detachment that was to link up with the airborne force that was to be dropped on Puerto Bolivar, the next and last target of the Peruvian airborne 'blitzkrieg' (Arana 1969, 255).

Since there were no overland communications with the rest of Ecuador, Puerto Bolivar was the only source of supplies and reinforcements open to the Ecuadorian troops on the Zarumilla Front. Peruvian Naval Forces had established a blockade by patrolling the lambeli channel which gave Puerto Bolivar access to the sea They may have even bombarded the port (Zook 1964, 183; Arana 1969, 227). The lack of an air field, however, meant that paratroopers would have to be employed to capture the town.

At least one of the Caproni transports at Machala returned to Tumbes to pick up a detachment of 'paracaidistas' (paratroopers) under the command of Adolfo Granadino Gamarra (Megee 1942, 63; Arana 1969, 254). At 16:40 the transport(s) took off, landing at Machala at 17:00 where Gamarra received his final instructions (Arana 1969, 252). Lt.-Col. Megee's account of the drop on Puerto Bolivar is worth quoting in full:

"The plaza at Puerto Bolivar was of the usual square block size. There was a thin ring of straggling thatch-roofed houses, the railroad station, and the dock. On three sides the jungle crowded close to the town: the fourth side was water. On the dock was a pair of 20 mm Breda [anti-aircraft] guns, supposedly manned. On the railroad sat three freight cars packed with a variety of military equipment.

At 5:30 PM there was a sudden roar of motors, a rattle of machine gun fire as the attack planes flashed overhead. The section of lumbering Capronis droned over the village at less than a thousand feet. Parachutes suddenly blossomed, settled into the plaza with their wriggling cargoes. Again a few shots and the Peruvian air landing force had the situation well in hand. One parachutist stuck halfway through a thatch roof and had to be pulled out otherwise there were no casualties. The garrison was captured intact - one sergeant, one corporal and four guardia civil (Megee 1942, 63).

Other sources state that the drop occurred at 17:45 and, although it was intended that the paratroopers should jump at 650 meters, the transport(s) had to descend to 400 meters because of a low ceiling (Arana 1969, 249, 253). Unfortunately, neither the number of transports nor the size of the paratrooper detachment is entirely clear. Two photographs of the 'Seccion de Paracaidistas' from one source show twenty-one men, while a third photo may show up to forty-five men (presumably these photographs, like the others in this book, were taken at Tumbes during the war) (Arana 1969, 357).

Lt.-Col. Megee estimated that between twenty and thirty men were employed, though the figure may actually be as low as seven (it should be noted that the Caproni CA 111 transport was a relatively small aircraft) (Megee 1942, 63; Arana 1969, 254).

(to be continued)

Other Installments

Airborne Forces in The Peru-Ecuador War (Part 1)
Airborne Forces in The Peru-Ecuador War (Part 3)

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