The EE&L Staff will be happy to answer questions related to their area of expertise. Please send your questions, comments, or answers on uniforms, tactics, and other subjects to the Editor Jean Lochet, 4 Kelly St. Metuchen, NJ 08840, USA. This offer is for subscribers to the printed version--RL In EE&L 13, Question 13-1, which is repeated below, was sent to Philip Haythornthwaite for clarification and we are happy to publish his answer. The Regiment of Nassau-Oranien entered into the service of the Kingdom of the Neterlands on November 8th, 1814, and it was numbered as the 28th regiment in 1815. What was the uniform of this regiment when it fought at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo? According to the the Osprey Men-At-Arms #98, page 20, "it wore the Nassau army uniform of shako (but with crowned 'W' in brass on the front) with orange cockade, dark green coat, with black collar and cuffs and yellow buttons and piping; dark green trousers; white belts, and black gaiters." In the Osprey Men-At-Arms #43, page 27, it says, "The Regiment Oranien-Nassau, like the 2nd Nassau Regiment, had been taken into Dutch service for six years from 8 November 1814. Even so, the Regiment Oranien-Nassau also wore Dutch uniforms." According to The Napoleonic Source Book by Philip J. Haythornthwaite, page 243, "The Nassau regiments retained their green uniforms worn under the Confedaration of the Rhine." According to the book Waterloo New Perspectives by David Hamilton-Williams, page 341, "The 28th Netherlands Line Regiment, were dressed in blue coats, grey trousers and white belting." As it can be seen, I am having troubles determining which uniform the Nassau-Oranien wore, or if the regiment changed over to the Dutch uniform before the Waterloo Campaign. ANSWER TO QUESTION 13-1: Uniforms of the Nassau regiments at Waterloo by Philip Haythornthwaite The confusion which has arisen here may well result from the designation of the various units with a Nassau connection. The 1st and 2nd Nassau Regiments, which were not integrated into the line infantry of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but retained their own designation, they did retain the green uniforms as worn when serving with the Confederation of the Rhine. The "Regiment of Nassau-Oranien", however, was a rather different case, in that it was incorporated into the Netherlands line with the number 28th, as stated in the question. Confusingly, it was sometimes referred to by its title rather than the number (for example, in William Siborne's History of the Waterloo Campaign it appears as the "Regiment of Orange Nassau" (1844 edn. II p.518; 1848 edn. pp. 531, 576. However, despite this emphasis upon the Nassau identity of the regiment, it does appear to have worn the ordinary infantry uniform at Waterloo, the blue with grey trousers and white belts described by David Hamilton-Williams in Waterloo: New Perspectives. On the color of horses in French cavalry. Some of our wargamers argue that horses of a same color were segregated in a given regiment. Is it true? ANSWER TO QUESTION 15-1: In the line cavalry, the horses of the same color were segregated in the squadrons. For instance, Parquin in Charles Parquin, Napoleon's Army 1969 reprint by Logman, p. 4, says: "The regiment had the most beautiful horses. The first squadron had black horses, the second bay, the third chestnut, the fourth, the trumpeters and the band had grey horses." The practice was standard in the French line cavalry as confirmed by other sources. The practice was not followed by the Guard cavalry. The Grenadiers à cheval were mounted on black horses, the Chasseurs à cheval had bay and chestnut horses, the Chevau-légers, chestnut, bay, black and dark grey horses. (ref. Anatomy of Glory. The trumpeters were also mounting greys) How was the artillery deployed in an Austrian cavalry regiment? ANSWER TO QUESTION 15-2: The Austrian artillery had no true horse artillery but "cavalry batteries" in which the artillerists were riding on a padded seat (the "wurst") located on top of the gun carriage as shown on the drawing. These "cavalry batteries" were deployed between a cavalry regiment's second and third squadrons as shown on the diagram below.
QUESTION 15-3: How was the Austrian artillery deployed after the reforms of 1809? ANSWER TO QUESTION 15-3: The regimental artillery was eliminated by the reforms of 1809 and the guns consolidated into two types of field batteries, the "brigade batteries" each of 8 3-pdr or 6-pdrs and the position batteries of 4 6-pdr or 12-pdr and 2 howitzers each. The deployment of batteries or artillery companies depended on the poundage and designation. The 3-pdr "brigade batteries" were placed beside the 2nd regiment of the brigade. 6-pdr "brigade batteries" were sited anywhere along the front of the brigade, usually in between battalions. The remainder of the artillery, the 6-pdr and 12-pdr "position batteries", either were in the Corps reserve or allocated to the Divisions. In the later case, the "position battery" was usually deployed next to the regimental standards of the units which occupied the front line. (Sources, Bowden and Tarbox, Armies on the Danube, 1809, EHQ, Chicago, 1989, p. 24. using data from official Austrian Archives.) In 1789, the French Royal Army included 26 regiments of cavalry of the line (including 2 of carabiniers), 18 of Dragoons, 6 of Hussars, and 12 of Chasseurs a Cheval. Several sources mention that the rate of emigration of the officers was the greatest among the cavalry regiments. Some other disagree. Do you have any information to give us some idea on the magnitude of the emigration in the cavalry and on its effect on the military values of the cavalry regiments? PARTIAL ANSWER TO QUESTION 115-1: We only have some sketchy information on the rate of the officers emigration in the cavalry. We can only say that it was significant. We are aware that 2 full regiments, the 4th (Saxe) Hussars and the 15th Cavalry (Royal Allemand) went over to the enemy in 1792. The Historique du 7e regiment de dragons, Paris, 1909 (Regimental History of 7th Dragoons) reports a number of pertinent events:
No less than 16 officers disturbed by the political events had resigned their commission. Others, on leave, did not rejoin the regiment and were replaced. The situation is well illustrated by the officer list of July 1791 and August 1792. During the same period no less than 5 colonels, in succession, became commander of the regiment mostly because they were promoted, giving us a hint that promotion was quick because of the emigration of many superior officers. (No less than 493 generals emigrated or were dismissed from the French army in 1791-92.)
All the officers on the July 1791 list marked with a (D) resigned their commission ((D) is for demissionaire, (officer that resigned). The names of the officers in italics on the list of July 1791, beside the Quartermaster De Montjallard, are the only ones found on the officers list of August 1792. Only 6 of the subaltern of ficers (below the grade of Major) on a total of 24 remained on that list. So 75% of these officers emigrated, deserted or resigned their commissions. None of the captains on the list of 1791 remained with the regiment in August 1792. They were replaced by the promotion to captain of 1 lieutenant Burgairolles) and 2 second lieutenants (Lavolaine and Laveran). Definitely it was a quick promotion for the second lieutenants. 3 other second lieutenants (Delisle, Martin and Didon were promotted to first lieutenant. In addition, none of the original second lieutenants are found on the 1792 list. The new second lieutenants were probably part promoted NCOs and of part transfers from other regiments. Did other officers emigrate after August 1792. Probably, but the Regimental History is mute on the matter beside that Colonel d'Averhoult tried to emigrate in 1793 but was caught during his attempt and shot himself to avoid capture. Were there others? Probably. What was the effect of that almost complete officer turnover on the military value of the regiment? We frankly have no hard data on the subject. We are reduced to conjecture. But it was probably bad, especially at a time when the Revolutionary Clubs openly instigated the rank and file to disobey orders. The result was a break down in discipline and unit readiness. The defection of the Colonel in 1793 certainly affected the 7th Dragoons' morale and increased the suspicion of the troopers toward their offficers. All we can say is that the regiment was transferred to Lafayette's army in 1792 and, from the reports of the Regimental History, the regiment performances were average. After 1792, the regiment performances improved drastically. Was the rate of emigration in the other cavalry regiments similar to that of the 7th Dragoons? Probably but that is also conjecture. Our opinion is that most cavalry regiments, in to 1792-93, were affected to some degree by the emigration of officers and the quick promotion that followed to fill up the vacancies. The temporary lack of discipline affected the steadiness of many cavalry regiments as it will be seen below. That state of affairs was also common in the infantry but the cavalry was not flooded by volunteers like the infantry was. Only the artillery remained untouched by the Revolution and kept its traditional high standard. The Wars of the Revolution started on April 20, 1792 after the French assembly declared war on Austria. The campaign was to be open by the invasion of Belgium. Marshal de Rochambeau, the well known commander of the French expeditionary force during the War of the American Revolution, now commander of the Army of the North, disagreed on launching an offensive on the ground that his troops - mostly regulars - were too green and too unsteady for such operations. He recommended remaining on the defensive until the troops were more battle ready. He was overruled and the badly organized operation took place with forces much too weak with too many volunteer battalions still poorly trained and with too few trained cadres. On April 29, 1792, two columns starting fmm Lille and Valenciennes panicked at the view of the enemy and muted. Phipps, in his very reliable The Armies of the French Revolution, (2. The Armies of the First French Republic. Vol. 1, p. 91,) relates the routing of the 3rd columns:
The rout was initiated by a panic that developed in the cavalry part of the regular army! Then, the rest of Biron's command - regular as well as volunteers - bolted. The steadiness of the regulars and volunteers improved rapidly as early as 1793 and we should cover the subject at length in a future issue. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 3 No. 1 © Copyright 1996 by Jean Lochet This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |