Wargamers often split on the question of 'national characteristics' or national differences and how to define those differences. This article suggests they should be defined and allowed for in wargames rules.

A 'national' characteristic is, by definition, one that is present inherently in the whole people of a nation (or at least the vast majority) and not just those who have joined the army. We may expect to find such a characteristic manifesting itself in the behaviour of the civilian population of the country to which the army belongs. Therefore such 'characteristics' as 'the British prefering to fight on the defensive' and 'the French prefering to be in column' must be wrong since, if they were 'national characteristics', groups of British and French people not belonging to the army would also habitually form lines and columns respectively.

Yet the British did spend much of their time on the battlefield in line, and the French spent the greater part of their time in column. If these were not 'national' characteristics, what were they?

A characteristic which is commonly present in the operations of bodies of troops, but which they would not adhere to if they were not in the army, would more correctly be defined as a 'military' or 'operational' characteristics, or even military or operational doctrine (the two terms not meaning the same thing).

An operational 'characteristic' is a habitual practice adopted by an army as a result of operational necessity. An operational 'doctrine' is a method of waging war employed by an army because its leaders think it superior to other methods and have, therefore, prescribed its use.

In wargaming terms, before we allow any effect, be it physical or moral, to accrue to a factor which was present in one army of the period in a greater degree than in others we must satisfy ourselves that it comes within the definitions of a 'national characteristic' or an 'operational doctrine'. We should not allow for factors which would correctly come under the heading of 'operational characteristics' because these are factors that are brought about because of the military situation facing the army, and which will be abandoned in preference for others should the situation change.

British Lines vs. French Columns

Returning to the question of British lines and French columns, we can see from the above definitions that these fall into the category of operational characteristics. For the majority of the time that he commanded the British and Allied forces during the Napoleonic wars in Europe, the Duke of Wellington was faced with superior numbers of enemy in total, and could not afford to lose troops owing to the difficulties he had in obtaining replacements.

Being on the strategic defensive compelled him to operate defensively, when the correct formation was the line. That the British troops (like all troops confident in their ability to defeat the enemy) would have preferred to attack- and made a good job of it when circumstances allowed their commander to 'let them off the leash' - is evidenced from the primary evidence available to us.

Similarly, it was no inherent preference for the column that caused French troops to employ it so often. Their commanders (and particularly their commander-in-chief) made a practice of taking the initiative, attacking their opponents coupled with the fact that they could generally rely on superior numbers at the decisive point caused them to employ formations designed for movement. They could, and did, when the situation demanded it, employ the line with equal ability to their foes.

Temper and Temperment

If there is any justification for allowing for different 'national characteristics' between, say, the French and the British troops, this would have to be based on a difference in temperment between the nations. Thus, if it is accepted, for example, that the French are generally a more volatile people than the British it would be proper to depict this in our morale rules. Emotionally volatile people are more likely to be affected both by success and defeat (or apparent defeat) than those of a more sombre temperament, and our morale rules should reflect such a situation by making it easier for troops from such a nation to become over-confident or to break.

As an example of how this factor may be allowed for without attaching it to specific formations, those readers familiar with the author's article on 'The Moral Battle' will remember that his rules employ a 'shaken' band, running from +2 down to -5.

To allow the introduction of 'French volatility', therefore, all that would have to be done would be to make French troops subject to breaking when their score sunk to -3 or-4. At the other end of the scale, with troops liable to over-confidence at 9 or more, the volatility of the French, if it is accepted as a factor by the gamer, could be shown by making French troops over-react on a score of 7 or 8.

There is one very important difference between the system of allowing for what would, correctly, be termed a 'national characteristic' that has been suggested above and those currently used. This is that the 'liability', or 'advantage' if applicable, would apply permanently and not just because the troops were in a particular formation. It is only right, however, that this should be the case if a national characteristic is allowed for.

Allowing for an operational doctrine requires us to 'dictate' to ourselves, often against our better judgement. This, however, is not unrealistic, and indeed is something that frequently happens to officers on the battlefield. It was, for example, operational doctrine in the Russian army for much of the period that the firefight was ineffective (which it was if looked at purely from a physical point of view), and that the bayonet attack was the decisive factor (which it was if effected properly, after the enemy's moral power had been reduced). This led automatically to the almost exclusive use of columns for attacking (as opposed to their use in other armies for movement into fighting range).

As in all armies, tactical thought and forward-thinking was a continuing process in the Russian army - and there were officers who would have disagreed with the operational doctrine that had been laid down by the Army Command, it was not their job to 'do their own thing' in defiance of it- and anyway, their troops would not be trained in different techniques - so that they were faced with no option but to make the best of things until the army's operational doctrine was altered.

Operational Doctrine vs. Operational Characteristics

We have to be very careful to distinguish between operational doctrine and operational characteristics of course. This has to be done by careful consideration of the evidence from the period. Generally, however, operational doctrine is to be found in the instructions for the way that battles are to be fought which were issued by those holding the ultimate authority in the army, such as the 'Yellow Book' issued to Russian Officers.

In general, subordinate commanders were not permitted any significant lassitude in their application of such doctrine -although, as in the case of the French army, where Napoleon did not involve himself in the tactical systems of his corps commanders to any great degree (unless they were blatantly faulty) it was possible for variations in operational doctrine to 'creep in'.

I hope that, from what has been said here, the reader may be able to apply the three definitions in his own rules, and that this may improve the representation of Napoleonic warfare provided by those rules.

I should like to record my gratitude to Ned Zuparko, who has greatly assisted me to clarify my thinking on this subject.

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com