As in Crisis on the Danube, Jim did an excellent job of research preparation. In his coverage of the campaign that followed the retreat of the Austrian Army after its initial fruitless campaign on the upper Danube, he very carefully uses documents from both sides. That gives a very objective account of what took place on the battlefields of Aspern-Essling and Wagram and debunks a few myths, such as the French tradition of blaming the Saxons for the setback of the French center at Wagram. The fact is that Wagram was a very hard fought battle and a narrow victory for the French.

We are presented at Aspern-Essling with a Napoleon that forgot some of his own basic principles and rushed into a battle before he concentrated his forces, before he had secured his bridges and before he had accumulated enough provisions and ammunition. It was a recipe for disaster. After his bridges were broken by the combination of the mighty Danube and Austrian fireships, Napoleon could not receive his expected reinforcements and was severed from his ammunition supply. The result was the Emperor's first defeat that demolished the myth of Napoleon invincibility.

Then, we see a Napoleon obviously learning from his mistake. He organizes Lobau Island, concentrates his army and secures his logistical situation for the second crossing of the Danube by his Army of Germany and the resulting costly battle of Wagram.

What the Archduke Charles did at Aspern-Essling and Wagram is also very well and very objectively covered. At Wagram, we find Charles with a very bold battle plan that took Napoleon by surprise on three different occasions and somewhat upset his battle plans. We are also presented with a clear picture of the fighting ability of the new Austrian war machine. Charles recommended the bataillonsmasse as the main battle formation and the deployment of the troops in two lines. That practice, not new in itself but well applied, repeatedly dislocated numerous French attacks. Time and again, French attacks overcame the Austrian first line only to find an intact second line ready to fight or counterattack.

Of course, we all know that Napoleon's famous grand battery broke the Austrian center with the concentration of fire by its 112 guns. Then the advance of Davout, Macdonald and the others did the rest and Charles had no choice but to order a retreat. The retreat was an orderly one and the French, exhausted by the long hours of combat, followed rather than pursued the defeated Austrians.

The losses at Wagram were frightful for both sides because of the ravages caused by the artillery of both sides. In fact, Wagram opened a new era in the art of warfare.

During all this time, Napoleon still found the time to run his Empire.

All these subjects are well covered in an objective manner by using sources from both sides. I highly recommend Jim's new book as a must for anyone interested in the Campaign of 1809 and the art of Napoleonic warfare. It is one of the most readable and objective works I have read in a long time. It is published by Praeger of Westport, Connecticut. The price is $49.95.

The book subjects include: Introduction; Strategic Delusion; The Armies of 1809; Day of Battle; "A Combat of Giants"; Tour d'Horizon; In Flank and in Rear; In Search of Battle; The Killing Ground; The Spoils of War; An End to Glory; Notes and Bibliography.

If you don't find the book in your bookstore, it can be ordered with a credit card by calling 1-800-225-5800.

Other Book Reviews:

Historical Description of the Clothing and Arms of the Russian Army, Vol 10a (Organization) & 10b (Uniforms)
Napoleon and the Grand Army in Russia (excerpt only)

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