Note from the EE&L Staff: We have long professed that, on many occasions, a battle is lost because of faulty initial dispositions and deployment. What follows is an excellent example of that contention.

The fictional battle of Mirkovo takes place during the invasion of Russia in 1812.

Map of Battlefield Terrain (big)

A Russian Provisional Corps under General Popov is the vanguard of a much larger force following one day's march behind. Popov's mission is to secure the road to Smolensk via Mirkovo and hold it to assure the passage of the force following him. At noon, his cavalry reached Mirkovo and spotted an important French force whose vanguard had reached Jakovo. Popov is disturbed by that news as he planned to spend the night in the comfortable Tambovo estate, home of a friend of his, Prince Dokorov. "Well, c'est la guerre!" he asserted to his aide as the cavalry courier finished his report. But, comfort apart, the situation was serious and he now had to secure a wide front as well as his line of retreat to the east. Securing Ozerska was out of the question, at least for the moment, but he had to hold the south road through the Fatova wood down through Mirkovo and on to Jokodetchna.

The Russian vanguard (First Division) under General Docturov reached point A on the road Jokodetchna to Mirkovo and cavalry vedettes fanned out to the east and northeast. Popov immediately issuedorders to his vanguard to occupy a position as far north as possible of Mirkovo.

Aware of the Russian presence around Jokodetchna at noon, Davout, who has been ordered to capture the south road through the Fatova wood to Smolensk as the other road to Smolensk via Ozerska was impassable (a key bridge had been destroyed by the retreating Russians), sent some cavalry patrols to locate the Russians. Without further delay, he advanced three of his infantry brigades through the center gap between the Jaroslova woods (see points 1, 2 and 3 on the map) and the Jakovo woods and a fourth brigade through the road to Jokodetchna between the Malovo woods and the Jaroslova woods (point 4). The fifth brigade and the artillery reserve remained in reserve around Jakovo to seize the road in the vicinity of Mirkovo and Mirkovo Hill.

Duhesme's Division was to cover Friant's right and support him. Friant's left and front was screened by the light cavalry.

The Battle

The French cavalry soon encountered their Russian counterparts in the gap between the Mirkovo wood and Fatova hill. Friant's 1st brigade advanced in support behind the cavalry. The Russian cavalry began to work its way around the French left flank and was countered by the French cavalry. By 12:30, both units maneuvered their way off the battlefield.

Some 10 minutes after noon, Duhesme's 2nd brigade (the French right column) spotted an important Russian infantry force supported by numerous artillery deployed (on line 4) between the Jokodetchna Hill and the Jokodetchna woods. Meanwhile, Friant's 1st brigade prepared to assault Mirkovo wood, his 2nd brigade seized the Tambovo estate unopposed and Duhesme's 1st brigade closed the gap between Friant and his 2nd brigade on the right.

At 12:20, on Davout's order, Duhesme's entire Division deployed on two lines on line 5 (each brigade had three battalions in the first line and two battalions on the second line) protecting Friant's right until further orders. Friant's two brigades in the center continued their march forward and to their great surprise, occupied Saskovo Hill (2nd brigade) and the Mirkovo woods (1st brigade) completely unopposed. Friant's 3rd brigade and the artillery reserve advanced to the vicinity of the Tambovo estate.

At 12:30, Friant's 2nd brigade had secured Tambovo Hill completely unopposed. From that point, Russian infantry could be seen deployed south of Mirkovo. On the French right, the Russians moved their Division further toward the center (line 5) and deployed their Reserve Artillery on line 6.

At 12:40, the French voltigeurs of the 2nd brigade occupied Mirkovo which was not occupied. The Russians did not make any attempt to dislodge them. At that time, Eugene of Wurttemberg send Davidov's brigade toward Mirkovo.

What was the matter with the Russian vanguard under Doctorov and where was it deployed?

Well, a diligent Russian vanguard commander would have immediately seen the importance of occupying as much defensive ground as possible, that is as much as possible in front of the road to be defended. He would have quickly occupied the Mirkovo woods with his light troops (four Jaeger battalions) and deployed his line troops on Tambovo Hill, in Mirkovo and on Mirkovo Hill. For some unknown reason, he deployed his troops on lines 10, 11 and 12, placing his four Jaeger battalions in the woods on Fatova Hill. [1]

At 12:50, an aggressive French 2nd brigade reinforced the voltigeurs in Mirkovo and occupied the buildings to repulse any Russian counterattack. Olssufiev's brigade (four battalions) withdrew and could be clearly seen deploying behind the road it was supposed to hold. Eugene deployed Davidov's brigade on line 14. Davout, in consultation with Friant and his brigadier, orders the Reserve Artillery positions in support of Friant's 2nd brigade. From then on, decisive events are going to quickly develop.

13:00: The French Reserve Artillery deployed its two artillery batteries which open fire on Davidov's command. Two French battalions from Friant's 1st Brigade occupy the edge of Fatova Hill and prepare to attack.

13:10: The French attack the woods on the Fatova Hill where they encounter the 42nd Jaegers (two battalions). After a 30-minute combat, they were defeated by the Jaegers (minor defeat). The Russian Jaegers remained in the woods.

13:20: A single French battalion from the 1st brigade, supported by another, attacked Mirkovo Hill defended by a single Russian Line battalion, which after a brief 10-minute combat, suffers a major defeat and is routed.

13:30: Three companies of French skirmishers engaged the four Russian battalions deployed on line 12.

13:40: The Russian finally deploy their Artillery Reserve (three batteries) in front of Davidov's brigade and counterbattery at long range the French Reserve Artillery batteries deployed between Tambovo Hill and Mirkovo. The French artillery does the same but long range counter-battery fire is not very efficient and not much is achieved by either side. At the same time, the supporting French battalion of the 1st Brigade passes through its victorious comrades and attacks a single Russian battalion at point 15. After a furious short combat (10 minutes), it routs it. The 2nd Russian line (two battalions) after witnessing the successive routing of two battalions and certainly impressed by the overwhelming number of French battalions deployed before them on Mirkovo Hill and to their front also rout and take to their heels toward Smolensk.

Thus, at 13:50, the road to Smolensk had been cut off by the French. By looking at the tactical situation, it was agreed by both parties that the Russians were now split into two commands. [2] Because of the tactical situation, the Russians were found highly unlikely to reopen the road during the remaining time and the battle was ended as a French victory.

Analysis of the battle

The French were very aggressive and fought a flawless and very well coordinated battle.

It was not the case for the Russians. Granted, they had to fight a difficult battle but so did the French. Once the deployment of the Russian vanguard was botched up the way it was and once it gave up the ground in front of Mirkovo without a fight, placing its four Jaeger battalions (a third of the vanguard forces) in a position that could have been held by a single battalion, the vanguard Division was in a precarious situation. Furthermore, Eugene, by deploying his twelve battalions and his three batteries of the Reserve in the plain, left a large gap between his command and the vanguard. At 13:30, Eugene finally decided to correct the situation by deploying a brigade and his artillery reserve at 14. But it was too late and irremediable damage had been done.

The French and Russian cavalries watched each other and were not engaged.

Basically, the Russians lacked coordination. The Russian commander should have been in charge but he was not. Furthermore, the Russians had an artillery superiority (they did not use their artillery efficiently), an excellent defensive position, but like their artillery they did not use it, and had a complete misunderstanding of what their mission was all about.

What should they have done? That is simple:

(1) The Vanguard should have tried to occupy the Mirkovo woods or at least contested it with its Jaegers.

(2) A line brigade should have deployed behind the woods [3] while the other line brigade should have deployed somewhere between Mirkovo Hill and Fatova Hill.

(3) Eugene should have held Tambovo Hill with a brigade and deployed his artillery reserve there. The rest of his command could have been deployed either in the plain (with his cavalry) or along the excellent defensive position on the ridge line in the front of the road from Jokodetchna to Mirkovo.

It would have been a hard battle but the Russians could have held the road until night fall.

Conclusion

Our conclusion is not different from our introductory note: We have long professed that a battle is often lost because of faulty initial dispositions and deployment.

The forces at Mirkovo:

(1) French forces:

Friant's Division of three infantry brigades and Duhesme's Division of two infantry brigades. Each brigade consisted of five battalions and one artillery battery (6-pdr, foot or horse).

Artillery Reserve: two 12-pdr batteries.

Cavalry: two Light regiments totaling eight squadrons (no artillery).

(2) Russian forces:

Two Divisions each of three infantry brigades. In each Division, one brigade had four Jaeger battalions (no artillery) and the two line infantry brigades each consisting of four battalions and one artillery battery (6-pdr).

Artillery Reserve: two 12-pdr batteries and a 6-pdr battery.

Cavalry: eight squadrons of light cavalry (no artillery).

[1] After the battle, the Russian vanguard commander declared that he did not want to get sucked into a bloodbath in Mirkovo. Yet holding Mirkovo was imperative [2] The Russian right command now included eight battalions and one artillery battery and the cavalry. Among these eight battalions, four had been routed and consequently were of doubtful value. In addition, they would be unable to coordinate their movement with Eugene of Wurttemberg's command. Eugene's Division (twelve battalions) and the 3rd brigade (four battalions) of the Vanguard were virtually intact but obviously they were at a tactical disadvantage and not numerous enough to reopen the road. [3] That brigade was in a reserve mode and could have counterattacked any French breakthrough either on its right, center or left.