Note from the Editor:

From time to time EE&L will publish articles covering the Wars of Frederick the Great, since they increase our understanding of the tactics used during the Wars of the Revolution and of the Empire. Note that Frederick's oblique order and oblique attack were used by the Prussian army during the Campaign of 1806.

I read with considerable interest the article on Frederick's Oblique Order by Marc Raiff in EE&L#4. I agree with Paddy Griffith and Christopher Duffy about the importance of studying eighteenth century strategy, tactics, etc., in order to better understand Napoleonic warfare.

Mr. Raiff's article is an extremely helpful effort toward a better understanding of the roots of Napoleonic warfare. I must, however, quibble with a few points in the article. While Mr. Raiff certainly has a working grasp of the nature of Frederick's Oblique Order, there are certain things that perhaps may be expounded. He rightly points out that Frederick's Oblique Order represented a rejection of the then common "attack along the entire front." This points to the heart of the issue of Frederick's Oblique Order and its uses, as the following will show. However, there are a few issues that first bear clarification.

Unfortunately, many people are somewhat confused about just exactly what the Oblique Order is, and how it differs from and works with other aspects of Frederick's tactics. This article will to try make these distinctions a little more clear, although, as the history of Frederickian warfare is no less contentious than the Napoleonic, others will no doubt have perspectives differing from my own.

Part of the confusion about Frederick's tactics stems in part from semantics. Frederick's system is often described as an "oblique attack," implying that it was essentially a system of advance upon the enemy. The EE&L #4 article tends to follow this lead, describing "the grand tactical ploy of Frederick's 'oblique attack' (as consisting) of two techniques: "march by lines" and "attack in echelon."

It is important to realize the distinction between the term Oblique Order and the oblique attack. (This may initially sound trifling, but it is absolutely essential to an understanding of Frederick's tactics.) Frederick himself refers in his writings to "my oblique order of battle" in many places. An order of battle in the eighteenth century was a schematic listing of the units of an army in the order of their deployment for battle. Because deployment touched upon the honor and prerogative of regiments and their commanders, staff officers drew up orders of battle to assign each unit a place in the battlefield deployment commensurate with its prestige or lineage, as well as its function. So, the oblique order of battle was the arranging of units in a certain fashion upon the battlefield. Thus, an oblique attack is made in an oblique order of battle. (Originally this involved withholding an entire wing of an army but was later refined to employ a deployment of battalions en echelon.)

This point may seem obvious enough, but much of the misperception about Frederick's Oblique Order stems from a confusion about the distinction between an arrangement of units within a deployment and the place of deployment and subsequent axis of advance. In other words, the Oblique Order is not synonymous with a flank attack.

A further word about flanks may be in order here. Anyone familiar with military history knows the importance of flanks. Frederick himself writes, "It is axoimatic that you must secure your own flanks and rear, and turn those of the enemy." [1]

This was particularly true in Frederick's time. Armies in the eighteenth century were brittle instruments. Infantry battalions had evolved into walking batteries whose function was largely to bring the highest volume of fire possible upon the enemy. This is why Prussians were extensively drilled to fire quickly. Frederick toyed with the idea of advancing his infantry without firing, but he gave this up as too expensive in manpower and impossible to achieve in the face of a steady enemy, especially artillery.

Because of the growing emphasis on firepower, units in the latter seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries gradually were "flattened." The number of ranks dropped from twelve or more in the early Thirty Years War to six, then to four, and eventually to three by the time of the Seven Years War. (Some armies may have persisted with four ranks, notably the Russians.) As this trend continued, a unit's maneuvering flexibility declined and its flanks became more vulnerable. In the early Thirty Years War it was not uncommon for a unit's depth to equal its breadth, and units (the tercio, for example) were able to defend themselves from attacks on any side.

As a result of "flatter" units, generals adapted their deployments and maneuver to maintain the security of their armies' flanks. Hence came the rise of long lines of units, each itself in line, with small intervals between units. Cavalry units, infantry units deployed in squares or at right angles to the front, and terrain features were used on the extreme flanks to provide security for the flanks of the army itself. (Frederick was a strong advocate of the use of terrain to secure a flank, and we see this legacy in the Prussian army of 1806.) The army had to " attack along the entire front, " because an advance by only part of an army would expose those units to being flanked. But a simultaneous advance with one's entire army risked total defeat, since the bulk of the army was committed to battle and beyond the commander's control.

One expedient was the use of reserves. Reserves at this time were often a "third line" or other such body deployed in the rear. In the event of defeat, this force would plug any gaping holes that occurred and would form the rearguard to protect their fleeing comrades. The idea of using reserves as a masse de rupture in the Napoleonic sense was virtually unknown. Since the army already was deployed in line without usable intervals, there was no place for such a reserve to deploy and strike. (Hohenfriedsberg is an exception to this and occurred because the 6th Prussian Dragoons were deployed in the middle of the Prussian lines rather than on a flank, as was custom.) Likewise, to disengage a portion of one's army to make way for such an attack again risked exposing the flanks of remaining units in the front line.

This was the dilemma facing eighteenth century tacticians. Viewed from this perspective, Frederick's solution seems all the more ingenious. His system allowed a commander to commit a portion of his forces, keeping the bulk of the army out of the canister range of enemy artillery, while not exposing the flanks of his advance elements. The withheld portions then could exploit a victory or cover the withdrawal if the advance elements were defeated. This technique neatly meets the requirements of Frederick's above mentioned axiom. Since the bulk of the army is kept in reserve until a decision is clear, it also lessens the requirement for a "third line" of reserves, which the smaller Prussian armies could ill afford.